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To my parents, 
Grigorios and Vassiliki, 
Efthyrnios Kermelis and Andrew Louth, 
For the distinctive way they - each of them - have granted Life. 
ph 
Evaggelia Grigoropoulou 
The Early Development of the Thought of Christos Yannaras 
When Personalist theology is not endorsed fully as a valid approach to elucidate our 
understanding of God, man and existence, it is often viewed with feelings that range 
from wonder and scepticism to serious criticism about the weaknesses and 
repercussions that it might have. What is seldom examined, however, are the reasons 
that may give rise to this kind of approach. This is what the present thesis wants to 
shed light on in the case of the personalist philosopher and theologian Christos 
Yannaras. It considers the circumstances that gave shape to his intellectual quests 
even before the start of his career: his involvement in the extra-ecclesiastic 
brotherhood of Zo6, his gradual disillusionment with it and his encounter with certain 
Greek intellectuals. It further looks at the conditions that fostered the particular 
formulation that his theoretical pursuits were to assume, as a result of his own 
engagement in the intellectual ferment of Europe in the 1960s (Chapter I and part of 
Chapter II). In Chapter 11 - as well as in Chapter III (Part 1) - we also follow closely 
the early progress of Christos Yannaras' thought as this is expounded in the two most 
important of his early productions (Heidegger and the Areopagite and Person and 
Eros), in which the course of his thought is already decisively indicated. An 
indication of the grounds in Christian Tradition for a personalist attitude in theology is 
presented in Part 11 of the third Chapter., alongside a short discussion of Yannaras' use 
of patristic quotations. In its last chapter the thesis demonstrates (following The 
Freedom of Morality) the intrinsically practical aspect of Yannaras' theoretical 
positions, as this is revealed in the area of Christian morality. The fundamental 
inspiration of Christos Yannaras' personalist approach with respect to the subject of 
ontology is revealed as a return to the fundamentals of Church life and tradition. 
'... I write this book only to point out a wrong way, 
the way that turns Christ into an idea, a notion, a 
dogma, a morality, a social scheme, and thus leads us 
away from the redemptive meeting with His Person - 
the way of ideology'. 
Christos Yarmaras, Ka-ca0ý6yto'16, -(Dv 
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Christos Yannaras is one of the most eminent thinkers in present-day Greece. A philosopher of 
existentialist inspiration and a theological expositor of what has been characterized as 'Neo- 
orthodoxy', he can still be described as an idiosyncratic example of his genre that rather 
escapes a definite labelling. To the western audience he is mostly known, if at all, as an 
exponent of personalist theology and a strong defender of theological apophaticism, in which 
he sees the counterbalance to the rationalistic corruption of Christian theology. This, in 
Yannaras' view, finds its principal representative in the scholastic systematization of theology 
that took place in the Medieval Latin West, but which, however, in later times gradually 
spread and influenced the theology and the spirituality of Eastern Christendom as well. The 
vehemence of Yannaras' opposition to the theological and intellectual dimensions of Western 
civilization has aroused western discontent and led to his position being dismissed as based on 
sweeping generalization. This anti-western critique, however, Yannaras has turned into self- 
criticism of his own modem Greek identity where he has found cultural and intellectual 
elements of deviation from the Eastern Orthodox- tradition that have caused him to consider 
himself, an eastern European man, as profoundly westernized. ' 
Yannaras has therefore been a vigorous advocate of the philosophical tradition of the 
Greek East, Classical and Byzantine, as this found its fulfilment and expression through the 
theological achievement of the Church Fathers of the Greek East in Christian antiquity and the 
Byzantine period: notably the Cappadocian Fathers, Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus the 
Confessor and Gregory Palamas. Yannaras sees In the Hellenic tradition of both Classical and 
Christian times an underlying principle of apophaticism in the approach to metaphysical 
debate, as a decisive manner for dealing with the questions of ontology and for understanding 
and advancing to the real or the true. This common basis in the Hellenic and Christian 
1 See his introduction to the English translation of 'Opeo6oýia Kai A f5aq a-cý Nc6-cEpq 'EAA66a: 'The critique 
of Western theology and tradition which I offer in this book does not contrast "Western" with something "right" 
which as an Orthodox I use to oppose something "wrong" outside myself. I am not attacking an external Western 
adversary. As a modem Greek, I myself embody both the thirst for what is "right" and the reality of what is 
"wrong": a contradictory and alienated survival of ecclesiastical Orthodoxy in a society radically and unhappily 
Westernized. My critical stance towards the West is self-criticism; it refers to my own wholly Western mode of 
life': Christos Yannaras, Orthodoxy and the West. Hellenic Self-Identity in the Modern Age, trans. Peter 
Chamberas and Norman Russell (Brookline MA: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 2006), pp. xviii-xix. 
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philosophy of the Greek East prevents identification of the real with the formulations used to 
allude to it and gives precedence to an experiential substantiation of what is proposed as the 
existent, inviting in this way to a communal partaking and validation in the search for and 
description of the real. 
Yannaras was enormously inspired by existentialist philosophy especially as this was 
voiced by Heidegger, in whom Yannaras identified a kind of modem reiteration of the 
fundamental measures for doing ontology, as the latter found expression in the 
accomplishment of the synthesis of the Christian faith with the Hellenic philosophical tradition 
in the Greek patristic heritage. Consequently, Yannaras did not hesitate to adopt existentialist 
language and apply existentialist terms in his attempt to give a contemporary expression to the 
ontological principles put forward by the Greek Fathers. This in effect gives Yannaras' work 
its distinctive mark: the fact that he has aspired to wed contemporary philosophical 
speculation - as the author became familiar with it mainly through his study of Heidegger - 
with the tradition of the Greek East and the theological understanding of the Church Fathers. 
Yannaras' theoretical quest sets off the ontological issue, the endeavour, that is, to 
approach and interpret the matter of existence - the beginning and the meaning of the existent. 
Nevertheless, Yannaras' response to this matter tries to illuminate also all aspects of human 
life and activity. Thus Yannaras often embarks upon topics that on a regular basis escape the 
attention of most theologians: politics, economy, art, social issues and current affairs. 
Yannaras seeks to inform by way of interpretation and cast light on all such aspects of human 
practice, bringing in a theological word that does not appear as an opposition but as a 
contribution to issues of contemporary concern (not as ccvd-Aoyoý but as OMO-Aoyoý), 
drawing on the patristic ontological tradition and the theology of the Church. 
His engagement with such a variety of matters of current concern has established him 
to the Greek world as a wide-ranging thinker rather than a theologian in the narrow sense of 
the term. Yannaras' philosophical works sometimes seem perplexing, especially to the non- 
specialized reader, owing to the broad nature of their themes and the elaborate expression of 
the author, and therefore may not be among his most widely read works. Instead, Yannaras has 
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become well known and reached a wider audience through his contributions in the media and 
especially his articles for the press where he has been a regular columnist for many years, in 
the newspapers Vima (1972-1989) and Kathimerini (1994-today), where he generally 
addresses themes of current affairs. In 2002 Yannaras retired from the chair of philosophy at 
the Faculty of International and European Studies at the Panteion University of Athens where 
he had been teaching since 1982. Earlier, he had also taught at the philosophical faculty at the 
University of Crete, as well as in Geneva and Paris. His record of publication is very extensive 
and still continues during his retirement. 
This thesis seeks to illuminate Yannaras' intellectual development up until his ideas 
took on their essential form in the composition of his early works. It consists, first of all, of an 
account of Yannaras' life, as Yannaras himself has set it down in his two autobiographical 
books - KaTa0zjyto'16, -W-v and M KaO" Eavc6v. This tells us of his early commitment to the 
extra-ecclesial brotherhood of Zo6 and his disillusionment with it, and explores two Greek 
figures - Dimitris Koutroumbis and Zissimos Lorentzatos - who provided the intellectual 
stimulus that enabled Yannaras to break away from Zo6. It also looks at Yannaras' experience 
during his years of study in Western Europe in the 1960s, which mostly confirmed his sense of 
the unique value of Eastern Orthodoxy (strengthened by his encounter in Paris with the 
Russian emigre community) and the bankruptcy of the Western intellectual tradition 
(confirmed by his reading of Heidegger's analysis of the intellectual history of the West). 
In addition, the thesis provides a close study of the three books fundamental to the 
expression of Yannaras' vision - Heidegger and the Areopagite, Person and Eros and Ae 
Freedom of Morality - and explores the development of his early thought - his attempt to 
identify the falsifications of Christian experience which he had personally undergone and to 
retrieve those elements of Christian theology that were essential in addressing the 
contemporary challenge that the modem intellect posed and which are vital if the existent is to 
have the possibility of being endowed with meaning. A conclusion draws these themes 
together, by making use of Yannaras' own early celebration of his central themes in his short 
but beautiful book Comment on the Song of Songs. 
3 
Yannaras' writings reveal a sharp mind and an exceptional gift in the creative use of 




Biographical Sketch by way of an introduction 
When we meet a new person for the first time the next information we often want to 
know after his name is where he comes from or where he lives. Our mind, that is, seeks 
primarily for those pieces of data that will help us to place our new acquaintance in context. 
Especially a person's place of origin not only allows us specify the parameters of locality or 
space, but also constitutes an important part of the identity of the person we get to know. If, 
for instance, I ask someone I have just met in which parts of the world he has worked so far, I 
will obtain some information about his life and his experience until this day, but I will still not 
quite know who he is. It is only when he tells me where he originally comes from that I will 
begin to form an understanding of the identity of the person I have before me. And still, it is 
not actually so much the place in which he was born that will make a difference in my shaping 
of understanding about him, as the place he was brought up, basically where he lived and 
grew. Even when an individual has an interrupted background of origin up to the present, 
owing, maybe, to his father's career requiring the family to move places every few years, this 
very fact will still appear as an intrinsic characteristic of who this person is. Basically, to get to 
know about a person's background is a step towards recognizing and comprehending the 
person himself. 
It follows then from the above that in order to appreciate how someone expresses 
himself in terms of thought, speculation and ideas, as well as in terms of the means used to 
express these, it is important to be aware of where he comes from and try to discern those 
elements that have contributed to shaping him and his preoccupations, questions and 
framework of thought or theories. Thus I have felt that it would make a difference in assessing 
Yannaras' philosophical and theological contribution if we look at his background and the 
conditions that influenced him in becoming the intellectual that he is. 
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There are two main sources for learning about Yannaras' background and intellectual 
development - two works in Greek written by Yannaras himself, neither of which, to my 
knowledge, has yet been translated in another language. The first of them in chronological 
order - in terms both of date of publishing and of the years of Yannaras' life it recounts- is 
Katafiigio Ide5n (Ka-caov'yto 76, cd)v - Refuge of Ideas), which mainly narrates Yannaras' 
religious experiences in his youth and his time in the Brotherhood of Zoý. The other one is Ta 
kath' eauton (T6KaO' Eavrov - According to oneself or From one's point of view), a work 
that covers Yannaras' adult years and offers an account of his intellectual development, 
following through the stages of Yannaras' study and work in Europe and also later again in 
Greece. In the following pages I will try, drawing on the above-mentioned sources, to provide 
an account of the framework of Yannaras' early life as well as of his experience as a scholar 
when he went abroad to Europe. By doing this I mean to bring out those conditions and 
elements that defined his intellectual profile and which, therefore, will help us to have a better 
grasp of him as a philosopher and theologian. 
In KacaOV'yto 76, -(Dv we have an account of Yannaras' experiences of the extra- 
ecclesial organization or religious brotherhood of theologians (a&A(ýWcTyca E)F-oAo-ywv) in 
Greece called 'Z(oTI' (Tife') and of the years he spent as a member of this body. I reckon that 
the value of the narrative lies in the information that it provides about the character and the 
style of Zoiý as a religious organisation; so far as Yannaras himself as a theologian and 
philosopher is concerned, it acquaints us with his early religious background and experiences, 
awareness of which may then cast some light on Yannaras' own style of theology, its content 
and how he arrived at the themes of theological interest that he later came to put forward. 
The account starts in the year 1926, nine years before Yannaras was born, and it opens 
with the story of how his parents came to be introduced to, and encouraged to subscribe to, the 
weekly pamphlet issued by Zoý under the same name. Yannaras' own earliest memories as a 
child include the delivery of issues of 'ZoC in the family post. Those religious leaflets once 
received would pile up unread somewhere not much further in than the entrance door of the 
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house. It was only from their address labels with the recipient's name on that Yannaras 
attempted to read his first words - his father's name, who was by then already dead. 2 
The above detail has not been mentioned idly, since the type of piety and the religious 
mentality that Zod represented was something foreign to Yannaras' family environment, even 
though his family was religious with a deeply faithful mother. For the family was religious in 
a genuine, natural and spontaneous way that was missing from the environment of Zoý as 
Yannaras was later to encounter it, and their religiosity - unlike what Yannaras experienced in 
Zod - was free from any sense of one-sidedness or conscription in the name of their faith; it 
was instead naturally incorporated into their life. Karaoi5yto 76Ecbv offers an account of 
Yannaras' own experience in the brotherhood of Zo6, yet before following Yannaras' 
narrative of his days in Zod, it will be useful to give a short outline of what this religious body 
was. 
1. The Brotherhood of Zoý 
The Church in Greece in the years that followed the Greek revolution in 1821 and the 
gradual liberation of the Greek provinces from the Turkish occupation in the 19th century 
found itself in rather a gloomy setting from a pastoral point of view. Although the population 
had preserved the Christian faith and had handed it down generation by generation through all 
the years of the Ottoman occupation, and the clergy had been renowned for their part in 
sustaining the nation through the four centuries of the Ottoman yoke, 3 the Church of the 
liberated country was in a wretched condition. 4 The lower clergy and monks had a poor 
2 Karaoi)yto 76, c(Dv [Refuge of Ideas] (Athens: 1karos, 2000, first published by Domos, 1987), pp. 9- 10. 
3 Over the four centuries of occupation the Church and the nation had been one single entity; the Church had 
upheld the nation's sentiment and hopes; the Patriarch was the head of the Greek community and represented the 
Orthodox citizens of the Ottoman Empire to the Sublime Porte; the hierarchs took a leading part in the Greek 
revolt. Greeks came out of the Turkish rule identifying Church and nation, religion and patriotism, a link that 
continued strong and was later also fervently fostered by the brotherhood of Zo6. See Christoph Maczewski, 'H 
Kivqaq -cq-,; 'Zcoq-i; ' acýv TAAd6a: ZvypoAý orT6 17p6ýAqya Tq-(; 17apa&aEwý -cq-ý Ava-[OALKqý 
EKKAquia,; [The Movement of 'Zoe' in Greece: contribution to the issue of the tradition of the Eastern Church], 
trans. Fr Georgios D. Metallinos (Athens: Armos, 2002), pp. 31-2, Peter Hammond, The Waters of Marah, 
(London: Rockliff, 1956), p. 25-6. 
4 For a description of the state of the Greek Church at this time see Hammond, pp. 115-124. 
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theological education and were therefore able to deliver only a feeble pastoral service, 
performing in most cases only the most basic of their celebrating duties, neglecting sermons 
and catechesis. The people accordingly were left uninstructed with regard to Church life and 
Christian teaching. Bishops took not much better note of their pastoral duties; furthermore 
their numbers had declined, given the delay on the part of the Ecumenical Patriarch to 
acknowledge the autocephalous Church of Greece. 5 Monasteries - no matter how much of a 
stalwart guardian of the traditions they had been over the years of the Turkish dominion - 
were also far from prosperous and in a state of decline; the number of monks had been 
reduced with those who remained generally possessing a low level of learning, while monastic 
properties had suffered government confiscation. 6 In general, the background picture of the 
Church at that time was one of corruption and decline. 
It was in such circumstances that there emerged some initiative for religious renewal 
and awakening. This initiative did not arise from the hierarchy, but primarily from individual 
laymen and monks. Right at the beginning of the effort of revival, which can be dated back as 
early as 1839,7 we find a layman named Kosmas Flamiatos 8 who travelled around the 
Peloponnese preaching, full of zeal to bring about a spiritual awakening. His example soon 
found imitators: two monks from Megaspelaion - the great monastery of Old Greece in 
Peloponnese - Christophoros Panagiotopoulos and Ignatios Labropoulos, and later Hierotheos 
Mitropoulos, a deacon, and his nephew Efsevios Mathiopoulos, who was also a monk in 
Megaspelaion and a spiritual son of Ignatios Labropoulos and who was to establish - in 1907 
- the brotherhood Zoý; they all became apostolic labourers, travelling fervently through towns 
and villages, preaching, hearing confessions, keeping correspondence with people they had 
met over their journeys, all in all contributing, in a non-organized way, to an enthusiastic 
missionary activity and spiritual reform. The most prominent of the missioners of this time, 
however, was Apostolos Makrakis, a lay philosopher who had been trained in Constantinople 
and in Paris and who - together with Efsevios Mathiopoulos - was to play a primary part 
in 
the missionary activity in Greece. Makrakis, surrounded by a team of fellow-workers in the 
5 Hammond, p. 116. 
6 Hammond, p. 88. 
7 Hammond, p. 117. 
8 For a further readmg on Flamiatos see Georgios Metallinos, 66o KEOa1lAq-vE,; Aywwarai 
AvEttItT607TOL (K. 
OAaytd-co,; icat K. TvTrdA6o(; ) [Two Ke/alonian fighters facing each other (K. Flamiatos and K. T)paldos)] 
(Leukosia, 1980). 
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cause of evangelization, founded in 1876 the School of Logos (EXOATIrou A6you), in which 
Efsevios Mathiopoulos, who was ordained priest in the same year, was the chaplain and 
spiritual father. 9 Without going into more detail here on Makrakis' wider activity and his 
school, we will only note that the by then archimandrite Efsevios Mathiopoulos, initially a 
disciple and one of the closest collaborators of Makrakis, 10 eventually dissociated from his 
teacher in 1884, continuing however until 1906 to '[give] himself wholly to the preaching of 
the Gospel and the ministry of the itinerant confessor, while, like his spiritual father Ignatius 
Lambropoulos, he shepherded and guided hundreds of Christians drawn from every walk of 
life by means of correspondence'. " 
I have made this concise reference to the activity on religious reform in the years that 
preceded the establishment of Zoý in 1907, in order to show that the founding of Zoý by the 
archimandrite Efsevios Mathiopoulos was basically part of the missionary work and activity 
for moral and spiritual awakening and reform that the post-revolution country of Greece had 
seen to a small extent for many decades already. This activity, as we have seen, can be broadly 
characterized as a matter of individual initiative and was not much organized, something that 
will not be the case, however, later on after the establishment of Zoý. 
The person who founded Zoý, Efsevios Mathiopoulos, was born in 1849 in a 
Peloponnesian province, the son of pious parents, and from a very young age he gave signs of 
a devout disposition. He was just fourteen years old when he joined the life of the monks in 
Megaspelaion, under the spiritual instruction of Ignatius Labropoulos, and seventeen years old 
when he himself became a monk there. In 1872, after eight years of monastic life and by then 
a deacon, he came to Athens to complete his schooling and to study further. He soon became 
involved in preaching, and applied himself to spread knowledge of the Scriptures and the 
9 The School of Logos was a private secondary school and an evening school for adults; see Hammond, p. 120-4 
for more on the School of Logos and on the activity of Apostolos Makrakis as well as on the conflict in which 
he 
came with the official Church. Also, Christos Yannaras, 'OpOo6oýia Kai Atýaq arý 
NE&rEpq -EAAd6a 
[Orthodoxy and the West in Modem Greece], pp. 359-62 for an account on Makrakis and 
his school, as well as 
on the extra-ecclesial religious organizations more generally, pp. 348-405 and 
Vassilios Youltsis, 
'KoLv(ovLoAoymý OE(OQTI(TL(; T(JV 0QTj0W-EvTLxd)v 6cbEAq)oTýT(ov' ['A Sociological View of the Religious 
Brotherhoods'] in 6EyaTa KotvcovtoAoyia,; Tq,; opeo6o4iai; [Themes in the Sociology of Orthodoxy], ed. 
Georgios Mantzaridis (Thessaloniki: Poumara Publications, 1975). 
10 Maczewski, p. 33. 
11 Hammond, p. 123. 
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Church Fathers. Four years later he became a keen priest and minister. In Athens he also 
made contact with Apostolos Makrakis and he served as a chaplain, as we saw, in the School 
of Logos, where his spiritual personality and charisma became even more apparent. The years 
that followed found Father Efsevios in Corfu, 12 where he was quickly asked to work for the 
evangelization of the local people, and soon became endeared to them and brought about a 
revival, while he went deeper into his own spiritual experience and faith. Returning to Athens 
(1882) and cut off from his old fellow-worker Apostolos Makrakis (1884) he continued for 
many years the work of an itinerant preacher and with his restless pastoral labour throughout 
Greece created a renewal of faith while by now people saw in him an important spiritual father 
and the model of a Christian. The first attempt to create an organized movement for ecclesial 
renewal was made in 1893 together with his uncle Hierotheos Mitropoulos who in that year 
was appointed bishop of Patra, in north Pelopponese. They drew together around them a group 
of clergy and laymen and so created in the diocese a centre for missionary work and the 
training of future clergy. This first organized endeavour came to an end with the death of 
Hierotheos Mitropoulos in less than a decade, however it was a decisive experience for the 
archimandrite Efsevios who came to appreciate that it was essential for a large-scale religious 
renewal to be based on collective activity with a systematic structure and schedule. 13 
Thus father Efsevios Mathiopoulos set up Zoý in 1907, drawing around him a team of 
theologians, consisting of both clergy and laymen, 14 he being the spiritual head in the 
movement. Zo6 was set up as a religious association of theologians ('Brotherhood of 
Theologians'), a body of legal status and autonomous from the jurisdiction of the official 
Church. This would allow the movement to work independently of Episcopal control for its 
missionary work and therefore would give the brotherhood the freedom to effect the religious 
instruction of the people and the ecclesial renewal that the official Church appeared unable to 
12 His arrival in Corfu was the result of the breaking-up of the School of Logos and the dispersal of its members 
by the Holy Synod; for more on these events see references given above and Maczewski, pp. 3 8-4 1. 
13 The biographical details for father Efsevios Mathiopoulos here are based on Maczewski's exposition: 
Maczewski, pp. 34-44. For more on the life of the man the reader can also refer to Serafim Papakostas, EýakpLoý 
Ma0t67zovAo,;: Btoypaoia [Efsevios Mathiopoulos: Biography] (Athens: Zo6 Publications, 1948,2 nd edition). 
14 One of the founding members of Zo6 was the lay theologian Panagiotis Trembelas, later a professor in the 
faculty of theology, University of Athens: Maczewski, p. 44. 
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deliver, as well as improving the corrupt state in the Church. 15 The extra-ecclesial action of the 
movement soon attracted criticisms, 16 which at times threatened its very existence, however 
the brotherhood's basic adherence to the accuracy of the doctrinal theology of the Church led 
the Holy Synod in 1923 to acknowledge the existence and the missionary activity of Zoý, 
dismissing the charges that had been made against it. Zoiý was a union made up of celibates 
and throughout the years it maintained its monastic character; its members were conunitted to 
the three monastic virtues of celibacy, poverty and obedience, although without any intention 
of formally preparing its members for monasticism. 17 The members of Zoý had to demonstrate 
exemplary ethical merit and compliance with regard to their assigned duties, as well as 
contributing annually to the funds of the brotherhood, as set down by Z06's Board of 
Directors. 18 
Zoý was set up in order to meet the needs of evangelistic work at that time and with the 
purpose of making up for the lack of pastoral coverage on behalf of the official Church, as 
well as to make amends for the lack of order and canonical discipline in the latter. The 
objectives of the movement were mainly to organize assemblies for catechesis, Christian 
lectures and the study of the Bible, to create a school for the preparation of preachers - the 
preaching role of a theologian, the 'ministry of the word', was from the beginning central in 
how Zoý -understood its purpose - and groups for religious discussion, to form Sunday Schools 
for youths and to promote the diligent students, to support Christian charity and the 
publication of religious literature and especially of the Bible in the original text. In 1911 Zoý 
also released her weekly pamphlet after the same name, Zo, ý, the circulation of which 
developed dramatically with thousands of subscriptions throughout Greece. 
15 See the account on the extra-ecclesial organizations in Orthodoxy and the West in Modern Greece quoted 
above and Hammond, pp. 120-2 for the incidents of simony that had occurred in the hierarchy. Also, the part of 
father Efsevios' letter of 1879 quoted in Hammond, p. 115, talking of 'spiritual death' and the absence of guides, 
] eachers and pastors is illustrative of ecclesial decline. )r P6 
See Maczewski, pp. 63-8 and Orthodoxy and the West, pp. 352-4; one of the very early voices of criticism of 
the extra-ecclesial missionary activity, even before any official reaction from the Church, was that of the short- 
story writer Alexandros Papadiamandis through stories of his such as `0 ALb6cXo,; ' ['The preacher'], `H 
ýiaicQaKLUT[va' ['The Makrakistine', the word referring to the name of Makrakis and means the female follower 
of him or his movement]. 
" Orthodoxy and the West, p. 364. In fact monasticism was seen by the new religious movements in Greece as 
outdated and not in touch with the true needs of the time; on the contrary, as was the case in Zod, there was a 
strong spirit and demand for 'activity', as opposed to the contemplative life of a monk: Hammond, pp. 79,89-90. 
18 This was so determined in the 4tharticle of the Zo6' constitution: see the Appendix in Maczewski, p. 256. 
II 
However, in the first years of its life, the brotherhood of Zoý did not see any immediate 
development. Apart from direct opposition - even though isolated - to the movement, it was 
politically a time of instability and unrest for Greece, with the Balkan wars in 1912 and 1913 
and the Asia Minor catastrophe in 1922 creating unfavourable conditions for regeneratint, C, 
activity and progress. 1923 was, as we saw, 'the year of triumph' for Zo, 6 as the latter found 
the official acknowledgement and support from the Holy Synod of the Church of Greece, a 
result that afforded Zoý. with recognized religious status so that it could thereafter carry out its 
work undisturbed by external resistance. The golden age, as it were, of Zo6 began after 1929, 
the year of the death of Efsevios Mathiopoulos, when he was succeeded as head of the 
brotherhood by the archimandrite Seraphim Papakostas. Between then and 1954 Zoý 
experienced a radical development; the number of its members increased, the Sunday Schools 
of the movement grew within ten years spectacularly, 19 the pamphlet 'Zo6' outnumbered 
tremendously in copies any other religious publication of the time and, as Maczewski notes, 
the publishing production of religious literature by Zoý until 1950 could provide three books 
for each Greek family. 20 Besides, alongside the flourishing of the Sunday Schools, many sub- 
unions of the movement emerged. The first of them, set up in 1926, was the 'Association for 
Inner Mission "Apostle Paul... ('EUAAoya; 'Eu(omQLY, ýi; 1EQa7zowcoAý(; "A716CFToAoý 
1FIaV-Ao(; `), which aimed specifically at spreading the Gospel and providing Christian 
education to the whole people of the country. This group and the brotherhood itself were the 
foundation from which many other sub-societies were later shaped. The sub-unions that 
formed in the bosom of Zoý are indicative of the fervour of the movement and made the latter 
grow into a large-scale body with a highly developed structure. I will for the purpose and 
space of my exposition here make only mention of what these sub-societies were. Their 
composition was in the main related not only to the offices held by individuals in the 
movement and to their years of service, but also to their social background and to their 
occupation. Thus different people belonged to different associations or branches of the 
movement of Zoiý, each specified with a certain name. To give some examples, such branches 
were the Christian Association of Scientists (X. E. E., standing for XQLCFTLaVLKII TWOO-9 
19 In 1936 the first prize of the international Sunday Schools conference in Oslo was awarded to the Sunday 
Schools of Greece: Maczewski, p. 5 1. 
20 Maczewski, p. 62. 
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171 LCF7 ýLOWOV), the association of the students (X. O. E., that is XQLO'TLCCVLXý (DOLUITMý 
'jVWO-TI), the sisterhood 'Ef)(YETELoC ('Piety') which represented the female equivalent of Zoý 
and was responsible for the training of women to provide for the needs of the female Sunday 
Schools, student groups and the female boarding houses of the movement; also the association 
'AyLfoc Eu'vL'xTl' ('Saint Eunice' - Eu-nike: well-victory) for the women medical nurses, the 
society of Christian parents (X. E. F.: XQL(TcLavL-K ' rjVWO-q ]FOV, (OV), TI E the society of teachers 
(X. E. E. A.: XQLCrTLCCVLY-Tl Twoorq 'Ex7_(O[LbEVTLX(_OV AELTOUQ-y(-Ov) and the society of 
employees. There were also sub-unions created especially around the time of the war, to attend 
to the needs caused by the war: the union 'IFIQOVOLa' ('Providence' or 'care'), which was set 
up in 1940 to address the needs of children and families affected by the war, and the 
association 'IIQOvoLaTOI_) ETQOCTL(OTOU' ('Care for the Soldier') which undertook to support 
those fighting in the front line by mailing to them letters of support, religious books and prayer 
books. 21 
One can realize from the above that Zoý and all the supervised associations that sprang 
from it engaged in a wide range of pastoral as well as social work, trying to meet with the 
needs of the population of Greece over the first half of the twentieth century. The primary aim 
of the movement was to renew the Christian faith by spreading the word of the Gospel and 
investing especially in the young generations whom it also recruited from a very young age to 
serve in the work of evangelisation. However, men and women involved in the movement and 
devoted to the shared vision for the regeneration of the country fervently offered their services 
in educational establishments, in orphanages and boarding houses for students and in hospitals 
run by Zo6. Philanthropic activity coupled with pastoral care and spiritual instruction, thriving 
production of religious books and periodicals, 22 restless work of preachers going all over the 
country: 23 all these activities of Zo6 played a strong part in the spiritual awakening of the 
21 For more details on the different sub-movements within Zo6 see Maczewski, pp. 52-62, Orthodoxy and the 
West, pp. 372-5. 
22 It is worth mentioning that Efsevios Mathiopoulos' The Destiny of Man came out in 65,000 copies and had 
evidently a paramount influence in the religious formation of the time: Hammond, p. 137, Orthodon, and the 
West, pp. 365-6. 
23 Peter Hammond gives a characteristic example of the 'typical week-end itinerary of a lay theologian': p. 130. 
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population of Greece. 24 By the middle of the twentieth century and after the time of the civil 
war in Greece in the middle 1940s when, as we shall see, Yannaras had his initial encounter 
with Zo6 through the local Christian student groups that were run in the area of Athens where 
he lived and which he joined, Zod was well established as a very active movement, widely 
acknowledged and developing networks through many levels of social life. Especially after the 
devastating effects of the war for the country, the Christian faith and the values of Christianity 
were even more promoted as the only secure base upon which the future of Greece, with a 
genuine civilization, could be built. Gradually, with the contribution of the distinguished jurist 
Alexandros Tsirindanis, professor in the Law School of the Athens University, the movement 
shifted in character: it was no longer a movement of merely pastoral work and catechesis, but 
25 acquired more and more the social objective of both religious and political renovation. In the 
post-war years the movement worked 'For a New Greece' - now the common slogan of Zoý - 
and the vision also included the catharsis of the political life of the country on the basis of the 
26 
values of Christian faith . It was at this time 
in the history of the Zoý that Yannaras' youthful 
fervour met with the new enthusiastic intentions of the movement and its Christian-Hellenic 
dream. 
2. Yannaras' own experience in Zoý 
Yannaras' first contact with the atmosphere and the world of Zoý took place through 
Sunday School which he joined at an early age and which was organized on a parish level in 
Athens, where Yannaras' family was based and where he was brought up. The teachers or 
leaders of those Sunday School groups were young people connected in one or another way 
with the organization of Zo6, members of the lower ranks of that religious 
body and appointed 
by it at the different parishes to deliver catechism and pastoral guidance to 
juvenile 
24 For a fuller picture of the country of Greece in the middle of the twentieth century and 
the activity also of other 
religious movements smaller than Zo6, see Hammond, pp. 129-40,154-66. 
25 Maczewski, pp. 57-8,272-9, Orthodoxy and the West, pp. 377-8 1. 
26 The work of Alexandros Tsirindanis Towards a Christian Civilization, which 
became something like a policy 
guide for the movement, expressed the new direction that Zo6 was now 
following. Yannaras draws a parallel 
between this new vision in Greece and the idea for a European Christian civilization and the 
formation of the 
Christian-democratic political parties in the West at that time, Orthodoxy and the West, p. 379. 
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attendants. 27 At that young age Yannaras was not yet fully conscious of the connection of 
their Sunday School with the world of Zo6; only later would he gradually discover the relation 
of the two. However, the narrative in Ka-cao6yto 76, -6-ov reveals clear memories of the 
practices and attitudes, of the spirit and dominant feelings, of the meetings and the 
environment of Sunday School in those early days. All these were of a kind that Yannaras 
would experience more intensely later on when he himself became more and more engaged in 
the environment of Zod. We thus read about the prevailing sense that was promoted amongst 
the young participants of the Sunday School groups: a sense of belonging to a sort of a sect 
and a feeling of being among the elected. Whoever attended Sunday School was of Christ 
(IUOV- XQUYIOV-) and equally and simply if you didn't join Sunday School, it meant that you 
were not a believer in Christ. This was Yannaras' first experience of the dualism represented 
by Zoý.. There were also a series of evident signs that brought about this feeling of being 
organized and of belonging to a special assembly: from the notebook that the children would 
have to bring along to the meetings, in which they would have to write the moral teaching and 
the religious message of the day, to a distinguishing badge that they all had to wear at all times 
on their shirt collar and the stereotyped songs they practised singing, the lyrics of which put 
across the members' special beliefs and dedication. This dedication again involved promoting 
and realizing a certain vision, to which all members of the organization of Zoý, from the lower 
to the higher ranks, had to attach themselves, and that was to bring about a renewal of the 
mother country, namely New Greece (NEoc 'EAACcbOO, as they would call it, Christian Greece 
or the Greece of Christ (, cTlv 'EAAO'Cba roU- XQLCF'COV-). The principal feeling enthusiastically 
experienced among the members of Zoý was that they were participating in an important 
movement which was to establish a new state of affairs based on the teachings and the morals 
of the gospel, in other words on the Christian faith, where all people would be illumined and 
drawn along to become believers in Christ. Even the young children joining Sunday School 
were being prepared and encouraged to live according to, and work towards, such a project - 
the Christianization of Greece. At that early age they had to start by turning their schoolmates 
27 Through also Yannaras' narrative in Karaoi)yto 76E6-)v it becomes immediately clear that 
Zod was a large 
extra-ecclesial organization with a developed structure and a very large number of members graded in the 
different ranks and sub-assemblies of the body. Yannaras' description lets a connection and parallel 
be drawn 
between Zod and western protestant associations of a sirMlar kind. 
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into believers and that primarily meant they had to persuade them to come along to Sunday 
School. Attendance there was checked, absentees each week were noted, 28 and the discussions 
were always of the same stereotyped and expected style, as were the moral conclusion of each 
of them and the answers provided to related questions. As for the participants themselves, one 
was to excel and stand out precisely by conforming to the provided standards. Conformity was 
in that way the condition for being distinguished ! 29 
Thus from a very early age Yannaras became exposed to the kind of religious 
environment represented by Zoiý, namely through his experiences at the Sunday School as well 
as in the Christian Unions for students and young people in which he participated as a 
teenager. 30 The main part of Karaot5yto 76Ecbv, however, concerns the ten years Yannaras 
spent living as a boarder in Zod's boarding house and later as a probationer in the brotherhood, 
a time stretching from the summer of 1954 to February 1964, that is between the nineteenth 
and twenty-ninth year of his life. We also read a description of the last days that preceded 
Yannaras' moving to the Zoý boarding house, in terms of how he reached that choice and what 
his own as well as his family's feelings about it were. It is clear that for Yannaras it was a hard 
decision to take, accompanied by feelings of pain and conflict that predominated over those 
days; conflict both within himself and with the family environment that did not appear at all 
keen on the young man's choice. His personal inclination had always been to study and 
follow a career in mathematics and science, however according to the mentality with which 
Zoý nurtured its young members such an option would mean compromise and weakness. " Zoý 
maintained that the ones who were indeed strong and genuinely devoted to 'God's work' with 
which Zoý identified itself would evidently and as a matter of course pursue theological study 
28 Hammond notes: '... the teacher would at the end of a lesson despatch his pupils, two by two, to call at the 
homes of any who through sickness or for some other cause had been unable to be present that day. When the 
defaulter was run to earth he would be given a brief rjsum, ý of the afternoon's lesson. ' The description shows 
something of the mentality and the atmosphere in which Sunday School was run, and it adds to 
Yannaras' own 
testimony: p. 134. 
29 Karaof)yto, pp. 16-28, 
30 Ka-raq5t)yto, pp. 61-8,76-84. 
" Yannaras gives some strikmg examples of parents who somewhat annoyed by the way Zo6 recruited young 
members claimed their children back. The youngster who would clash with his family was praised 
by the 
movement in such a way that made the other members of the same age look up on him with awe and consider 
him a hero: Ka-caobyto, pp. 59-60. Equally, resistance by the teenagers to align with the practices of the 
movement or to take up choices for their life that Zo6 even made for them were penalized, Ka-caobyto, p. 116. 
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and join the brotherhood of Zod as celibates, committing themselves to a life with the 
objectives and visions of that body. Anything different than that would demonstrate 
cowardice. Marriage itself was viewed and treated as a compromise and the choice for the 
weak ones. It was understood to be a rather deficient option of life, allowed condescendingly 
for the less determined who were unable to bear the load of the dignified celibacy. As for any 
aspiration or will to pursue an academic education and further knowledge of any discipline 
other than theology, that would mean that the person interested was simply ruled by a spirit of 
vanity and in pursuit of worldly distinctions. 
Within such an atmosphere and given Yannaras' vibrant temperament and passion for 
life, he would not be at peace were he to ignore that 'gracious' calling and follow his own 
talents. Nevertheless, he was at the same time put through an equally traumatic experience by 
being mentally compelled to opt for something he was not naturally comfortable with, and by 
suffering in addition a painful situation of frustration and smothered conflict that his decision 
to study theology and move out from his family had caused them. 32 
In his account of the different aspects of life as a boarder in Zoý and the details of 
everyday incidents that we read in Ka-raofqto 76E6-Ov, Yannaras clearly intends to highlight 
the following: the distortion that takes place when the Christian faith turns into an ideology, 
when the Christian belief becomes a system that safeguards the individual instead of being a 
relational, self-exposing stance towards the desired Other; when the Christian life, instead of 
being a personal journeying to find the true God, becomes an objectified set of concepts and 
codes of conduct that imprison and strangle within us the true and free self, the original 
imprint of God in man. Basically, as the very title of the whole account denotes, KaTaý15yto 
76Ed)v is an expression of the phenomenon by which Christian faith turns into just another 
theory, a system of norms and beliefs that wants to regulate life just as all other theoretical 
systems have done; where Christian life, instead of being life or a challenge for true life with 
all the spontaneity and uncertainty that real life involves, it becomes an idea and thus a refuge 
32Ka, Ca(PIýy1o, pp. 127-144 provide details on how Yannaras ended up studying theology as well as attaching 
himself, as a young man, to Zod. The same pages also include descriptions of Yannaras' family setting at that 
time. 
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for the egocentricity of the human consciousness that naturally seeks for shelters of 
ideological and psychological certainty and reassurance. 
Yannaras provides some more details on the character of the movement of Zoý, as he 
had the opportunity to know it further once he decided to 'devote' himself to it. 33 Ihe 
members of Zod had specific places where they met and where they would also hold services 
of worship instead of the already existing parish churches, even though they officially 
continued to belong to the latter. The place of their meetings was in the centres of Zo, ý, where 
some hall was shaped in such a way to accommodate also the members' worship and the 
celebration of the liturgy, the duration of which was not longer than an hour, emphasis being 
laid on the preaching. The liturgy often was celebrated for some society of the movement in 
particular, and then in order to be able to enter it you had to produce your card of membership 
for that certain society. The structure and the function of the movement of Zoý, in their 
attitudes and objectives of bringing about spiritual growth and improving the society, as well 
as in the external aspects of their formation, was taken from Westem models. 34 Yannaras lets a 
parallel in his account be drawn with the large Catholic Christian organization 'Opus Dei' - 
for the movement typically identified its widely propagated socio-religious vision of 'New 
Greece' as "'EQyo E)Eou-' ('The work of God') - as well as with the German 'Innere Mission', 
even though at that time he was not yet in a position to understand that the title of 'EuAAo-yol; 
7-C F-(Y(0TEQLXIJý; LEQa7Too-, coAT-1,;: 6 Anogrokoq Fla-bkoq ', which was put up on a panel at the 
entrance of some hall in ZWs premises, incorporates 'Innere Mission' in translation. 
35 
The members in the movement of Zod were grouped in clearly distinguished single-sex 
assemblies. There was an intense feeling for them that they were living in or belonging to a 
strictly one-gender world. The fact as such might not be of a great importance, were it not 
made to happen and maintained by a certain philosophy and mentality behind it. The mentality 
33 Note that the celibate members of Zod were referred to as 'devotees' or 'consecrated' ('6t(ýLF-QcopýVOL'), 
meaning that they had dedicated themselves fully to the work of the movement. 
34 In orthodoxy and the West, p. 356, Yannaras draws on the minutes of the Assemblies of the brotherhood over 
the years 1934-1936 that show the open admiration for the methods of work of the Western missionaries. Also 
Hammond makes mention of Zod borrowing 'unwarily from the West', Hammond, p. 139. 
35 KaTaoi)yto, pp. 81,52. For the correspondence of elements of Zod with Opus Dei see Peter Hertel, 
'International Christian Democracy (Opus Dei)', Concilium 193 (1987), pp. 95-105. 
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was that a person of the opposite gender was to be seen only as the embodiment of temptation 
and identified with the possibility of committing sin. It is striking to read in Yannaras' 
narrative about the awkwardness caused in the young boys' gatherings, should there be 
mention of some female friend or relative, and how any discussion of, or even word alluding 
to, a female person, still less love, was out of the question. 36 Love for a person was presented 
and identified only with a sinful act, a disastrous enterprise, destructive of the personal 
integrity and of the chastity that one should preserve. Such positions were promoted by the 
handbook 'The Chaste Youth' by a Hungarian protestant pastor Tihamer Toth, which was 
provided for the youngsters of Zo6 as the source of sexual 'education' or edification. It seemed 
that none of the young members of the Sunday schools was to escape the feelings of terror and 
guilt brought about by that book, in relation to sexual relationships and love. No reference 
whatsoever was made in the catechism the young men received those days to the erotic 
theology of the Orthodox East neither was there any chance for them to suspect that such a 
theology existed. But all the more young people in Zoý suffered the absence even of a 
secularized idealism concerning love. Love to them equalled only sexual relationship and 
pleasure of the flesh, nothing else. 37 
The above approach to the sexual conduct was coupled with a generalized practice of 
uniformity with regards to the external appearance. The code of external style, which had to be 
strictly followed, involved not only how to dress but also extended to the hairstyle and the 
growth of a moustache for the men. Not that there were written rules about such things; 
however the prevailing practice held the place of an unwritten law. The pattern of appearance 
adopted in the religious circles of Zoý became like a trademark, so that should one come 
across a member of the movement one would straightaway recognize his or her identity. Such 
identicalness not only flattened out all sense of personal differentiation, 38 but the kind of 
appearance promoted spelt boorishness and lack of smartness to the young peoples' taste, and 
crushed the natural desire of an individual to be elegant. 
36 Karaq5f)ytO, pp. 69-70. 
37 Karaofqto, pp. 69-72. 
38yannaras recalls an incident where he was dramatically reprimanded for using a scarf that he was wearing to 
protect himself following an operation, but which was totally alien to the dressing habits in the movement, p. 309. 
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The strictness experienced in the movement about what was and what was not allowed 
to be worn was furthermore applied to every other expression of conduct. From the way one 
was to address one's 'brothers' or how one was supposed to sit to what literature it was 
permitted or not permitted to read: all had to follow certain manners and habits. To conform to 
all the set standards and ways was an indication of quality of character and of virtue, of 
goodness and piety. The atmosphere also imposed a serious, stem look and a formality of 
manner, where smiling or light-hearted behaviour was not in any case appropriate. One can 
easily understand how such a setting entailed feelings of oppression and the strangling of all 
spontaneity. 
Yannaras had already been exposed to the circumstances described above within the 
atmosphere of the Sunday Schools since still a young boy and a teenager. His experience had 
been the same in the Christian youth groups he attended, as well as during the time the 
children of the Christian groups spent within the premises of Zoý as visitors on different 
occasions 39 or in the farm campus of the movement where the children's and the youngsters' 
summer camps were accommodated. However, the experience of the world of the movement 
was even more intense for Yannaras when he became a boarder. Each of the boarders was now 
allocated a confessor or spiritual father, whom however the administrative leadership would 
use as a liaison between them and the young members in order to keep a watch over them and 
regulate them. The content of the confession in this way was goingto be a source of drawing 
information about the moral status of a young member and a basis of calling him to discipline 
or for taking action towards his correction! The environment in which the young men were 
living was very much a setting of control, lack of freedom and of puritanical check and 
restriction. 40 
Another central element of the life of the young devotees in Zoý was the obligation 
they had to work in the movement every day and practically on a full time basis. Yannaras' 
39 Yannaras refers to his attendance - while still a young boy and as a member of a choir - at the inaugurating 
event of "EAATIVLK6 06)ý; ' ('Greek Light'), a new association that was set up by Zo6 in collaboration with the 
palace, to organize the theoretical part of the anti-communist resistance in Greece. The event took place in the 
presence of King Paul, and Yannaras remembers the amazement and the awe that the sumptuousness and the 
social pretence of the atmosphere imposed: Karaoi)yto, pp. 101-2. 
4' Karaoi)yto, pp. 151-2. 
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memories of the working commitment of those days appear again pretty distressing. There 
were two main workplaces where the young men were occupied: the secretarial office of the 
movement, where all the processing work related to the then 200,000 subscriptions to the 
issues of Zo6 was done 41, and the printing and bookbinder workplaces of the movement. 42 To 
be chosen to work in the secretarial section, Ywmaras explains, was considered to be a 
privilege, as one there escaped the terrible amount of noise and the dirt that the people in the 
printing rooms suffered. However, the work in the secretarial service was also very 
monotonous and mundane and was made even harder to bear by the formality of people's 
relationships there, the authoritarianism and the strict discipline imposed. The shift of 
relationships that took place once someone joined the working team was quite striking, as 
appears from Yannaras' narrative. People, who had known each other for a long time and had 
been friends up to then, spending joyful times over games and activities together during their 
adolescent years in the youth groups of the movement, now spoke to each other in a remote 
and formal way addressing one another as Mr. So-and-so. Every move and action of people in 
there was watched, and even a frequent absence due to one's need to visit the toilet was 
noticed and attracted scolding comments: 'What is going on, Mr. Yannaras? Are you illT But 
Mr Yannaras - Yannaras' account continuous - used to find refuge in the toilet, to escape there 
for a few moments from the uniformity that crushed him and to release his held-back distress 
by crying. 43 The writer's own words have a vividness that no paraphrase can convey: 
I was crying because I was really suffocating. I was overburdened by the cold, 
official style of the people in there, the unbearable boorishness and stony- 
heartedness, the deliberate and unjustified reprimands that wanted to break down 
your 'pride'. But I was overloaded, above all, by the sterile, mechanical and mind- 
numbing job of a scribbler. I did not dare say anything to anyone, because I was 
advantaged compared to those working in the factory. Still, I felt tortured and 
broken apart by the thought that all those hours of the supposedly God-pleasing 
'work', the most beautiful years of life could have been a time of serious study and 
significant learning, a time for free reading, for which I was so much thirsting, 
[could have been] hours to keep up with the languages which I had given up so 
deeply embittered. ... I do not 
know if other people have ever prayed in a toilet, 
but I was screaming silently my despair to God, without thinking of whether it was 
the appropriate place. I was desperately trying to keep my wilfulness for my 
41 Maczewski gives the number of 165,000, pp. 46,49. 
42 Kacaq5t)YtO, PP- 146-9. 
43 Karaq5f)Y'O, P- 149. 
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'dedication', but I found impossible to believe that such a messing-up of my life 
could have the slightest relation with God and His truth. ' 
Yannaras' distress during the years he spent in Zoý was related, as seen by now, to his 
experiences of moralistic mentality, oppressive discipline, flattening environment and life, 
unfriendly and officious relationships and also the fact that study was the sideline activity 
during their 'student' life. Furthermore, another fact of the life and the atmosphere in Zoý 
added to the feelings of suffocation and constraint: that was the attitude of contempt towards 
knowledge that prevailed within the movement. To study and acquire knowledge, to follow 
even the theological discipline at an academic level, was not considered as very important and 
emphasis was rather put on how much someone conformed to the style and the objectives of 
the movement. The disregard for academic education was not only obvious in the movement 
but it was in fact openly stated. 45 There had been statements that explicitly despised the value 
of academic theological learning while at the same time expressing confidence in the 
superiority of the members of Zoý, who excelled by participating in a brotherhood like Zoý, 
and were not like knowledgeable theologians who, despite their learning, were not religious 
personalities and did not want to or could not have the same input in the social and national 
work that Zoý was accomplishing. In this way the lack of higher education and well- 
researched knowledge, combined with the feeling of superiority towards others, created a 
dreadful attitude that led members of Zoý not to take university life seriously, instead forming 
a rather low opinion of it. The kind of theological edification the members were receiving 
within Zoý was considered to be the only approach to the understanding of the Christian faith, 
the correct interpretation of the Christian message. And that theological instruction was 
mainly of a poor apologetic style, which basically suggested that Christian belief was based on 
and certified by science and the certainties of science. Science was seen as the basis or the 
grounds for securing and enforcing the Christian faith. Thus a 'scientific' and rational style of 
apologetics was put forward which proposed the Christian faith as a certainty based on reason 
44 KaTa(pt)yto, Pp. 149-150. 
45 See Karaofqto, p. 165, where Yannaras refers the reader to the minutes of the 7thassembly of the movement, 
which took place in 1930. 
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and well-founded on scientific findings. Therefore Christian faith, resulting from science. was 
compelling, and this binding faith also entailed the imperative keeping of the moral law. 46 
But even the theology they received in the university did not appear very inspiring. 
Owing to their working commitments it was not possible for the boarders of Zo, ý to attend all 
the lectures and the few to which they could go tended to be the less interesting ones. The 
theological knowledge offered was fragmentary and disconnected from the substantive criteria 
of Orthodox theology and tradition, which meant that there was no space for someone even to 
suspect the relationship of that tradition with real life itself and with being, with the world and 
history. In other words it seemed that the approach to the subject of knowledge was quite 
sterile. For example in the field of Patristics, instead of getting in touch with the real thought 
and the texts of the Church Fathers, the learning was limited to the Church writers' names, to 
the dates and the titles of the patristic writings. In Yannaras' own striking words, 'preparation 
for the exams in Patristics meant memorizing a kind of phone book". 47 There was no chance of 
getting acquainted with actual patristic thought, and if ever lines from the Church Fathers' 
texts were used it was only to support pre-packaged ideas and moralistic objectives. The 
Church Fathers in this way were brought forward only for moralistic purposes. 
Furthermore, the lecturers at the University appeared oblivious to the revival that was 
flourishing in Europe at that time with regard to the study of Patristics. Yannaras expresses the 
legitimate wonder whether - even just at the level of academic awareness - names like those 
of Danielou, or Henri de Lubac and others, were known at all to the professors in the faculties 
of theology in Greece, or whether any of the lecturers had come across and read the Mystical 
Theology of the Eastern Church by Vladimir Lossky, which could be seen as an elementary 
handbook of the neo-patristic turn in European Orthodox theology; or whether anyone was 
familiar with even the names of Fr Florovsky's works. 
48 
46 For Yannaras' later response on the nature of apologetic theology see Christos Yannaras, 'H A7TOA0YqUKý 
U, rýviopooboýia [Apologetics in Orthodoxy] (Athens: Grigori Publications, 
1989,2 nd edition). 
47 Kara0t)Y'0, P- 168. 
48 KaTa(pi)ylo, Pp. 168-9. All of chapter 15 of the book demonstrates the contemptuous attitude of the 
brotherhood towards knowledge and education. 
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Throughout Kacaoi5yto 76, -6)v we come across several striking incidents from 
Yannaras' time in Zoý, which are illustrative of the oppressive religious formalism and the 
psychopathological atmosphere, as Yannaras himself calls it, within the movement. There is 
also clearly apparent the unsatisfied feeling that several of the young men living in the 
brotherhood of Zoý had, a kind of spiritual thirst and hunger they were experiencing, and 
which was not fulfilled with the straw-like spirituality and the cheap moralizing they received 
in the movement. Yannaras' own life in those days, as, we are informed, has survived in the 
pages of his diary from those years, featured daily distress and sadness, with a feeling of 
terrible, aching void and a tortured frustration. 49He could feel that something had gone wrong, 
something in the whole mission was not quite right. The young men had given up their 
personal dreams and aspirations, their families and any personal ambition for their own life 
and had devoted themselves to a higher and sacred objective. Still they were left feeling 
emotionally empty and deeply unhappy: deceived about the standards they had set themselves, 
or rather the ideals they had allowed Zoý to set for them. They were supposedly working 
towards a social and moral renovation, but even so were moving, as it were, on the margins of 
real life. The narrow mindedness and the puritanism practised in the brotherhood were at odds 
with what was going on outside the brotherhood, with the life and practice of the wider 
society. The devotees of Zoý were often seen as eccentric, belonging to a world somewhat 
sterilized from real life. And in themselves they felt rather devoid of the spiritual renewal they 
wanted to establish widely. Yannaras gradually and reluctantly came to realize that there was 
something wrong at a deeper level, beyond the apparent conservative exaggerations of the 
leadership of Zo6, beyond their narrow-mindedness and their carelessness or failures in their 
manners. The reasons for the smouldering failure were felt to be somewhere in the roots of 
their "Christian" endeavour, in a religiosity mistaken right from the very starting point. 
50 
As mentioned earlier above, Kacaoi5yto 76E6-)v constitutes a criticism of, and an 
opposition to, the state of error where, instead of being a personal journey to encounter 
God or 
a unique exploration in quest of attaining and realizing our true self 
in love for God and the 
world, instead of being the 'way' and the 'life', Christian life becomes a set of objectified 
4' KaTa(P')YLO, PP. 190-2. 
5' Kara(PI)YtO, P. 189. 
24 
certainties and beliefs, which result in a fixed and moralistic pattern of life that imprisons true 
being and nullifies the real and creative freedom of existence. I will let here Yannaras' own 
words make the point: 
I am sitting and writing this book without believing that I will "enlighten" anyone 
or that I will "edify" the new generations. I only want to leave behind at least a 
minimal and weak testimony to the inhuman role that every ideology - religious, 
political or any other - plays in our life. [I only want] to show - if I manage to - through my own life and experience, how even the most innocent and sincere 
"devotion" to noble ideals can be only a fixation that is used to house our 
unconscious self-centredness. And we become blind slaves in the grip of our 
obsessive faith, unable to distinguish the real from the unreal, the imaginary idols 
from the reality of life. At least, when in politics or in our social life we substitute 
thoughts and ideas for reality and when it is there - in politics or economy - that 
we find the whole meaning of being and life, our fixation (ý&_oXqiýLa) perhaps 
can operate as a delightful opium and give us the psychological courage to bear 
persecutions, imprisonments, exiles, tortures, even to stand up as fearless men in 
front of the firing squad, proud of our ideas. But when our question lies elsewhere, 
when we do not locate the real in the absurdity of the ephemeral, of decay, of the 
anonymity of the billions [of people] that preceded us and of those that will follow, 
when that which we thirst for is a "sign" of personal, eponymous and at the same 
time catholic life, a "sign" unmoving in the endless passing of time - the still point 
of the turning world - and when the "sign" has been given but we make it an idea, 
a world-doctrine (KocrýtoOE(oQia), morality, "Christianity" ("XQLO_TLaV-LffýtO") - 
who can then measure the consequences? All my life I studied theology and 
philosophy, I became passionate about modem physics and cosmology, I read 
psychology and a lot of history. And R did] all this looking into the one and only 
riddle that puzzles me: [that] of existence that can love restlessly and not die. I 
found the most complete answer in the Greek fathers of the Church - the most 
ingenious eye-opener up to now. However, the sense of the certainty that one day, 
not very far away, my body will dissolve in the ground - this body with the thrill of 
the senses and the sharpness of mind, the body alone with which I enjoy the beauty 
of the world, I travel to the longitudes and latitudes of the earth, I smile to those 
next to me, I gesture, I speak, I listen to music and make love - the sense that my 
body is meant to become mud cannot be outbalanced not even by the knowledge of 
patristic theology, nor of course with the vertigo of the information of astrophysics 
or the findings of psychoanalysis, which compel the mind to acknowledge a 
Supreme Authority, itself existing and source of all. For thousands of years now, 
moment by moment thousands of people on earth die and my death will be one of 
innumerable deaths, another grain in the sand passing through the everlasting 
hourglass. In such a flow where my life is drawn closer and closer to the inevitable 
end, no ideology, no knowledge or science, lights up a prop for me to hold on to, to 
prevent me diving head first in the swirl of meaninglessness. As for schemes of 
social restructuring and the dialectic process of History, at them without any guilt I 
the moribund simply roar with laughter. It is only at a name that I stop. Not an idea 
or notion, but just a name - "sign" of life personal, eponymous and at the same 
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time catholic: the name Christ Jesus. In the limits of the personal reference that [it] denotes, ideas are ridiculed, notions become useless, the riddle of love and death does not wait for me any more as a Sphinx at the crossroads. And any other word beyond this name seems redundant. 
I write this book only to point out a wrong way, the way that turns Christ into an idea, a notion, a dogma, a morality, a social scheme, and thus leads us away from the redemptive meeting with His Person - the way of ideology. 51 
In the later years of Yannaras' life in Zoý internal cracks and ruptures in the 
relationships of people in the movement came to add to the anxieties, concerns and inner 
reactions that were already developing within Yannaras and others about the style of the 
religiosity and about the objectives that the movement represented. The internal crisis resulted 
in a rift that took place in the brotherhood, which was caused by conflicts in relation to the 
leadership of the organization. Again the narrative is striking in bringing up and describing the 
circumstances and the events of those days of the split in Zoý, all marked by intense 
opposition among the members, mistrust and slander. 52 If there is anything that Yannaras' 
account aims at through the detailed exposition of the story of the conflict in Zoý, that is not to 
lay bare or judge any of the individuals involved as such. What he wants to do is to 
demonstrate what happens when one is hooked on to one's own self and one's own certainties, 
what happens when faith in Christ, in Christianity, XQLCF'[LaVL(7pO, or any other -ism, 
becomes an objectified conviction or an idea on to which we desperately cling in our struggle 
to triumph over the threatening gap that lies under our feet, that is the issue of life, existence 
and death, and in our endeavour to attain self-reassurance. But following Christ does not 
actually involve any self-reassurance; it rather involves quite the opposite: to abandon oneself, 
to 'lose' one's SOU1,53 to become the last one. The disagreements and clashes leading up to the 
division in Zoiý were in Yarmaras' view the result of such pathological religious attitudes in 
the part of people who would rip their clothes while preaching about love, altruism and 
sacrifice for the sake of the others, but who ended up breaking their bonds with their 'brothers' 
and held tight to their self-assuredness and their small or big egoisms. Selfishness proved 
stronger than anything else, stronger than all the ideas and ideals of love, of purity and of so- 
called moral standards, simply because one cannot easily disengage from one's certitudes with 
" KaTaol)yto, PP. 95-8. 
52 Kara(pt)yto, pp. 228-292. 
53 Luke 17: 33. 
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which one has been holding, for that is what one, in such a religious mentality as the one 
described here, has learnt to do in order to be 'saved'. 
It is, in my view, this experience that lies behind the way in which Yarmaras goes on to 
talk as he does about faith, God and the human quest for salvation. He understands Christian 
life as an abandonment of religious certitudes and a trustful surrender to the One who only 
loves and who awaits our return to Him, on the model of the father of the prodigal son. In fact 
Yannaras likes to look into the origins of the terms we employ in our religious and theological 
language and to bring out their original content. Thus 'faith' (71LCrTLC, ), as he uses it, has not 
the meaning of conviction but of trust, a content that the word has actually retained in other 
aspects of the socially organized life, for example in the area of commerce and the trading 
relationships. Thus EýMOQLXTJ 7ILCF'[L(;, for instance, means not commercial belief or idea, but 
commercial confidence, commercial trust. 54 Besides, Yannaras' experience of life in Zoý, with 
the stiff puritanism and the sterile religiosity described above, left him with a thirst not for 
ideas and theoretical opinions, of which he had had more than enough in Zoiý, but for an 
honest and humane contact, for communication and communion, which he had bitterly missed. 
I think this also casts some light on the fact that his work later developed so much around 
central ideas such as the 'person', 'eros', 'existence' and 'relational being', and why his 
theology, as also his thought in general, is largely articulated in existential terms. 
While still a probationer in Zoý Yannaras encountered certain people, such as Dinuitris 
Koutroumbis and Zissimos Lorentzatos, who, through their presence, their theological 
positions and more generally their ideas with relation to the tradition and the metaphysical 
had 
their own influence on, and input to, the inner developments, re-examinations and changes of 
mind that Yannaras was to experience. But before moving in to the encounter of the members 
of Zoý, with the figures mentioned here, I think it would 
be valuable to mention briefly one 
further aspect of the life in the movement for the young men. I have already mentioned at the 
beginning that Zoiý identified itself with the objective of bringing about spiritual growth and 
improvement of society in Greece. The movement aspired to inaugurate a spiritually renovated 
54 ChriStOS Yannaras, Elements of Faith: an Introduction to Orthodox Theology, trans. Keith Schram (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 199 1), p. II- 
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Greece, 'NF-a'EAAaba', "EAAaba Tov- XQLCTTOI-)', based on the norms and the ideals of the 
gospel. This goal was propagated to the members and the potential converts from an early age 
and at every stage. Every individual felt the calling, or rather the obligation of a personal 
mission, to bring along others to Christ, and that basically meant to attract people to the 
spirituality the movement represented and convince them about the sacred 'work' that was 
being done in Zoiý. 
This commitment to working towards the spiritual elevation and the Christianization of 
society was even more enthusiastically propagated and practised during the years of the civil 
war in Greece, namely the years of the middle and late 1940s. Yannaras' memories of those 
days mention the atrocities reported at the time that were committed by both parties and also 
the atmosphere present in the youth assemblies and the Christian youth summer camps that he, 
as a young boy, used to go to. The feeling was that Christian Greece was fighting against 
atheist communism, and no Christian person should stay unresponsive to that challenge. The 
b VI nation was fighting for 'Tof) 
XQLcFTou- TTIv 7d(TcTj cTlv otyLa xaL TTI (; 71aCQL 0V 
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F-AEuOEQLa' - 'the holy faith of Christ and the freedom of the motherland'. Especially at the 
youth camps where the young people of Zo6 spent their summer days the mood that was 
conveyed to the young members was to take sides with the conservative party of the civilian 
population and with the armed forces of the government. This was communicated through 
songs - among which war marches prevailed - prayers and educational speeches 
delivered to 
the youngsters. Reference was made also to the persecution of the Christians in Russia and 
quotations from Marx, Lenin, Bukharin and others were introduced. Those recruited to the 
work of spiritual edification and revival that was based on Christian 
ideals needed to be 
acquainted with the enemy, they should know who the enemy was. 
'For all of us were signed 
up for this war - the soldiers on the front line and us back 
home with our ideas to enlighten the 
people'. 
56 
Part of the summer routine for the young people of Zo6 included dashing out from 
their camps to hospitals, to meet with the injured men of the war, and also to the shops and the 
streets, to distribute everywhere possible pamphlets of the movement about the nation's 
55 Kacaq5z)yto, P. 98. 
56 Karaq5i)yto, P. 99. 
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struggle towards the New Greece. Such acts of campaign went on over the wintertime too. The 
narrative is again striking about how children of thirteen, fourteen, fifteen years old 
encountered men who had lost their limbs by running into landmines, men with vacant looks 
and livid faces, only to deliver a lecture before such a tragedy and to remove secular 
magazines from the bedside tables of the injured people, replacing them with the Zo6 
pamphlets. It was important that the visitors kept a record of how many 'dirty' magazines they 
disposed of and how often they told to the soldiers not to swear: attitudes all induced by a one- 
sided, Manichean obsession to oppose evil, do good and make the Christ-idea conquer. 57 
It took time for Yannaras to realize that all the fever of exhilarating and committed 
activity against the communists that was taking place throughout all the Zo6 movement was 
planned and promulgated by the Palace. It was only as time went on and by relating his 
experiences that he became conscious of this fact. However, among his memories of early life 
there are vivid ones about the special connection and acts of collaboration between the Zoý 
movement and the Palace, which afforded a kind of secular endorsement to the movement and 
its work and also made the Church in Greece appear politically devoted. 58 The Zoý movement 
thus initiated - in Yannaras' descriptive words - 'a discreet romance with the Palace' by 
undertaking the spiritual dimension of the anticommunist war. The consequences of such an 
identification - namely of Christianity, Christians, Christian faith with conservatism and the 
established civil powers - even to this day remain damaging in the people's conscience, in 
their understanding of Church life and faith and in their political stance. This was therefore 
another strong aspect of the type of Christian life that Yannaras experienced in Zo6: Christian 
faith seeking for secular acknowledgement and the Church openly joining forces with the 
powers of this world. 
All the feelings of uncertainty and uneasiness, which over time affected many 
members of Zoiý in relation to the objectives of the brotherhood and its work, were 
like cracks 
in their faith and confidence in the life in Zoý and in what they were trying to achieve there, 
and these cracks of discomfort and doubt became even more gaping in the 
dispute and the split 
57 KaraOI)YIO, PP- 99-100- 
5' KaTaOI)YLO, PP- 100-6; there is also a reference to the collaboration of Zo6 with the palace in Orthodoxy and 
the West, pp. 375-6. 
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that took place in the bosom of the organization. However, through these cracks there came a 
light to soothe somehow the bitterness and the chill of the rigid, one-sided and pietistic life of 
the young theologians and to cast hope for a way out from the overshadowing impasse, and 
this light was the encounter with such people as Dimitris Koutroumbis and Zissimos 
Lorentzatos. These people could be described as representatives of the Orthodox 
consciousness that remained alert and reactive against the pietism and the spirituality - of 
protestant inspiration - that organizations such as the brotherhood of Zod embodied and 
promoted. 59 
In Karaov'yto 76Ed)v there are only brief references to these men, as Yannaras brings 
out mainly the circumstances of his personal encounter with them and demonstrates how their 
presence and their utterances altered not only Yannaras' understanding of things, but brought 
about shifts for many of the young theologians of Zo6 and determined their stance and life- 
decisions thereafter. Their importance is such that we shall provide a somewhat longer 
account. 
3. Dimitris Koutroumbis 
Dimitris Koutroumbis was a lay theologian, living in the southern outskirts of Athens 
with his elderly mother in straightened circumstances and leading a quiet life of a rather 
unusual pattern. He had behind him a long personal history and a diverse theological and 
cultural experience. Bom in Athens in 1921, he had become a student of the medical 
faculty of 
the University, from which however he never graduated. It was due to an accident that he 
interrupted his study there and that he got to meet with some Jesuits and join their order as a 
probationer in the year 1946. In the years that followed he travelled to 
England and studied 
philosophy in Heythrop College in Oxfordshire. He also attended 
lectures in philosophy in the 
College de Mongre in Lyon, where he came across Pere Henri de Lubac and his associates, 
59 In The Freedom of Morality Yannaras makes reference to the pietism and the religious/theological 
distortions - 
according to Orthodox criteria - that crept into 
Church life in Greece, under the influence of religious 
organizations and theological 
brotherhoods such as Zo6. There he also refers to the weakening of the influence 
that followed and to the awakening of the Orthodox theological consciousness and the awareness of 
the Orthodoy 
patristic tradition: Christos 
Yannaras, The Freedom of Morality, trans. Elizabeth Briere (Crestwood, New York: 
St Vladin-tirs's Seminary Press, 1196), pp. 134-6. 
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who were embarking on a systematic study of the Orthodox theological and liturgical 
tradition. Later, from 1950, he taught in the St. Joseph University of Beirut. It was then in 
1953 that Dimitris Koutroumbis, seven years after joining the Jesuit order and after learning 
about the Orthodox tradition as an outsider, returned to his mother Church and moved back to 
Athens. His activity from thereon was to transmit in Greece his knowledge and experience, by 
making contact with religious circles and by getting involved in theological discussions of the 
time. From 1956 he also started publishing articles in religious journals, trying to enlighten 
people in Greece about the theological contribution of the Russians of the Diaspora, to bring 
out the theology of the liturgical texts and to recover the focal points of a genuinely 
ecclesiastical ethos. 
Dimitris Koutroumbis is remembered by people who actually met with him 60 as a 
person of a profound Christian spirituality, which was reflected in the simplicity of his life, 
and the warm welcoming and the loving hospitality he reserved for all those who came to visit 
and to spend some time with him. He is described as a man of great kindness and affection, 
who was very attentive to everybody's little problems despite the strains and pains of his own 
life, someone who listened carefully and valued what the other person had to say or what one 
had achieved in himself by then, in a way that would embrace everybody and make them feel 
worthy and valuable to serve in the mystery of the Church. He was able to adjust to, and speak 
in, the style of each person; he used to enter the world of each one, so that he could meet with 
them and transmit his message, as if he was taking care of each one separately. He had the 
aptitude to credit the words of each one with importance and built on them through his own 
contribution, often leading the conversation back to his interlocutors, letting them feel that 
they had come up with the wisdom of his words and his ideas. Apart from being very 
perceptive and insightful, Koutroumbis is referred to also as a man of love and humility, one 
who inspired and encouraged others in their achievements, without ever claiming anything for 
60 Further to Yannaras' testi 
i 
mony about Koutroumbis - Orthodoxy and the West, pp. 470-3 - other people also 
portray the man in a very similar way and underline much the same qualities and characteristics about 
him as 
Yannaras. For such evidence see the obituary: 'In Memoriam Demetrios Koutroubis', Sobornost, 6: 1,1984, pp. 
67-77. Also, see the witness by the archimandrite Vassilios Ghontikakis, prior of the holy monastery lpýp(ov in 
Mount Athos, in his preface of a collection of texts by Koutroumbis, which was published in 1995 under the title 
,H Xjp,,; (9, -oAoyia(;: D. G. Koutroumbis, H Xýrpt,; , -q(; eEoAoyia(; [The Grace of Theology] (Athens: 
Domos 1995). Archimandrite Vassilios was also one among the young men who used to visit Koutroumbis in his 
Athens residence and benefit from the encounter and conversations with him. 
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himself; even on occasions where it was obvious that behind someone's presentation in fact 
was hidden Koutroumbis' influence or inspiration, the latter would only attribute the 
originality and the achievement to the presenter himself. 
Dimitris Koutroumbis was introduced to the assemblies of Zoý by Fr Elias 
Mastrogiannopoulos, who was the new head of the movement after the split within it and who 
was trying to mitigate the protestant character of Zoý and bring to its life and work some 
orthodox theological ethos. Koutroumbis drove a wedge into the life of Zoý, as Yannaras puts 
it. He was invited to the premises of Zod to attend discussions and deliver a kind of theological 
training to the young theologians of the movement. His contribution was so crucial that 
Yannaras actually speaks in terms of a pre-Koutroumbis and post-Koutroumbis epoch of 
theology in Greece. 61 Up until the encounter with him no one from inside the movement was 
n, k able to suspect the protestant character of the Brotherhood and of its work, and any such 
comments from the outside were received with annoyance and discontent as unfounded blame 
62 
and falsehood . 
What is remarkable, however, in what we read about Koutroumbis, is that he 
was not a man who made criticisms; instead of finding fault with, say, Zoý he rather spoke of 
matters in a constructive way and pointed to the positive side, letting his listeners gather from 
his words what the misrepresentation of things would be. His contribution was to present and 
speak positively rather than to deliver a negative critique. This was a very different stance 
from what had been the practice in the world of Zoý; it made an impression and won over the 
hearts of some of the young men in the movement, to whom such an outlook felt like solid 
, 63 nourishment for their 'thirst and hunger , in which the shallowness of the puritanism and the 
castigating theological teaching and morality that they had been fed with had left them. 
Further to the personal example that Koutroumbis was in his own presence, what was 
equally important and made a difference acting as a catalyst in the minds and the life of the 
61 Ka-ca0l)Y10, p. 356. Also: Chrisos Yannaras, 'The Master Builder' in 'In Memoriam Demetrios Koutroubis', 
Sobornost 6: 1 (1984), p. 72. 
62 Kara(Pt)Y10, p. 314. Yannaras mentions Fotis Kontoglou - the re-discoverer in Greece of the authentic 
tradition of iconography - and his friends as a source of such allegations. 
63 One of Yannaras' earliest collections of texts from those days was published under the title Hunger and Thirst; 
it is expressive of the quest and the yearning he experienced for something substantial and genuine for his 
Christian life and for a longing for God's life-transforming presence: Christos Yannaras, REiva Kai 6iýa 
[Hunger and Thirst] (Athens: Grigon Publications, 198 1; first published by Skapani, 196 1). 
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young theologians in the brotherhood of Zoý was the theological word that Koutroumbis 
delivered as well as the content of the thought that people like Zissimos Lorentzatos spoke. 
They used a language that appeared alive and meaningful, as relating to real life and 
experience. It was the encounter with such people that opened the eyes of some members in 
Zoý to aspects of theology and of the Christian faith that they had ignored up to then. They 
came to realize the realistic quality of the orthodox tradition, its connection with and relevance 
to real life; if not to say that they came to discover the orthodox tradition itself. They had been 
abundantly fed with translations of protestant handbooks and for the first time they were 
drawn into contact with the Fathers of the Church and the theology the latter represented. 
Koutroumbis as well as Lorentzatos spoke a realistic word, not abstract notions, neither 
moralistic exhortations nor mental or sentimental certainties. They discussed theology, the 
dogmas and the articles of faith with immediate reference to their meaning and relevance in 
Church life and for the affairs of a Christian. The Church was no longer an ideology or a 
penitentiary for reforming morals. It was the rehabilitation of Life. Theology did not seem to 
be a mental exertion any more, a drilling of the mind or cold, meaningless speech. What 
people had known as abstract, idealized principles and doctrines would now be starting points 
to cast light on real life, they would relate to the experience of life and to the materiality of 
things. The history of Church tradition and the people who belonged to it now assumed a 
meaning and appeared important. 
Koutroumbis brought a theological awakening. He introduced and spoke about things 
that the young theologians in Zo6 heard for the first time; Gregory Palamas and the 
hesychastic tradition, for example, was completely new knowledge to them. Koutroumbis was 
also aware of the rediscovery of the patristic tradition that was taking place in Europe at the 
time, and was up to date on the crucially important works of Danielou, of Henri de Lubac, of 
Congar, of Louis Bouyer, of Ivdnka, of Balthasar. 
64 The reader of Koutroumbis' texts in the 
volume HXtipiý; -rt7(; OcoAoyiag easily notes that Koutroumbis does not present what 
he writes 
as his own ideas, but most often speaks through others. He indeed appears 
informed of the 
theological developments of his days and knowledgeable about modem theologians and 
people who have rediscovered the Church tradition and who take on the responsibility to 
" KaraOI)Y'O, p. 319. 
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revive it and cast its light on contemporary life. He draws on, for example, John Meyendorff s 
study of Gregory of Palarnas, Myrra Lot-Borodine and her book on Nicholas Kavasilas, on 
Vladimir Lossky and Paul Evdokimov. 65 Such references by Koutroumbis as well as his 
mentions of the Church Fathers naturally marked him out in the eyes of the young members of 
Zod, who as we saw had basically encountered teachers at the university who were 
theologically uninformed and also the general disrespect of Zo6 towards knowledge. 
Any reading of Koutroumbis confirms that his thought and theology are based on 
Church practice and draw from the patristic tradition. Often he introduces a theme sparked off 
by ecclesiastical and liturgical practice, as he does for example when he discusses the Holy 
Cross, or the Baptism of Christ, or the person of the Mother of God, where he sets off by 
explaining the content of the relevant feast or by analysing the a7zoAv-ci'Ktov of the day. He 
also refers to the Church Fathers' teaching: John Damascene and Gregory Palamas, 
Nicodemos of the Holy Mountain, Gregory of Nyssa and Athanasius the Great are all sources 
Koutrournbis makes use of. Thus, the way he presents his topics is deeply ecclesial. 
Furthermore, his themes, even the more dogmatic and theological ones, are given in a simple 
and clear way, while still knowledgeable and informative. Take, for example, the rather 
extended chapter in 'H Xapt(; -cj7-(; eEoAoyia,; where he talks about the Church as the 
Mystical Body of Christ. 66 All the ideas are expressed in an organized way and with clarity. 
Although he deals with what initially appears as a rather theoretical matter his exposition bears 
a quite practical and instructive quality. The reader is illumined about the discussed topic both 
in terms of the doctrine about the Church and in a way that makes sense in practical terms: 
what it means to be a member of the Church, what the 'mystical' character of the Body of 
Christ and man's participation in it involves. Theological matters in Koutroumbis appear 
conceivable, comprehensible and are presented in a language that feels realistic and 
meaningful, one to which a modem reader can relate. The different theological topics are not 
approached as abstract and theoretical matters. Koutroumbis' theological word transmits a 
living experience and his themes are brought up and talked through with the quest to find and 
65 See Xtipt,; eEoAoyia,;, pp. 159-255 and especially the unit 'Y-&YXOOVOL eEoAoyLKaý AvaýTITýGELý' 
['Contemporary Theological Pursuits'], pp. 239-250. 
66 `H 'EK-KAq(YLa, MVGTLK6v Ewpcc rof) XQLcTrof)' ['The Church: the Mystical Body of Christ'] in Xcipt(; 
OEoAoyia,;, pp. 29-80. 
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to know their true meaning and importance. In this way what we read is presented as relevant 
to contemporary reality and present day life. Theology for Koutroumbis is not a science or a 
theoretical sport that remains unconnected to everyday life and the practical interests of 
67 Christians. It is instead, as he clearly states , the base and the foundation of the Church life, 
not an intellectual exercise, that is, but closely connected with Christian practice. Equally, the 
Christian faith itself is not about adopting some kind sentiments or having some noble ideals, 
rather it leads to an all-inclusive way of living, it is a way of being that embraces the whole of 
the human life, all the aspects of man's existence. 
In fact Koutroumbis' interests are not confined to what we would consider as strictly 
theological subjects. His theological writing touches on modem topics and aspects of life that 
people would generally consider to lie outside the span of theology. For instance he discusses 
Marxism in relation to Orthodoxy, or the realm of finance in relation to Christian faith and 
life, 68 or, to keep closer to the way Koutroumbis himself puts it, as an aspect rather of 
Christian faith and life. To manage effectively the material part of the world is a major task for 
Christians. Christians bear a responsibility not to leave the world in the administration of the 
devil. Unfortunately, religious faith and financial life, as Koutrourabis argues, have generally 
been treated in the course of history as completely separate, hermetically sealed off from each 
other, so to speak, owing to a mistaken understanding of anachoreticism and eschatology. 
However, the trap of idealism, into which Christianity fell as far as the material nature of 
things is concerned, needs to be overcome. If we, the Christians, fail to see that man is made 
of spirit and matter alike, then the Christian confession and the message of the gospel turn 
easily to beautiful but empty words. Koutroumbis sees in man and human life a strong unity of 
the material and the spiritual, and he repeatedly points out the danger of falling into either 
extreme and neglecting the one or the other aspect respectively. Either attitude constitutes a 
false version of the Christian faith, indeed a heretical deviation. It is a failure in Christianity, 
Koutroumbis notes, when it becomes a religion of the soul, leaving outside the body. Man is 
an indivisible and inseparable unity of both soul and body and he is to be saved and restored to 
the pre-fallen condition as a whole. 
67 6EJV5yX00V0L E)EoAoymaý AvaýTITq'crEu; ', p. 240. 
68 See chapters "OQ0obo4a Kaý MaQ4aýt&; ' ['Orthodoxy and Marxism'] and TIEQý 11T(oxE1a,; ' ['On 
Poverty'] in Xtipt(; 6EoAoyia(;, pp. 127-134 and 135-138. 
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It would seem that this overcoming of dualism with respect to man's existence and his 
life must have been one of the main points of difference in Koutroumbis' theological stance, if 
not the prime one, that Yannaras and others found appealing. Yannaras had been fed a 
'spirituality' within Zo6 that set apart the corporeal from the religious element; man's true 
needs were felt to have no place in the preached kingdom of God, since the latter was put 
forward rather as an otherworldly reality that did not accommodate the world in the sense of 
transforming it through God's grace and by restoring it to its true meaning, but rather 
disqualified the world. Anything human felt only sinful. To be able then to recover unity with 
relation to one's existence, for a person to feel valued as a whole and to be invited to God's 
grace and kingdom as a unity of body and soul, formed a new outlook on the Christian faith 
and the Church life. To such a stance people like Yannaras, who had agonisingly suffered the 
splits of dualism, were bound to be attracted. In Yannaras' own intellectual approach then we 
come to see an all-permeating attitude of seeing things and speaking about things in their 
wholeness. 
However, this is not the only case in which we can find a connection between 
Koutroumbis and Yannaras. Several other matters appear to be common in the thought of the 
two men. First, when he describes the spiritual relationship between God and humanity 
Koutroumbis employs the concept of an erotic event. In fact it is not Koutroumbis himself 
who parallels man's relationship with God with erotic love; Koutroumbis only brings out the 
relevant parts of the Church Fathers' mind and the biblical tradition which highlight the 
69 
strong, loving bond in the relationship of God with the world, of Christ with the Church. 
There, the creation of humankind as male and female and even the making of Eve from 
Adam's side and then Adam's love for her are treated as symbols and signs of a mystery: the 
mystery of the spiritual call and the destination set out for man, which is to love and to unite 
himself to the True God, and also the mystery of the creation of the 'new humanity', namely 
the Church, within which God's spiritual calling towards man is realised. The connection of 
love and desire between a man and a woman and the union of the two are meant to depict the 
deep and powerful love of God for mankind and God's affection for and loyalty to the Church. 
69 See the chapter 'T6 MVGTýQLOV Tou- AvbQ6; xaý 7ý; ]FuvccLx6g' ['The mystery of the Man and the 
Woman'] in Xcipic 6EoAoyia,;, pp. 113-26. 
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The True and Living God is presented and referred to from early on - namely from the time of 
the Old Covenant - as someone who longs for an intimate and personal relationship with man, 
as the Groom of the bride, which is the Church, as a spouse and a lover who is full of care and 
patience. The very relationship of Yahweh with Israel is so close and affectionate that it can be 
described only in the language borrowed from a marital and erotic context. It resembles the 
story of a marriage, or even more, is paralleled to an erotic drama . 
70 And then the divine 
Kingdom is referred to as 'Marriage', since it forms a deeply intimate union with God, a 
representation of which is the Church. Koutroumbis notes that the Song of Songs was listed 
among the canonical books of the Old Testament in order to underline exactly the very fact 
that the whole Scripture is a Song of Love, the love of God for mankind and of man for God. 
Yannaras, apparently inspired by this, composed later a ZX611to (Commentary) on the Song of 
Songs, finding himself in it a strong metaphor to express the experiential and erotic character 
of the knowledge of God. One can easily draw a parallel between all this and the erotic 
language that Yannaras employs to speak about God and his creative and providing activity, 
and also about man and his objective of true, authentic existence. To be authentic for Yannaras 
is basically equivalent to being erotic, that is to seek out the other and to abandon oneself by 
self-surrender to the love of the other, to the manic lover who is God; it is the restoration of 
existence back to the way it was created to be from the beginning: in a unity of love with the 
Creator God, as a result of freedom. That is how Eros is a fundamental ontological category 
for Yannaras, as it forms the very mode of being within which one truly overcomes fallen 
nature and attains the mode of the revealed God, which is the mode of personal existence. 
This notion of personal existence is another point of contact that we can identify 
between Koutroumbis and Yannaras. The concept of the 'person' possesses in Koutroumbis 
too a dynamic similar to the one that we see in Yannaras. Drawing 
from the theology of 
Gregory Palamas, Koutroumbis sees the human person as a being that exists in communion 
with God and with other persons, and thus he opposes it to the concept of 
the individual, 
which means an existence isolated and closed in upon itself. 
Koutroumbis explains that God is 
personal, as, according to the experience and the teaching of the 
Church, he is not a monad, 
closed selfishly upon himself and absorbed in his own beatitude, and 
he is not even a dyad, 
70 'To Mvo-TýQLowrof) AvbQ6(; ]FuvaLx6g', p. 121. 
37 
which could imply division and compromise. God is Trinitarian, a communion and unity of 
three persons, each of which exists for and on account of the others. Man then, who is made 
after the image of God, cannot live selfishly just for himself, but he is meant, if he wants to be 
a real and perfect man, to live up to his prototype, that is the Trinitarian God. In our modem 
times the fact that we have lost the sense of the mystery of God has led us to also miss out on 
the sense of the mystery of the human person. However, the call for man to go beyond his 
biological individuality and come to live as a person is still present and real, and that is what 
the Church is for. The Church is a call to become something more than just a totality of 
individuals; it is a call to become the family of God. The Church is a communion of persons; it 
subsists as the created image of the Holy Trinity. 7 1 The way Koutroumbis speaks of the human 
person shows that he, just like Yannaras, understands it as the expression of the unique and 
unequalled existence, and also as what one may or ought to become. In Koutroumbis, as in 
Yannaras, 'person' means what is distinctive and matchless, whilst the characteristics, either 
physical or psychological, that people have in common are qualities rather of their shared 
nature. Besides, 'person' is not always an accomplished reality but is referred to by 
Koutroumbis as an objective to which man must attain. 'Man becomes a person when he 
breaks the chains of his selfishness, when he overcomes himself and offers himself to the 
72 others... and stretches out towards God' . Koutroumbis actually 
borrows these last words 
from Paul Evdokimov, a significant figure for Yannaras whom he shall meet later. He also 
puts forward the latter's thoughts - which in their turn reflect the language of the Fathers - 
when he says that 'person' or 'hypostasis' are actually relative notions to that of the 'image'. 
This means that when we say that man is made after the image of God, this 'image' has a 
dynamic meaning and denotes the potential that man has, namely the will and the freedom 
imprinted in him, to abide by God's will and become what God wills him to become, and that 
ultimately is to resemble God. 73 
71 TQ71-y6Q1.0ý; 0 1710(AaýW(I; KCCý 660 CnýyXQova7l(20PAýýtaca' ['Gregory of Palamas and two contemporary 
problems'] in Xtipt,; 6, -oAoyia,;, pp. 178-82. 
72 6"EVCc PLPA[0-(T%jFL0: KQLTLXý crT6 PLPM0 TI 'OpOo6oýia Tou Flai5Aov Ei)boKýýA(oq)' ['A book-sign: 
Critique on the book Orthodoxy of Paul Evdoklmov' in Xdpt,; 6EoAoyim;, p. 217. 
73 "JVC( PLPMo-o-qPELO', pp. 216-19. 
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This dynamic approach to the concept of the person can also be picked up in the way 
Koutroumbis sees and talks about the Christian life as a whole. Koutroumbis discusses this in 
a chapter on Nicholas Kavasilas' treatise 'Life in Christ' and Myrra Lot-Borodine's study on 
this Church Father. 74 Life in Christ for Koutroumbis is primarily an ontological event, as it 
entails the renovation of the whole man in Christ. It involves the participation in the risen life 
of Christ through our partaking in the sacraments of the Church, Baptism, Chrism, and the 
Eucharist. To live as a Christian is an existential event, as Koutroumbis somewhat 
apologetically calls it. 75 It involves not simply an imitation of the life of Christ as if the latter 
was to be accurately copied, neither just an external keeping of the Lord's commandments, but 
it rather refers to an inner renewal of the self. A true Christian endures an all-embracing 
transformation in Christ, through his sharing in the life of the Church, so that he bears Christ, 
so that Christ dwells in him and is revealed through him, through his words and his thoughts 
and his actions. Christian life thus is by no means some sort of static observance of a law, an 
adjustment to a preset pattern of life, but a powerful activity for the Christian, which is always 
in progress. Consequently, Christian life as an ontological event of inner renovation is 
reflected also in the realm of the moral. Morality, it follows, is a reflection of the existential 
renovation of man in Christ, the expression of what takes place in the inner self of the 
Christian. Koutroumbis puts forward a dynamic perception of morality. Morality for him is an 
event of dynamic character, an ongoing and always developing condition. Because to lead a 
moral life is not just a matter of adapting oneself to external moral codes and sets of norms, 
but is the very event of leading a spiritual life, that is the life of the Spirit. Thus morality 
cannot be measured and objectively certified and to achieve it is an advancing and never 
ending process, an always-evolving situation. This dynamic perception of Christian life and of 
morality is not something that Koutroumbis improvises. On the contrary, he puts forward such 
positions based on the tradition of the faith, on the mind and the teaching of the Church 
fathers. This is clear for example, in the chapter about Nicholas Kavasilas. The similarities 
between Koutroumbis' standpoint on the matters presented here and the positions that 
Yannaras takes up on the same topics are quite apparent. 
74 'NLXOAao,; Kap6ccYLAm, -: Tva,; Aaix6; bLbctCFKaAo; rill; 
f1VEUý1CCTLY, 6Ti1Ta(; ' ['Nicholas Kavasilas: A lay 
teacher of spirituality'] in Xdpt(; (9EoAoyia(;, pp. 187-211. 
75 NmMaoc, Kap6caLAac', p. 205. 
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Also another subject where comparability can be noted between Koutroumbis and 
Yannaras is the question of the nature of the truly Good. Koutroumbis explains how man, 
when he was created, was granted the freedom to love God or not, to choose between good 
and evil, to live by what is righteous or what is not. Man's existence, Koutroumbis explains, 
reaches its true fulfilment and happiness when he responds to God's loving invitation and thus 
lets himself be united with God. One could possibly then argue here that to opt for God and 
the Good is a selfishly motivated act, a move of self-interest. The answer to this, Koutroumbis 
makes clear in his brief dialogue 'On poverty' '76 is that the nature of the truly Good is 
communion, to share it. 77 According to the doctrinal faith of the Church none of the divine 
persons of the Trinitarian God exists closed in upon itself and for itself, but each lives for the 
other persons. In the same way when man lives in God's love and grace and unites himself 
with God, he is bound to open up and give out what he is and what he has to others and to the 
rest of the whole creation. The nature of the Good is not to be selfishly retained and enjoyed, 
but to be communicated and shared. This strikes a chord with Yannaras' exposition of the 
characteristic of man's worldly or fallen nature as being to appropriate everything, to seize 
things and use them towards its own ends. Yannaras asserts that this mechanism of the 
darkened nature applies also in the sphere of the moral; the individual wants to be moral, to 
meet with certain ethical standards and to live by moral codes, as this sustains the selfish need 
of the human consciousness to be reassured and certified, by mirroring and justifying itself 
against such an objectified law. The way out of such an impasse, as Yannaras like 
Koutroumbis suggests, is for man to abandon himself to God's merciful love and trust Him, 
who is the only Good, for his life and fulfilment, rather than to hold on to self-centred 
certainties of being ethical and good. 
In general, Koutroumbis' style is very spiritual. His thoughts and his remarks are 
permeated by a spirituality, which is not just intellectuality; they radiate a sense of the true and 
real Life. Koutroumbis speaks of a spiritual life, that is of the life of the Spirit; he does not 
communicate a moralistic word, and he does not discuss Christian life on the basis of morals 
76 ]FIEOL Hc(oXEim; ', Xdpt,; ecAoyia,;, pp. 135-8. 
77 Xdpt,; eEoAoyim;, p. 138. 
40 
and norms. 78 He conveys a frame of mind that is free from the stress of abiding to codes of 
conduct. He puts across a clear and realistic outlook on what it takes to be a member of the 
Church and a Christian, and that involves not just adopting some good thoughts and manners 
or some gentle sentiments but cleaving faithfully to Church tradition and practice and to seek, 
with humility and trust in God, to become in one's own self and in one's own heart a witness 
of the Truth that the Church maintains. Thus, repeating what Yannaras notes about 
Koutroumbis, one can confirm that the latter does not speak sentimentally; rather he puts 
forward a pragmatic and practical word. He employs neither a legalistic nor a sentimental 
language, and wherever he adopts terms such as 'love', 'pure heart' or 'desire' for God, these 
are used in an unsentimental and in a matter-of-fact way. His writings express a spiritual 
experience and convey a warm reality and a charitable atmosphere to the reader. 
I would also say that what makes Koutrournbis' utterances significant is not that his 
positions appear different and attractive, not even the fact that they create a whole style of 
outlook on Christian faith and life and an atmosphere that feels warm and charitable, 
especially to a troubled reader or to a restless and searching mind. These are very much true 
and also important; however, what made Koutrournbis' contribution a breakthrough in his day 
was the fact that he articulated a return to the true content of the Christian faith and Church 
life. Koutrournbis puts his finger 'into the prints of the nails' by detecting and referring to a 
loss of the correct feeling about the Church that has led people to think of it as a national or 
even a cultural institution instead of the place where the Logos and the Holy Spirit actually 
dwell . 
79He notes that falsifications occurred in Christian theology that resulted in missing out 
on the Mystery of God and the view of the true God, and that too often replaced true belief in 
God with 'theological idols'. 80 He appears critical towards scholasticism and western 
developments of Christianity. 81 He is, however, optimistic and sees in his day a turning of 
78 See as a characteristic example how even the idea of God's justice, 'bLYaL0(T6vq' -a notion that can 
lend 
itself for a moralistic interpretation - in Koutroumbis is understood and approached as a rather spiritual category 
related to the pureness of the heart, and not as a juridical one: Xcipt,; 
6EoAoyia,;, pp. 151-2. 
79X, jpI,; OEoAoyia,;, pp. 45,254. 
80 XLipL,; (9EoAoyia,;, pp. 174-5. 
81 See XipI,; 6EoAoyia,;, pp. 174,245 and generally the chapter on Gregory of Palamas. On the other hand 
Koutroumbis does not hesitate to acknowledge and praise the Roman Catholic Church for the openings it made to 
the contemporary world through the Second Vatican Council: Xdpi(: 6EoAoyia,;, pp. 257-66, and 267-72. 
He 
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Christian faith and theology to their roots. 'Christianity becomes again ecclesial', he says; 
'theological thought turns again towards the sources of Christian life, that is the Liturgy, the 
Scripture and the Fathers of the Church'. 82 One can imagine that certain positions taken by 
Koutroumbis could have been quite or even very challenging in his day, given that the kind of 
spirituality and theological mentality put forward by Zoý was prevalent in theological circles 
and to a large extent throughout the Church in Greece, due to the pastoral and missionary 
work that members of the brotherhood had undertaken throughout the country. For example, 
when Koutroumbis says that morality is a matter of creativity on behalf of the free and 
fulfilled person rather than submission to external law, 83 or when he comments on some 
exaggerations of asceticism and of religious activity that were noticed in his days, 84 one feels 
that he sharply alludes to practices fostered by Zoý which dominated Church life at that time. 
Furthermore, Koutroumbis' remarks that Christianity is not a religion of just the soul, that 
Christians have the responsibility not to ignore or neglect the 'non-spiritual' matters of the 
world and his attitude towards the event of human love and his deep respect towards marriage 
and towards the couple's life in which he saw an image of the life of the Trinitarian God: all 
these must have appeared as quite alien to people who had undergone their religious education 
in circles like Zoý. Also, as I have mentioned earlier, Koutrounibis was knowledgeable of 
recent intellectual developments in general and up to date with modem theologians in 
particular and with people who, also on an academic level, had rediscovered the Church 
tradition and had taken on the responsibility to revive it and cast its light on contemporary life. 
This fact about Koutroumbis must have marked a striking difference from the attitude and 
mentality of the academic theologians in Athens, for example, to whom Yannaras refers as 
uninformed and quite closed off in their falsely self-sufficient intellectuality. 
In fact through his essays in TI Xaptý; rýý; eEoAoyia,;, Koutroumbis makes reference 
not only to traditional sources of Church faith and life such as the 
Fathers, but also to several 
contemporary voices in the sphere of theology, all of whom shared parallel views and 
brought 
out a similar kind of stance with regard to themes such as the nature of the 
Church, the 
goes even further to praise the example of the Church of Rome, as an expression of 
hurnility that all Christian 
Churches must imitate. 
82 Xtipt,; 6EoAoyI'ac, p. 240. 
83X6c, 2Lý; E)EMoyýa,;, p. 292. 
84 X6C()Lý; E)EoAoy[a,;, pp. 208-9. 
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character of the Christian life and of Christian spirituality. 85 One cannot fail to notice how 
great an impact the more spiritual insights about Christianity and Orthodoxy - brought out 
again in recent years through the rediscovery of the neptic and mystical tradition of the Church 
Fathers and also the interest in liturgical theology and the monastic life - have had on modem 
theological minds and on thinking people in general. In the thinkers that Koutroumbis quotes 
theological matters appear in quite a different light from the moralistic 'twaddle', according to 
Yannaras's expression, that remained foreign to people's real needs and anxieties. Theology 
now appears connected to life and is other than 'the Thomist-rationalistic understanding of 
dogmas' and 'the legalistic version of "orthodoxy" that was measured, in an Anselmian style, 
to the letter of the Holy Canons'. 86 
4. Zissimos Lorentzatos 
Whenever Yannaras speaks about the early years of his manhood, there is another 
name, next to Dimitris Koutroumbis, which commonly comes up - more than anybody else's, 
that of Zissimos Lorentzatos. Yannaras refers to him as a figure who had a great impact on his 
own intellectual and spiritual formation. Yannaras became aware of Lorentzatos while he was 
still an active member of Zoý and a boarder in the brotherhood, and more particularly towards 
the later years of that time. As we have seen, for Yannaras then it was a rather unpleasant time 
of bitterness, of spiritual hunger and of scepticism about his experience in Zo6 and what the 
brotherhood really represented. At the same time other young members in the brotherhood 
shared Yarmaras' feelings. Dimitris Koutroumbis and Zissimos Lorentzatos are not mentioned 
by Yannaras simply as of decisive significance for his own intellectual development. They are 
also presented as voices of the time that uttered a decisive and groundbreaking word for many, 
not least for those who had been mostly nurtured on the spirituality of the extra-ecclesial 
bodies like Zo6 and who had experienced dissatisfaction and felt its spiritual poverty. 
85 Apart from the names of Meyendorff, Lossky, Evdokimov and Lot-Borodine that we mentioned earlier. 
Koutroumbis also draws on people such as Georges Florovsky and Alexander Schmemann, on Uon Zander 
(X, jpj,; OEOAoyia,; pp. 295-304), Lev Gillet (ibid, pp. 291-3), Claude Tresmontant and his contribution in the 
reassessment of biblical metaphysics (ibid, pp. 245-6), Louis Bouyer (ibid, p. 226), Pierre Struve (ibid, p. 290) 
and others - 
86 KaTaoi)ylo, p. 350. 
43 
Lorentzatos came from a different walk of life from Koutroumbis; the latter, as we 
have seen, was a theologian and came from a working class family, Lorentzatos was a literary 
critic and a great man of letters, descendant of a professional family of Athens. They both 
converged, however, in their attitude towards the fundamentals of life and also shared similar 
reflections on their Christian and Hellenic roots and an analogous stance towards the true 
content of the tradition of their motherland. 
As we have already presented in some detail the life, thought and personality of 
Dirnitris Koutroumbis, the portrait of Zissimos Lorentzatos will be drawn more briefly. 
Lorentzatos was a great critic and essayist who lived from 1915 to 2004 and was prolific as a 
writer until his very last days. He was born the son of Panagis Lorentzatos, professor of 
Classical Greek Literature at the University of Athens, and he was brought up in Athens, 
where he also received his education. In the year 1949 he moved to France, where he 
registered at the Faculte des Lettres in the Sorbonne. He spent the following years between 
France, Greece and England, where he worked for the Greek Service of the BBC, until in 1956 
he returned to Greece permanently. 
He had connections and friendships with many people on the intellectual scene in his 
own days, such as Georgiog Seferis and Odyseas Elytis in Greece, Philip Sherrard in England 
and Alexander Schmemann, whom he met during a visit to the Seminary of St Vladimir's in 
New York, and whose book For the life of the World he had also translated into Greek. 
To give just a few examples of Lorentzatos' productivity, among his works are translations 
and essays on Edgar Allan Poe, Ezra Pound, T. S. Eliot and William Blake, and on the Greek 
side he wrote and published studies on Homer, Dionysios Solomos, Alexandros 
Papadiamandis, Constantinos Kavafis and Georgios Seferis and the architect Dimitrios 
Pikionis - to mention only a very few. 
87 
Zissimos Lorentzatos died recently, in 2004, and he is still today remembered and 
referred to by people who came to know him. Thus he is mentioned as a man who, even 
though he had a wide network of people that he knew and related with, did not mingle very 
87 For a full account of Zissimos Lorentzatos' life see N. P. Paisios, 'XQovoA6-yLo ZýcrLýiov AoQEvrC6tuov 
1915-2004' ['Chronicle/Timetable for Zissimos Lorentzatos 1915-2004'], Ma EcyTia: 1786 (Feb. 2006), pp. 
330-350. Also in the same issue there is a full list of Lorentzatos' works: Dimitris Daskalopoulos, 
'BLPALoyQaý)ýct ZýMý. tov AoQEvTý6ccov (1931-2005)' ['Bibliography of Zissimos Lorentzatos (1931-2005)'], 
pp. 351-397. 
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much in the marketplace. He is described as a figure who kept himself to himself and was 
quite isolated in his place on the north side of Athens, where he used to spend most of his time 
reflecting and writing. 88 The last is not at all to be taken as some expression of social 
arrogance, but rather as a style of life that expressed Lorentzatos' abstinent and wiry 
temperament and saved him for his literary work which was marked by clarity and sobriety. 
Lorentzatos' main focus of work was the study and the criticism of poetry, but also 
more widely of literature and not least the analysis of the history and theory of art in general. 
What we have available from Lorentzatos so far is in the main what he published when still 
living, and thus what is known about his thoughts and positions is basically based upon that 
material. A significant part of his work, however, is said to be still unpublished '89 so what we 
already have under his name is in fact only part of what he actually wrote. Zissimos 
Lorentzatos also wrote some poetry. However, as he himself put it, he was chosen to praise 
poetry rather than create it himself. 
Accounts of Lorentzatos' life and work commonly refer to an inner change that took 
place in him, and place it in the years between 1953 and 1961. This was the time when 
Lorentzatos met Philip Sherrard and became exposed to all the new stimuli and knowledge 
that his friendship with the latter had to offer. Within his connection with Sherrard, 
Lorentzatos got to read Ananda Coomaraswamy, Rene Guenon, Blake and Yeats, writers who 
clearly had an impact on him. 90 The two men also travelled together to Mount Athos in 1957.91 
This was the only trip Lorentzatos made to Athos, but it is still acknowledged as an event that 
put the finishing touch to his transformation. His critics consequently speak about an inner 
border and intersection that is noticeable also in Lorentzatos' work. This esoteric border is 
specifically identified by many with 'The lost centre', 'To XaýtEvo -KEvrQo, which is 
consider to be Lorentzatos' classic work, written in 1961 and included in an honorary volume 
for the poet Georgios Seferis. 92 The year 1961 is thus regarded as a milestone in Lorentzatos' 
88 Avi Saron, 'AoQE: vTC6cTo,; bTLKTjq)LCTL4', [Torentzatos in Kiffisia'], trns. Georgia Vamvounaki-Raffan, Ma 
EcrTia: 1786 (Feb. 2006), p. 217. 
89CIairi Mitsotaki, 'ýH obcovoýjfa 7,; xQfcnýtTj,; crT ry4ý,; ' ['The economy of the crucial moment'], Ma 
EoF, ria: 1786 (Feb. 2006), p. 226. 
' Stavros Zouboulakis, 'U 6m6(pacrq ",; 7jofTjo-q,; ' ['The decision on poetry], Ma EUTia: 1786 (Feb. 
2006), p. 213. 
91 XQovoA6-YLO', p. 338. 
92 Zissimos Lorentzatos, MERTEC T6ýt. A' [Studies, vol. A] (Athens: Dornos, 1994), pp. 331-419. 
45 
career, as his inner change is largely manifest in the positions he takes in his writings starting 
from 'The lost centre'. 
In particular, the new manner of thought that Zissimos Lorentzatos appears to embrace 
from that time in his life onwards, and which seems to colour all his thought thereafter, is his 
metaphysical attitude and his evaluation of not only the classical Hellenic, but also the 
Byzantine, tradition. And it is this that provides the connection between Lorentzatos' work 
and the context we are looking at here. 
As I have already said Lorentzatos discusses mainly poetry. His reflections and 
critiques, however, do not regard strictly poetry or - more generally - literature, nor - even 
more widely - just art. By starting most often from the milieu of literature the ideas he 
expresses are of a more comprehensive nature as they touch upon the theme of tradition, of 
metaphysics, of life itself. In other words, Lorentzatos' reviews, for the most part on various 
poets and their work, comprise the man's observations not only on the handling of language 
and on art -a form of which is poetry - but even further on human history and culture, on the 
current condition of cultural, political and ecclesiastical life, on faith and religious tradition, on 
the very question of life and metaphysics. 
Poetry itself for Lorentzatos is not merely a kind of aesthetic writing and expression, 
but he finds in it metaphysical significance, since poetry 'is meant to save US . 
93 Lorentzatos 
maintains that poetry used to be of a prophetic character and thus it has a 
function of rescue, 
which Lorentzatos perceived that in his days, however, had been 
lost and thus poetry became 
simply aesthetic. He also says that because of this we have ended up paying attention 
to the 
94 
words and not to the message, to how things are said and not to what we really mean 
to say. 
Therefore poetry, being only aesthetic, does not serve its purpose, which is to communicate 
metaphysical meaning and to transmit life, and has become pointless and empty. 
In fact this kind of critique by Lorentzatos is directed more generally to art as a whole 
and not only to poetry and literature. It is art in general that 
has become aesthetic rather than 
being metaphysical. He thus talks of a crisis in art, which is not an aesthetic 
but a 
93 Saron, p. 218. 
94 Thanasis Hantzopoulos, '110f) ELVaL T6 xývTQO, 7-COL6C ý &TCbAEL6C TOU; ' ['Where is the centre, what 
is its 




meaning that art has ceased to derive from life and to serve life. It is 
96 incomprehensible for Lorentzatos how life and art can be separate spheres. He observes, 
however, that the unity between art and life has been lost, and art has turned into a fragmented 
activity of humans that primarily seeks to please, rather than to communicate our experience 
of life and to edify. For Lorentzatos this is a symptom noticed widely in modem times, namely 
from the Renaissance and thereafter. Furthermore, this symptom does not appear only in art, 
but is even more generally a symptom of modernity and of civilization as a whole. 97 He very 
stylishly uses a metaphor of a boat in a storm: 98 the boat represents the art which suffers the 
storm, that is the wider cultural crisis, and it is by managing the general crisis of our modem 
times that art itself will find again its true role and place. The boat does not bring about the 
storm, and thus the crisis in art is not to be overcome from art itself as from within; we first 
need to tackle the general crisis of our modem civilization, and by doing so all the 'unhealthy' 
aspects of it will consequently be amended. 
The crisis of modem Europe that Lorentzatos refers to and more generally of modem 
civilization is namely the fact that man has become the centre of this civilization. We have 
ended up in a man-centred development (C(VOQ(07T0KEVTQLXO TioALTLapo), where man has 
taken the place of God: hence Lorentzatos' essay 'The lost Centre'. 
99 'The lost centre', that is, 
refers to what used to hold the place of man's metaphysical reference and it is where we need 
to return, what we need to recover. We need to return to the original, to the source, to the root, 
to the mother tradition. 
When Zissimos Lorentzatos speaks in favour of the tradition he means to appeal to the 
core of what the tradition in its historical continuity represents: both the Classical-Hellenic 
culture as well as the later Christian-Byzantine one incorporate a strong unity of 
belief and 
practice, of metaphysical faith and life, ultimately a strong unity and 
'catholicity' of life. 
Lorentzatos' essential observation is that this unity is largely missing in modem times. 
Present-day humanity experiences a state of fragmentation in life which results from the fact 
95 Hantzopoul0s, p. 248. 
96 yiannis Dimitrakakis, 'TEXvTj xaL' vE(orEQL-KOTqIra: 10 ZTjCFLýto(; AoQEvcC6rcoc, lcaý 
ý ý'OvTýQvcl 
Aoyo'rEXVLa' ['Art and modernism: Zissimos Lorentzatos and modem literature'], 
Ma Ta-iia: 1786 (Feb. 
2006), p. 242. 
97 Hantzopoul0s, p. 250: The crisis of the modem world and civilization is of spiritual, metaphysical character. 
98 Hantzopoulos, p. 247. 
99 Hantzopoulos, p. 252. 
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that we have distanced ourselves from what the life-serving tradition had to teach us and have 
replaced it all with the present-day worldview that deffies reason. Thus Lorentzatos seeks to 
find in modem poetry and art cases of poets and artists who dissent from the modem 
worldview (KO(7RO6I'6(OkO), which places man in the very centre. 100 And he finds such 
examples, for instance, in Yeats and T. S. Eliot, in the Greek short-story writer Alexandros 
Papadiamandis and the architect Dimitrios Pikionis. 
The fact that art is now displayed in museums - for example Christian icons in the 
Byzantine museum - is for Lorentzatos an expression of the modem fragmentation of life. He 
observes that we have lost the true content of the tradition and thus tradition is now dead 
remains without any other interest than the purely aesthetic and historical. In such a 
perspective, as it has been said, Lorentzatos' appreciation of the heritage of tradition does not 
pass 'through the spectacles of historicism but through the telescope of eschatology'. 101 He 
does not seek to restore the past for the sake of it or go backwards, but to illumine and afford 
meaning for the present. 
As we have seen, researchers who look into the person and the work of Lorentzatos 
speak about some esoteric change in the man. They tend to describe this change in terms of a 
movement of interests that took place in Lorentzatos, which is depicted in his works and is 
identified with a turn he made from art to religion and from aesthetics to metaphysics. 
However, in my understanding, to talk of a shift of interests in Lorentzatos from art to 
religion, for example, is not quite accurate. Lorentzatos never stopped being not merely 
interested but devoted to art. Therefore, it is not a shift of interests that took place in him, but 
rather a change or an enrichment of criteria in assessing things. In the later part of his life and 
his productions Lorentzatos continued to discuss art, aesthetics, and poetry, but he took a new 
stand towards all these, in re-defining them and elucidating their true content and their 
essential value. He looks for the true role of poetry and more generally of art, for their actual 
function and ralson d'&tre. Lorentzatos looks for the true logos in art. Lorentzatos' change is a 
turn towards finding and bringing out the unity between art and life. Lorentzatos' criticism 
touches upon the dissociation, the split that has taken place widely in modem culture and life, 
100 Dii-nitrakakis, p. 240. 
['One of the 101 Dimit is Triantafylopoulos, "lVa; TCOV "ýYT6; " PLA&EL -YL6( '161 PVýaVTLVd PVqPE: LCI n 
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between the true content of life and human activity, between the metaphysical and the 
practical, the truth of the metaphysics that once used to inspire and underlie and to give a 
reason to the arts and art itself. What Lorentzatos consequently suggests for humans is to rise 
above, to overcome this dissociation of the practical and the spiritual. The latter has actually 
and over the times been lost, hence Lorentzatos' Lost Centre; the spiritual centre, that is, what 
used to define human life and afford to all human activity meaning has been misplaced, or 
even replaced by a materialistic attitude and by man who has now become the centre himself. 
The element of unity is what Lorentzatos appreciates, for example, in Pikionis - who saw in 
matter and architectural construction not simply a functional purpose, but the embodiment of 
an attitude to life itself. 
Lorentzatos is concerned with the 'EýmQayýtcccTl ýtETa(ývumTl% the practical, we 
would say, or applied metaphysics. He sees the Orthodox Christian tradition - 'for us, at least, 
who live in this part of the world', he says - as the only vein through which live metaphysics 
can run. 102 The notion of tradition holds, therefore, a vital place for him; he sees tradition not 
as something fossilized but as something alive that is handed down from generation to 
generation and needs to be kept living, that is - as every living organism - to grow and 
prosper. Hence he is very critical of exaggerations of a historicism that abolishes the new 
without discretion for the sake of the old. Also, his insistence on the essentials of Hellenism 
and Orthodoxy does not foster a nationalistic attitude; in fact it annuls it, when he says that the 
conveyor of this tradition is he who engages with it, not he who just inherits it 
conventionally. 103 Lorentzatos is able to discern the value and the ethos of every civilization. 
He perceives continuity in the Greek-Orthodox tradition from the Classical through the 
Christian to modem Greece, and he is critical of the import of the 'western lights' to Greek 
reality in modem times. 
All such elements are also highly central and important for Yannaras. If Koutroumbis' 
contribution enlightened the theological criteria for Yannaras and helped him appreciate the 
patristic heritage, the input by Lorentzatos rounded this off by casting light on the significance 
102 McAtTE,; T6ýt. A', p. 246. 
103 MEA&E,; T6ýt. A', p. 419. 
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and the meaning of the wider cultural Greek-Orthodox formation in dealing with metaphysics. 
Besides, the main spirit that permeates Lorentzatos' remarks and thoughts, the quest for the 
lost unity in human life, freed from the fragmentation of the human experience that the 
dualistic mode creates, seems to me that which was the vital aspect that put the finishing touch 
to the inspiration the young Yannaras - himself at a time of distress and questioning around 
the essentials of life - found in Lorentzatos. The proposal or search for the wholeness of 
human life, the missing unity in life between belief and action, theory and practice, which 
gives meaning to life and lets our experience and all we do make sense, is a common attitude 
in Koutrournbis, Lorentzatos, and all the people whom these two presented or praised through 
their work. And this is what also connects them all and brings them all - even though from 
different pathways and each one at a different position - back to the tradition and lets them 
meet upon it; the fact, that is, that they all seek to preserve or to restore in their times the very 
element of 'catholicity' and order between theory and praxis, between the way of thinking or 
the metaphysical faith and the practice of life as expressed in all aspects of human activity, be 
it arts, politics or even financial life and social structure. After all, as we have seen, 
Lorentzatos does not discuss only art and the decline of it, but his concerns touch upon a more 
general crisis: we have seen the image of the boat that represents art storming in the wider 
cultural tornado. 
It is precisely, therefore, Lorentzatos' criticism of contemporary alienation from the 
originals in all ways (linguistic, cultural, ecclesiastical) and his appeal to the essential deposits 
of life that provided the insights that Yannaras needed. 
Yannaras' break with Zoý and move to Westem Europe 
Further to the introducing of Dimitris Koutroumbis to Zoý there were also efforts made 
by Father Elias Mastrogiannopoulos to open up new experiences for the theologians of the 
brotherhood, in terms of a theological edification, and let them be exposed to new voices. 
Thus Fr Elias organized a large theological assembly every summer to which he invited people 
like the Orthodox theologians from France, Fr John Meyendorff (at that time working on his 
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thesis on Gregory Palamas) and Elizabeth Behr-Sigel. 104 In relation to this activity Yannaras' 
notes: 'The immediate meeting with these people and the discussions with them was an even 
more eye-opening experience than the reading of texts. We had the chance to meet for the first 
time with people who embodied the atmosphere, the style and the ethos of the - to our eyes 
legendary - Russian Diaspora. People fully belonging in their time, smart, educated, vigorous, 
informed in all, and at the same time with passion for a theology that was questing its genuine 
verification in its engagement with the current and dramatic impasses of the Western 
World' 105 The influence of the encounter with the above persons was essential for Yannaras 
himself and for other theologians of the movement of Zoý who left the brotherhood in short 
time. 
Yannaras broke with the brotherhood of Zoý in the winter of 1964. He was already 29 
years of age by then and had spent ten years of his life as a boarder and later as a probationer 
in Zoiý. Just before he left the brotherhood he had expressed the idea that, in order to work 
through his dilemmas regarding his dedication to it, and to get a clearer view of his future 
decisions, he would seek funding and get away for a couple of years, to study abroad; 
Germany seemed a realistic option. The immediate response to his suggestion from Fr Elias 
Mastrogiannopoulos, who was Yannaras' spiritual father and to whom Yannaras had chosen to 
entrust his thoughts, was totally shattering. In an almost theatrical demonstration Fr Elias 
expressed his disapproval and utter refusal even to discuss the idea. For Yannaras, however, Fr 
Elias' reaction, despite the initial devastating shock it caused, eventually resulted in his 
decision to leave Zod. 106 
It is then through TAKaO' Eavcov, the other main autobiographical source mentioned 
at the beginning, that we learn about Yannaras' life in the years that followed. Yannaras went 
in fact to Germany, where he spent the first three years after leaving Greece, and then later to 
104 For a reading on Elizabeth Behr-Sigel see Olga Lossky, Vers le jour sans d&lin: une vie d'tlisabeth Behr- 
Sigel (Paris: Le Cerf, 2007). 
105 isrespect some people in Zo6 had Ka-[a0t5yto, p. 344. It worth to note the expressions of resentment and di 
.*I shown in relation to the presence of Koutroumbis and Behr-Sigel, as they are characteristic of the reaction to the 
renewal Fr Elias tried to 
bring: Ka-raýp6yto, p. 349. Similar contempt applied further to the monks of Mount 
Athos, and members of Zod were allowed to visit there only to get more subscriptions for Zoe! 
106 KaTaq5t)Y'O, pp. 387-9. 
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France, to Paris. His experience of life and study abroad was really significant for him, and it 
is necessary to draw out those elements from it which show how he connected with what he 
met in Europe, how he related to the philosophical traditions he encountered there, how he got 
the stimulus to go into the kind of discourse that became characteristic of him; how he came to 
look into, develop and discuss metaphysics and ontology in personalist terms, placing in the 
centre of his whole outlook notions like 'being in truth', 'person', and 'Eros'. 
As Yannaras himself admits, all his work is an expression of also his own 'personal 
107 
quest and fight for [his] existential problem' . In other words, the kind of philosophical 
themes that he involved himself in resulted also from a personal questioning and speculation 
and were not at all irrelevant to his experiences of life. The title of the first book that he had 
published, Hunger and Thirst (17EL'vaKai biq)a), as he himself says, could have been repeated 
as a subtitle on all his subsequent works, expressing the fact that each of them was a cry of 
personal hunger and thirst, an ardent wish for Eros. Given the experience he was bringing with 
him from the extra-ecclesial brotherhood of Zoý, one first thing that struck him was the 
connection he could now draw (while a student in Germany) between that experience and the 
new settings in Europe that he was encountering: 'I was living the life of a Roman-Catholic 
boarding-house; I- the only foreigner - was sharing the confined every-day life of the 
German students. It was one more revelation: I had met in Greece the distorted religiosity of 
the extra-ecclesial organisations, and for the first time I felt myself in contact with those who 
first taught this distortion'. 108 
Gradually Yannaras came to understand that there were two different worlds in terms 
of Christian religious experience: on the one hand a feeling for Church 
life as a mystical 
festive leap untouched by ideology, and on the other hand a Christian experience of life as an 
ideological conscription monitored by discipline and obedience in every little aspect of life. 
Yannaras' own words describe best how the problem came into focus for him: 
I was uncovering little by little the vital lead: My own experiences of 
westemised religiosity were coming to match, in a revealing way, their 
historical and social prototype here in the West. I could see more and more 
clearly the issue of my time, the question I had to clarify, first and foremost for 
107 Christos Yannaras, Týt Kae, ýavrbv (Athens: Ikaros, 2005), p. 39. 
"' Kae, EavT6v, p. 42. 
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myself, in my life: orthodoxy and the West, Greece and Europe, Tradition and 
Ideology, Church and Religion. 109 
While studying in Germany Yannaras came across the name and the work of 
Heidegger, and he was very quickly carried away by the style of Heidegger's writing and how 
Heidegger was wedding together a poetic language with philosophy. Familiar with 
Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics, Yannaras found inspiration there for the title of his 
first book: The Metaphysics of the Body. Yannaras' initial interests, so to speak, were to see 
the contradictions and to overcome the challenge of the dualism that had conftised and 
horrified him since his childhood; he wanted to look into the borders of the soul and the body: 
'Where does the soul end and where does the body begin? A look or a smile, the voice or the 
charm of a movement: are these of the soul or of the bodyT And furthermore, some equally 
perplexing issues: why the contempt, why the suspicion and the fear towards the human body, 
and how have these been passed down as the fundamental nature of Christianity? How much 
Platonism and Manichaism are hidden in this dualism that had taken over? "O Such questions 
had to be examined, for Yannaras, against what was taken by many to be the "womb" of the 
most severe dualism, against one of the most austere and formal texts of Christian asceticism. 
For Yannaras this would be the Ladder of John of Sinai. 
In Germany too, Yannaras found out how western he had been: 'My "armour", my 
way of thought (voo-rQo7da), was second-hand from a European department store. I did not 
even have the awareness of modem speculation: my education reached as far as the "evidences 
for the existence of God"'. "' He then came to the understanding that the metaphysics of 
modem Greeks was a blend of Roman Catholic scholasticism and protestant moralism. 
Very soon Yannaras found that he had to face the challenge of demythologisation. 
'EntmytholOgisierung' was of supreme importance in those years in Germany: the belief in the 
Christian God had to be freed from all mythological elements. According to the modem 
analysis, the stories of the Bible had been narrated in a certain historical context and therefore 
, l, Kao, javröv, p. 43. 
, 11 Kao, eavröv, p. 45 
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their message had been dressed in fictitious garments. It was not possible any longer, under 
the experience of modernity and the weight of the intellect's critiques of religion and theism, 
to ignore the challenge and to retain unquestionably what was now understood as objectified 
naive theological conceptions. It was, therefore, the task of demythologisation to ask what it 
was that the biblical writers were trying to say in a mythological way and then to clarify the 
message of the gospel (the kerygma, Kqpvyya) by interpreting and re-presenting it anew and 
uncontaminated from false conceptions in terms of a twentieth-century world-view. However, 
all that demythologisation was aiming at and could accomplish, to Yannaras' understanding, 
was to shatter the "objectivity") of metaphysics also in the theological realm; still the 
ontological questions gaped unanswered. Demythologisation might secure God's 
"subjectivity", which was otherwise undermined by the act of identifying objects of human 
conceiving with the wholly Other and by accepting revelation to be contained and possessed 
by a certain time in history. Even so, demythologisation seemed, as it were, to build new 
matter upon the old. ) unchanged frame. The 
fundamental questions of being, God and 
existence, which were set afresh there where the account of theism ended up, were not 
substantially and adequately addressed by the historical critique. Again in Yannaras' own 
words: 'Either I could understand Heidegger better than the great Bultmann, or I had illusions 
of explosives there where the other was building towers. " 112 What Yannaras saw in Heidegger 
was something that exploded the whole tradition of western philosophy. For the ultimate of 
human thought and critique that Heidegger and the existentialists represented at the time, the 
issue of metaphysics was not a matter of reiterating the subject matter of the gospel using a 
fresh, modem language. The question was not to reiterate the content of religion in a modem 
way; not to equip the old skeleton-bones of metaphysics with a new flesh, but to acknowledge 
that the structure itself had now collapsed. The development of Western metaphysics had led 
to the death of God, and that was a blunt fact that had to be honestly faced. Nietzsche's 
madman, seeing through all modem metaphysics, had bravely declared that 
God had died. It 
was an irrevocable outcome of the course of the human intellect that needed not to 
be 
overlooked: God was dead! That is, the notion of God, the idolatrous 
image of God that was 
put forward even by what had passed for Christian theism - ever since the 
development of 
scholasticism - could not survive and be believed in any longer. 'Years went 
by', Yannaras" 
112 KaO'tavr6v, p. 49. 
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account continues, 'before I became sure how naturally incapable the "great" theologians of 
the West were of posing ontological questions. Rationalism is not a school or a method. It has 
the entrenched reflexes of a defensive hermitism. The explosive problematic of Heidegger and 
Sartre remained (and remains) incomprehensible for the West. So did the message that 
Nietzsche's "mad man" was putting across. What was certain was that the philosophers were 
in the vanguard; the theologians were following: Bultmann following Heidegger, Moltmann 
following Bloch'. 113 
Yannaras soon came to realize that the true answer to demythologization was already 
there, in the position of apophaticism that had always been a vital part of the eastern tradition. 
The issue was not to look for a way of moving from one way of saying things to another, since 
any language one might end up using was bound to be inadequate for describing the reality of 
God. The key, for Yannaras, was to acknowledge this very inadequacy and agree on the 
conditional quality of all theological expressions. The apophatic approach with regard to the 
knowledge of God for the great theologians of the East meant that theological language could 
not be a conceptual language that sought to identify the transcendent reality with the terms 
used in that context and even less to exhaust that reality in any theological utterances about it. 
The consciousness that accompanied all theological discourse was that the language best used 
to serve its purposes would rather be a poetic, prophetic language expressed in imagery. 'The 
conceptual, historical, mythical, pictorial expression is only a definition-outline (OQO(; -OQLO) 
of the truth. ... You 
do not need to demythologise anything, when you refuse to identify the 
expression with its meaning; when what is important about knowledge is the whole experience 
of the relationship, not the fragmentary nature of understanding'. 
114 
It follows naturally from this how for Yannaras the idea of relationship came to 
occupy such a central place in his theoretical approaches. It is through relational practice that 
we reach a true knowledge and understanding of the reality that surrounds us; it takes 
immediate personal involvement to get to know and experience what lies beyond us. The jump 
beyond the impasse that modernity had to face, the existential salto mortale, so to speak, 
113 KaO'kavT6v, p. 49. 
114 KaO'EavT6v, p. 50. 
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beyond the void that is gaping wide open under man's feet - since the notion of God on which 
he once stood is now gone - is, Yannaras will say, the opportunity of the relationship. 
In such a way, as he notes, apophaticism led him to the realism of the relationship. 
And consequently the latter brought him to Eros, as the fulfilling potentiality of the former. 
For a relationship to be a source of true knowledge it needs to be erotic. This means that the 
agents involved in a relationship do so in a "self-exiting" way, in other terms in a loving and 
self-denying way. It takes a commitment to be kenotic to find and meet with the real other 
person or the Ultimate Other. It means that you need to leave aside all your prejudices and pre- 
understandings, and even more all your self-defences and 'armours' so as to be able to see 
things as they are. This is, in a way, similar to that of an erotic event, where all preset 
conditions will collapse to open the way for the embrace of the loving other. In this way 
Yannaras, likes to identify Eros with authentic existence, true being and true knowledge. For 
Yannaras Eros ultimately refers us to the very being of God, the way in other words in which 
God reveals himself and makes himself known: as ultimate and kenotic love. 
Subsequently, as the chain of Yannaras' succeeding developments in the realm of his 
theoretical quests unfolds, Eros led him to existential otherness and freedom. This means that 
to be erotic, to be self-denying and to stand out of oneself, is an act that takes place only by 
free choice. In the fallen state of things every individual experiences its existence engrossed, 
so to speak, within it, and it takes an act of free and conscious choice to deny one's ways and 
stride out to meet with the other. This very journey in the 'wilderness' of the other brings out 
the reality as much as the importance of othemess. For Yannaras, in contrast to the fearful 
threat of 'the other' prevailing in the philosophy of the existentialists, otherness is a joyous 
opportunity for establishing a relationship and from there for celebrating communion, the 
loving sharing of life. In this way finally, from otherness and freedom, Yannaras will reach the 
notion and the ontological priority of the person. The person is that ontological category of 
existence that fulfils Eros. To be a person means that one achieves a mode of being qualified 
with all those elements that make being erotic. A person is thus self-exiting, self-denying, and 
so on within the quest of authentically relating with the other. Since the person is relational, 
and given the precedence of the relationship described earlier here with regard to achieving 
knowledge, Yannaras ends up talking about the ontological priority of the person. This means 
that to start with one gets to relate oneself as a distinct existence from other people and the 
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world around one; it is through personal encounter and experiential exchange with what 
surrounds us that we embark on the journey of true knowledge. Nature does not exist 
abstractly as such, but only in certain personal beings. And it is through them that we get to 
approach the wider and more inclusive idea of nature. God himself, as related in the Christian 
tradition, is personal; he is made known through a personal revelation and as certain persons. 
Furthermore the very existence of each of us is dependent upon the relationship of two other 
persons. In such a way Being itself is manifest for Yannaras as personal. 
The first pioneer in Yannaras' pursuit of the themes described above was to be John of 
the Ladder. The fruit of this guidance was the METWPVMKý rov u6pa-rog (Metaphysics of the 
Body). John of the Ladder referred Yannaras to the apophaticism of Denys the Areopagite. A 
second book came out of this study: Heidegger and the Areopagite, which basically comprised 
an assessment of the differences between apophaticism and agnosticism-nihilism. From Denys 
the Areopagite Yannaras moved on to read Maximus the Confessor, to whom the ancient 
comments or scholia on the Areopagite have been (mostly wrongly) ascribed. Maximus 
fascinated Yannaras. The fruit of the encounter this time was the treatise Person and Eros. 
Heidegger always remained a challenge for ontological realism. However, 'the fence that 
Heidegger did not have the courage to jump, Maximus was striding over with the ease of a 
giant'. 115 Maximus consequently encouraged Yannaras to study the language of Aristotle. And 
from there on, to look at Gregory Palamas, who carried on from Maximus, and who shed light 
for Yannaras on the 'Thomistic falsification of Aristotelian realism'. 
Starting his study from the Ladder of John Climacus, Yannaras' objective, as 
mentioned earlier, was to look into the dualism of the spiritual and the material, the soul and 
the body: a dualism that Yannaras came to see exemplified in Cartesian rationalism, that 
eventually drained the bodily of all significance. Yannaras now sought to represent his thought 
here in terms drawn from the existentialist ontology of Heidegger, gamely finding Greek 
equivalents for Heidegger's terminology. 
yannaras here attempts a first sketch of a Greek Heideggerianism that will be pursued 
in great detail in later works, such as Person and Eros. The human body is the place of 
115 E KcrO' 'crvr6v, p. 50. 
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Dasein, 'being there', EvOabL-K6Tqra, and existence is manifest in an ecstasy -a 'standing 
out' of the body - towards the other: a movement that takes place in freedom. Therefore, in 
the Ladder, Yannaras finds the conditions of self-centredness - rationalist or existentialist - 
radically overturned. The body is the natural reality of practised relationships. Such practice - 
ota-KTIo-q - is seen as an exercise in freedom, not an imposition to be endured. Yannaras 
begins to develop a dialectic of nature and hypostasis, introduces the notion of the person, 
71QOff(Ono, and speaks of an 'apophaticism' that identifies ro 6cATjOF-vELv - being in truth - 
with, ro xoLwowiiv - being in communion. 
The next literary step of Yannaras was the publishing of Heidegger and the 
Areopagite; this was the result of research supervised by Luise Abramowskyl 16 and it 
comprised a systematic comparison of the differences between apophaticism and agnosticism 
or nihilism. He had been let down with his submission of Metaphysics of the Body in the 
faculty of theology in the University of Athens, ' 17 but he came back to write it all over again 
later in Paris, to submit it as a doctorate of philosophy in the faculty of Letters. At the same 
time he kept putting together his materials for a systematic expression of a 'person-centred' 
ontology. To the challenges that Heidegger was setting, there were now added those of Sartre. 
For Yannaras this new encounter was an exciting experience; in the latter's own words Sartre 
represented 'probably the most crucial theological thought of the century - theological as the 
negative of the picture - far more metaphysical than the western theologians'. For Yannaras, 
that is, Sartre appeared as a theologising mind and voice, even though a proclaimed atheist, in 
the sense that his nihilism was the other side - the negative print - of an experiential 
theology - 
11 8 
The years that Yannaras spent in Paris - three continuous years there and another two 
of discontinuous dwelling - were very fruitful also for another reason: his 
discovery of the 
French scholars of the medieval period, mainly Gilson and Chenu, and also the encounter with 
116 Kao, cavr6v, P. 64. 
J17Kao'iav, i6v, pp. 62-4. 
1" KaO' ýavr6v, p- 72. 
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the works of Erwin Panofsky and Georges Duby. 
119 All these became immensely illuminating, 
for Yannaras, in his study of scholasticism and for his understanding and interpretation of the 
development of the cultural differences between the Greek East and the Latin West. To 
Yannaras' understanding the diverse routes in the progress of the civilizations of these two 
worlds emerged from a differentiation in their ontological approach. Yannaras could see two 
worlds, two different traditions and cultural structures. On the one hand stood Hellenized 
Christianity, which had retained the same approach to the theory of knowledge that was 
present in classical times: an approach that was to identify true being with being in 
conununion. On the other side was the civilization of the West which was based on and was 
the result of a shift that had taken place in the realm of ontology; the change consisted in the 
move from the Greek meaning of 'Logos' to the Thomist understanding of veritas or essentia. 
This shift for Yannaras could cast light on the development of the civilization in the West that 
now ended in nihilism. Therefore for him it was illuminating to be able to pin down and 
clarify how the deviation from the theory of knowledge as it stood in classical times - the 
identifying of being in truth with being in communion - and from the theory of knowledge in 
Hellenized Christianity brought medieval Europe to split from the Greek tradition, and 
overthrew the terms of Greek civilization with reference both to the theory of knowledge and 
to ontology. Also, how from the requirements of the new theory of knowledge, namely the 
requirements for self-centred rational certainties, follows the phenomenon of dogmatism, and 
how dogmatism led to the formation of totalitarianism - an atrocious and novel episode in 
history. And to what extent can the person-centred, ontological realism of the Byzantines 
stand today as a proposition for getting out of the nihilistic impasse; how can that tradition 
be 
worded in the language of modem speculation, how it can converse with 
Heidegger and 
Sartre, with the theatre of the absurd, with surrealism in painting and poetry, with the 
principles of Political Economy, or with the language of quantum mechanics? 
For Yannaras 
even the attribution of a different meaning to ratio by Aquinas, the radical overthrow of 
the 
Greek meaning of logos, and the way veritas or essentia were approached and presented over 
and over again in Aquinas' works, were enough to cast 
light on the whole religious, 
philosophical, social and political structure of western medieval times, on 
the Cartesian 
119 Yannaras mentions two certain works of these scholars that for him became key books for his understanding 
of a whole epoch and civilization, 
M. D. Chenu: La thiologie comme science au X[He siMe and Etienne Gilson: 
La philosophie au moyen dge: 
Kae, kav-c6v, pp. 73-74. 
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recapitulation of scholasticism and on the imprisonment of modem naturalism within the 
conditions of medieval ontology. 120 
The picture of Yannaras' time and experience in Europe over the years of his life that 
we look at here would be incomplete did we not mention his encounter with the Orthodox 
population in Paris. To come across the 'Orthodox Paris' was a powerful experience for 
Yannaras and it was specifically the Orthodox communities formed by the Russian enuigres 
that had a great impact upon him. 12 1 Unlike the assemblies at the Greek and the Russian 
cathedrals that existed rather out of a hereditary custom and which used to come together in a 
style of secular socializing that served also to maintain quaint customs of a nationalistic 
character, the Russian parishes of the emigres constitute an altogether different case. These 
parishes conveyed an Orthodoxy which had none of the characteristics that Yannaras had 
come across so far: it was neither an ideology nor an association nor an administrative 
institution and it was not even the school of theology that the Russian emigres had founded. 
Their Orthodoxy was the very parishes themselves, the living body of the community of 
persons gathering together to celebrate the Eucharist and thus to form the Church. These 
parishes brought out a spirituality, a sense of life and a reason why they existed all quite 
different from what Yannaras had known of similar congregations up to that time. In Paris, 
Yannaras notes, he became aware, for the first time, of what the nature and the meaning of a 
Church parish is: an actual community of people that come together primarily due to the need 
for communion, each of them bringing to it his/her own self and otherness, no matter how 
much more or less virtuous or sinful they may be, and without the concern to conform to 
uniform codes and appearances. They were not characterized by a fixed expression of piety as 
other pietistic groups he could recall from his days in Greece and Germany. The two French- 
speaking parishes of Russian Orthodox in Paris were live communities of generous fellowship, 
of simplicity in peoples' relationships and unvarnished manners. They were living bodies with 
120 KaO'Eavc6v, p. 74. 
121 Yarmaras refers specifically to two such French-speaking communities to which he became more connected: 
the one that met in the basement, the 'crypt' of the Russian Cathedral, at rue Daru close to 
ttoile, and the other at 
rue St. Victor, at the 
5th arron dissement of Paris. This second parish had transformed a previous shop to a church. 
which accommodated an 
iconostasis decorated by Leonid Ouspenky (KaO' kavE6v, pp. 91,93). Yannaras also 
makes reference to the 
famous and less famous Russian theologians of this time, mainly scholars of different 
tracks who had found refuge in Paris and engaged themselves here with the serving in the 
Church life and the 
teaching of Orthodox theology. 
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a strong consciousness of the Eucharistic character of their gathering together and free from a 
customary type of religiosity that was simply a matter of inheritance. Also, he was struck by 
the prayerful atmosphere and devout serenity of these two Church communities, in contrast to 
the flamboyant style and aristocratic wealth that a visitor would sense in the Greek or the 
Russian cathedrals. The orthodoxy and the Church experience of the people at the crypt and 
the other French-speaking Russian Orthodox parish he knew were organically bound to real 
life. The Russian emigres had brought to Europe something like a revolt. The theology that 
they presented did not remain on the sides of interest and life as just another, partial 
theological-church tradition that was ideologically more correct or more spiritual, more 
mystical, than other traditions. The contribution of the great Russian theologians in France 
was that they had a realistic proposal of life to counter-present against the European impasse, a 
proposal of existential meaning. In this way they gave flesh again to the skeleton-like 
language of academic and moralistic theology. On the whole the encounter with these 
Orthodox communities in Paris and the experience of the event of the parish to Yannaras was 
a constructive, revelation-like occurrence. 122 
Yannaras' experience of Paris also included the rebellion of May '68 which, as 
Yannaras notes. ) was not in the 
least a claim for economic gains or trade-union demands. It 
was a protest for freedom from the captivity of the consumerist way of life. It was an outcry 
for creative life and freedom, real freedom, where one can stand up for and manage the place 
of one's work and of one's life, where one can find the neighbour and companionship. May of 
'68 demanded a new ethos. However, the demand remained ontologically unsettled, and 
therefore utopian, a nostalgic utopia. The European self-questioning could not go further than 
the phenomenology of the symptoms. For Yannaras the events and the developments of those 
days were a practical study in ontology, a practical review of the ontological lines / definitions 
and their importance for the meaning of everyday life. 
This is in a general sense the way in which Yannaras's thoughts developed until they 
took shape in the form of a doctoral thesis which he submitted to the faculty of theology at the 
university of Salonica and also later at the Sorbonne, a thesis called 
Person and Eros. 
122 E KaO' favr6v, pp. 87-94 
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Yannaras had been attracted to the contribution Of thought made by Heidegger and 
Sartre; he found Sartre even more appealing owing to his 'disarming honesty'. In Yannaras 
own words: 
Even Heidegger protected himself behind academic formality, even though he 
constructed his philosophical word poetically. Sartre dared to expose himself, to 
cry out. Systematic thought did not fit him; he laid his anguish bare in theatrical 
plays, in novels, in free prose. He committed himself to desperate struggle, he 
went down to the streets, to demonstrations for social demands, he was thirsty for 
action. In almost every one of his lines I felt his claim for empirical certainty of 
an ontological character. ... He would not be reconciled with rationalist 
replacements of the real and the experiential, opposed to the self-delusion of 
identifying the real with just the social phenomenology (p. 104). 
For Yannaras these two existentialists represented a courageous expression of the fact 
that the whole structure of modem civilization was founded on the repression and disregard of 
the ontological question; the existentialists 'were tearing away the comfortable screen, they 
were provoking openly voluntary blindness'. Neither the rationalist language of theology nor 
the language of naturalism and mechanistic psychology appeared adequate to sustain empirical 
nihilism, the absence of meaning for existence and for the world. They did not address the 
question of the origins of being, of the issue of the origins of freedom or necessity. ýIbe 
fundamental questions of man's existence and life remained unanswered, since the answers 
that had seemed convincing before had given way to uncertainty and absence of meaningful 
solutions; therefore there was needed some nerve to be able to state honestly the ontological 
nihilism that had emerged and that could be felt. 
123 To Yannaras, Heidegger and Sartre 
represented such a daring spirit. 
Yannaras felt that the same realism and bravery in expressing reality could be 
identified in the language of the Greek fathers of the Church. Furthermore, he found that in 
addition they led towards an answer, and their greatest effort was to 
distinguish and shed light 
on the difference between empirical facts and 'imaginary reflections', 
between what could be 
experientially approached and certified and that which was a rather unreliable or misleading 
123 For Yannaras, attempts to fill the gap of the riddle of the existence such as those amvlng by philosophising 
sociologists or sociologising philosophers, as 
he calls them, like Habermas, Appel, Derrida, Althusser, Lyotard, 
were rather cornic, as they were annoyingly unrealistic in the way they constructed and 
tried to impress with 
deceitful and non-sustainable structures of substantial non-meaningful expression: KaO'EavT6v, p. 
105. 
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invention of the human. In this way Yannaras considered that there were the following 
challenges lying ahead: to try and answer the ontological problems of Heidegger and Sartre by 
drawing on the experience and knowledge of the Church, but also using a language that would 
engage with and be convincing to Heidegger and Sartre. Also, to try and build a bridge 
between the age of the Church Fathers and the modem one, clearing up all the rust that had 
accumulated in between. Both tasks appeared to be really ambitious and challenging, if not an 
endeavour that would take a whole lifetime. Even so, as Yannaras notes, it was worth a try at 
least, with the hope that others, more competent, would later appear to take these efforts 
further. 124 
According to his own account in KacaýV'yto 76, -C)v and T6C KaO' Eav-cov, this was 
how Yannaras was led to embark on the series of works that were to mark out his career as a 
Greek intellectual and philosopher. The earliest fruits of these include the works already 
mentioned - Heidegger and the Areopagite, The Freedom of 
Morality and, especially, Person 
and Eros - which will form the basis for the rest of this thesis. 
124 The preceding two paragraphs sununarize what 
Yannaras says in Kae, kavr6v, pp. 105-6. 
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Chapter 11 
Heidegger and the Areopagite 
When Yannaras came to Western Europe there were mainly two elements from his 
background that he was carrying within himself and which were going to play their part in the 
later formation and expression of the philosophical and theological mind of the man. First, 
Yannaras was bringing with him the experience of religious devotion with a moralistic 
approach to Christian faith and life; this was what he had been edified with in the brotherhood 
of Zoiý. The tenet of being virtuous and keeping the moral law, the attitude of measuring every 
single move of man's everyday activity against the articles of the moral code, written and 
unwritten, was what was principally put forward by the organization. In the spirit of the 
teaching presented there, Christ was primarily a conceptualised ideal and the mission for the 
members was to implement that ideal not only in their own lives but, equally importantly, to as 
many other people around in the society as they could, who had not yet had the fortune to have 
this Christ-idea formed in themselves. To live up to the moral law was crucial and was what 
primarily counted for the objective of applying the Christ-idea. To a large part emphasis used 
to fall on being good and that meant being moral, which was specified in a narrow way by 
measuring oneself against restricted standards of external behaviour. There was no similar 
emphasis on liturgical life, for example, or on the practice of prayer and the inner spiritual 
development of the person. Such aspects were seen rather only as parts of the good moral life 
that a Christian should demonstrate; they were not put forward as the heart of Christian life, as 
what life in the Church basically involved. The main ingredient of Christian life, as it were, 
was the ethical, the morally pure conduct of Christians, reflected mainly in social and welfare 
activity. In Ka-caOf)yto'1bE(Dv there are several illustrating examples of the expression of this 
moralistic style of life practised in the groups of Zoý and we have seen some in the relevant 
paragraphs of the previous chapter. 
Secondly, when Yannaras went abroad he was also carrying in himself the spirituality 
he had seen practised by his family and mainly by his mother. This was an experience quite 
detached from the idea of the religious law and more inspired by participation in the liturgical 
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life of the Church and trust in Church practice and tradition in a way that the latter were 
organically fitted in the current, at the time, reality of people's lives. Faith in God and trust in 
Christ were a natural thing to do, or rather a way to live, bound comfortably with people's real 
life. Here there was not any Zo6-like stress on external appearance and behaviour; Christian 
life did not feel like an externally-imposed frame into which people had to fit by squeezing in 
and strangling their individuality. Instead, to be a believer was a joyful choice and an 
opportunity for opening up further possibilities for an authentic life, and Church life was 
experienced as a festivity. 125 Following from this twofold experience Yanarras was keen to 
know where truth and falsehood lay in the different forms of religious practice that he had 
experienced. The Christian education he had received since a child through the circles of Zoý, 
and the great vocation to remain a celibate dedicated to the work of the brotherhood which had 
been propagated to the young men, including himself, but which he had personally now 
suspended, followed him as a problem to resolve. Yannaras found himself troubled by the 
question of what was true and faithful to Christian teaching and tradition, what was genuine 
and what was not in the type of Christianity that he had experienced in Zoý, and which had 
also gradually spread and had coloured widely the Church in Greece. 
In Western Europe Yannaras encountered, as we have already seen, the protestant 
Christian world, and very soon he started to draw parallels between this new setting and his 
past experience in Zoiý, and to realize what, to his understanding, had gone wrong in the 
religiosity of the latter. Also, arriving at Europe in the early 1960s Yannaras came upon the 
intellectual developments going on at that time and the frame of mind that characterized 
European thought in those years. Yannaras found himself facing recent developments in 
European thought both on a theological and a philosophical level, as the Western Europe of 
the 1960s presented a twofold setting for him. First, on a theological level, there was a 
prevailing spirit of doubt and reform, largely expressed 
in the theme widely diffused and 
discussed in those days of the 'death of God'. Secondly, the Europe of the 1960s was 
dominated by the philosophy of existentialism, to which, as we shall see, Yannaras was very 
125 See TLOQTý' [Celebration] in KaO'iavc6v, where Yannaras illustrates through his memories of 
his family 
life in his young years, how metaphysics for him was before anything else experienced as a 
festive event, an 
experiential certainty of celebration and 
joy, pp. 35-7. 
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soon attracted. In the following section I will try therefore to describe briefly this European 
setting. 
1. The religious scene of the 1960s 
The 1960s was a sipificant time in the history of Western Europe. The 1960s was for 
the Western world a period of striking change at all levels, from pop music to politics to 
religion, culminating in the revolts in universities that bordered on revolution in 1968.126 This 
change and development did not exclude - in fact it was to some extent brought about by 
change in - the realm of religion and a shift with regard to the power that Christian faith in 
particular and the Church had over people and their life. In fact change in relation to 
religiosity had occurred as early as in the 17 th to 19ý' centuries, which had seen religious 
tolerance and pluralism. 127 The sips of religious transformation in modem times were even 
more apparent over the 19th and the first half of the 20th century through all the countries of 
Western Europe - even though with variations from country to country - with evidence of 
changes in the role and the status of the Christian religion: decline of Christianity, 
secularization of public institutions such as education, fall of society's religiosity and 
detachment from Christian faith and practice. The decade of the 1960s then is marked by 
historians as the culminating, as it were, period, and a milestone of change in western 
societies, a 'hinge decade, separating the 1940s and 1950s from the 1970s and 1980s'. 
128 it 
was a period that witnessed a dramatic collapse in religious practice and Christian religious 
culture and values -a time signified by great decline of the social importance of religion, 
drop 
in church-going, and decrease in the level in which people associated their life and their 
choices with Christian ethics, as the matter of faith in God became more and more 
irrelevant. 129AIso economic prosperity contributed to social and cultural changes in the life of 
communities, families and individuals, including a loosening of 
Christian identity on 
126 The decade we refer to is often described by historians as the 'long 1960s', extending from 1958 to 1974. See 
the introduction in McLeod, Hugh, The Religious Crisis of the 1960s (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
127 See introduction in Religious Crisis. 
128Religious Crisis, p. 258. 
129For an overview of the historical changes related to religion and the status of Christian faith In society in 
modern times Europe see 
McLeod, Hugh and Ustorf, Werner (eds. ), The Decline of Christendom in Western 
Europe, 1750-2000 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Religious Crisis as quoted above. 
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developing populations. ' 30 The 1960s was a time of intense doubt and disbelief with regard to 
Christian religion, where the general public did not succeed to Christian faith unquestionably 
but grew more and more into skeptics and even atheists. In general, the characteristic of 
modernity where social and political life become more and more autonomous from religion, as 
well as the main changes that modernity signifies - the advance of science and technology, 
rationalization, individualization and freedom, nationalism, economic development - all form 
the picture of the ferment that marked the 1960s. 1 31 
Consequently, the enviromnent that Yannaras encountered when he arrived in Western 
Europe was in broad terms characterized by open rejection of Christianity and religious 
indifference in the general public, and the understanding of society not any longer as a 
Christian society but as a pluralist or secular one. ' 32 Developments accordingly were taking 
place in theology too, since theology tried to engage with the widely felt ramifications and 
conditions of modernity. Themes of 1960s Christianity were characterized by self-criticism on 
part of intellectuals in respect of the triumphalism, dogmatism and legalism in terms of which 
Christian belief had been interpreted, and religious doubt was widely stimulated by many 
theologians themselves. 1 33 The most dramatic expression of such criticism in the English- 
speaking world, which had a huge impact, seemed to be the publication of Honest to God, 
written by an Anglican bishop and former academic John Robinson, and which was introduced 
as an attempt to make sense of Christianity in the contemporary age, by exploring new ways 
of thinking about God and of interpreting the Christian faith in language and ideas appropriate 
to the twentieth century. One way in which theology engaged with this 'involved widespread 
acceptance of the notion of the 'death of God' in modem Western societies -a response of a 
theme that had developed in German Protestant circles in the 190' century and had culminated 
in the thought of Nietzsche. As far as morality was concerned there was a new attitude which 
distanced itself from legalistic ethics and thinking, taking account of needs of the actual 
130 Religious Crisis, pp. 122-3. 
13 1 The description of the changes is based on Yves Lambert's discussion on the factors that contributed to 
religious change 
in modem times, Lambert, Yves 'New Christianity, indifference and diffused spirituality', The 
Decline of Christendom, pp. 63-78, particularly pp. 66-9. 
132 At the same time McLeod notes Dommic Sandbrook's remark that 'Although the sixties are often seen as a 
secular, even post-religious, age, in 
few decades of the twentieth century were religious issues so hotly and 
enthusiastically 
debated', Religious Crisis, p. 83. 
133 Religious Crisis, pp. 83-92. 
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situations of real life and discussing morals by being more adaptive to real life circumstances 
('Situation Ethics'). There also seemed to be a new drift in theology that favoured 'action' in 
'the world' and placed an emphasis on individual freedom and responsibility and promoted a 
positive view of science. ' 34 This led Christians - both Catholic and Protestant - to become 
involved in social and political movements, something that was understood as an important 
and expected aspect of being a Christian. 
The 1960s also saw the convoking of the Second Vatican Council (1962-5) by Pope 
John XXIII - an explicitly pastoral council called to face the unprecedented challenges of 
modem societies. The convening of Vatican 11 expressed in the most vivid way the mood for 
reform so intense at that time. The council's basic objective was to initiate reforms that would 
address contemporary issues and integrate more the laity, even though in practice this was 
hardly the result of the changes introduced. 135 The reforms aspired to 'modernize' the Church 
and theology and address modem issues of life, expressing a focus on the present life and its 
themes rather than on the hereafter. Vatican 11 wanted to deliver a revised proclamation of 
Christian faith and teaching, without however altering the substance. 
Yannaras, himself a theologian, was very much in tune with the atmosphere of the time 
and the need for theology to make sense and speak in a relevant language to the modem world. 
Therefore from the very beginning in his scholarly work he sought to address modem 
intellectual concerns and deliver his theological word in ways that would appeal to the 
religiously sceptical or indifferent mind and to secularized man. Yannaras, however - as we 
have seen through his own account in T6 Kaff'Eav-mv - felt that the theologians were not in 
fact in a position to appreciate the significance of the changes at the time and that they did not 
therefore engage with modem challenges effectively. On the contrary, he found that the 
philosophers were those who took up the true challenge of modernity and addressed it bravely 
and creatively. Thus Yannaras appeared very soon inclined to relate and interact more with the 
response expressed by the philosophy dominant in Europe at that time, namely existentialism. 
134 Religious Crisis, p. 10 1 
135 Religious Crisis, p. 94. 
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2. Existentialism 
During his time in Germany Yannaras became acquainted and involved in particular 
with the thought of Heidegger, which for him was a new discovery. Later, during his time in 
France, he continued to be exposed to the thought and the positions of the existentialists; 
Sartre was still writing and lecturing and very much a part of what was going on intellectually 
in Paris at the time. Yannaras became fascinated by the work of Heidegger and Sartre, as he 
found in them an acute description and critique of conceptual systems, of the philosophical 
trends of rationalism and empiricism, and not least of philosophical idealism and moralism, 
and of the failure and bankruptcy to which they had led. Yannaras' religious experience in Zo, ý 
came to seem just another example of such a system of ideology, deprived of the touch of real 
life. Instead this unvarnished awareness of the actual experience of human beings was - 
Yannaras found - present and intense in the response of the existentialists, who represented at 
the time a reaction against the falsehood and pretence to which the Cartesian model of thought 
and conduct in modem times had gradually and inexorably led human consciousness, and 
which also was reflected strongly in the area of metaphysics. The Christ-ideal that Yannaras 
had experienced in the religiosity of Zoý, and to which I referred earlier above, was what 
Heidegger was now calling the 'highest value' into which God had been turned and which 
Heidegger identified as the hardest blow against God, a blow even more damaging than the 
problem of the impossibility of God's being known or the problem that his existence could not 
be proved. 136 The reduction of God to the idea of the highest value was what brought about - 
inexorably - nihilism. 
Basically, Heidegger and Sartre, following in this from Nietztsche, held fast to the 
proclamation of the death of God, that is of the bankruptcy of the idea of God - as it 
had been 
maintained in the systems of thought up until then - and consequently of the end of the values 
underwritten by the divine. Their philosophy was ending up in nihilism. 
They pronounced 
nihilism to be the only true result of faith in a conceptualized God and world of morals to 
which the earlier concern with pure reason and idealism had led. The centre of all experience 
for the existentialists is human existence, which, despite any human effort and beyond 
136ChrI-stos Yannaras, 'An Orthodox Comment on the 'Death of God", in A. M. Allchin, ed., Orthodoxy and the 
Death of God: Essays in Contemporary Theology, Studies supplementary to Sobornost I (London: 
Fellowship of 
St. Alban and St. Sergius, 1971), p. 43. 
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anything good that could take place in a man's life, would have eventually to face the reality 
of death and nothingness. And in fact death did not only mean the biological end of life, but 
represented also an ontological experience of pain, of despair and agony, the reality of failure 
and loss in man's social and emotional life, in human relationships and in all aspects of human 
activity. After all, existentialism - at least as expressed by Sartre - arose from the distressing 
experience of European man in the outbreak and then the aftermath of the Second World War 
and addressed an audience in whose souls there prevailed pain, frustration and despair in the 
light of the political and moral crisis of the time and in the face of the failure of any values to 
sustain stability and justice between the nations. 
Sartre himself delivered a lecture in Paris, in 1945,137 in which we can identify some 
key points of the positions of the existentialists, which illustrate the type of philosophical 
views and ideas that Yannaras encountered during the time he spent studying in Germany and 
later in France. 
Sartre's lecture formed a defensive response by him to criticisms of his time that 
charged the existentialist development as being a negative movement issuing in despair about 
human reality, and promoting quietism among humans, instead of encouraging hopeful 
creativity and action. Sartre, being a Marxist himself, needed to defend his existentialist views 
before the communists; for a philosophy that would otherwise appear as not leading up to or 
serving the communist vision would not be of any value to the Marxists. Taking up Sartre's 
exposition then, we soon come to understand that the first of the basic pronouncements of the 
existentialists is that 'existence precedes essence'. Basically, for the existential philosopher 
there is not such a thing as a human nature or essence. There is no predetermined fundamental 
nature of man, given that, as an atheist existentialist would maintain, there is no creator of man 
behind human being, who would fashion humans as any other craftsman might model their 
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creation or their artifact. 
' Sartre presents his well-known example of the paper knife 
137 Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism and Humanism, trans. Philip Mairet (London: Methuen, 1997). 
138 Even a Christian existentialist as for example Kierkegaard sees the 'existence precedes essence' dictum as a 
priority of subjectivity. 
The subject itself exists first and has priority over any generalized description or idea 
about existence; the subject is an ontological category and it 
is through which we step out into existence and we 
come to experience 
life and reality and acquire knowledge. In this way Kierkegaard's existentialism - and the 
philosophy of other existentialists - can 
be seen as a reaction to Hegelianism, an idealism that proposed the 
application of an ontological system through which we are allowed to 
know and understand and explain 
everything, and which 
lets us have the answers on how and why things are the way they are. See Nikolaos 
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which is crafted to serve a certain purpose. The concept of a paper knife, that is, pre-exists in 
the mind of its creator. The idea of the paper knife, with all the appropriate features and 
qualities that a paper knife should have in order to be what it is -a real paper knife - exists 
before the actual object is made. The object is thus produced according to a certain model that 
somebody has already envisaged. For the existentialist, however, there is no such parallel in 
the case of humans. Man is not made after some pre-existing model, but he simply is what he 
makes of himself. Sartre analyses how a person's choices of life and his actions make that 
person what he appears to be. Again, following the philosopher's characteristic example, a 
coward is described as such by his actions, and he is not so until he takes steps that allow us to 
confer on him that description. 
The fact that man's existence is not predefined or charged with a concrete purpose, as 
for example in the case of a knife - where the material and the attributes of it are determined 
before the knife is made so as to correspond to its purpose of use - does not simply me-an that 
human existence has no purpose. An existentialist would argue that the maxim 'existence 
precedes essence' does not simply mean that human nature has no purpose, since many 
physical objects may have no purpose either, and few would argue that everything has a 
purpose. 140 'Existence precedes essence' means that human nature - whatever that means - is 
not something set and permanent that dictates human development and behaviour; on the 
contrary, there is ongoing possibility for the latter to be altered and adjusted, in such a way 
that man, through his decisions, his choices and acts, can always develop and even change 
who he is. Therefore, statements such as A is coward' or 'Y is a criminal' are not credible for 
an existentialist, if used to determine the nature of one's being. In the words of Sartre, 'man is 
not what he is', meaning that human existence cannot be exhausted by any such 
descriptions, 
as there is always an ongoing process of becoming and changing towards something. 
Man can 
rise above what he is and direct how he shall become. 
141 
It follows that the first quality the existential philosopher sees in man is that of 
responsibility. In fact 'subjectivity' in existentialism is more or 
less a synonym of human 
responsibility as well as of human freedom. The term, that is, refers to the quality of 
being a 
Nissiotis, T7Tap4tcry64; Kai Xptcrrtavmý Tricrrt4; [Existentialism and Christian Faith] (Athens: 
Minima 
publications, 1986), section on Kiergegaard and especially pp. 44-54. 
139 Sartre, p. 26. 
140 David E. Cooper, Existentialism (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2 nd ed. 2000), p. 69. 
141 Cooper, p. 69. 
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human subject, which in turn bears primarily the characteristic of responsibility for its own 
existence and which is also free. Man is responsible for his actions and the choices he makes, 
and for what he makes of himself. And he is not responsible only towards himself but - the 
existentialist upholds - towards all his fellowhuman beings. A person's deeds do not only 
shape that person into what he comes to be, but also form a model or an example of behaviour 
for other people as well. When someone makes a choice for a certain action, Sartre explains, 
he in effect pronounces his action to be legitimate for other people to take too. Somebody 
cannot assume that others will not take up his behaviour also. That is because by selecting to 
act in a certain way man ought to understand that he legitimizes his action as a permissible and 
justifiable one. 142 In that way man's role and his choices of life are accorded a great deal of 
importance and responsibility. 
Furthermore, the existential philosopher does not accept the idea of determinism. He 
does not see man compelled to take a certain step of action by reasons and causes that are 
outside his realm of responsibility and free will, and therefore the freedom of the human 
subject is another fundamental position of existentialism. That is how subjectivity stands 
primarily for freedom, and that is what is meant by the other famous existentialist 
pronouncement that 'man is condemned to be free'. Man is bound to have to choose between 
different possibilities of action and to make decisions, as there are not any pre-packed answers 
or ready-made solutions in real life situations, and to have to make choices basically means the 
exercise of human freedom. The fact that man has to make decisions and choices is what 
Sartre describes also as abandonment and it furthermore involves what the philosopher refers 
to consequently as anguish. 143 In the circumstances of real life there are often not any easy 
answers for what a person should or should not do; in other words, it is not always obvious 
what is right and wrong or moral and immoral. Thus to assess the circumstances presented by 
life and each time to decide upon which action is appropriate often involves an intense sense 
of ambiguity and doubt. Therefore, the human agent experiences what Sartre calls 'anguish', 
in other words the distress and agony that, due to the uncertainty of life situations, the 
decision-making entails. There is a strong sense of risk, then, and responsibility, and man 
142sartre, pp. 30-1. 
143 Sartre, pp. 30-2. 
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often finds himself standing on a borderline between different choices that can be equally 
imperative. One consequently needs to interpret the conditions of the circumstances one may 
be facing and the possibilities of action in a particular situation and to determine which choice 
out of the potential or available ones would be valuable. The anguish that this process involves 
does not function - according to the existentialist - as a deterrent for action and does not lead 
to quietism; it is rather the very qualification of action, as it points to the fact that it is 
impossible not to choose. Even not to choose - the existentialist insists - would still be a 
choice. Anguish thus signifies the complexity of having to choose among multiple options and 
the burden of human freedom for making a choice as well as the pressing need that a choice is 
actively made and realized. 144 
Thus 'existence precedes essence' for the existentialist also has effects in the realm of 
morality. The existentialist sees the human agent in a context where man is left alone and he is 
the only one and fully liable for his choices. Man's actions are not induced by any apriorl 
values, and certain values we may revere often are too vague in terms of our circumstances in 
practice and therefore need to be interpreted in action based solely on our instinct. 1 45 Man is M 
this way entirely responsible and without any excuses for his deeds. As Sartre puts it 
succinctly, 'man is the creator of his morality'. 146 Basically, for existentialism there are no 
apriori values on the basis of which man can judge what is ethical, nor any golden rule to 
determine what is the correct decision to make and what is the right thing to do. Furthermore, 
for the atheist existentialist there is no God who could validate apriori ethics. Since then there 
are not any such standards already available, man needs to invent his morality. Therefore 
morality for existentialism involves invention and creativity. 147 Man, that is, invents what is 
moral; he creates a morality at the very time of making his choices. There are no absolute rules 
that determine in advance what right action is. Sartre illustrates his thoughts upon this point 
using another example - this time from the realm of artistic creation, especially as understood 
by his modernist contemporaries. In art, he says, there are no fixed or supreme principles 
144 Sartre, pp. 31-2. 
hi 145 Sartre, pp. 34-36, where the French philosopher also brings up his well-known example about Is student's 
dilerm-na, who needed to choose between going to fight and staying with his mother. and his anxiety over 
working out what would be the right thing to do. 
146Sartre, p. 49. 
147sartre, p. 49. 
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according to which art is done. The code of aesthetics is essentially created at the same time 
as a piece of art is produced. There is, for example, no specific concept of what a painting 
should look like before it is created; there are no preset aesthetic values against which a 
painting would fall short. The painter creates in the freedom of his expression and it is by 
doing so and through his work that he presents and forms what is only then and afterwards 
valued as aesthetic. The same, existentialism holds, applies in human behaviour. In human life 
there are no pre-decided standards to judge human action or to dictate what the correct thing to 
do is - especially given the complicated circumstances and the dilenuna-like situations with 
which life often present us. For example, the Christian doctrines of ethics, Sartre says, need to 
be interpreted. No one can give an answer to the apriori ethical norms. We need to work out in 
practice what is the right thing to do and to interpret the norms as we try to apply them in 
action as '... values are uncertain ... 
[and] too abstract... 3, . 
148 
Therefore - the existentialist philosopher takes the argument further - it would not be 
appropriate to think of and to describe someone's activity or choices as irresponsible, as there 
are not certain and abiding norms upon which to base such a judgment. In the absence of 
supreme ethical standards, there is no principle in terms of which a choice of human behaviour 
would be seen as transgression. What basically matters then for an existentialist is the trait of 
freedom in which humans make their choices and decide upon their acts. What an 
existentialist can evaluate about a man's choice is whether it is made in freedom, which also 
means in freedom from self-deception and therefore with honesty. The existentialist's 
judgment on other people then is not a moral one but one based on facts, a judgment of 
truth. 149 Existentialism values the quality of free commitment on behalf of the human agent. 
150 
To perform an act of open and responsible choice is what counts in the mind of the 
existentialist philosopher, and in fact it is this exactly that affords authenticity in 
human 
activity. To be authentic for existentialism, in other words, means to exercise our 
freedom in 
the decision-making process and in the shaping of our lives. The use of human freedom does 
not deliver us to anarchy, Sartre argues, but involves responsibility in the manner we 
have 
already described above. At the same time, a responsible attitude means that man tries to 
be 
148 Sartre, p. 36. 
149 Sar-tre, pp. 50-1. 
150 Sartre, p. 53. 
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genuine in his options about how to act and how to live; first and above all he needs to be 
honest with his own self and rule out misapprehensions about him and avoid deceiving 
himself. In other words, an existentialist is someone who fights bravely and unceasingly 
against false consciousness and towards discovering, knowing and realizing his true self. It is 
in this way that existentialism defines authenticity and that it puts it forward with regard to 
human life. And it is in this line of approach that human life and man's actions are not 
measured against some moral standards - which for the existentialist do not exist as apriori 
anyway - but they are validated in terms of the freedom and the responsibility the individual 
takes. In other words, human activity is valued against the authenticity with which it is 
realized, or else against the overcoming of the false consciousness of the individual. 
The existentialist philosopher does not feel satisfied with the standard account of the 
world, where man stands as a spectator of reality, and where all his knowledge and 
understanding of the surrounding world derives from his observing this world, himself being 
as a subject disassociated from the world. The existentialist emphasizes - in relation to his 
view of the world - the element of human involvement. The world for an existentialist is a 
human one, which means that the world as we know, perceive and understand it is the world 
that we humans are involved with. Existentialism maintains that we know the world as ready- 
to-hand, that is our knowledge and understanding of the world cannot escape our encounter 
with it, cannot be free of our involvement with things. Present-at-hand knowledge of the 
world, that is the view we get when we take a step back from things and look at them as 
spectators, the existential philosopher holds, comes after, is never the first way we know 
things, but a purely supplementary way, as it were, we need to take basically out of necessity, 
when things in the ready-to-hand encounter go wrong, and therefore we need to take a distance 
from things and study them by disassociating ourselves from them, so as to settle the 
breakdowns. To make this more specific, and following an example brought up in David 
Cooper's account on existentialism, 151 we would not concern ourselves with the structure or 
the technical aspect of the pen we use to write with, until it ceases to write any more; it is then 
that we would take it to bits, examine its structure, and so on. So the present-at-hand 
examination of things is not our basic attitude towards them, as - following another pertinent 
151 Cooper, p. 62. 
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example employed in the account we just mentioned - the surgeon's examination of our 
bodies is not the primary encounter among human beings. All in all, the element of human 
involvement, the idea that the world around us is a world that we view as very parts of it 
ourselves and not as outside spectators is a key point in the existentialist's viewpoint of the 
world. 
It is possible by now to identify attitudes in the mindset of existentialism that can be in 
some way paralleled with elements in the outlook that Yannaras came to develop and to 
express in his own work in relation to man and human life. In the observations and the views 
of the existentialists Yannaras must have generally found a dynamic insight into man's 
existence, which he had experienced as missing from the static-moralistic religiosity of Zo6, 
and which however he considered was closer to the mind of the Orthodox tradition as 
preserved through the life and the works of the Church Fathers. First of all, this element of 
dynamic movement was expressed in the existentialist attitude, where human being as an 
entity is in a process of constant development and becoming something that is not yet. What a 
person is at a given time - the existentialist maintains - results from the decisions he has 
made, and 'man is not what he is', since there is for him the possibility to make choices and 
consequently changes, and thus rise above what he is and determine for himself what he shall 
become. According to the existentialist's view, our true self is not hidden inside us, but is 
rather a goal. This, we can say, squares with the stance that lies at the heart of Christian life 
and which sees the Christian enterprise as a dynamic process of continuous advancement and 
spiritual progress. Even the state of spiritual perfection for a Christian is not perceived as a 
motionless condition that someone attains once and for all, but as a 
limitless situation of 
infinite advance. 152 It is not difficult to recognize then a parallel between the existentialist 
view of human existence and the Orthodox theological understanding of the 
human person as 
it has been put forward in the twentieth century. 153 The theological mind, that is, sees in the 
human person the idea of motion and dynamic movement as a structural element of man's 
152 See Mega Farantou, "Fln ýo-T Lý; cýý v 7-cýQpa(J-Lý' ['Faith as Transcendence] in AoyyaTIKd Kai 
HOIKd 
(Athens, 1983), pp. 235-41, where with the opportunity of a reference to the 
life of Photius the Great the author 
discusses the nature of Christian faith and repentance, ýtETd-vowt. 
153 Mega Farantou, 'E)E6,; icaý o*&yxQovTj 7iQaYýMTLK67Tcc' ['God and contemporary reality'], in 
AoypaTtO 
Kai, HOIKA, p. 
31. 
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being. The etymology offered for the Greek word for 'person', 7iQ6Cr(07To, as 7Q6(; + 6ýM - 
meaning 'towards the face' or 'facing' - signifies and expresses this understanding and strikes 
a correspondence with Heideggerian 'ex-istence'. The human person is not viewed just as a 
chunk of matter, static and fixed, but is seen more like a dynamic reality, as something that is 
realized in the encounter with what stands outside itself; moreover - in the mind of the 
Christian tradition - man is viewed as a being with the potential to develop and grow towards 
perfection through the exercise of human freedom and the active course of Christian ascesis 
within the ongoing participation in the life of the Church. In Christos Yannaras' thought and 
discussion about existence this view of the person occupies a central place. Yannaras himself 
took up very keenly this existentialist idea of personal existence and in his own work he put 
forward the notion of the person mainly in terms of moving-towards the Other and of 
standing-out of oneself, thus connecting intrinsically the existence of the person with concepts 
such as self-transcendence, ' ecstasy and communion, aspects that we will have the chance to 
explore further in the next chapter. 
In connection with the above the existentialist evaluates the present time in the light of 
the future, in terms of what it is that man is heading to. One's present behaviour can be 
explained or identified only in the light of what one is in the process of becoming. According 
to Heidegger, 'The primary meaning of existentiality is the future'. It is the future that 'first of 
all awakes the Present'. 154 This existentialist approach to time mentioned here adds to the 
sense of dynamic development towards something not yet existent that is present in 
existentialism and to which we referred earlier. Without trying to overstrain this view in an 
attempt to match it with Christian thought and the understanding of time there, our 
impulse 
would not err if it discerned in it an echo of the eschatological. element attributed to time 
in 
Christian theology. Christian faith and instruction does not seek to abduct man from the 
present time; it does not depreciate the value of the present, and 
does not ask to disorientate 
man from current reality by offering him visions of a utopian 
future or of the afterlife. 
However, the Christian mind likes to strike a balance, where as much as the present is valued 
man is also encouraged not to be reduced to the present or simply plunge 
into it. For Christians 
there is an eschatological prospect for everything that goes on in the present time, the prospect 
154 Cooper, p. 73. 
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of the 'Kingdom to come'. In other words there is the prospect of the fulfilment of the 'here 
and now' in the light of what is not yet accomplished. Thus, we can say, the present time also 
in a Christian's life acquires meaning or is inspired in view of what is yet to come, of what lies 
ahead. 
Yannaras' work then is not at all foreign to nor far from this aspect that we discuss 
here. Yannaras' emphasis, as we will see, on apophaticism as a fundamental attitude of 
Orthodox theology, links closely - even though not very explicitly - with the eschatological 
character of Church life and experience. When Yannaras underlines the apophatic character of 
the knowledge of God, which - closely related for Yannaras to the reality of personal 
existence - is never a fully secured knowledge but an always -practised aim and anticipation 
for man, he in fact touches upon its eschatological character; for the knowledge of God will 
only be complete in the eschaton, the last day of the Church: '... now we see through a glass, 
darkly; but then face to face: now I know in part; but then shall I know even as also I am 
known'. 155 In other words the knowledge of God as comprehended within Orthodox theology, 
and which is Yannaras' response to modem nihilism, is not very much else than the Kingdom 
of God, which the members of the Church can taste even in the present day, and in the 
anticipation of which they live and pray. These all are ideas which we will have the chance to 
explore more extensively later; what is worth noting here however is that the notion of time is 
grasped and discussed by Yannaras in ways that can be paralleled with elements of 
existentialist perceptions on this matter. 156 Whatever actual points of identification and/or 
difference with existentialism there may be, what interests us here is the way in which - as in 
existentialism - Yannaras also discusses time in relation to existence and 
development or 
change. In particular, he employs the notion of time in the context of his analysis about 
personal existence, and links closely the experience of time with the reality and the uniqueness 
of the personal relationship, speaking thus of the non-dimensional present of the personal 
relationship. For Yannaras' personal existence, the experience of time is not simply a series of 
successive moments but involves a sense of quality that introduces the idea of the eternal, 
155 1 Corinthians 13: 12. 
156 Time Is one of the themes - alongside others such as space and spatiality, logos, language and the nil - that 
Yannaras takes up in distinct sections in his treatise Person and Eros, a work that sometimes seems to echo 
Heidegger's Being and Time. 
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where past, present and future are all one-' 57 This is how theology sees the reality of God, in 
whom the limits of time as we know them in our human experience are annulled. Yannaras is 
then very keen to highlight and put forward this dynamic approach to human experience, 
where the limits of time - as well as of space - are overcome within the context of ec-static 
personal being; expressions of this we find in the theology about liturgical time and the 
Church practice of worship for example, where the whole of the creation and the world - dead, 
alive and not yet born - are taken up in glorification and prayer and embraced as one. Or even 
in the fundamentals of the Christian revelation and faith, according to which 'o 61(jaQKoý 
CFaQ-KOI)TaL' 6 Aoyoý 7IaXVVF-'raL- 0 ('XOQaTOý; OQC-XTaL' KaL 0 aVa(ýTji; ýMAa(ýO/(TaL- 0 
VV 158 aVaQXO(; aQXETaL... : here the time limits are removed as the present is professed to now 
hold the eternal. All these are positions with which Yannaras very much identifies within his 
work and is keen to bring out and highlight. 
The idea of the human being as a dynamic category always in the process of becoming, 
which in the theological context is consequently associated, as we will see, with the notion of 
communion, brings us to another point of contact between Christian theology and the 
philosophy of existentialism: the position of the existentialist that man discovers and knows 
himself through others, that self-knowledge is achieved through the experience of 'inter- 
subjectivity', that human subjectivity becomes aware of itself through the mediation of 
others' 59 can be paralleled with the theological analysis of the human person - which is so 
fundamental in Yannaras - that someone becomes/ is a person precisely through the act in 
which and to the extent that he relates to and shares with others. For the existentialist the 
communal character of man's being is an essential aspect of human existence. 
160 The 
existentialist emphasizes the communal character of existence, man's being-with and for 
others. 161 Also, to know and understand oneself is not achieved by turning inwards and 
searching inside oneself, but by reflecting on the relation of oneself to the outside world. Self- 
157 See section 1.5. c of next chapter. 
158 One of thegTiXot for Vespers 26 December. 
159 Sartre, p. 45. 
160 Cooper, P. 109. 
16 1 This in existentialism is stressed alongside the other and equally significant aspect of human being, that of 
individual self-expression and struggle against 'mass existence', which, however, can also be seen as another 
version of the theological pronouncement about the uniqueness and the unrepeatable character of each personal 
existence. 
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knowledge is not an inward but an outward movement. 162 For the theological mind too a 
human person is not a human monad; man is truly a person when he stands out of his self- 
centredness and opens up and unites in a communion with the Other, this 'Other' being God 
first and all the world subsequently. Salvation in Christian terms is not seen as a self- 
accomplishment. One is not saved alone; it is the participation of man in God's glory that 
brings about salvation. 163 In other words, it is a message of unity that lies in the heart of 
Christian life; the message of communion on man's part with God, a communion depicted in 
the unity of the whole body of the Church. For Christian ecclesiology each Christian is a 
member of Christ, a member of the body of the Church, and for someone to see where he 
stands in relation to God he needs to see where he stands in relation to the body. 
Also, following from the existentialist view of the world as a human one and as a 
'referential totality', man is not regarded as separated from the world, but in integral unity 
with it. For existentialism 'There is not a world and ourselves, standing in a causal relation, 
for without ourselves there is not that 'referential totality' which constitutes our world'. 164 
This again can refer us to the Christian position about the close unity between man and the 
world, portrayed for example in the event of the Fall, where not only man but through him the 
whole world around him was affected and, similarly, in man's deification the creation around 
him Participates as well. For Christian theology the unity of the Church and of the kingdom of 
God is not made up solely by humans but embraces the whole of the creation. Yannaras' 
thought, too, lines up very much with such an outlook, when he sees in man's personal 
existence a fundamental expression of the human thankful and loving response to the 
creation. 165 
Furthermore, another vital point that Yannaras' theological mind seems to share with 
existentialist philosophy is the rejection of dualisms. A crucial issue to overcome for 
existentialism - as indeed for all the rest of philosophy - is that of alienation. The existentialist 
162 Cooper, p. 97. 
163 This is a commonplace in Orthodox Spirituality; e. g. see Kallistos Ware, 'H OpO66Oýq EKKAqaia [The 
Orthodox Church] trans. Iosif Roilidis (Athens: Akritas Publications, 1996), p. 41. 
164Cooper, p. 75. 
165 For Yannaras individualism (i. e. the failing of personal existence, the inability for 'icowwww') lies at the 
heart of the phenomenon of the forest fires in Greece in the summer of 2007. See his relevant article in 'H 
KaOýYEP'vý, July 2007. 
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sees that various forms of dualism (eg. mind versus body, reason versus passion, and so on) 
bring on this sense of alienation from the world, to which we are anyway prone; therefore the 
existential philosopher is critical of and hostile towards dualisms. ' 66 Yannaras must have 
found in the existentialist opposition to dualism a more genuine expression of his Christian 
heritage than the one he had experienced in the intensely moralistic and dualistic religiosity of 
Zod. Through the paths of his European experience Yannaras came to realize and appreciate 
the theological instruction of his Orthodox tradition that there is not good and evil, as evil in 
the teaching of the Fathers has no hypostasis, since it was not created in the first place; 
therefore evil is viewed only as the absence of good. 167 Consequently Yannaras' work is 
characterised by a negative response to dualism and by the quest to overcome dualistic 
partitions in relation to man's existence, life and the material world. Closely then related to 
this is also Yannaras' attitude to the theme of morality. Morality, as we shall see in the fourth 
chapter, is for Yannaras fundamentally linked again to the ontological category of personal 
existence and to man's existential stance; how man deals with the matter of his existence as a 
whole, with life and death and human freedom. Christian morality for Yannaras does not 
involve predetermined answers and solutions that apply to all situations that the reality of life 
may present us with, but it rather involves a journeying on man's side for the discovery of his 
authenticity and the identity of his personal existence. This is another crucial point of view in 
Yannaras' approach and understanding of Christian life and can easily correspond to the quite 
fundamental existentialist position about the role of human responsibility and the fact that for 
the existential philosopher there are not pre-packaged solutions for what one ought to do and 
how to live and make choices; for the existentialist, as we have seen, man creates his morality, 
and any a-priori values - if there are any - need to be interpreted in practice. 
In general the elements of existentialism that were most likely to appeal to Yarmaras at 
that time were those that characterized the general attitude and mood of the philosophy, 
namely the strong realism and honesty with which the existentialists addressed the matter of 
existence on the one hand, and also - as at least Sartre in 
his lecture maintained against 
adverse allegations - the idea that existentialism was in the end a 
doctrine of optimism and 
166 Cooper, pp. 22-3,35-6 and 'Dualisms Dissolved' pp. 79-92. 
167 Athanasius, On the Incarnation 4: oiýK 6VTa'y6cQ T6c xaK6c, 6VTa U T61 KaAd, and endlessly repeated in the 
patristic tradition. 
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action. 168 For existentialism man needs to face himself; nothing can save him from himself, 
meaning that man ultimately needs to encounter his true circumstances, overcome any false 
consciousness about his existence, see himself bare and have a genuine attitude towards the 
experience of his reality. Hence the existentialist reacts against the attitude of '... most 
people... [who prefer] to be "distracted" from and "anaesthetized" against the prospect of their 
-) 169 deaths . Instead, the existential philosopher puts the human being face to face with his death 
and sees man as a being-towards-death; death, therefore, is viewed as a possibility, that is as a 
way of being, a way of living in relation to the prospect of death. The realism in addressing 
openly the facts about life and existence and in fighting a false consciousness was something 
that Yannaras had very much missed in his experience of the 'ideological refuge' that the 
religiosity of Zod had offered him, and it was therefore a quality in which he could now find 
inspiration. In this unvarnished honesty of the existentialists and the sheer realism in their 
attitude to being and existence, Yannaras could gradually recognize an attitude that reminded 
him rather of the Christian mind as this was handed down in the Fathers' tradition: the 
teaching on remembrance of death, on exercising vigilance in the practice of life and on 
attending to the truth by repudiating oblivion (note oi-Aij()ELa, the Greek word for truth 
signifies the absence of AýOTI, that is of forgetfulness or oblivion). How much closer to the TI 
actual Christian exhortation for abandoning religious hypocrisy and attaining to honesty 
towards God and the self was Yannaras to find the stance of the existentialists than that of the 
pietistic type of religious devotion he had experienced in ZW 
We have mentioned already that Sartre liked to defend existentialism against charges 
that viewed existentialist philosophy as pessimistic. What was widely seen as the gloomy side 
of existentialism Sartre described as realism, and he maintained that existentialism was rather 
a movement of optimism, especially as it sees man fundamentally 
holding a possibility of 
choice in life. 
170 In particular what was widely received as a depressing side of existentialism, 
and to which Sartre instead referred as realism, is the position that one should 
have a 
pragmatic view of the potential and the results of one's activity, without 
holding hopes that 
168Sartre, p. 56. 
169 Cooper, p. 137. 
171 Sartre, p- 25. 
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others will continue one's work and take one's actions further; besides man needs to 
acknowledge bravely the limitedness of his actions, in terms of the passing of time, and often 
of their narrow effects. 171 Man needs to recognize that his activity may not bring about 
spectacular results; still - and this affords to the philosophy a bright tone - the existentialist 
can even so find meaning in his very activity despite the incomplete character of his actions. 
Sartre - also in defence of existentialism before the judgment of the Marxists - says that 
'[existentialism is not] a philosophy of quietism since it defines man by his action'. 172 Man 
holds his destiny within himself. Thus the existentialist proposes 'an ethic of action and self- 
commitment'. 173 The meaning and the value that the existentialist sees in human efforts derive 
from the very fact that man stretches out to his potential of action and life and realizes himself. 
When individuals do what they can, meaning that they do to the full what they can, this very 
choice accords value to their activity. To do one's best, to live out and realize and become the 
most one can do is, at the end, all one can do, and beyond this one could not go anyway. So 
existentialism seems to prompt human beings to live out the fullness of the potential their 
humanity holds. 
Not surprisingly this was just another aspect of the existential philosophy in which 
Yannaras could find equal attraction and with which he could engage. Again, such a stance 
could feel - with no exaggeration - that it was voicing better the true spirit of the Christian 
vocation and life than the expressions of Christian religiosity Yannaras had been presented 
with in his Zoý. experience. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the activity of the 
organization of Zoiý was very strongly characterized by an attitude - which was intensely 
propagated to all the members - that it was the brotherhood's mission to inaugurate a large- 
scale spiritual renewal for the whole body of the Church and for the entire nation. Yannaras 
himself had been carried away by such an enthusiastic vision that had appealed, largely at the 
beginning, to his pure and passionate youthful spirit. However, through time and experience 
he had reached the realization that such visions live only in the sphere of idealization, which 
stays remote from the real life of humans, from the pragmatism of human failure and 
from the 
reality of issues that men encounter in every age. Tbus he came to see the 
ideological 
171 Sartre, pp. 39-41. Sartre delineates this as despair, which, however, relates also to the acknowledgement that 
6man is nothing else but what his life is'. 
172 Sartre, p. 44. 
173 sartre, p. 44. 
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Christian visions that aspire to bring change to the world rather as a fallacy, while the true 
Christian spirituality of the authentic Orthodox tradition that he gradually discovered was a 
quite different story. In the tradition of the Church the members of the body of Christ do not 
take up the message of the Gospel in any conviction that through their good deeds or righteous 
life they will manage to change the world or bring about dramatic transformations in human 
reality. Human history would have many examples to prove that such hopes would be simply 
unrealistic. Neither are Christians on the other hand called to faith with the mere objective of 
being somehow selfishly saved, while neglecting or disregarding the fate of the rest of the 
world around them. Before the absurdity of the world's reality and existence the Church 
invites man to the other 'absurdity' or foolishness (I Corinthians 1: 18) of faith in God, not in 
order to change or save the world, but out of a grateful and loving response to what has been 
experienced as God's love and offer to mankind. Thus a Christian takes up his faith with 
humility hoping to find grace and be saved through the life of the Church and not hoping that 
he will save the Church in any way. 174 The members of the Church live in faith, and exercise 
themselves continuously in their spiritual struggle, conscious of their human shortfall, and 
therefore with humility and with trust in the mercy of God, knowing that this is the most they 
can do and without building hopes that this will make some big difference on the large scale, 
neither expecting or demanding that those who will come after them will necessarily take their 
example further. The triumphant attitude of Zoý, Yannaras felt, was not a very faithful 
expression of authentic Christian spirituality, which - in the expression of the Church tradition 
- is characterized rather by the sacrificial element, not a triumphant one. This is the kind of 
Christian spirituality, in line with the mind and the teaching of the Fathers' ascetic tradition, 
with which Yannaras could identify, and which he could at that time recognize more in the 
reserved optimism and the honest commitment of an atheist existentialist than in the 
ideological faith and the pietistic devotion of a religious Christian. 
The honesty and the realism of existentialist philosophy had a great appeal to 
yannaras. However, the answer to nihilism, the answer to the deadlock that the western mind 
seemed to have reached, for Yannaras lay somewhere further than what the pure intellect 
174 Note that the 'save the Church' attitude was instead typical of Zoý. We recall that the brotherhood had been 
set up independently of 
the official Church, precisely in order to fulfil unhindered the correction of failings of the 
official Church. 
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could present, and it emerged from the tradition of the Church Fathers' theology and their 
experience of the divine life. In Heidegger and the Areopagite we have Yannaras' scholarly 
response to the intellectual setting he encountered in Europe; this work is Yannaras' own 
account of what he made of this European setting. First published in 1967, it is an early 
expression of the author's philosophical and theological thoughts and positions, as they started 
to take shape under the stimuli and the inspiration that his experience in Western Europe at the 
time of his study there provided him with. It provides for us an exposition in which we find 
the first articulation of Yannaras' views that will later become entrenched and fundamental 
aspects of his whole work; therefore we will go on here to explore Heidegger and the 
Areopagite in some detail. 
3. Nihilism and the absence of God 
Heidegger and the Areopagite is the first scholarly published work of Yannaras and 
one of the earliest fruits - second after the Metaphysics of the Body - of Yannaras' course of 
study and research. The very title strikes a contrast between two names of people that would 
seem apparently unconnected, both in terms of their context and their time. It is then 
Yannaras' task in this book to bring together these two names and the tradition that each of 
them represents. And he does so, as we will see, by unfolding for the reader the rationale, as it 
were, of the philosophical and the theological standpoint of Heidegger and the Areopagite 
respectively. The former is generally known and identified as an existential philosopher 
working in the theoretical aftermath of modem nihilism; the Areopagite's name is widely 
referred to in the realm of Church tradition and Christian scholarship in connection with the 
theme of apophaticism, or else apophatic theology. 175ThUS Yannaras basically lays out what 
he made of the matter of nihilism, as he came across it during his time in Germany, and, based 
on his own background, theological heritage and tradition, which he sees - for the purposes of 
175 The Areopagitical Writings - which scholarly research regards as pseudonymous, owing to the fact that their 
writer was not really 
St Paul's convert, Dionysius the Areopagite, and which have consequently been consigned 
to the end of the fifth or the begini-ýng of the sixth century - have been very influential in the course of Christian 
theology as this developed both in the Eastern and the Western part of Christendom, mainly for their notion of 
hierarchy or the cosmic and ecclesial order and for their theology of the transcendence or unknowability of God. 
See further Andrew Louth, Denys the Areopagite (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1989). 
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this book - summarized in the Areopagite, he offers his response to this matter. 
176 Nihilism 
represented at the time the ultimate development, as it were, of the human intellect in the 
sphere of philosophical thought and speculation, which also had undoubtedly a powerful 
impact in the realm of religious life and faith. Faith in the very existence of God was 
challenged. The Christian God did not appear a very reliable reality any longer; in fact it was 
not felt now to be anything of a reality, but rather an erroneous belief, a misleading notion. 
God was pronounced absent and in his place was substituted nothing - the nihil. Theology had 
to face earnestly this new setting and to construct a meaningful response. This is exactly what 
Yannaras wished to do in Heidegger and the Areopagite. It is important to remember that 
Heidegger and the Areopagite was written out of the Western experience Yannaras shared of 
the 1960s: the period when Protestant theology tried to take seriously the 'Death of God' and 
responded by a programme of demythologization. As we have seen, Yannaras thought the 
Western response was dangerously superficial and found a radical response in the Fathers - 
especially in the Areopagite. 
In the following pages I will look closely at Yannaras' account in his above work, 
since by this we will build up another account - alongside that of his biographical 
development - of the direction which Yannaras' intellect followed during the time of 
his study 
in Western Europe and from which, in his more mature years, there developed the kind of 
understanding of the personal that we find in his later writings. Heidegger and the Areopagite 
is in a way a prelude to Yannaras' vast volume of published work in which the reader gets the 
first disclosures of a philosophical and theological speculation that kept growing with 
consistency and persistence of thought in his subsequent years. 
Yannaras 1) exposition in the first part of Heidegger and the Areopagite basically forms 
an analysis of the different developments that the theoretical approach to 
knowledge followed 
in the Western and Eastern milieu of the world respectively over the centuries. The variance 
between the two worlds in the theoretical understanding of what constitutes the truth, in other 
words - as Yannaras 
himself puts it in the introduction of his book - the different approach to 
176 It is not by chance that Yannaras dedicates his book Heidegger and the Areopagite to 
his mother, 'to whom 
[he] owes the "first theology... 
(Yannaras' actual miscription). It is evident that the author's production is an effort 
to recover and present what 
he sees as the heart and the true content of the tradition that he as an Orthodox 
represents - 
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epistemology, and consequently to the method of apophaticism, comprised the very starting 
point for the diverse evolution that the philosophical mind followed in the East and the West 
through the centuries. Yannaras identifies the results of this fundamental difference not just in 
the different course which European metaphysics followed in the West and the East; the 
theoretical difference did not remain simply a notional one, but was also represented in the 
different forms that the social, political and cultural strands of human activity and history then 
acquired, ending up in the opposition of the Western European to Eastern Orthodox 
civilization and culture. 177 
The key point in understanding the different course of the philosophical and the 
metaphysical developments that we will discuss here lies, Yannaras argues and as we have 
already briefly seen, in the change that the original approach to and understanding of logos 
underwent in the West. 178 As handed down from the classical heritage logos signified the inner 
logic or coherence of reality, which was known and understood through a relational reference 
to things. Logos stood for the kind of inner consistency and structure of what was there or of 
what was real; in other words logos could stand for the truth of things, which was approached 
within a referential totality of immediate involvement with things. Thus logos was the 
4common logos' of Herakleitos, and it represented the practice ofKotvwvEtv, that is of sharing 
or of being together, of being involved or being part of and of having in common. In the 
classical understanding this mode of the common being, the Kotv(OVE-tV, also specified the 
potential of knowing the truth and the practice of being true, of truthfulness, aAqO, -i5Etv. In 
other words the general stance was that the truth was achieved to the extent that or as much as 
being in common was realized; Kotva)vEtiv was the way to aAqOEi)ELv. 
179 This attitude 
177 Yannaras' 'OjoOo6oýiaKai M)aq orrý NE(i)-cEpq EAA66a gives an account of the development of theology 
in which the author sketches 'in broad strokes the differences 
between the Eastern and the Western Christian 
milieus, especially as these 
differences can be detected in the development and the history of Greece in modem 
times. 
I Kai ApEonayiTq,; ý 7rEpi ' 7Tovaia(; Kai iyvwaiaý rof) 
eEo - [Heidegger 178 Chr-stos Yannaras, X6i'vrcyyEp aaV 
and the Areopagite or on 
the absence and unknowability of God (Athens: Domos, 1998), p. 22. 
179 For a longer analysis by Yarmaras on the connection between 
6LAqOEz)Etv and KOLV(J)I'Etv see'OpO6,; A6yoý 
Kai K01V(, )VWý npaKTLKý 
[Right Reason and Social Practice] (Athens: Domos, 1999, first published 1984), pp. 
188-210. This is, however, much more than a philosophical position; note the way 
Lorentzatos appeals to this in 
his article on Papadiamandis: 
MEAftE,; T6[t. A', p. 247. 
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towards logos or truth was fundamentally crucial for the shaping of the whole outlook that 
man would adopt towards the reality of life, cosmos and God. What interests us here is that 
within that outlook, as Yannaras argues, man was not the condition for reaching an 
understanding of the real or for arriving at the truth. The measure, the criterion was the 
participation in the totality of the things, the 'being part of' or 'being in common', the 
KotvwvEtv. Yannaras' next point then is that the scholastic tradition in the West actually 
overturned the Aristotelian premise for knowledge and of the category of logos as this was 
held in the Hellenic tradition. Logos ceased to represent that inner coherence of things and the 
relational knowing or the communal reference to things and came to mean what we up to this 
day understand simply as logic or reason. Thus the scholastics moved away from the 
Aristotelian approach to knowledge, even though they thought they were entering more deeply 
into the Aristotelian heritage, and sought to validate the truth and consequently the matter of 
God and of the existence of God on the basis of the faculty of human reason, understood 
narrowly as the intellect's ability to construct logical arguments. This constituted an alienation 
of the Hellenic way of attaining knowledge and comprised what Yannaras calls a 'historic 
temptation' for the Western mind, philosophy and metaphysics. 180 
This historic temptation of the West found its prime expression in Descartes. ' 81 With 
Descartes we have the consolidation of the content of logos as ratio. In other words logos, 
reason, becomes narrowed down to denote the rational ability of the human subject to 
approach and define the truth. Most notably, this ability of the human reason comes forward as 
a power fully adequate in itself to attain the truth. This means that logos, with this narrow 
meaning of reason (facultas rationis), is now brought to the fore as the ultimate principle on 
the basis of which we certify the accuracy of knowledge and we arrive at the truth. The 
immediate consequence of this is that man's intellect becomes the measure to work out and 
understand all things and that accordingly God becomes now part of a system of thought; God 
is identified with the highest, the most refined notion, which is approached and understood 
through the rational capacity of the mind and on the basis of systematized and logically 
certified conceptual advances. In other words the God presented by the human intellect, the 
180 Heidegger, p. 2 1. 
181 Yannaras - quoting in this Heidegger - sees Descartes dependent on the scholastic tradition and he lists a 
series of names whom, 
in their expression of this tradition, Descartes followed: Augustine, Campanella, Anselm 
of Canterbury, 
Hugh of Saint-Victor, Bonaventura, Thomas Aquinas: Heidegger, p. 21. 
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God that men's rationalism approaches and puts forward in a manner of well-ordered, 
analytical affirmations ends up, basically, as a rational principle which can be logically 
verified. God ends up as an idea, even if the highest one. He appears in other words to be a 
rational product, a logical conclusion; He is the outcome of a rational and methodical 
consistency. The God of the scholastics thus had little to do with the reality of life. God 
became a noble concept that answered the need of the human ratio to identify God with the 
prima causa, the primal and creative principle of the worldly order. However, such an 
approach to the matter of God placed the foundation stone for a quite idolatrous account of 
God, a version of God as an idea, in other words an entity created rather by man, and not the 
Creator. God was identified perhaps with the mostly advanced and dignified idea and was 
understood as the principle of the highest supremacy; still, however, He was in the best case 
mainly a concept, the product of rationalization. Such an approach, however, undermined the 
kind of God proclaimed in the scriptures, which was a divine Logos directly engaging with the 
reality of human history and life, a God who connected immediately with the actual world and 
human corporeality, a God who was known as a historical and close presence. Instead, the 
conceptually verified God was not any longer a real presence to be related to and 
experientially known, but rather a distant God, a fine concept, a logical creation that answered 
to the rational requirements of man's methodical mind. Eventually, the existence of God was 
not a revealed truth; it was not an experienced presence, as it had originally been put forward 
in the Gospels. For the scholastic theological mind God's existence was a principle rationally 
established, it was a consequent conclusion of western rationalism. The latter had sought to 
validate and to sustain belief in the existence of God on the basis of conceptual and 
methodically structured verification. ' 82 
Yannaras' analysis goes on to acknowledge the fact that this conceptualized God 
whom human thought had established was to be progressively disputed and considered from 
the point of view of cause-and-effect. It was inevitable that sooner or later the divinity of a 
God-idea would be called into question. A God that could be perceived and reasoned by the 
human mind, the divinity, that is, of a God that could be conceived and captured in 
demonstrable conceptions by the human intellect inevitably came to be severely criticized. It 
182 Cf. Heidegger, pp. 19-22. 
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was not possible to trust the divinity of the transcendental God who was set up as a perfectly 
substantiated conception by a being, which was the created man. Faith could not sustain a God 
that ended up being the product of human creation, an entity invented by another entity, that 
is, by man. The divinity of a perfect being or of a perfect notion that was conceived by a 
limited being and mind represented in man was not possible to be upheld for long. Sooner or 
later there would be some Nietzsche to proclaim God truly absent and dead. Nietzsche, that is, 
- Yannaras acknowledges - through his kerygma of the death of God, did not put forward 
some atheist conviction of his own. Nietzsche's public statement that God was dead and that 
the churches were but his burial place was not a personal belief that the philosopher aspired to 
disseminate. Nietzsche's account was not propaganda, but only a prophetic announcement, as 
Heidegger would later identify it and as Yannaras recognizes too. 
What we have seen so far is that what we can narrowly understand and define as ratio, 
human reason or logic, became, in the field of Western metaphysics, the leading and exclusive 
instrument and way to advance towards true knowledge, to know the truth. Ratio was accepted 
as a self-sufficient knowing agency or method and it was applied as such. In this way the truth 
was defined on the basis of the possibilities of reason to approach and to expound it. Reality 
was determined according to the capacity of pure reason to describe it, and then knowledge, in 
other words what would derive from the labour of the intellect, was also verified through the 
agency of reasoning/logic. This simply meant that man was rendered the only measure and the 
ultimate defining power of reality, of the matter of existence and of true knowledge. The 
dominance, that is, of pure logic or rather its absolute authority led in this way to the absolute 
mastery of man and created the 'superman', since man's reasoning ability gained ascendancy 
over God himself. Therefore Descartes, even though he reckoned that his system marked an 
advance for European metaphysics, in reality, as later criticized by Nietzsche and also 
endorsed by Heidegger, initiated the problem of the refutation of God and established the 
6superman'. 183 
In the first part of Heidegger and the Areopagite Yannaras sets out an analysis of the 
historical course of Western metaphysics. This analysis basically sees European metaphysics 
183 Heidegger, pp. 22. 
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as a series of intellectual advances or developments with an inner consistency, developments 
which led step by step to the very overthrow of the metaphysical system itself, and to the 
refutation of God whom initially that metaphysical structure seemed to defend. Theology did 
not escape that setting. With the intellect being in the lead in developing metaphysics, 
theology consequently became a systematic edifice, a structured scheme of doctrines and ideas 
that presented, as it were, the 'geography' of God. Descartes perhaps was the first to create the 
presuppositions for this, but he was not the only one who contributed to the fashioning of 
theology as scientia. In the analysis that Yannaras follows here, the positions and the work of 
Spinoza - who identified one single substance called indifferently nature and God - and of 
Leibniz - with whom the autonomy of human thought culminates in demonstrating the famous 
'proofs' for the existence of God, in a way-parallel to the maimer in which the sciences would 
attain their authority - are also seen to have been of a critical character for turning theology 
into a well-ordered system of knowledge that could now - because it was systematized - claim 
a status similar to that of the now highly developed natural sciences. ' 84 
So all three philosophers, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz are understood, in Yannaras' 
analysis, to be decisive figures in the historical course of the European mind, all of whose 
contributions gradually but consistently added to the same effect that occurred later in time: an 
atheistic nihilism, the negation of God. 
The philosophers mentioned so far, Yannaras goes on, represent the time of 
rationalism, the phase in the history of the European intellect where ratio is the sovereign 
apparatus, as it were, for doing metaphysics. However rationalism is only the first stage in the 
epoch of the intellectus fidei. The common denominator of all the phases in this new age in 
which faith in God aspires to take up the authority of a logically valid theoretical system is the 
184 Heidegger, pp. 23-7. In the understanding of the tradition with which, however, Yannaras identifies himself 
and which he felt he represented at the time of his encountering the European setting, theology 
is not a science or 
it cannot be only a science in the sense the latter has been exercised in modem times; 
in modem times theology 
indeed sought to imitate the positive sciences, on the grounds of the advance the latter could present. See Andrew 
Louth, Discerning the Mystery: An Essay on the Nature of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). Theology, 
however, as it becomes apparent in the second part of Heidegger and Areopagite is a matter beyond any 
systematic study and investigation, 
if it is to remain honest and truly a word or logos about God. It is what 
becorries available in the life of the Church, what becomes known in prayer. Theology is the fruit of prayer, as the 
famous statement of Evagrios tells us ('if you are a theologian you will pray truly and if you pray truly you are a 
theologian': On Praver 
61). In the ecclesiastical understanding of the term, theology is what God informs us 
about as we take steps 
to get to know and come near Him. This may well incorporate all the scientific knowledge 
that we can possibly 
have, but is not identified solely with it, it may well take it into account but goes beyond it. 
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sole dominion of the human subject; as we noted earlier with regard to rationalism, man is the 
decisive factor, the measure for reaching true knowledge, for arriving at the truth. Therefore a 
next stage following rationalism, but still characterized by the same 'monism of the subject', 
was empiricism. With empiricism the prior condition for validating knowledge is not the 
subject's mental power but the experience allowed or provided by the human senses. The 
burden in other words for knowledge to qualify as true knowledge now falls on the 
information the subject can gather through the employment of the senses. This new fashion in 
the history of philosophy is referred to as positive empiricism and is based on the traditional 
idea that what exists in the mind was previously let in, as it were, by the senses. The 
experience of the senses is now regarded as the sole way of obtaining valid data for growth in 
knowledge and for approaching to the truth. It is apparent, therefore, how positivist 
empiricism, by exalting the role of the senses, remains trapped in the same presupposition of 
the scholastic epistemology that rationalism had served, which was to assign to the individual 
subject the exclusive power to administer knowledge and the truth. 185 
It is a commonplace to say that intellectual developments in the history of philosophy 
take place gradually and usually take a long time to become effective, and it is also true that 
the transition between the different trends is not a clear-cut movement from, as it were, one 
trend completely to another, but more like a blending process. It happens rather in a way so 
that elements of the different phases may at times co-exist, or that single voices that articulate 
the spirit or the principles of a certain period may have lived in terms of time in a previous 
age. Having this in mind, we could say, with regard to what we discuss here, that it seems as if 
rationalism prepared the ground for the inexorable death of God and then positivist empiricism 
came to finish him off by strengthening the exclusive autonomy of the subject's capacity to 
decide upon matters such as that of existence and truth. Even more, since with empiricism the 
emphasis now falls on what can be approached through the human senses and, consequently, 
since only what can be verified through the direct experience of the senses is trusted as truly 
existent, rationalist metaphysics is stripped from all grounds of credibility; the existent is now 
identified solely with what is accessible through empirical observation. Given that for 
empiricism only the physical world perceived by the senses is believable and therefore 
185 Heidegger, p. 27. 
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existent, the death of God is only at the threshold. Quite predictably then the sciences turn to 
the exploration of the empirical world resigning from any effort to investigate what lies 
beyond the terrestrial order. At the same time metaphysics aspires to attain a more 
epistemological content and status. In both cases the new conditions that human thought has 
imposed render the matter of God irrelevant. 186 
Yannaras then goes back in his exposition of the historical development of European 
metaphysics to explain that the event of the Reformation in the sixteenth century was 
essentially a reaction against the beginnings in the late Middle Ages of the philosophical and 
the theological setting that we have tried to describe here so far, and which was the reference 
of humans to a rationalized God. The Reformation was a protest against the rationalism that 
had been imposed in the realm of Christian faith; it was an opposition to the analytical 
theology that was Presented as an objectively true set of beliefs and which had principally 
introduced God as a notion or a set of notions, as the conceptualized supreme being that could 
be objectively validated. The Church of the Pope was at the time the institutionalized 
expression of this scholastic form of theology and it was therefore this Church with which the 
Reformation did battle. 
However, Yannaras explains, the Reformation itself basically remained in the same 
trap of the 'monism of the subject' which characterized rationalism, while battling the latter, 
which otherwise it wanted to defeat. The Reformation, Yannaras goes on, reacted against the 
rationally objective validation of metaphysics by putting forward the importance of man's 
faith. 187 It maintained that God was not reachable by human reason and that in fact the 
Christian God was a hidden God. He was not a God directly known, but one who had 
disguised himself in the event of the Cross. So God's divinity had been hidden on the Cross, 
while the Cross was at the same time the only way in which God had chosen to present 
himself. Therefore, in the theological approach the Reformation put forward, it takes faith and 
only faith to recognize God and to know him. Sola fide is thus the new dictum in the period of 
the Reformation; faith alone is now put forward as the tool to unravel the mystery of God. 
Consequently individual faith is the absolute possibility for the subject to know and to draw 
186 Cf. Heidegger, p. 28. 
187 Cf. Heidegger, pp. 33-5. 
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near to God. The Reformation thus, Yannaras notes, laid emphasis on the psychological or 
emotional participation of the individual in the mystery of the Cross, as the guarantee for 
achieving knowledge of God. However, the theologia crucis in the period of the Reformation 
and the sovereign role of personal faith carried on the same attitude as the scholastic theology 
did before: the assumption that the knowledge of God is a matter of individual achievement 
that can be realized within the limits of the subject's potentialities. Yannaras considers that 
also the mystics of the Post-Reformation years - whether Protestant or Catholic - took the 
same line; he mentions Jakob Boehme and Angelus Silesius, and characterizes their position 
as that the divine world becomes known through the man-microcosm and his tangible 
experience rather than through abstract conceptual structures of objective proofs. ' 88 
In Yannaras' understanding, then, the anti-rationalism of the Reformation culminated 
in the movement of pietism that developed within Protestantism at the end of the seventeenth 
and at the beginning of the eighteenth century with parallels in the Catholic world. 189 This 
simply means that the religious experience of the individual person assumed priority over 
theological formulations and doctrinal faith, since religious experience was considered the 
only place, as we saw, where God became approachable. Religious practice, then, was what 
mainly mattered, and it actually involved the spiritual renewal of the individual, which was 
interpreted more and more in moralistic terms. Consequently, with pietism the emphasis falls 
on the observance of the moral law while the authenticity of the religious life is measured by 
compliance to the standards of a moral life. Morality in this way was put forward and 
understood not so much as the fruit of the spiritual renovation of the person, but rather as its 
presupposition. Therefore morality, identified with obedience to the Christian law, became a 
central aspect of religious practice and thus assumed prior significance. In this way pietism put 
forward a type of moralistic religiosity. Other aspects, then, of the modem setting, Yannaras 
argues, such as the importance that modem mentality placed on the factors of efficiency and 
usefulness with regard to all the aspects of human activity, contributed to strengthening 
the 
role of pietism in a social way: pietism appeared acceptable 
for the reason that it promoted the 
Christian religion as a socially useful thing. Christians engaged with practical welfare activity 
for the public and presented the gospel as empowered and convincing owing to its social 
188 Heidegger, p. 35. 
189 Cf. Heidegger, pp. 36-7. 
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objectives, which were, in general terms, to eliminate evil in society and to make the world a 
better place. ' 90 
Yannaras rounds off his exposition of the historical process that led to the 'death of 
God' by referring to three more critical philosophers: Kant, Fichte and Hegel. Kant is brought 
in as a thinker who developed out of the mood of Protestant pietism and whose Critique of 
Pure Reason undermined any metaphysical notion of God and laid the foundation for God as 
an essential principle that is required if morality is to make sense. 191 God, this means, has to 
exist because his existence justifies the empirical conflict of the human consciousness between 
the ethical categories of good and bad, as well as man's moral exertion in deciding what the 
right thing to do in life is. God thus is the necessary principle in a system of ethics and Christ 
is the personified Good. 192 With this ethical approach to the matter of God however, Yannaras 
notes, Kant initiated just another form of the man-centred atheism - moralistic atheism. In so 
far as the history of the Western intellect is concerned, man is once again the axis for 
constructing interpretations about the True and the Real on the basis of isolated aspects of his 
experience, namely this time the ethical requirements of the human subject. Human 
individuality is still the centre and the means for understanding divine reality. 
According to Yannaras, Fichte then takes over Kant's critique and regards the moral 
requirements of the subject's consciousness as the place to detect the content of all revelation. 
With Fichte the Ego remains the fundamental presupposition for the achievement of all 
knowledge. It is on the basis of the consciousness of the Self and its distinction from the 
outside world, which constitutes the non-Self, that the human subject attains all cognitive and 
ethical achievements. In other words, it is again human individuality which is the embodiment 
of all true knowledge with regard to all aspects of human experience, including the issue of 
God. Fichte does not accept God's existence as an absolute reality but sees it only linked with 
man') s moral conscience. 
193 
190 yannaras elsewhere argues that the exemplary systematisation of the social structures found in western 
societies, with their. perfectly administered ruling systems and organizational efficiency is a reflection of, and has 
this rationalistic attitude of shaping life by adjusti ivity in its roots in, ng to standards of well-ordered human acti i 
terms of efficiency and usefulness. Right Reason and Social Practice offers an analysis from a sociological angle 
of the note of rationalism 
in the shaping of Western European civilization. 
" Heidegger, pp. 36-8. 
192 Heidegger, p. 38. 
193 Heidegger, pp. 38-40. 
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Like Fichte, Hegel recognizes in the dialectical feature of the human intellect the 
ability to understand objective reality and to identify itself. The dialectic power of the self- 
consciousness that allows the subject to distinguish and define itself as opposed to the outer 
world is for Hegel the only basis for acknowledging that the Absolute reveals itself in finite 
reality and also for classifying human subjectivity in relation to the infinite. 194 To put it in 
other words, if the Self did not have the ability to reach an elaborate understanding of itself 
and outside reality through a process of synthesizing the data and the positions presented to it, 
God would be a meaningless or empty concept. Basically God is disqualified from any 
autonomous existence, and that is here also on the basis of the absolutized role of the human 
subjectivity. Hence the positions of all the philosophical approaches presented here by 
Yannaras, that is, of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, also fail to sustain religious faith and they 
eventually contribute towards the Death of God and atheistic nihilism. 
All the phases of the intellectual development described here so far which 
characterized Western metaphysics have, according to Yannaras, one and the same thing in 
common: human individuality becomes the centre and the absolute means for understanding 
and discussing the matter of God. It is man in his restricted intellectual and empirical potential 
that constitutes the decisive factor and sets the principles for defining God's existence. 
Consequently, the human subject seeks to define its relation with the divine reality in a way 
that provides the individual with moral reassurance. Such a human quest found its expression 
in the phenomenon of pietism and the moralistic model of the Christian life. However, all 
these attempts to expound the issue of God's existence and to justify religious faith in fact 
only result in an anthropocentric edifice, which eventually fails to maintain its credibility and 
collapses, giving way to the philosophical Death of God. 
Therefore Nietzsche's statements about the death and the absence of God 195 arrived not 
as a personal proclamation but as a historical realization. In Nietzsche's delivery of his 
message we have an act of just giving voice, honestly and courageously, to what had happened 
194 Heidegger, pp. 41-2. 
195 Heidegger, and following him Yarmaras, acknowledges that Nietzsche was not the first to talk of a dead God, 
but rather the first to 
do it conscious of what that meant, of the results that were to follow, see Heidegger, pp. 43- 
4. 
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historically in the area of the philosophical intellect and of religious faith, to what had already 
taken place in European metaphysics. Nietzsche was by and large regarded as a blasphemous 
atheist. However, in reality it was simply that he was the only one bold enough to speak out 
what he perceived as already completed, what had already been realized over the course of 
time in the sphere of philosophical metaphysics. And the statements that Nietzsche put 
forward about the death of God would inevitably overthrow the whole system of values for the 
European mind, since Nietzsche's statements basically attacked the very presuppositions of 
the European consciousness, God as the primal Cause and as the highest authority upon which 
social life and moral conduct had been structured. 
The new intellectual phase, then, that the straightforward announcement presented in 
Nietzsche's The Gay Science (Die frAliche Wissenschaft) introduced and which humanity had 
now to face was nihilism. For Yannaras, nihilism, the philosophy of nothingness, basically 
rejected the 'conceptual idols' of God, in other words it denied God as identified with the 
rationalistic concepts of scholastic theology and theistic philosophy. Nihilism did not in itself 
represent some kind of destructive attitude that wanted to bring down all the values in a spirit 
of manic destruction. To be a nihilist did not mean to disqualify all the good that was there in 
the finest of human beliefs and principles. It was rather an open and earnest admission that the 
so-called values and fine beliefs were not really such. Nihilism was a consequence of man- 
centred metaphysics and opposed it; it abandoned anthropocentric notions about God and thus 
left the 'place' of God in human thought empty. The concepts that once used to define divine 
reality and were identified with God were now annulled; their content - God created by the 
human intellect - was not there anymore, he had been invalidated. The God of Western 
metaphysics had died. 
To sum up Yannaras' view of the historical development of the Western intellect: first 
rationalism, by putting forward intellectual certainties, aspired to replace the living Church 
experience, but only provoked its rational overthrow and prepared the ground for the 
ascendancy of empiricism; empiricism then strengthened the authority of the individual and 
consequently, in the long term, brought about nihilism. Similarly, the ways of Roman 
Catholic 
fideism and of Protestant pietism resulted in utilitarianism, where values were assessed 
practically and used as means to effect social and moral objectives. This 
in turn led gradually 
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to the demolition of all values, through a process of growing uncertainty and lack of 
conviction for the traditional hierarchy of values. 196 Therefore European metaphysics and 
Christian theology were inevitably run down. 
Yannaras sees, then, in Heidegger someone who takes up Nietzsche's nihilist kerygma 
fearlessly and acknowledges openly the bankruptcy of Western metaphysics and of Christian 
theology as that was represented by scholasticism. Heidegger recognizes the leading role of 
human subjectivity in the development of Western metaphysics and the dominating authority 
of reason. He accepts that the efforts made by Kant and Hegel to limit the primacy of reason in 
verifying the existent did not really manage to break through the limitations of the subject. 
Even with Kant and Hegel the human subject remained the measure and the centre in 
determining the matter of existence, and consequently ontology and theology stayed 
anthropocentric. 197 For Yannaras, that is, Heidegger represents a modem philosopher who 
openly recognises that the monism of the subject has characterised the advance of Western 
metaphysics and who consents to the fact that modem times have been defined by the way that 
humans have been doing ontology, that is, in an anthropocentric manner. 
The analysis, however, of the historical process of the European intellect by Heiddeger 
is presented, Yannaras notes, on the basis of a significant distinction. Heidegger, here 
following Nietzsche, differentiates historical Christendom, in other words the historical 
presentation of the Church that was often a presence of and a quest for social and political 
authority, from the actual Christian message and faith that was originally put forward in the 
scriptures. Whether Nietzsche really meant anything by this distinction, whether it was really a 
way of limiting the criticism he was bound to receive, is not our concern. Yannaras takes this 
distinction seriously. In the light of such a distinction Nietzsche's pronouncement about the 
death of God can then be interpreted as not substantially a statement of an anti-Christian 
nature. Nietzsche's criticism was not in fact directed against the Christian message of the 
Gospels, simply because the message of the Gospels was not the same as the historical reality 
of Christendom. In other words, Nietzsche's kerygma was a criticism of the 
historical 
alienation and distortion of the Christian faith in the West. Through his critique Nietzsche 
196 Heidegger, p. 54. 
197 Heidegger, p. 5 1. 
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actually targeted the departure of the Western Churches from, or their abandonment of, the 
Christianity of the first centuries presented in the New Testament. Nietzsche's nihilism did not 
thus envisage the actual God of the early Christian experience, but rather the historical 
formulations of Christian theology that had been shown to fall short of its original content. 
Accordingly, Heidegger's analysis also acknowledges that a Christian presentation, a life that 
presents itself in the name of tfie Christian God, may not be truly Christian, and vice versa, 
that a life not obviously connected with the course of historical Christianity may in fact be 
Christian. Moreover, the death and absence of God pronounced in modem times does not 
suggest the absence of the God of primal ecclesial experience. The absence of God is an event 
or an insight that relates only to certain historical formulations of Christianity in Western 
Christendom. 198 
Consequently, Yannaras takes Nietzsche's kerygma as in reality seeking to preserve a 
more divine view of God, an understanding of God more divine than the notional idols of 
theistic metaphysics. In Heidegger's analysis, then, Yannaras comments, European nihilism is 
seen as an effort to preserve the divinity of God. The philosophy of nothingness does not seek 
to annul what metaphysics would see as a truth 'beyond' the world of the senses. It rather 
aspires to invalidate the anthropocentric systems or views that were falsely and misleadingly 
identified with that reality 'beyond'. Nihilism, in other words, does not mean that there is no 
longer any God to believe in, but rather that the images of God believed in so far were not 
worthy of God and therefore not credible. ' 99 
Nihilism, then, in Heidegger, Yannaras explains, opens the way anew for a true 
metaphysics . 
200 Heidegger, as we saw, makes a distinction between the 'dead God' 
pronounced by Nietzsche, that is the God of Western metaphysics, and the God presented in 
the Christian Gospel. Consequently the modem 'nothingness' does not mean the complete 
inability to proceed to any formulation about God or the denial of any qualities of God 
whatsoever. The modem 'emptiness' of the place of God, the un-definability of God, rather 
leaves space for reaching a more theological view of faith about God than the conceptual- 
rational approaches and interpretations allowed us to reach. In Heidegger and the Areopagite 
19' Heidegger, pp. 56-9 
199 Heidegger, pp. 59-60. 
200 Heidegger, pp. 60-4. 
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Yannaras wants to show how Heidegger's approach to the matter of the existent opens the way 
to a true ontology, in a manner similar to what had been expressed in the field of Christian 
theology already in the first centuries of the Christian East. Basically, Yannaras argues, 
Heidegger does not understand Being as the first and causal principle for beings, he does not 
see Being, ýhat is, as something that is or exists; in other words Heidegger does not identify 
Being with a sort of entity, even though superior as it would be in all ways. This is because 
Heidegger starts off by examining Being and beings not on the basis of their relationship - 
which approach renders Being the cause of beings and leads to an understanding of them in 
terms of cause and effect - but instead on the basis of the difference between Being and 
beings. Thus beings reveal themselves to us, while Being remains hidden. Beings, as it were, 
emerge at the surface of existence as phenomena; they disclose themselves as coming into 
view from oblivion (a-ATIOF-Uouv), thus beings are what we can see and observe. Being on 
the contrary stays veiled and unknown (in AýOTI). It is in the nature of Being to be concealed 
and the only way we can catch a glimpse of it is through beings. 201 In other words a being is a 
way of Being. Therefore, what does not come forward as a being, what remains hidden, is not 
necessarily 'nothing'. If being is what presents Being as just a way of Being, then nil or the 
non-being, in other words that which does not disclose itself, is not automatically identified 
with 'nothing'. Nil is thus rather another way of Being, as being is a way of Being. 'Nothing' 
is not in this way identified with Being itself, but rather belongs to the mode (TQ07io) of 
Being, is another aspect of the way to be (, cQ67ioi; rov- F-'LvaL). This means that the question 
whether that which does not disclose itself is really 'nothing' or not remains open. In other 
words God is certainly not a being, a tangible entity; however the question of faith in Him still 
remains open. 
The attraction that Yannaras seemed to experience to Heidegger's analysis of the state 
of Western metaphysics and the philosopher's approach to the metaphysical problem can be 
interpreted in this dual way: first, Heiddeger represented for Yannaras, as we have mentioned 
again, an honest voice that admitted openly the bankruptcy of Western metaphysics, 
something that, 
for polemical reasons, Yannaras was perhaps all too ready to embrace. 
20 1 Heidegger, p. 60. 
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Heidegger, as well as Sartre, and in a way the existentialists of those days in general, voiced 
openly an issue that was there but which the great theologians, as it were, had not been able to 
recognize and face: that the traditional beliefs, as they had developed and been presented 
through the centuries up to modem times, could not be sustained any longer, and as a result of 
this man found himself helplessly alone, having to redefine the truth about grave matters such 
as that of his existence, of where he comes from and where he goes, of the meaning of life and 
of how to make choices and reach decisions or, in other words, of the grounds upon which to 
judge what the right thing to do is, of the reason or the absurdity of pain and of death. 
Secondly, Heidegger, with his interpretation of the matter of Being and beings, seemed to 
offer a different ground for a metaphysical approach from what Western metaphysics had seen 
so far. Heidegger's method refused to determine Being in any other way than to say that Being 
is that which stays unknown and hidden. Being, as we already explained earlier above, 
discloses itself only in beings, which are ways of Being, but it cannot be associated absolutely 
with any of the things we know. Heidegger's philosophy refuses to furnish Being with any of 
the descriptions applied to beings. Such an approach did not allow for any sort of worldly or 
human-experience-based formulations to be connected with Being as such, and thus left open 
the possibility of assuming a more holy, as it were, or superhuman view of the transcendental. 
In Heidegger's philosophy, to put it in other words, the transcendental was said and allowed to 
be really so. It was beyond all ability of man whatsoever to know, to define and to speak about 
it. Heidegger's understanding of Being imposed upon man or at least invited from him 
modesty and silence. 
Yannaras seemed to have found this analysis immensely attractive, as he felt that in 
fact the same attitude had been already expressed in the theological tradition of the Christian 
East. Reading Heidegger, Yannaras felt that the philosopher's position found echoes in the 
stance presented in the Eastern Christian tradition since the early 
days of the Church and 
especially through the ideas of the so-called Areopagitical texts. 
This stance is namely the 
theology of apophaticism. Therefore, in the second part of his book Heidegger and the 
Areopagite Yannaras presents the apophatic theology of the eastern Christian tradition and 
shows how it bears on the matter of 
God as discussed here. Heidegger might well have been 
surprised at the way 
his analysis was being made to serve Yannaras' espousal of the Eastern 
Christian tradition. However, he himself prepares the way for such an approach when 
he 
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reaches back behind the tradition of Western metaphysics, inaugurated by Plato and Aristotle, 
to the pre-Socratics, especially Herakleitos, where he finds hints pointing to his analysis of 
Being and his notion of truth as ok-AýOaot - un-concealedness. 
4. Apophaticism and the unknowability of God 
When it comes to the apophaticism of Christian theology Yannaras appears ready and 
confident to make another distinction, reflecting his understanding of the East and the West as 
two separate milieus in terms of their philosophical and theological developments. This time 
he sets apart the form that theological apophaticism assumed in the Eastern Church tradition 
from the type of apophaticism that has been commonly practised in Western theology. Thus 
Yannaras finds that apophaticism in the theology of the Christian East is not quite the same 
thing as the apophaticism that has been followed in the Western realm of Christendom. 202 
Apophaticism for the West, Yannaras argues, has been pursued within the same frame 
of mind that characterized European intellectual history, a summary of which Yannaras offers, 
as we saw and sketched out above, in the first part of Heidegger and the Areopagite. This 
means that apophaticism as practised in the West was just another expression of the 
philosophical outlook of the European intellect, namely what Yannaras refers to as the 
6,203 monism of the subject . As we 
have seen already, the whole of the European intellectual 
advancement has been characterised by the fact that the human subject was always the starting 
point for doing philosophy and metaphysics. Man, sometimes with his fully authoritative 
ratio, sometimes with his deified senses, was in every case the condition, the 
decisive factor 
for defining the real, the existent, the One or the Supreme that supposedly lay beyond all 
human experience. Apophaticism then, as practised by the systematic theologians of the West, 
according to Yannaras, was only another aspect of the attitude of 
defining the transcendental 
202 In Right Reason and Social Practice Yannaras discusses apophaticism not in theology but in terms of 
philosophical thought and 
the practice of political activity. Also To Pq-c6 Kai T6 Appqro [What can be said and 
what cannot be said] 
(Athens: Ikaros, 1999) is an analysis by Yannaras of the function and the limitations of 
rhetoric to express or indicate 
the actual experience or knowledge to which it refers; an analysis of the limits of 
language as identified in the interval between names and their meaning. 
203 This is not originally in fact Yannaras' expression, but one that he borrows from Yvon Belaval, see Right 
Reason, p. 220. 
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on the basis of human means. Basically what the apophaticism in the West involved in general 
was a rejection - or negation - of the qualities of beings when referring to the reality of God. 
Thus, for example, since worldly things exist in time and are determined by it having an end, 
the element of time is denied to divine reality, and thus God is beyond time and knows no end 
(a-XQovoý;, a' -rEAF-Uvycoý). Apophaticism, in other words, meant to refuse to confer on God 
attributes that belonged to created beings. This, however, was done in such a way that God 
could still be described and referred to in terms of what could be known and defined; God was 
just the reversal of it. This found expression in the development of branches in theology such 
as theologia naturalis and theologia negativa, which Yannaras sees as the aberration on the 
part of Western theology from true apophaticism. 204 
Apophatic theology as it has been put forward within the Eastern Christian tradition, 
Yannaras asserts, is not just associated with the use of negative language in relation to God's 
reality. Instead, it involves a further and more comprehensive resignation from any hope of 
designating the reality of God in the categories of reason, whether affirmative or negative. To 
be apophatic means to acknowledge the complete impossibility on man's part to know the 
very nature or the substance of God. 205 The substance of God remains beyond any capacity of 
human knowledge, approach or understanding. God's being is a reality completely other from 
all our experiences, it is beyond the categories of space and time, only in terms of which we 
are able to understand beings or anything at all that exists. It is beyond our capability, 
therefore, to form any idea about how God is in Himself. 206 
204 Other Orthodox theologians, however, would not be so dismissive of Western apophaticism. Bishop Kallistos, 
for example, writing on the English hermit of the early 14'h century Richard Rolle, finds an apophaticism that in 
his words is not a relative but a radical one, and asserts that he would have been wholeheartedly endorsed by the 
Cappadocians in his exposition of the transcendence and incomprehensibility of God ('God is beyond our 
understanding because we are created. He can never be comprehended by us as he is in himself: p. 182): 
Kallistos 
of Diokleia 'The Holy Name of Jesus in East and West: the Hesychasts and Richard Rolle', Sobornost 
4: 2,1982, 
pp. 163-184, where also further examples of people and texts - for example The Cloud of 
Unknowing - of a 
western origin (in particular of l4ffi century England) are brought up as expressing an apophatic stance. 
205 This is the case not only for the Areopagitical texts but according also to other Church Fathers, as is clear from 
the references Yarmaras makes to the patristic tradition, for example drawing 
from St Maximus and St John 
Damascene. 
206 Ila this yannaraS is voicing a position expounded by many other Orthodox theologians, for example Vladimir 
Lossky and Dumitru Stdniloae. Vladimir Lossky, also based on the Areopagite, put a strong emphasis on the 
radical character of apophaticism 
in the Eastern Church that wants to maintain the complete unknowability of the 
'unfathomable depths of God' and the absolute character of the 'divine incomprehensibility': Vladimir Lossky, 
The mystical theology of the Eastern Church (London: James Clarke, 1957), especially chapter two, on 
'The 
Divine Darkness', pp. 23-43. Though Yannaras cannot have met Lossky, who died in 1958, Lossky must 
have 
been a mentor and guide for Yannaras, as the latter himself acknowledges: Aristotle Papanikolaou, 
Being with 
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We will come back to this distinction Yannaras makes in relation to theological 
apophaticism further on, after a short digression we must make here to spell out a crucial 
differentiation that we find in the course of the Eastern Church tradition which is also 
presupposed for Yannaras' discussion of apophatic theology and the knowledge of God. 
Yannaras is anxious to make clear that the apophatic theology of the Church does not imply, 
and is not the way to, agnosticism. There is, as it were, a 'safety valve' in the theology of the 
Eastern Church. Alongside with the conviction expressed by the apophatic theology of the 
Greek Fathers, according to which it is utterly inappropriate to try to specify God as such, 
there is also an important distinction made by the Greek theologians: the distinction between 
207 God's essence and God's energies. The Christian tradition may have defended the complete 
unknowability of God ever since the time of the Areopagitical texts, but it has not ended up in 
agnosticism. Christians did not set off to believe in or to proclaim a mystified kind of God. 
Their God was a personal God, in other words, a God who revealed Himself to humans 
directly on various occasions within history, ever since the days of the Old Testament. God's 
personal revelation, then, for Christians, culminated in the historical person of Christ in whom 
his disciples and every other faithful Christian from there on recognised the Son and Word of 
God. However, none of the ways in which God revealed Himself made God's Being or 
substance as such available to man's knowledge. The theological formulations of the Church 
expressed this fact by means of the 'ineffable but real distinction' that needs to be made 
'between the unknowable essence and the self-revealing energies of the Divinity' or, as 
Dionysius puts it, between the 'unions' and 'distinctions' in God; the latter are God's 
(processions (npoo6ot) beyond Himself, His manifestations (E-K(ýAvUF_Lý) ... or 
forces 
208 (buvaýtEU; )' In terms of their results the energies of God are also referred to as 'being 
imparting' (OU'UL(OCFE U; 
), 'life-iMParting' (C(O(O'CFE U; ), 'wisdom-imparting' 
(CFOý)07, OLT, ()-EL,; ). 
209 The energies of God are the way in which God reveals himself, they are 
God Trinity, Apophaticism and Divine-Human Communion (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2006), P. 198, n. 4. 
207 This distinction became famous in the hesychast controversy, as employed by St Gregory Palamas. Palamas 
traced the distinction 
back to the Fathers and Yannaras does not hesitate to accept Palamas here. 
208 Mystical theology, p. 72. 
209 Heidegger, p. 100. 
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the course through which God allows himself be identified; in them 'everything that exists 
partakes, thus making God known in His creatures'. 210 It means, therefore, that all we can 
approach or get to know of God is his energies, that is those 'actions' of Him or 'movements' 
through which He relates to the world - in the main God's creative and providential energies. 
In Yannaras' words, we can therefore form some idea of the way (TQOno) God is, through his 
creation, in a similar way that we can understand something about the personality of an 
architect or a musician through what they create, whether a house or a piece Of MUSiC. 211 
For the Christian theological tradition the very nature of the Godhead, God's being as 
such remains unknowable for humans. God's nature is a reality of absolute unknowability and 
incomprehensibility for created man. Even though the essence of God cannot be known, God, 
however, reveals himself through his energies and man has the possibility to know not God's 
nature but God's way of being. This is a possibility that man has due to what theological 
language calls the energies or activities (E-'VEQ-YELE(; ) of God. The energies of God, in other 
words, are the ways through which God discloses himself and becomes accessible and known 
to us; the divine energies are the channels, as it were, through which man gets to have a grasp 
of the presence of God and to know what God is like: not the essence of God but the way God 
is. And for the theological tradition of the Church the Christian God has been known as a 
personal God; theological language specifies the way that God 'exists', or rather the way we 
know God, as a personal way. The phrase 'way of existence' (, cQoTcoý v7iocQýF-(oý) is, as we 
shall see, central to Yannaras' understanding of what it is to be personal. 212 
Yannaras explains that we name the way that God exists as personal based on our 
experience of man's personal existence: we get to know man's existence in the multitude of 
personal individualities, that is in the existential otherness personified in each unique and 
unrepeatable human person. And each human person discloses itself to us through a series of 
acts and expressions, which are the human energies. These are common to all people since 
210 Mystical theology, p. 72. 
211 it is characteristic of Yannaras - in relation to the distinction between 'essence' and 
'energies' that we refer to 
here and also in his discussion about the uniqueness of each personal existence - to 
bring up the example of 
artistic creativity; he typically takes the names of 
Van Gogh and Mozart, where the work of the artists, as a result 
Ih the creator himself or of their creative energy, 
is evidence about Its creator, without being identified either wit 
his energy of creating, see e. g. 
Heidegger, pp. 101,105. 
212 This distinction between essence and energies remains important for Yannaras and he returns to it frequently. 
See his article, 'The Distinction between Essence and Energies and its Importance 
for Theology', SVTQ 19 
(1975), pp. 232-45. 
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they are shared by the common human nature, however they are realized in the case of each 
individual in a totally distinctive, matchless and inimitable way. 213 Thus, as Yamaras Puts it. 
by participating in the energies that exemplify the otherness of each person - for example the 
energy of speech, of thought, of imagination, or of will and so on - we get to know each 
214 individual existence and are able to distinguish their personal distinctiveness . In a similar 
way, mutatis mutandis, by participating in the divine energies we get to know God as 
personally existing, that is, as a presence of otherness, distinct and free from any 
predeterminations. Moreover, we get to know God as the presence of a Triad, of three distinct 
hypostases, which are at the same time the one and single God. The fact, Yannaras comments, 
that the Christian God is a Trinitarian God indicates that what we humans describe as God's 
personal existence is nonetheless free even from our conventional image of 'person' as 
'individual existence'. Therefore even this way of referring to God is not to be conditioned by 
the limitedness that the terms carry from their use in the conformity of our reality. In a similar 
way Lossky notes that when the Areopagitical texts refer to God not just as 'One' or 'Unity' - 
terms that Plotinus had used to describe the divine - but as 'Triad', this is in fact a way of 
preserving the unknowability of God. 'Trinity' alludes to the fact that God is neither one nor 
many, and that He transcends even this antinomy and all the names we may use about Him, 
remaining beyond knowledge in what He is. 215 
It is once again pointed out, in this way, that no wording or formulation (AEKc LKTI 
b LoccU 7z(jorq) can adequately provide us with true knowledge of God. The knowledge of God 
lies beyond all possible specifications of an objective character and takes place only in our 
direct participation in the divine life revealed to us in the Church and through God's energies. 
Therefore this knowledge has been described by the Patristic mind as an 'ascent towards the 
divine incomprehensibility' or the darkness of God. It is rather a 'knowledge' of ignorance in 
which by unknowing we know what surpasses understanding. 
216 It is the state that theological 
language also delineates as mystical union with God that involves not a method of the intellect 
213 Heidegger, p. 105. 




Mystical Theology, p. 31. 
216 Cf. Mystical Theology, p. 28. 
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but the abandonment of all created categories: purification, KdOaQo-Lý. Lossky, nevertheless, 
clarifies that for the Eastern tradition mysticism and theology are not separated or opposed. 
There is no sharp distinction between them; one is necessary for the other or impossible 
without the other. This saves mysticism from being taken as equal to agnosticism; hence we 
can talk of the 'mystical knowledge' of God. Besides, unlike gnosticism for example, 
knowledge for the Church is the means to the end, which is union with God. Thus theology as 
formulated in the doctrines of the Church is the foundation of Christian spirituality. 217 
However, no matter how we specify in our human language this idea we get to form 
about God, we should still be conscious of the fact that none of our formulations can define 
God's reality as such. Nothing we say can identify or exhaustively express what God really is. 
Even doctrinal theology - for example the teaching of the Church concerning Trinitarian 
theology - does not give an objective presentation of God's Being; it is rather an apparatus of 
a descriptive or indicative nature in relation to God, that puts forward what or how we ought to 
believe with regard to God in order to have a more orthodox, that is truthful, rather than a 
falsified understanding of Him and thus to be saved. To put it in a different way, the doctrinal 
formulations are rather meant to have the function of a rule or a standard that delineates the 
way to be followed with regard to the faith, leaving out or eliminating convictions that would 
be deceptive; they are not at all utterances of an exhaustive character, nor do they offer any 
objective or fully comprehensive description of God's being. 218 
Hence the need for apophaticism, which, Yannaras points out, is understood - within 
the Eastern theological approach - as the refusal to accept that the truth can be exhausted in 
any formulation. Here, therefore, we have not simply the negation of qualities of the created 
order in relation to God, but the all-embracing negation of identifying the truth with any way 
of talking - whether positively or negatively - that we use to refer to the truth. Apophaticism 
here, in other words, is the resignation altogether on the part of the knowing subject from any 
217 Mystical Theology, pp. 8-11. 
218 See Mystical Theology, pp. 39-40, on how even cataphatic theology leads to apophaticism. Also, Heidegger, p. 
117 and Andrew Louth 'The 
influence of Denys the Areopagite on Eastern and Western spirituality in the 
fourteenth century', Sobomost 4: 2 (1982), p. 187: '... cataphatic and symbolic theology ... 
leads beyond itself, 
for it points to a God who 
is unknowable. The very words the sacred Scriptures give us to praise God with, the 
very rites and ceremonies 
the sacred Tradition has handed down to us, point beyond themselves to an ineffable 
mystery ... the 
Divine Darkness, where the soul knows God by unknowing in an ecstasy of love'. 
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'objective' setting down of the Truth .2 
19 Apophaticism takes an utterly different stance from 
that of the positivism of knowledge; it rejects any manner of ascribing absolute authority to 
any methods and procedures that are applied in order to arrive at or convey valid 
knowledge 
. 
220 This does not mean, Yannaras makes clear, that apophaticism in theology 
fosters arbitrariness or irrationality by turning its back on the principles of logic and the 
coherent formulation of knowledge. Apophaticism accepts the methods of the philosophical 
approach to knowledge, but does not see these methods as the only effective ways of 
providing us with convincing truths. This however, Yannaras says, has been the path down 
which the West went. Western theological thought deviated from the true attitude towards 
knowledge by taking the means of attaining to knowledge - such as theologia naturalis and 
theologia negativa - as absolute methods that lead to binding truths. 221 Scholastic and neo- 
scholastic theology put forward the claim that it is possible for us to know God in an 
analogical way, and in order to sustain this suggestion it fell back on the Areopagitical texts. 
Such a proposal, Yannaras admits, had its theoretical origins in Aristotle's teaching on 
analogy. However, Aristotle, Yannaras explains, did not apply this principle of analogy to 
ontology. He did not draw from such an analogy any conclusions about the existence of 
beings, in other words about the relationship of beings and Being. Aristotle, that is, did not go 
on to speak of Being or to draw knowledge about Being from beings, as the scholastics did. 222 
The crucial section of the Areopagitical texts upon which the scholastics sought to base the 
teaching of the analogical knowledge of God, Yannaras explains, does not really uphold such 
a suggestion. 223 The knowledge of the substance of God is fully ruled out in the Fathers, and 
analogical knowledge is suggested only in relation to God's distinctive qualities or energies. 
Besides, the created order that allows us to describe in an analogical way God's properties is 
only a reflection of these properties and by no means is it identified with God's energies as 
such. This allows, Yannaras goes on, space for the factor of human freedom and for the 
219 Heidegger, p. 71. 
tt i an 220 See how Lossky also appeals to this, and his point that apophatIcicm Is an a tude d not just a branch of 
theology: Mystical Theology, p. 42. 
22 1 Heidegger, p. 72. 
222 Heidegger, p. 73. 
223 1 Heidegger, pp. 74-6. See also Vladimir Lossky, 'La notIon des "analogies" chez le ps. Denys I'Ar6opagite-, 
Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littiraire du Moyen 
Age 5 (1930), pp. 279-309. 
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element of man's personal readiness to approach or to receive the analogical knowledge to 
which the created images only point. 224 
In this way Yannaras makes space, as we will see, for his discussion on the theme of 
225 personal participation in the knowledge of God , in relation to which he later on defines the 
apophaticism he sees practised in the East as the apophaticism of the person as opposed to the 
apophaticism of Western theology, the apophaticism of the scholastics, which he accordingly 
calls the apophaticism of the substance. 226 1 will explain briefly what this distinction by 
Yannaras means. 
Western theology acknowledges that it is impossible to know the substance of God and 
therefore it denies all known properties with regard to God's essence. The apophaticism of 
western theology then is the negation of attributing qualities taken from our worldly 
experience to God's substance. This stance, Yannaras points out, is expressed through 
negative theology and the apophaticism of the great scholastics, such as Anselm and Aquinas, 
who were the main 'architects' of the analogical knowledge of God in the West. 227 For 
Yannaras this constitutes what he describes as the apophaticism of the substance, as it is 
exercised within a framework where God is still understood as 'something', as the highest of 
what we could ever think of, which however we acknowledge that we are not in a position to 
fully understand and possess knowledge of and define. God in a way is already there as a part 
of our system of thought, but because it is the highest and greatest and most supernatural we 
could ever conceive, we opt to keep silent about it and not seek to fully represent it by any 
descriptions; in other words we realize that we need to be apophatic. But we are so in a way 
that still allows us the confidence for things we can say in relation to God, such as that God is 
transcendental, or that God is beyond knowing. 
The apophaticism of the East, however, Yannaras would argue, is an altogether 
different story. There, apophaticism does not refer to the fact that we cannot attribute any of 
224 Heidegger, p. 79. 
225 Further on knowledge as participation see the section 'Knowledge of God as personal participation' later in 
the present chapter. 
226 T6 7Tp6er( )7-CO Kai 6 Zpwc [Person and Eros] (Athens: Domos, 2001,4th edition), 
§ 7. 
227 Person and Eros, p. 39. Yannaras sees the apophaticism of the scholastics and of the mystics of the 
West as 
simply the other side, as it were, of 
the same coin of the affirmative and analogical determination of Being. This, 
however, may not represent a faithful reading of the apophaticism of Aquinas; see Josef Pieper, 
The Silence of St. 
Thomas: Three Essays, trans. Daniel O'Connor (London: Faber and Faber, 1957). 
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the worldly qualities to a supernatural reality, but that even to refer to God as a supernatural 
reality falls short of the truth of God. Apophaticism in the East means that we acknowledge as 
inadequate any possible statement about God, even to say that God is beyond knowledge. For 
the East - due to the distinction between God's essence and energies to which we referred 
earlier - God is beyond comprehension and at the same time within knowledge, but it is not 
possible for that knowledge to be exhaustively expressed in any human way or fully 
conununicated through language, hence apophaticism. Furthermore, to get to know God at all 
is only possible through personal involvement. Knowledge of God is approached only on a 
personal basis, through a personal engagement; it takes a direct relating, a relationship. 
Yannaras, consequently, calls the apophaticism practised in the East 'apophaticism of the 
person', which means that God is known within a personal encounter and as a personal 
presence; as a personal presence and experience He can be neither known nor expressed 
exhaustively. God here is not understood and put forward as the ultimate cause or substance, 
but is rather known as a presence, he reveals himself as a presence within a personal 
engagement undertaken in the life of Christians. This is very similar to the way Stdniloae 
understands apophatic theology. 228 For the East, therefore, apophaticism represents the 
realization or the fact that anything at all we say to refer to the experienced God, any 
formulations we attempt to describe what we know as an encompassing experience, is 
inadequate to relate that experience. Thus for Yannaras' distinction 'apophaticism of the 
substance' means that we cannot define God, any way of describing God needs qualification; 
for the East apophaticism rather means that we cannot define our experience of God, we 
cannot exhaust our knowledge of Him in any definitions. We realize that there is nothing that 
we can say which will be adequate to denote God's reality. Nothing of what we can say 
referring to God and our spiritual experience is fully accurate in an exhaustive way. We 
basically cannot exhaust or adequately express in any statement what we mean to share as an 
experience of God - therefore, in the end, the invitation 'Come and see' of the fourth gospel. 
Yannaras is aware of the danger in this way that we appear to pass to agnosticism or to 
some obscure mysticism; therefore he notes that personal knowledge is not a completely non- 
communicated knowledge. The knowledge of God as a result of personal engagement 
does not 
228 Durnitru Stdniloae, The Experience of God, trans. Ioan Ionitd and Robert Barringer (Brookline, MA: Holy 
Cross Orthodox Press, 1994), pp. 103-17. 
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take place in isolation and it is not an individual matter, 229but takes place with and through 
that personal involvement of others too, that is in the body of the Church. The personal 
knowledge then which is shared within the body of the Church is formulated in dogmas and 
articles of faith, and thus the truth that we experience and that we cannot exhaustively 
communicate is not an individual and mystifying truth; it is a shared and common truth, a 
knowledge we all get to know, the knowledge of the whole body, which however each 
member shares in personally, in a personal engagement and participation. Besides, the dogmas 
we formulate to express our Church experience are not of any exhaustive nature with regard to 
the reality of God that they refer to, or with regard to the actual knowledge of God Christians 
may have. The Church experience that is, in which each one of us participates through a 
personal engagement, cannot be ultimately worded or replaced by any descriptions, hence the 
constantly applied stance of apophaticism. We could say, then, that the 'Come and see' that 
we mentioned already summarizes the whole attitude of the apophatic theology in the East, 
which, Yannaras wants to underline, serves not as a way to describe God although in a 
negative way, but as a dynamic starting-point for the realization of a personal relationship, 
230 
since it is only on the basis of personal experience, on the basis of each distinct person's 
existence that God can be approached and related to. It is therefore the 'apophaticism of the 
person', the apophaticism that points to and at the same time emanates from a personal 
engagement, which involves the participation of more capacities and not just reason. 
231 This is 
how relationship, then, in Yannaras becomes a fundamental category for knowledge. 
For the apophatic theology of the East, therefore, even to say that 'God is personal' or 
'God is unknowable' is only a matter of indicative references and thus inadequate, and it is 
impossible to exhaust what we actually mean to suggest, the experience that we mean to share. 
It ultimately falls short of the truth of God, the divine reality that we mean to suggest. 
229 Yannaras would identify this attitude for example in Protestantism, where relationship with 
God is seen rather 
as a private affair and the person is saved on the 
basis of their own faith. 
230 See for example Lossky's discussion about the person of the Mother of God: it 
is only through participation in 
the life of the Church that we can understand the devotion the 
Church offers to the Mother of God. Lossky 
appeals to the 4silence' required in 
being able to adhere to this devotion: Vladimir Lossky, 'Panagia', In the 
Image and Likeness of God 
(New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1974), pp. 195-210. 
... when 
we speak of empirical relationship, we refer to the special capacity of the human subject to approach 231 61 
the knowledge of reality 
by means of a general faculty of apprehension, that is to say, a coordination of several 
factors in the event of knowledge (such as sensation, understanding, judgement, 
imagination, abstraction, 
reduction, emotion, intuition, 
insight, etc. )', Heidegger, p. 88. 
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Apophaticism in the Eastern theological tradition is not to give negative attributes - to say 
what God is not - and not just to keep silent - on the grounds that we do not know what God 
is - but to realize and acknowledge that whatever we say, even the negative definitions we 
may use, or even to say that our silence best describes it, falls short of what we have 
experienced and known. In the mind of Eastern theology silence in relation to God is not a 
passive silence; it is not a silence imposed because we cannot possibly comprehend God and 
are too inferior to God to say anything accurate about Him. The silence of the 'apophaticism 
of the person' is rather an active silence, that recognizes that there is more to know than what 
we can speak of, there is more there to share and also to explore than what we can describe or 
say. It is not a silence we keep because we don't know what to say, but a silence we choose to 
take up even though there are things we could say, but those very ones we recognize would be 
partial and inadequate to what we actually mean to express and for this reason they could 
perhaps be misleading. Therefore there are times when we choose to speak and times we 
choose to keep silent, things we can say and things that we choose not to, for we know that 
once we do they will not be the same as what we had known or wanted to communicate. 
Accordingly, the theological language that communicates the experience of God's 
knowledge is a particular language, of an apophatic character in its very make-up rather than 
in its apparent forms. Yannaras emphasizes the fact that apophaticism in Orthodox theology is 
also expressed through the use of contrary terms with relation to God known as antinomies 
((TUVOEUKa aV'CL0F_T0(): for example ineffable word, intellect without intelligence, being 
V-C0, Cr, ). 232 beyond being (Aoyo(; 0(QQTJT0ý, VOUý; aVOIJTOý;, V71FEQ0UCFL0i; V La These are 
introduced so that theology stays free from objectified definitions and escapes the limits of 
conceptual language and meanings. The use of pairs of contrary expressions that complete 
each other, Yannaras notes, alludes to the transcendence of all literal meaning of their content 
through a logical antithesis and thus allows for the possibility of personal participation in the 
reality they mean to denote. The language used in theology is not a literal language but rather 
a symbolic one; it does not represent the truth in a factual way but rather invites to the 
immediate experience and the experiential verification of it. The use of the antinomies does 
not lead to absurdity 
but rather allows our human, conventional language to 'create' or work 
-- ------- - --- 232 Heidegger, p. 83. 
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through images, where the quality described is neither the one nor the other; the reality of God 
is neither the one nor the other. The language of theology is rather a poetic tongue that seeks 
to express the truth in terms of poetry and imagery rather than to articulate it in terms of a 
matter-offact discourse or through conventional concepts. Theological expressions are 
apophatic for they mean to release our understanding from all conceptual conformities; the use 
of contrary terms in particular transmits a particular dynamic and seeks to annihilate 
'conceptual idols' and thus to point to the complete otherness of God. 233 
We could illustrate this by reflecting on the way Orthodox theology speaks in terms of 
God's glory. The people of God know Him as glory. God's presence is felt in the lives of the 
saints as a glorious presence; the vision of God is often spoken of in terms of the vision of the 
light of Tabor. Even the icon of the Transfiguration shows Christ illumined; Christ is depicted 
with a flame of light surrounding Him, which in the technical language of the icon makers is 
called '66ýa% 'glory'. That is, God is revealed as light, those who achieve deification see him 
as light, and deification is identified in one aspect as the view of the Glory of God, that is of 
the non-created light of God (Ota coD a-KdcFrou (ýcocoý). We see thus that the Orthodox 
experience speaks of or refers to the view of God as something that can only be experienced 
personally and, moreover, can be described and referred to only partly. That is why there is no 
fully objective language similar to that of the sciences to describe the knowledge or the view 
of God. Theological language speaking of the 'glory' of God or of the non-created light still 
aspires to use terms that indicate an otherness, the otherness of God's reality, which because it 
is other always slips away from the significance and the actual meaning of any words and 
terms involved to refer to it. Theological language finds ways to refer to God's knowledge and 
revelation that escape from the possibility to be objectified or taken literally. The theological 
terms involved are still terms and words of human and created language, however they retain a 
kind of antinomy: they tend to hold in themselves the contradiction of the truthfulness of the 
reality they refer to and at the same time of the impossibility for that reality to be held and 
expressed in any human terms. Thus the experience of God in the lives of holy people is 
233 Heidegger, pp. 82-3,86-7 and Elements of Faith, pp. 17-8. In Heidegger, pp. 83-4 Yannaras also notes that 
even the reference to 
God as the First Cause of beings can bear a part In the abandonment of conceptual 
necessities when 
it is used as an image and not as a certifying definition. 
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firn-fly described as the view of the 'uncreated light'; however, the very expression of 
6 uncreated light' as such - no matter how real and meaningful the language terms involved 
may be in themselves and as separate words - has no apparent or objective meaning. The very 
idiom appears rather perplexing and odd. Still, for those who have known God as 'uncreated 
light', the phrase makes some very good sense, and preserves at the same time the very core of 
their knowledge, the fact that God is completely other and therefore referred to in ways that 
appear rather strange or unnatural. Theological language alludes to the complete otherness of 
God. 
5. The Nihilism of theological qpophaticism 
Because we acknowledge that the theological language we use in relation to God - 
either in the form of affirmations or of negations - is only a symbolic language, a language 
that makes use of images taken from the created world that we know, and uses them only as 
sketches to refer to the reality of God, Yannaras then speaks of what he calls ýtTjbEVLCFýtoý or 
the 'nihilism' of theological apophaticism. By this he refers to the stance of the Orthodox 
tradition that was expressed as early as in the Areopagitical texts and which discourages the 
human mind to identify any of the intelligible images with the reality of God. The nihilism of 
the apophatic attitude, in other words, is constituted in that it nullifies any possible perceptible 
effigy of God. 234 By no means does the apophaticism of the Areopagitical texts and the 
Fathers, however, suggest or lead to agnosticism. The ecclesial life is the milieu where God is 
known in a personal and experiential way, and this ecclesial experience is no doubt 
communicated by means of human language. However this language is only a conventional 
way of expressing our Church experience and therefore we should always be conscious of its 
symbolic character. Even the meaning conveyed by terms such as 'deity', 'spirit', 'sonship', 
'fatherhood' and so on are not to be taken as autonomous concepts. 235 This, Yannaras 
suggests, could actually be seen as an early expression of demythologization, 
236 where God is 
the nil, meaning that he cannot be regarded as a being; the possibility of forn-iing an 
234 Heidegger, p. 90- 
235 Heidegger, p. 95. 
236 Heidegger, p. 92. 
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understanding of God's reality through our worldly experience is completely ruled out. God is 
non-existing, pilbayC),; w'v, in relation to what we can understand at all as existence and name 
as such on the basis of our experience of created beings, based on our perception of the created 
order. 237 
Thus what Yannaras calls the 'nihilism of the theological apophaticism' opens the way 
to a 'more divine idea about God' - as in Heidegger's quest - since it outlaws the real obstacle 
to genuine knowledge of God which is the self-confidence of anthropocentric natural 
knowledge. 238 Consequently, it naturally leads to the ontology of the 'person' since it is 
acknowledged that God is known only as a personal presence through His personal 
Energies. 239 
6. Knowledge of God as personal participation 
Yannaras emphasizes the fact that the Areopagitical writings allow no room for any 
other kind of attempt to know God apart from the possibility of knowledge delivered through 
our participation in the divine life. And so to participate is not a process of a mental turning to 
or understanding of some divine concept about God, but rather a dynamic existential event, a 
turning of the whole existence that seeks the face of God towards God and into union with 
Him. For the Areopagitical tradition that Yannaras so sturdily wants to endorse as a 
substantial response to the debate about God in modem times, this existential move is a totally 
experiential reality; it is an experience of a powerful realism, sound in the assurance of the 
knowledge that the experience of a relationship can bring. Yannaras points out the consensus 
of the ecclesial tradition about the realism of the union with God as the true expression of 
apophaticism. 240 Therefore, for the mind and the practice of the Church tradition, to be 
apophatic is simply an act consistent with the relational empiricism that the Church 
consciously holds, since it points to the priority of experiential relatedness as the way to know 
237 Heidegger, p. 94. 
238 Heidegger, p. 93 
239 Heidegger, p. 98 and the section in Heidegger headed 'The apophatic knowledge as personal participation', 
pp. 103-123. 
ý'fo Heidegger, p. 107. 
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God, rather than the use of objectified terms and definitions . 
24 1 The theological formulations 
of the Church, then, are not there to replace the personal relationship; they rather open the way 
and point to the right belief about God by saving us from an erroneous one (6'QOoboýLa - 
rcaycoboýW, and they do not eliminate the necessity for the personal step of seeking out God 
that we need to take. The mystery of God for the Church Fathers, and in particular here for the 
theology of the Areopagitical texts, is only approached through a personal involvement; it 
takes a personal engagement to fathom the depths of the mystery of the Godhead. The soul 
that longs to know God has to stride out on a journey that needs to be made in person. 
However, 'in person', as we have touched on this before, does not mean in private or 
in secret, and it does not imply some mystifying or obscure individualistic experience. As we 
have noted before, Yannaras wants to make quite clear the fact that apophaticism does not 
relate to some esoteric mysticism. It is true that terms such as 'mysticism' or 'mystical 
theology' have been commonly employed to refer to the content of the Christian life and 
spirituality - notably in the title of Lossky's famous book. However, all such expressions as 
4mysticism', 'mystical theology' or the 'mystical life' of the Church do not refer to something 
that stays in secret or which is abstract and non-tangible and therefore puzzling. They simply 
relate to the life and experience of those people who took steps along the way of personally 
meeting with God. Their experience then is conventionally, as it were, specified as 'mystical' 
- rather to indicate its truly intimate and personal character - but for the tradition of the 
Church this has never meant that it is a mysterious and a non-communicable experience. The 
mystical life of the holy people of God and mystical theology is laid out in the open and 
shared in the community of the Church. Because, however, it remains at the same time an 
experience obtained on a personal level, it cannot be fully exhausted or grasped through any 
wordings and notional forms. Hence - it is once again pointed out - the apophaticism, in other 
words the call to the experience of a personal relationship and participation (ýtF_ToXTI). 
In this way the factor of human readiness to meet with God is also drawn out. God can 
be known to the extent of human inclination; knowledge of God depends on free human 
intention and the will to meet with him. Knowledge of God, then, is personal, like direct 
24 1 Heidegger, pp. 107-9. 
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knowledge of a human person supersedes all descriptions about them which somebody could 
give us, and is achieved only in personal contact and relation with them. Relation with God, as 
we shall see, is likewise erotic; in eros not everything is exhaustively phrased or described, 
much of it is just lived and felt and known as just a personal experience, possible to be talked 
about and described, but not possible to be fully shared. No one can fully identify with our 
personal experience or share our very own knowledge of our erotic participation as if they 
were us. 
Yannaras draws attention to the fact that the Areopagitical writings talk even of a 
Christological apophaticism. This simply means that even the revelation that took place in 
Christ bears a strongly apophatic character for the Church: the historicity of the person of 
Christ can be discussed and verified through the use of an objectively meaningful language; 
however, it takes the experience of real participation in the life of the Church and of unity with 
Christ to recognize in him the incarnate Word of God. As Yannaras aptly notes, in this way 
there is wisely avoided any attempt to turn the revelation of Christ into a matter of ideological 
character and objective proof and to remove from the event of the Incarnation the dynamism 
of experiential participation in it. 
242 
If the distinction between Ov'aq, nature, and F-vtpy, -t, -(;, energies, of God is the 
theological presupposition for grounding the affirmation of the possibility of the knowledge of 
God and for discussing, consequently, the apophaticism of knowledge, Yannaras points out an 
anthropological presupposition that needs equally not to be neglected. This second premise is 
the unity and the integrity of the human person. God calls mankind to share in communion 
with him, and man's response to this call is an act made consciously and in freedom. This 
means that participation in a personal communion with God is an event that recapitulates all 
the faculties of the human person; it brings and holds together all the existential possibilities of 
our nature, uniting and not dividing it. 
243 Man responds and relates to God with a complete 
self-consciousness, and the knowledge of God that he achieves is analogous to the 
degree to 
which man manages to overcome his nature, to stand out of his limited existence 
in a loving 
242 Heidegger, pp. 118-120. 
243 Heidegger, pp. I 11,115. 
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and self-abandoning movement. Still, the self-exiting on man's side and his self-surrender into 
a relationship of communion with God incorporates man's full will and freedom, and seeks to 
reveal the authentic image and the fullness of the human person. This means that all cases of 
an ecstatic mysticism where the T evaporates within the ambiguity of an indefinite and 
impersonal 'absolute' are ruled out as far as the Christian experience is concerned. The 
knowledge of God for the Orthodox theological tradition is achieved within a personal 
relationship and communion with God, where human nature is not annulled but rather restored 
to its primal richness and authenticity. 
7. Ecstatic nature 
Yannaras' thought often delineates this union with God in terms of the overcoming of 
human nature on man's part, in terms of a personal ec-static movement of the human person 
that rises above, as it were, its nature to realize its union with God. It is, similarly, a typical 
attitude of Yannaras to define existence as ex-isting, that is as the being realized in the 
movement of standing-out of the way of its nature. This can naturally give the impression that 
human nature in Yannaras is then treated as something rather undesirable that needs to be 
abandoned in order to achieve a superior mode of being that would not involve human nature, 
a way of being that would be beyond and rather freed from human nature. This could easily 
suggest a derogatory view of the nature of humanity. However, a more careful reading of 
Yannaras allows us to get a clearer view of what is really meant by Yannaras' idioms on 
ecstatic existence. In Yannaras' mind there is not really any contempt for human nature; 
indeed, the opposite would be much closer to the truth. Given the strong monism of the 
exaltation of the spirit alone and the contempt for the corporeal functions of the human body 
that Yannaras had experienced in his youth through Zoý, what he aspires to do through his 
turn to the patristic tradition is rather the opposite of laying the grounds for any disrespect for 
or cancellation of human nature. He instead, as far as I can understand, wishes to bring out the 
integrity of human nature considered as a unity, which is xaA-q' Mav, since not just created by 
God, but made to exist in God's image and likeness. Therefore, when Yannaras discusses true 
being or union with God as taking place out of or beyond human nature, he does not really 
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hold some disregard for human nature and its functions as such; he only alludes to the 
limitedness of nature, to the fact that the being of nature is conditioned and has limits. This at 
least is the way of being as we know it in the state of affairs we experience, which, in the 
language of theology, has been described as a fallen state; in other words it is the state into 
which nature entered after Adam's fall. This is basically a state where nature does not refer 
itself to God and where life is not realized as union with God. It is the condition where man 
does not exist in God's way, that is, free from any predeterminations of nature, but rather 
governed by its limitations. The fallen way, rpoTro(; -cý-(; 0,6aqý;, in which nature exists, is the 
way of existential autonomy of nature, the breach of the bond with God and the turning away 
from Him to seek self-sufficiency and self-existence, as if the created nature itself was the 
source of life. Existence, that is, ceases to be a reality that substantiates communion and true 
life, since in the way that nature now exists we perceive a separation in man's union with God 
and in human nature itself, which is now subject to death. As Yannaras notes, Adam's 
severing of communion with God determined the way of nature's existence in which we all 
are confined, not legally or morally, but existentially. It simply means that we are all born in 
and carry the same rebellious nature, which exists in the way of individualism; the nature that 
wants to be in the mutinous way of self-determination and self-sufficiency, and which can find 
its way out of this impasse only in the person of Christ. 
244 In the person of Christ we have 
exactly the reversal of this process. Christ, whom therefore we name as the 'second Adam', 
substantiates in his person a new way of existing for human nature, which is not any longer a 
matter of existential autonomy, but of existential union between God and man, existential 
communion of life between the divine and the human nature. Again in Yannaras' words, it is 
now up to the personal freedom of each of us to take up this new way of existence, the new 
way of nature which the new, Katvý, divine-human nature of Christ renders possible. And as 
Yannaras also notes, Christ's human nature is new, Katvq, without ceasing to be human. The 
4new-ness' of the human nature in Christ, that is, consists in the way the nature is, which is the 
union between man and God as opposed to the separation of the Fall, the communion of 
divine 
and human nature and the fact that man now can exist again truly due to 
his communion with 
244 Heidegger, pp. 115-6. 
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the Godhead. 245 Man has the possibility of participation in the divine life, which participation 
is identified with the possibility of apophatic knowledge. 
Consequently, when Yannaras talks of7zQ6cT-(j7io or of existence as the achievement 
of exiting nature - with respect to human nature - it is the way of nature that he means, and in 
particular the way of nature as we now know it, of what theological language defines as fallen 
nature. Therefore apophatic knowledge for Yannaras - which is identified in the end with the 
very relationship and union with God, and for which the self-exiting of the human existence is 
a requisite - does not involve any abandonment of nature or any cancellation or distortion of 
the faculty of reason or of the individual's consciousness. For the mystical theology of the 
Church, in man's union with God all the human attributes are recapitulated and deified. 246 
Deification, 0E (OCF L(;, in other words to be in the way of God 'without identity of essence', 
amounts to CF(O'CTIQLa, salvation, where man is o-cboý, whole and safe from any 'deficiencies of 
corruption, death or unfulfilled desire'. 247 
Accordingly, apophatic knowledge for Yannaras is achieved to the extent that we oPen 
up ourselves to God in a quest to go beyond the limits that are imposed by the self-directed 
/ 11 human nature of the fallen state. This is what Yannaras defines as 0'(Vcc(ýoQL-KTj F-Yc-crToco-q 
, roU aVOQ(07iou, a standing-out of man from the necessity of self-reliance and the sense of 
self-sufficiency that characterizes the fallen created matter, in a movement of referring himself 
to God. Apophatic knowledge, that is, results where the realization of life takes place as 
communion with God, or in other words, as participation in the divine life, partaking in the 
way of the Godhead which is freedom from the necessity of nature and personal 
distinctiveness in the loving mutual coinherence, AAAqAoTrEptX(ýpqaq, of the divine persons. 
245 Heidegger, p. 117. 
246 Yannaras position on this matter is not isolated, but shared by theologians like Panaglotis Nellas, who also 
speak of the deification of the whole man, of man's united nature. 
See Panayiotis Nellas, Deification in Christ: 
The Nature of the Human Person, trans. Norman Russel (Crestwood, New York: St Vladimir's Seminary Press, 
1997). 
247 Heidegger, p. 138. 
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8. The apophatic knowledge of God as erotic communion 
Yannaras, then, takes the last chapter of Heidegger and the Areopagite to explore and 
present the fact that the theology of the Church has often adopted the kind of language that 
reflects the experience of erotic love in order to refer to and to denote the reality of knowledge 
of God. The language used to describe the participation in the personal relationship with God, 
the experience of union with God, is the erotic. Theology, which is ultimately the same thing 
as the apophatic knowledge of God, or, in other words, the consequence that flows from the 
state where man is united with God, is an experiential knowledge, as we have noted already, 
since it takes an immediate involvement on the part of man to be practised and achieved. God 
is known experientially, and this mystical or apophatic knowledge that we attain through our 
personal communion with God is often expressed, in the tradition of the Church, with the help 
of erotic terminology. This is the case for the Areopagitical writings also, where the 
relationship with God and the knowledge of Him is described as an erotic union, it is seen as 
an erotic event. Yannaras notes that even the name of love, ok-Ya7TTI, is viewed as having a 
poorer content, since it is often used for and identified with behaviours and human expressions 
of a merely social or of "charitable" kind; in other words, it is widely used to refer to attitudes 
that characterize the human manner in its fallen state of self-centred goodness and of self- 
sufficiency. Therefore 'eros' is treated by the Areopagitical texts as a more divine name to 
describe the event of union with God, as Yannaras points out. 
248 In fact, the writer of the 
Areopagitical texts takes the apophatic knowledge of God to be an erotic naming-of-God, 
Q(Oc 0,249 C LY-Ti _(OVI) ýt LOC; in other words apophatic 
knowledge is identified closely with the 
potential to attribute certain names to God of which we become aware, or of which we acquire 
a sense, through an erotic relationship with God. In fact, the practice of identifying the erotic 
union, the fulfillment that is of a relationship, with knowledge, is not much of a novelty 
for the 
Areopagitical source or the Church Fathers more generally, since even in the biblical context 
we have the connection of erotic love and knowledge. 
250 Erotic knowledge thus is 
participation, event, experience, not just knowledge as information. 
248 Heidegger, p. 125. 
249 Heidegger, p. 132. 
250 Heidegger, pp. 111-2 , and 
Yannaras' references to Gen. 4: 1,4: 17,4: 25, Judges 21: 12, Mat. 1: 25, Luk. 1: 34.. 
Also see Gen. 16: 4 
(Abraham-Agar), 24: 67 (Isaac-Rebecca). 
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Again, 'eros' and 'erotic' are terms that can commonly at any time - including the time 
of the Areopagitical writings - be taken as untrustworthy and treated with suspicion. This is 
normally so, Yannaras again explains, due to the content that 'eros' universally bears, as 
generally identified with the human experience of the self-centred desire for pleasure, in other 
words the form that 'eros' takes in the fallen state of the insurgent created nature, where it acts 
only as an autonomous physical requirement to sustain the individual's existence. For the 
theological understanding of the Church, however, this form of 'eros' is only a fallen 
condition from the true eros. For the theology of the Church tradition, the true eros is a mode 
of being that does not initiate or uphold division and contrast between the different beings 
united in eros, but true eros unites and keeps the agents of the erotic event together. In our 
human reality, we commonly experience the sense of failing and frustration to which erotic 
love generally brings us when it falls short of presenting us with a firm and lasting sense of 
fulfilled life. The contentment experienced in human eros is most certainly to be combined 
with or followed by - in one way or another - the ordeal of pain and affliction. Thus we, in 
our created and fallen state of being, can witness to the experience of erotic relationship 251 as 
perhaps the ultimate sense of life fulfilled; even so, we sooner or later realize that our 
experience of eros is one bound up with imperfection, and therefore not rarely coupled with a 
feel of insubstantiality. 
However, even in such a fallen state of affairs where eros is trapped in the way of 
being of fallen nature and where it basically serves the divisive autonomy of human 
individuality, erotic desire or the erotic event is still a representation, even though a faint one, 
of the true eros. This is because it still indicates or points to a way of existence in terms of 
communion and unity. It reveals life not as seclusion and self-sufficient isolation but as a 
movement of reaching out for the other and uniting with it. Therefore, the language that 
describes the human erotic experience has been taken up by the greatest theologians of the 
Church to denote also the experience of the divine love, in other words, of the event of 
communion and unity with God and knowledge of Him. 
251 'Erotic relationship' as employed in Yannaras' discourse does not mean just the relationship of two people, 
I inadequacy that makes but any experience that 
is characterized by a 'drive' towards the Other, by a sense of self-, 
us look out there for 
finding and uniting with the desired Other. 
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The event of erotic love is fitting to describe the union with God for another reason 
too. The knowledge of God, which necessitates personal participation in the divine life, cannot 
be expressed in objectified definitions and with concepts of a strictly rational character. 252 Our 
knowledge of God is apophatic, and therefore it is conveyed through statements that do not 
represent it in an exhaustive way, but rather allude to it. Thus the language that signifies man's 
experience of eros and of erotic longing - which is again a very personal experience - is taken 
up by the theological tradition as a more appropriate way to communicate and describe the 
experience of the Christian God. 
This, for Yannaras, illustrates the ec-static character of personal existence, an aspect 
that he likes - enthusiastically and with consistency throughout his works - to bring out. 
'Ecstatic' is ultimately identified with 'erotic' since it denotes the stepping out from the self in 
a referential movement towards the Other. For the Areopagitical writings, Yamaras notes, 
God is a 'manic lover', 253 an image demonstrative of the powerful motion of yearning for the 
other, which in the case of God is an act not made by compulsion or some necessity that God's 
nature imposes, but is rather expressive of the very being of God, which is love in freedom. 
Thus God's very being and existence is ecstatic, as God is or becomes out of himself (E'ý(o 
r Eav, cou') not only with regard to the event of the Incarnation, which is the greatest of God's 
ecstatic, erotic movements towards mankind, 254 but more generally as he offers himself to be 
related to and communicated with. The very way of God, the very being of the Godhead is the 
opposite of seclusion; God the Father pre-eternally begets the Son and causes the Spirit to 
proceed, and there was never a time when this was not done. This means that the authentic and 
primal way of being, life not as existential sufficiency of individuality but as communion and 
union, the personal way of being, is identified as erotic. In other words, the way that God is for 
Christian theology is not a way of disconnection in his self-inclusiveness, but what Yannaras 
highlights as ec-static. God's existence is ecstatic because it is erotic - that is, creative and 
loving. God is ec-static, since 'God is love'. God is as three Trinitarian persons who exist in an 
ec-static mutual coinherence, E-'xcrTccrcL-KTj 6u"TjAo7iEQL 'QTjo-q. Therefore, knowledge of X(O 
252 Heidegger, p. 138. It is a remark that Yannaras fervently stresses at every chance, that conceptual formulation 
and objective definitions are 
inadequate to represent the experiential knowledge of divine truth. 
253 Heidegger, p. 134. 




jod on man's side, that is participation in the divine life, equates with man's partaking in 
God's way, which is erotic communion. 
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Chapter III 
Person and Eros 
Part 1: Exposition 
The last century was theologically characterized by an intense interest across the 
theological world - at an Orthodox and at an inter-confessional level - around' questions in 
relation to the nature of the Church. Many publications and a lot of discussion were oriented 
and developed on matters like 'What is [or what makes] the ChurchT, 'What is the reason the 
Church existsT, 'What is the relation between the One, Holy, Catholic and Apostolic Church 
and the different local churches? ': all such topics were in the centre of the theologians' efforts 
to address and answer them. In fact the theme had been already opened the century before, 
with the distinctive work of the Russian philosopher and theologian Alexy Khomiakov playing 
a key part in this. Khomiakov's unconventional and influential insights about the Church were 
then carried on creatively into the twentieth century by another great Russian theologian, 
Nikolai Afanasiev. The latter built on Khomiakov's ecclesiology, and we could say that his 
theology of the Church marked a starting point for most of the theological discourse on the 
same subject that was to follow among the Orthodox in the last century. The discussion of 
ecclesiology - highlighted by a turn to and emphasis on Eucharistic ecclesiology - acquired 
extended interest and further dimensions through the whole of the twentieth century with the 
many other theologians that became involved. It was not by chance that at the same time there 
was also a rise in renewed efforts from the different Christian confessions to come closer to 
each other, by establishing new means for communication and dialogue, and by looking into 
ways of re-assessing their common ground and bridging the gaps that divided them. 
On such grounds Bishop Kallistos Ware - in a presentation he delivered in the Spring 
of 2004 at an Academy of Theological Studies in Greece 255 and which was titled 'Orthodox 
255 Published at the same time: Kallistos Ware, 'Orthodox theology in the new millerimum: What is the most 
important questionT, Sobornost 26: 2 (2004), pp. 7-23. The talk was given to the Academy of Theological Studies 
of the Metropolis of Demetrias in Volos in April 2004 within a wider agenda of study organized in that year and 
themed as 'Orthodoxy and Multicultural ism,. The address also exists in Greek translation. 
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theology in the twenty-first century' - has described the twentieth century as the century of 
ecclesiology and of ecclesial ecumenism, a description that other theologians may well accept. 
Similarly in the twenty-first century, Bishop Kallistos also suggested, Orthodox theology will 
be dominated by a turn to anthropological questions, namely to the issue about man, and 
particularly an effort to understand and theologically define aspects of man's nature, of what it 
means to be human, or what it means to be a person and to participate as such in the body of 
the Church. It may be too early in time to designate the twenty-first century as solely the 
century of anthropology. However, Bishop Kallistos' remark feels pertinent, as it is a well- 
known fact among contemporary theologians that interest and discussions around man's being 
have seen a remarkable growth over the recent decades and the topic remains open and very 
relevant. Both at a philosophical and a theological level, from the existentialist philosophers 
and writers and artists reflecting existentialist ideas to the well-known names of Eirgen 
Moltmann and John Zizioulas in the theological world, the exposition and analysis of the 
making of human existence have occupied the core of contemporary interest and speculation. 
Given that we witness a time of expeditious developments as, for example, in human genetics, 
or in the shaping of our modem societies with the signs of globalization constantly altering the 
picture of the communities we live in, the present situation allows a lot of scope for the topic 
of what constitutes man's being, of what makes a human truly be so, to occupy the centre of 
our speculation over the years to come. 
Even though the theme of man's nature has been touched upon by the Church Fathers, 
the patristic tradition does not provide us with an extensive or thorough analysis of this matter. 
I will have the chance to say more on this in the second part of this chapter, where I will also 
give some examples of the use of the patristic sources made by Yannaras. For the time being, 
we need to note that the subject of human nature has been addressed in contemporary times 'in 
a way that feels distinct in its very analysis of the parameters of the human existence: man's 
existence, we are told, is personal, and this involves a series of qualities and characteristics 
attached to personal existence, to what it means to be a person. Thus personalist anthropology 
- if we can so specify 
the current discourse on the matter - is distinguished by an emphasis on 
certain elements that constitute the human person: relationality, freedom and the uniqueness of 
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personal existence summarize the main characteristics that the notion of the person acquires in 
the exposition of theological anthropology. 
Again, I will have the chance later, in the second part of this chapter, to expand on 
these characteristics and also to see how they make up an anthropology that has largely drawn 
on the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. However, these aspects of personal existence will also 
become apparent in the present first part of this chapter, where I will be looking closely at 
Person and Eros, Yannaras's principal exposition of his approach to the personal. Yannaras, 
therefore, should be seen as part of the wider modem context, where both in philosophy and in 
theology the matter of Being, God and existence have been discussed largely in personalist 
terms. The concept of the person has become a fundamental category, a kind of axis around 
which philosophers and theologians have tried to develop an understanding of, and to interpret 
the matter of, existence and its meaning. Yannaras is by no means the only one who has put 
forward a personalist theology; he stands in fact in a wider context of modem philosophers 
and theologians of the last few decades who, addressing ontological issues, have put forward 
their views in existentialist and personalist terms. However there are distinctive elements in 
Yannaras' work about the human person, which I hope I will manage adequately to introduce 
in this chapter, as there are similarly individual constituents in the course of the personal route 
that brought Yannaras to see the importance of personalism and which I have tried to illustrate 
in my first chapter. Yannaras' thought on personal existence was set forth, as we have seen, in 
his early work Heidegger and the Areopagite. His positions on personhood, however, were 
later more fully developed and laid out in his treatise Person and Eros; I will therefore give 
here an account of Yannaras' exposition by way of a close reading of parts of this work. 
Introducing Person and Eros 
Person and Eros is one of Yannaras' principal works and, in fact, the first 
chronologically among the more extensive pieces of scholarly work that the author produced 
and which established him in the realm of philosophical as much as theological scholarship. 
The work is named after what Yannaras regards as the two main categories that stand at the 
centre of the philosophical Christian tradition in relation to the question of ontology. For 
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Yannaras, these two terms, (person' and 'Eros', sum up the answers that this tradition offers to 
the question of Being. As we will see later on, Yannaras maintains that the 'personal' is for the 
patristic mind the very starting point from which to approach the event of existence, while 
'Eros' is the way, the means to do so, and to achieve knowledge of the personal. Person and 
Eros originally appeared in a first form in 1970 under the title The Ontological Content of the 
Theological Notion of the Person (T6 0'v-roAoytK6 7TEpt, -X6yEvo OEoAoytKq-ý; E'Vvotm; 
, roV 7you(t) Trov) and as such it had formed Yannaras' doctoral thesis in the faculty of 
Theology of the University of Thessalonika. It was, in fact, a study that had been carried out 
by Yannaras during the time of his postgraduate reading with Marguerite Harl in Paris, and a 
year later, in 1971, it was also submitted at the Sorbonne and successfully examined by 
Maurice de Gandillac and Jean Gouillard. 256 The work was then published as Person and Eros 
I J6 -apoorwTro Kat o' "Epw(; ) in 1974 and has since that time seen several reprints. It has also 
been translated into German and English. 
Person and Eros, which has been described as less a theological than a philosophical 
exposition, 257 is the core source for Yannaras' responses and positions on the matter of 
existence, as the writer sees it in the light of the patristic tradition and more specifically of the 
Greek philosophical tradition of the early and the middle Christian years. It is truly a complex 
work, not only because of the ontological themes that it analyses, but also due to the 
philosophical language in which the topics are discussed, and also the range of references that 
it brings in - classical, patristic and contemporary. Person and Eros is a study of the truths of 
the Christian tradition regarding the ontological issue, that is the matter of Being and beings. 
However, as has been pointed out before, 258 the language the author takes up refers the reader 
more to the modem philosophical context, namely to the terminology of Heidegger and 
existentialism rather than to the philosophical terms the Fathers had used in order to 
communicate their thought and doctrines in their time. This can be explained if we think back 
to Yannaras' earlier work, Heidegger and the Areopagite, in which Yannaras proposes that 
256 KaO'EavT6v, pp. II 1- 114. 
257 Philip Sherrard, review of Person and Eros (published by the author, Athens 1970) by Christos Yannaras in 
Eastern Churches Rei, iew 3: 3 (1971), pp. 356-7. 
258 Sherrard, p. 357. It is a realization upon which critics seem to agree: See also Gerald Bray, review of Person 
und Eros. Eine Gegenüberstellung 
der Ontologie der griechischen Kirchenväter und der Existenzphilosophie des 
Westerns (Gbttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982) by Christos Yannaras in Sobornost 5: 2 (1983), pp. 98-9. 
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Heidegger's metaphysical analysis echoes the theology of apophaticism that the Areopagitical 
texts put forward some fourteen hundred years before Heidegger. It is evident that in Person 
and Eros its author maintains quite predictably a similar perception when he seems to 
advocate that some of the theological positions of the Fathers can be expressed in modem 
existentialist terms. Since Heidegger, to Yannaras, appears to reflect in his discussion of the 
matter of Being the manner of apophaticism, which is fundamentally present in the tradition of 
the Church, Yannaras subsequently appears to be accommodating to the terms of the 
Heideggerean articulation in his attempt to deliver the Fathers' theology on the subject of 
existence and the concept of the person, since as we will see Being in this tradition is 
approached only as personal. 
In fact, Yannaras' own words in the preface of Person and Eros perfectly confirm our 
very thoughts here. The author shows that he consciously undertakes to express or reiterate the 
ontological approaches that are found in the philosophical tradition of early and Byzantine 
Christianity using the language of his contemporary philosophical setting. Person and Eros, 
Yannaras says, is more than a historical study; it is an attempt that he personally makes to 
explore the possibility of whether the language of the existentialists can express the notions of 
the philosophical tradition of Christianity. And he makes this endeavour as he finds the 
inspiration on the basis of what we noted exactly above, and which is what he had disclosed 
earlier in Heidegger and the Areopagite, that he can see a common presupposition or attitude 
in the two realms of thought, that is in Heidegger's metaphysics and in the patristic mind. The 
common premise of both of these areas of thought for Yannaras is their apophatic attitude, the 
fact that they both refrain from defining the essence, Being as such, that they hold back from 
associating Being with objective definitions, from identifying it with categories of the existent. 
I consider that the very title of Yannaras' thesis - The Ontological Content of the 
Theological Notion of the Person - is indicative of a presupposition that the traditional 
theological positions about personal being can be discussed in terms of philosophical 
ontology. And if the great Fathers of the Church constructed their theology and expressed 
it 
with the aid of their contemporary ontological terminology, from the Hellenic 
background, it 
seems an equally imperative need for today creatively to encounter and 
interact with modem 
philosophical thought. 
Yannaras consciously invites one towards such a direction with his 
129 
work, which in itself takes some steps down such a path. Whether this is successfully done or 
not is a question worth asking, but it would be a question to be answered by the Church and 
her theologians as a whole, in the sense that it touches upon the great and general matter of the 
formulation of the Church's theology and the articulation of her faith. For the purposes of this 
thesis I will mainly explore the content of the theological/philosophical element of the 
personal present in Yannaras' thought. 
It is worth noting that Yannaras' views and his approach to the ontological matter, 
which is what he basically discusses in Person and Eros, are not just found in this particular 
work, but are very much infused in everything else Yannaras wrote. I would say that with even 
a little exposure to Yannaras' writing one would easily realize that for Yannaras the existential 
issue is not just an isolated theme among others with which Yannaras engages. Accordingly, 
his views on this topic, his standpoint in relation to Being and beings, are not just some of 
Yannaras' philosophical positions. For Yannaras the matter of existence is the topic where all 
speculation and developments - whether it be theoretical, theological and philosophical or 
even cultural and scientific - need to start from and where they should meet. Consequently the 
positions Yannaras takes on the matter of existence form, rather, his whole mindset; Yannaras' 
approach to the existential is, as I understand it, the way Yannaras thinks and is therefore very 
prominent in his approach to every other topic he may be called to comment on or develop, 
from civilization and culture or the environmental crisis and the economy to the state of 
political affairs or matters related to the Christian tradition and the modem life of the Church. 
This distinctive characteristic of the author is expressive of his very attitude to consider that all 
aspects of human history and activity and the form they may take spring from the worldview 
from which they arise. Depending on how man interprets the matter of existence, depending 
on what meaning he affords to Being, he will accordingly take a stance towards his life and the 
world and thus organize and run his living; all sides of his activity will then depict his world- 
view, the way he understands and interprets Being and existence. Yannaras' thought, then, 
presents in itself an example of this unity in the consistency between man's approach to 
ontology and the way in which all aspects of life are consequently addressed. However, even 
though Yannaras' positions about human existence or about what it means to be a person 
colour very much all of 
his thought and work, it is in Person and Eros that he develops the 
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question of ontology with a systematic analysis, and it is there that he develops further and 
presents more profoundly the ideas he introduced, as we have seen, with relation to personal 
existence, in his preceding work Heidegger and the Areopagite. 
2. Priority of the particular over the universal 
In Person and Eros Yannaras embarks on his exposition of the ontological issue, that 
is, on the question about Being and beings, by accepting a certain viewpoint as specified: that 
Being - and therefore also human nature - does not exist as something abstract and vague, and 
that we cannot get to know and approach it, save in certain particular existences. For Yannaras 
this means that the personal is the only possibility for existence, the only way in which 
existence takes place and is revealed to us. We may have a concept about a substance as the 
whole of a sum of certain properties and characteristics, but as regards God's and man's nature 
it is only known in certain distinct persons . 
259The way in which Being is is personal, that is, 
as in particular persons. Personal existence, in other words, is the only possible manifestation 
of Being, the only way in which we get to know that Being is. Before we get to acquire any 
concept or understanding about Being in a wider sense, we approach it as a reality represented 
only in the tangible existence of personal beings. Therefore, priority is given to the event of 
existence and relationship with actual persons. Our exposure to tangible personal beings 
precedes any conceptual understanding and formulation of their substance as the total of their 
attributes; it comes before the rationalization and the understanding of objectified substances. 
God as well as human nature, consequently, is approached only as concrete personal presence, 
in the existence of certain persons. The personal is the only way of realizing Being and, 
accordingly, human nature, and the only opportunity for it to be revealed. Nature does not 
exist, save in persons. 
At least this is, Yannaras discerns, the position that the Greek philosophical mind of 
early and Byzantine Christianity presents, and therefore personal existence is the starting point 
for this tradition when dealing with the ontological question. In other words, when the patristic 
259 Person and Eros, p. 34. 
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mind, mainly as this has been represented for Yannaras in the Greek East, discusses and 
studies the event of existence or God it begins with the fundamental category of existence, 
which is the person. This means the particular has priority over the universal. In Yannaras' 
expression, the way of Being, the way Being is, which is the person, precedes Being as such. 
This priority of the person, as I understand it, does not mean for Yannaras that the wav of 
Being, in other words persons, prescribes Being, or that the personal operates in a constraining 
way over Being. The precedence of the person refers rather to the position that we opt to take 
in dealing with the issue of Being; more specifically it refers to the approach adopted by the 
Greek East, according to Yannaras, as regards the ontological question, in other words to the 
manner in which the East chose to look at and speak about Being. And this manner was to 
start with the specific, by what was revealed as a personal presence and as distinct, namely by 
the person. In the Eastern Church, Yannaras points out, when one speaks about God it is the 
specific God of Abraham and of Isaac and of Jacob, the God of Jesus Christ that is referred to, 
or even the Trinity of specific persons, of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. 260 
The Cappadocian Fathers, Yannaras explains, in their attempt to talk of the truth of the 
Trinitarian God and describe the experience that the Church had about God - according to the 
ways in which God had revealed himself through history - used the terms 'substance' (ov'cia) 
and 'hypostasis' (UTIOCYMCYLý), which they borrowed from the language of neoplatonic 
ontology, and they sought to clarify these terms. 'Hypostasis' thus was used to designate the 
separate, distinct ways in which God had revealed himself, versus the one nature of God, 
which remained single and united. 'Hypostasis' soon - with St Gregory of Nyssa - became a 
synonym of 'person'. In this way 'person' came to indicate the different, special, non- 
comparable way in which the one, united and invariable nature would be revealed . 
261 'Person' 
would mean the unequalled expression of the common attributes of the one nature, the unique 
way in which the one, indivisible nature could be realized. Since person was understood to be 
the only possibility of disclosing the event of Being, given that the only way in which 
anything which is can be is the reality of personal existence, the concept of 'person' received 
priority over that of 'substance' or 'nature', the latter being revealed and approached only 
through personal existence. This took place, Yannaras remarks, in the thought of the Greek 
260 Person and Eros, p. 40. 
261 Person and Eros, pp. 31-33. 
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East, whilst the approach to the ontological question by the Christian West followed a 
different path, and this dissimilarity of mind did not remain just a matter of theoretical 
disagreement but was followed by practical consequences. 
In the western intellect, Yannaras continues, the starting point for doing ontology 
turned out to be the notion of Being in general, or in other words the wider concept of 
'substance' or 'nature'. In this case however, where we do not begin with the concrete reality 
of personal existence in order to understand Being or nature - which is materialized in the 
event of the person - but we set off in the reverse way by trying to approach and describe 
Being and 'substance' first, as if they were an objective and independent reality, we inevitably 
end up defining also beings and anything that exists in an objectified way. Thus beings 
represent to us a kind of prearranged reality; we understand and refer to them as if they were a 
far-off, remote event disassociated from us. This, however, in other words means that in our 
attempt to understand the event of life and existence we end up giving priority rather to a 
conceptual approach to things, and we thus limit or identify our perception and knowledge to 
our ability to conceptualize and give rational definitions. 
In this way, Yannaras argues, our knowledge springs from and is based on objectified 
definitions and rational formations. In the case of the ontological issue then, the way we built 
and found our understanding and knowledge about Being is through logical constructions, 
based mainly on the principle of analogy: Being as such is by all means a far broader concept 
than our limited existence, but is so approached and understood only in parallel with our 
reality. The same applies in the way Western theology talked about God: His reality is without 
any doubt far above ours, but his all-embracing superiority is conceived corresponding to our 
worldly experience. 
To base our thoughts and knowledge about Being on the principle of analogy, when 
dealing with the ontological question, Yannaras' argument carries on, involves the following 
triple way in the building of our knowledge: we reach Being first through negation, meaning 
that we refuse to suggest for it attributes that apply to our human experience and existence. 
Then we acknowledge Being or God being superior to all that our earthly experience has to 
present. And finally Being represents for us the prima causa, the ultimate reason and cause of 
everything that exists. God in this way is primarily recognized as a principle, not as a person. 
He is the first cause of things and in our perception this corresponds to a conviction rather than 
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to the familiarity of someone who has been revealed to us. The above triple way of knowledge 
is what Yannaras calls the 'analogical knowledge of Being', as it is essentially based on 
analogies, on comparisons between Being and our reality. 262 Taking this way leads us to what 
he then names, as we have mentioned in the previous chapter, 'apophaticism of the substance' 
(4) a7io(ýaucrýtog TT-1i; ou'cuag') which is basically, as Yannaras likes to emphasize, the 
method that the Western intellect adopted in the attempt to understand Being. 
In the East, however, things developed in a different way, according to Yannaras' 
exposition. What prevailed there, as we have seen before in our exposition of Heidegger and 
the Areopagite, was the 4apophaticism of the person' ('a7io(ýa, [LCFPOý 'Cou- 7iQocrCo"nou'), 
which means that knowledge is achieved on the basis, and within the reality, of personal 
existence, and does not result from speculative definitions and rational reflection. We get to 
know things through our life as a whole, through our 'catholic' personal encounter with others 
and the world around us, in other words through our ecstatic movement to and relational 
meeting with all that surrounds our existence. And this personal ecstatic encounter, as we have 
had the chance to explain in the second chapter, can then be described and spoken of and 
expounded in words and thoughts and narratives, but in every case it is inexhaustible; it cannot 
be exhausted and thoroughly shared or expounded in detail. It always remains partly quiet and 
unrevealed, and this is because every relationship is unique and non-repeatable and thus 
impossible to be fully represented or covered by any description. This is therefore what we can 
define as 'apophaticism of the person' in our attempt to approach and talk about Being. 
Yannaras maintains that the dissimilarity of mind on ontology between the two 
historical parts of the Christian world did not remain just a matter of theoretical disagreement 
but was followed by practical consequences. The difference between the two distinct kinds of 
apophatic thought described above seems to assume huge importance for Yannaras. He sees 
that this variation reflects on the whole theoretical frame and consequently on the whole 
culture and style of life formed in the East and the West. In the one case, and that is in the 
262 Analogy or comparison does not mean that we necessarily consider Being to be similar to what our limited, 
human experience can provide us with; to be analogical in our understanding of Being means that even if we 
agree on it being 
highly greater in every aspect compared with our partial existence, our starting point is still the 
ontological categories of 
this world which we then project in an analogous way on our reflections on Being. 
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Eastern way of thought where, as we noted, priority is given to the reality of the person, the 
Truth that we aspire to is identified with a relationship and with an existential experience. 
Therefore, to be authentic, to achieve the Truth and live in it means to achieve communion, to 
realize a relational way of being, to exist and grow creating authentic relationships. Truth is 
lived and experienced within the communicative dynamic of life, and thus life proves worthy 
and is highly appreciated, as it forms the field where Truth takes place, the latter identified 
with communion, sharing, participation, being together. 
On the contrary, where knowledge about Being derives from a conceptual approach, 
and this, as we have said, for Yannaras is represented by the situation in the Western intellect 
and world, then Truth itself is identified with concepts and rational definitions, and in this way 
it is objectified, it is seen as something outside of us, something objective that exists 
independently of ourselves and our reality. In this way however, Yannaras will carry on, Truth 
becomes an object of utility, it is viewed as something to make use of, and this consequently 
restricts life itself, as everything submits to the expediency of our options and is calculated in 
terms of practicality and usefulness. This means that man becomes constrained and distorted 
as his freedom is maltreated and damaged. 
3. Personal existence 
a. Person as a relational reality 
From the very beginning of his analysis of the personal Yannaras sets forth that the 
person is a relational reality. He sets off from the etymology of the Greek word 71QOCFWT[O, 
according to which the term means a face or a look that turns towards someone or something, 
and thus it denotes a movement, a reference-to-somebody or to-something else (7iQoý + (jý)q 
)n, ý). 
263 
CO 0 Thus we are immediately introduced to the idea which is very prominent in 
Yannaras, and present throughout his reflection and argumentation, that the person is 
fundamentally a relational entity, a being-to-relate. 'Person' thus manifests a communicative 
contact with the other and it is almost a synonym for the opportunity for relationship; 
it is 
263 Person and Eros, p. 2 1. 
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essentially indicative of a movement, of the action of meeting and engaging with other beings. 
'Person' stands for the existence that is or that realizes its very being by the move to engage 
and connect with what is found outside it. In other words, the primary concept the word 
(person' represents is a link between two things: the subject and what is outside it. In this way, 
the person assumes a dynamic feature and is straight off juxtaposed with any impression of a 
static reality. It is not an inert being closed and bound in itself that exists as such. Moreover, it 
does not signify just a unit, a separated and objectively measured individuality which can be 
exhaustively described and defined as such. In such a view the person is not merely an 
independent subdivision of its genus that draws existence autonomously in a way of self- 
reliance. This all means that it is contrasted with the idea of the individual, where the latter is 
understood as a being in isolation, a being shut in the limitedness of its individuality and 
secured in the egocentricity of its self-sufficiency. The person, Yarmaras points out, also 
carries individuality, it is also an individual in the sense of a distinct being, but it is an 
individual in reference. The person is a referential existence, it exists by referring itself to the 
Other; it does not fasten upon itself autonomously with a sense of self-support but it looks to 
connect and share with the Other, with a willingness and inclination to overcome its 
egocentric restraints. 
This inclination of personal existence to move out of itself and get to meet with what 
surrounds it is basically in Yannaras' presentation identified with eros. As we briefly 
mentioned before, for the philosophical mind of the Christian tradition that Yannaras looks at, 
'eros' is, alongside 'person', a fundamental category. In the analysis of the existent that this 
tradition presents, that is, if 'person' is an essential notion to refer to the way in which Being 
is, then 'eros' is an equally central designation of the means or the force through which we get 
to acquire awareness of the person, through which we advance to our knowledge of the ways 
of the existent. In Yannaras' reading of the patristic tradition, then, eros comes to have an 
utterly focal place. 
in its earliest use the word 'Eros' referred to the Greek God of love and desire and was 
consequently employed to signify passionate love, often associated with physical desire and 
longing. Eros, however, in the classical period was not only given a corporeal meaning. In 
Plato the term 'Eros' denoted love possibly at first for a person but also for the beauty within 
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that person. 264 In this way it ended up meaning the appreciation for beauty as such, and love 
for the virtue of beauty, without the allusion to physical attraction. Hence the term 'platonic 
love' has come to refer to erotic attraction without a sensual content. Thus, for Plato, Eros 
leads the soul to the knowledge of beauty and to an understanding of spiritual truth. As a result 
Eros also denoted the longing for wholeness and completeness, and therefore the fulfillment 
achieved not only in the love between people but also between man and the gods. 
When Yannaras maintains that 'Eros' holds a vital place in the patristic mind it is 
rather with this last sense that the term is used there. The Fathers use 'Eros' primarily to refer 
to God's strong love for humanity and consequently to God's self-offering and sacrifice for 
man's salvation. Thus God's erotic love for the creation is not associated with sexuality. 
Moreover, Eros in human reality is in a similar way not ascribed solely to sexuality; it denotes 
the living and flowing energy in the human, where the physical/sexual expression of it is only 
one way of its manifestation. Moreover, wherever Eros is identified in the Christian tradition 
with love, it clearly means the kind of love that is not self-centred, but which is ascetic and 
self-denying. In our general reality we sometimes make use of the term 'love', and we say 'we 
love someone' or 'we love something' to specify in fact our preference or our attraction to the 
object of our love. Our love in this way refers to the feeling of finding something appealing to 
us and pleasing. 'Love' can be a feeling of rather desiring something ultimately for self- 
satisfaction and of looking to appropriate the object of love for one's own self-interest. In 
theological language, however, 'love' signifies something very different from the content we 
often attribute to this term in our common human reality. In the Christian understanding of 
love, it is not the self of love, that is the subject who loves, but the recipient of love that stands 
in the centre. Love, this means, does not aim at the advantage of the self's own desires, but it 
seeks to benefit the very object of love. And in fact, in the words of Philip Sherrard, this 
6object of love ceases to be an object and becomes an 'other', a particularized being, and it is 
this 'other' that is the centre of attraction. And love is fulfilled ... not in an act of 
appropriation... it is fulfilled in a total act of giving'. 
265 
264 See SymPOsium- 
265 Philip Sherrard, Christianitý, and Eros: Essays on the Theme of Sexual Love (London: SPCK, 
1976), p. 46. 
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Consequently, in Yannaras' thought Eros is a notion of decisive significance. Despite 
some perverse interpretations of Yannaras, Yannaras does not employ this term with just the 
narrow meaning of a natural erotic-sexual urge. Rather, for Yannaras, Eros is the very force 
or impulse for life infused in human nature; it is the kind of drive that makes the human being 
be always in search of the not-as-yet realized, and advance himself to what lies over and 
above, to the further or to the other. In this way, Eros for Yannaras is the might of the human 
disposition to move beyond oneself and relate with what lies outside one's own being, with the 
other, whether this other be the rest of created beings or God. Furthermore, and even more 
importantly, Eros is qualified for Yannaras also in another sense. Eros is referred to as an 
inclination of a positive quality only. Therefore, the erotic manner of the being in Yannaras' 
usage of the term 'Eros' is not a movement towards the other with an intention to appropriate, 
with a disposition for getting hold of or for reaching out for something in the interest and for 
the benefit of one's own self. Erotic conduct signifies in Yannaras' understanding the mood of 
self-offering, it is the manner of a being characterized by generosity and self-sacrifice. The 
erotic subject moves towards the desired other not as an act of self-indulgence but as only a 
free turning of self- abandonment. The centre of the erotic feeling and attitude is not the self, 
but the other. And for the self thus to be erotic it needs to step out of its own being, to exit 
from its own limitations of self-assurance and egoism, in order to be able to tune into the 
needs or the terms and the circumstances of the loved one. That is why Yannaras associates 
the erotic, as we have seen, with the ecstatic, and thus identifies Eros with ecstasy. Besides, 
this move of self-denying is not treated in Yannaras' thought as something naturally given or 
easily done in the present state of human nature, but it is an accomplishment of continual 
training in the domain of the spirit. 266 Eros is thus an achievement of existence; it is attained 
through asceticism. And as such it is equivalent to the fulfillment of being, to the way of being 
as authentic and complete. Since in Yannaras to truly Be means to connect and to relate, and 
since Eros represents the perfect state of relating, this means that Eros and true being are one 
266 Spirit, , avef)ý1cc, is not understood as a part of being as opposed to matter, but 
it denotes the whole mode of 
being, the state of turning towards and uniting with God. The opposite is indicated by 'CF6(QKCC', which is used to 
refer to the condition of 
the separation from God. This distinction is described better in Christos Yannaras, 'H 
ME, ra(pvlj'Ký -rof) go5yaro,;: 
D-rov6ý aTOV'I6OdVVq Tý(; KAiyaKOý; [Metaphysics of the Body: Studýv on John 
Clirnacus] (Athens: Dodoni, 197 1). See pp. 36-9. 
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and the same thing. As far as I understand, to be erotic for Yannaras is another way to signify 
the authenticity and the fullness of existence. Eros is the way b/Being is fulfilled. 
We have seen that the person in Yannaras' mind is fundamentally a relational reality, a 
being- in-relationship. Since Eros then is identified with the very move or the flowing energy 
for relating, it means that for Yannaras the person is intrinsically erotic. Once again let us 
clarify that 'erotic' in Yannaras' intellect is not connected merely with the sexuality of the 
body. 'Erotic' represents a much broader meaning and understanding, and it is significant of 
the nature that is inclined not to detach itself and to stay in isolation but to realize its very 
existence in the act of connecting lovingly, to realize existence as a relationship. In this sense 
Eros represents for Yannaras the very Life, the true life, rilv OVc(o(; ý(jTj. Thus in Yannaras' 
mind personal being, Eros and Life are ultimately identified. In Yannaras' language Eros is 
therefore a category full of ontological content and not a restrictive term that relates only to 
the experience of human or sexual love. In the experience of human love rather, which is truly 
one expression of the event of Eros, Yannaras finds the images and the paradigm to describe 
the experience and the sense of the ontological, erotic fulfillment of life. The sense of fulfilled 
life, that is, comes about in the event of the relationship with the other. The possibility for life 
to be truly so, the achievement of Life takes place only in the event of communion, in the 
sharing of life with the Other. Life fulfilled is life realized as communion, as erotic love, 
where all the resistances of the nature to preserve its autonomy and defend its self-interest are 
overcome or abolished and the lover surrenders to the terms of the loved one. 
Yannaras' thoughts in relation to the erotic are also presented, apart from Person and 
Eros, in a later piece: Commentary on the Songs of Songs. There we can clearly see that for 
Yannaras to live is essentially to love. To love, that is, is not something to do while we live, 
but it is the way to be, the way to live. Life and love in this way are also seen as one and the 
same thing. In order to Be, one needs to love. Anything less that this constitutes 
death, where 
death is not meant in terms of the physical, but it also carries ontological significance. Thus 
death as the absence of love would not be incompatible with biological life, which, 
in this case 
and in line with 
Yannaras' philosophical look on the matter, would amount to no more than 
survival. True life 
instead is the erotic life, the life of the nature that moves forcefully beyond 
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its own restraints into meeting with the Other and being in a relationship of loving communion 
with it. 
b. The ecstatic character of personal existence 
We have seen so far that Yannaras' discussion about existence unfolds closely bound 
to the notion of the person, since for the philosophical expression of the Christian tradition in 
which Yannaras is interested the way in which existence takes place is the personal. The 
person is the only available way of getting to know the existent, for getting a grasp on Being, 
since the person is the way in which nature is realized; the way of nature is the personal, the 
personal being is the unique and distinct way to actualize nature, to let anything that is be. We 
have also seen that the personal being is in Yannaras' exposition innately relational, and 
consequently it is also erotic, or at least called or created to be erotic. The more the human 
being attains to being truly a person, the further it moves from being an individual, that is, and 
the closer it gets to realizing being as a relationship, as loving communion with what lies 
beyond itself by overcoming the restraints of its own individuality, the more it reaches its 
erotic quality. 
If the patristic mind - as Yannaras himself detects - specifies the living and flowing 
energy in the subject and even more the abstinence of the subject from its self-sufficiency and 
the realization of a relationship with what lies out of the subject as Eros, this in Yannaras' 
language is also described as ecstasy (EK(7TaTLKO'CTJTa). The word comes from the Greek 
verb EýL(T'UaýM, which means 'to be surprised' or 'amazed at'. In its older form Eý'L(T7PL 
also meant 'to change one's position' or 'to be taken out of oneself' and also 'to cease from' 
or to abandon'. It is then with the import of this older usage that the noun F'--KffTa(TU; and the 
adjective E-'XCF'ECC'[L-Ko(; are used in Yannaras' phraseology. Therefore, 
E'KcFTcccrLý in Yannaras' 
language indicates mainly the dynamic of a 'standing-out' movement, the dynamic of the 
advance from a given state or condition to another or to what is not as yet accomplished, and 
all this activity that is referred to as ecstatic heads to or realizes a relationship. In other words, 
the very event of the personal relationship, which as we have seen is fundamental for the 
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reality of the person, is existentially ecstatic; the personal relationship is seen as an existential 
ecstasy. And when he says 'personal relationship', we need to keep in mind that Yannaras 
refers not only to the bond or the affair between two agents but rather more broadly to an 
existential state or movement, to the energy of transcending oneself and of engaging directly 
with the other, with what is beyond the subject. 'Relationship', aXwq, and consequently 
'ecstasy', stand broadly in Yannaras' thought for the dynamic of personal engagement, 
personal exposure; they ultimately denote the vigor of personal experience, which is an 
existential effect. This analysis is largely drawn from Heidegger, who derives it by analyzing 
the word Existenz, existential, in terms of ex-sistere. The Greek word for existence, U'7MQýTl, 
does not offer this etymological analysis, so Yannaras transfers Heidegger's analysis to 
I/ txcr, cao-q, as explained above. 
I would say that to pin down or to delineate a clear-cut content for the terms 'ecstasy' 
and 'ecstatic' in Yannaras' presentation, at least as this unfolds in Person and Eros, is not 
really a straightforward task. This is because the author employs the terms in his text broadly 
and in connection not just with a single concept but fused with rather a series of ideas, of 
which I will give some examples. 
First, 'ecstasy' is identified by Yannaras as the otherness of personal being, the 
distinctiveness in which the common attributes or features of nature are found and realized in 
each distinct person. 267 Ecstasy is the realization of personal uniqueness, the unparalleled way 
in which the objectively given nature is personally actualized in each person. Therefore it 
refers to the complete distinction of the person as regards other beings. The move of the 
person from the naturally given life to the unequalled embodiment or instantiation of existence 
realized in each personal being signifies ecstasy. 
This involves, Yannaras also notes, the overcoming or the self-transcendence 
(av'OvTrtpýaaq) of nature, in the sense that personal existence ascends from the 
predeterminations of nature to its own matchless way in which it exemplifies its nature. The 
person instantiates within its natural individuality the universal qualities of its nature; 
however, it is not a settled, prearranged reality on the basis of the objectified features of its 
267 Person and Eros, p. 37. 
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kind, that is, of its nature. In fact, the person actually determines its nature within its very own 
existential ecstatic reference, in other words within Its complete difference. Therefore, 
personal existence is ecstatic not only as regards other objective beings and other persons but 
also and primarily in relation to its own natural individuality, which it transcends in order to 
reach its ecstatic otherness. 268 On the whole Yannaras speaks of the ecstatic character of 
personal existence. 
The term 'ecstasy', however, is also employed in Yannaras' expression in relation to 
nature itself. Thus nature is ecstatic too, the nature 'LCYTaTaL-EKT0i; -EaUTTj';, stands out of 
itself, in the sense that it is approached and known only as the content of the person. The 
nature is not made known as a notion, but through persons in their uniqueness and 
matchlessness. Ecstasy is here, following Yannaras' wording, the way in which the nature is 
disclosed and becomes familiar within the reality of personal otherness; ecstasy is the energy 
of the nature, and it is not the same as nature nor its effect. Yannaras explains this further 
through the example of the natural will. The will, he says, is a characteristic or energy of the 
nature. We get to know of this energy of the nature only through its personal carrier who is the 
person that wills. This means that we get to know and speak about the energy of the will only 
through the very individual way in which it is realized and expressed. So the how of the will 
lets us speak of the feature of willing which belongs to the nature. The energy of willing, 
however, is identified neither with the nature that has the possibility to will, nor with the 
person who wills in a distinct and unequalled way. 269 Overall, I would say that here again it is 
the kind of dynamic course or activity of the nature to be realized in unparalleled personal 
existences that is referred to by Yannaras as the ecstasy of the nature. 
So far I have tried to describe how the notion of the ecstatic/ecstasy is associated in 
Yannaras' discourse both with the person as well as with the nature. The personal being is 
ecstatic as it substantiates the nature in a totally distinctive way; it differentiates 
itself both as 
regards the way in which it exemplifies the energies of the nature which are common 
in all the 
beings, and in relation to its own natural individuality, by making a move further from the 
268 "ý. IOIIVEL Tý bl-)VOCPLKý CCIýOU71ýQPC(Crq '[ýý (ýUOFUKýI; 6(TOpLx6Tqccu--, Týv ýAE: uOEQýa -nlz 
, (ýVormoý%Z- 7TQOICaOOQLGp0151; Tq(; ': Person and Eros, p. 46. aT16TO69 ý&OV9Wilý- 
269 Person and Eros, p. 
87. 
142 
conventionalities of the nature which are inherited, as it were, within the person's natural 
individuality, and also by standing out of its own self to engage with the other. 'Referential 
ecstasy of the human existence' (O'(vaOoptKq' E'KGFTaT[K TqM Tq-i; V"Trapýq(; ), is Yannaras' 
common phrase to refer to this act of the human being to step out of itself and refer 
existentially to and relate with the reality around it. The nature, then, is ecstatic as it is 
ecstacized 270 in distinct personal existences. Furthermore, ecstasy is also applied in relation to 
the Godhead. Thus the divine Eros is described as ecstatic and the loving response and 
relationship between God and man is again pronounced as ecstasy. 271 Ecstasy, that is, takes 
place not only in relation to personal otherness, in other words as regards the different beings, 
but also in relation to different natures or substances. God thus is ecstatically self-offered, he 
1711 gets revealed in his erotic ecstatic self-offering (EpwTtKq EKor-ca-cmq avro7youOopti). In 
such a verbalization Yannaras decides to express what theological language has specified as 
Grace, Xapq, the fact that God gives Himself away to the creation, XCePi(ECCtI. 272 
As I suggested earlier the idea of ecstasy or the ecstatic is not presented in Yannaras' 
work in a very straightforward way. However, I would say that as far as I understand it, 
wherever the terms 'ecstasy' (E'K-OTaO7j, EKO-raT1K6T-rj-ra) and 'ecstatic' (EKo-ravKog /-ý) are 
employed, they are used to Put across the dynamics of a moving activity towards what is to be 
existentially accomplished or the force of the inclination towards the realization of a 
relationship, of a personal engagement. To my understanding Yannaras applies the notion of 
ecstasy and the ecstatic wherever he wants to express some kind of dynamism, the dynamics 
or drive of the person's existential reference to things or the vigour of personal engagement, 
the potentiality of a relationship, whether this relationship be a unifying one that connects two 
separate realities - as in the case of the human person with other beings or with God - or a 
relationship of transcendence and liberation from something, for example, from individuality. 
Generally, that is, ecstasy represents and is identified in Yannaras' thought with the opposite 
of stagnation and motionlessness. And it also signifies a different approach to Being than 
270 In fact the term 'ecstacized' does not appear much in Yannaras' articulation, but it has been used before to 
express a similar idea 
in Vladimir Lossky: 'The theological notion of the human person', In the Image and 
Likeness of God, p. 120. 
271 Person and Eros, P- 100- 
272 Person and Eros, p- 10 1- 
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having an objectified understanding or concept of it. Being, this means, is actualised as an 
extraordinary realization (7iQayýtar(o(Tq) and it bears in this sense an ecstatic character; It 
does not exist as a settled or solidified objectively determined reality. 
c. The 'catholic' character of the person 
Since the reality of the person is the only possibility, as we saw, of revealing and 
knowing nature, or, in other words, since nature is not an abstract concept but it can be 
approached only in the reality of certain existing persons, it means that the person is of a 
catholic - universal or perhaps holistic - character. Yannaras justifies this attribute by 
explaining that the person is not just a part or fraction of the nature, which would be in this 
way understood as a far more inclusive and wider notion than that of the person; the person, 
rather than being a division of nature, is the way in which nature is made known, it is a 
revelation of the whole nature. The person embraces the whole nature, therefore it is of a 
catholic character. The whole, the catholic nature is disclosed in each personal existence. The 
full nature is enclosed in each individual being, and each human person is a dynamic 
disclosure of the entire, catholic human nature. 273 
Besides, given that nature is the only possible way in which Being as such comes to be 
made known, it can be consequently understood that it is then only through the distinct 
persons, which are, say, vessels of the nature, that access to the knowledge and the 
274 
understanding of Being can be gained . Therefore the person remains of a catholic character 
additionally for the reason that the catholic Being finds the unique possibility to be manifested 
in the reality of distinct persons; the person embodies for us the only and single way to come 
up to Being, it is a catholic disclosure of Being itself. 
d. The unity of the person 
Furthermore the person for Yannaras is the substantiation of unity. Unity is another key 
quality of the person that Yannaras points out. The dual nature of man, that is of matter and 
spirit, Yannaras claims, does not introduce any division in human existence. Body and soul, in 
273 Person and Eros, p. 47. 
274 Person and Eros, p. 60. 
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the thought and theology of the Church Fathers to whom Yannaras likes to refer, are seen in 
complete and firm unity. It was only in the Christian West and within scholasticism, Yannaras 
remarks, that matter and spirit came to be seen as two separate elements of human nature. 
Western thought, carried away in its attitude to identify the truth with objectified definitions 
and well-reasoned statements, and because of the ontological priority it gave to the substance 
and not to the person, came to distinguish between the body and the soul as two different and 
often contrary parts of human existence; thus it initiated a dualism with regard to the view of 
man and his life. 
On the contrary, the Fathers in the Greek East, Yannaras argues, have wisely avoided 
giving any absolute and exhaustive definition of the dual nature of man and designating 
exactly to what each of his components, body and soul, refer. It is true, Yannaras notes, that 
both terms, 'body' and 'soul', appear in the writings of the Fathers, with reference to human 
existence. However they do not introduce any division into the human person, neither do they 
establish any contrast between the two components that they name. Moreover, '1ýuXll% that is 
6soul', represents also the senses, 275 and in the language of the Fathers denotes not just the 
psychological part of man, but the separate, the distinct character of human existence or the 
particular and unique personality - what Yannaras names as '7iQ6cT(j7io'- versus 'aCqta', that 
is 'body', which stands for the broader reality of human nature as a whole, or for the physical 
possibility of evidence and expression of each united again and distinct human person. 276 
Therefore 'soul' and 'body' as discussed in the theology of the Fathers, Yannaras explains, are 
only conventional ways to state the one united human activity (q)vcrmij EvEQyELa) which 
stems from or is the result and expression of the one and sole but composite human nature. It 
is the same in modem psychology, Yannaras points out, where no precise and definite 
distinction is made between bodily and psychological expressions of behaviour, as man is 
regarded as a solid whole that it is not possible to separate into purely bodily or purely 
psychological functions. 
Similarly to the above reluctance of theological language to defme in an exhaustive 
way the reality of the body and the soul, the Eastern patristic mind has also avoided limiting in 
any exclusive interpretation the biblical teaching about man's creation 'in the image and 
275 Person and Eros, p. 67. 
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likeness' of God. Again the attitude of the Eastern Christian tradition has been to ascribe the 
'image and likeness' to the entirety of man's existence, body and soul together, and to refer it 
to the way of being of the whole man, rather than to link 'the image and likeness' with the 
human soul only, as the case has been, according to Yannaras' exposition, in Western 
scholastic theology. 277 
4. The distinction between the 'nature' and the 'energies' of the person 
All the above aspire to display that the perspective of the Christian mind - at least in 
its Eastern Greek version which Yannaras takes as the authentic interpretation of the biblical 
tradition - towards man and his life has been to regard man as an inseparable and integral 
totality, as an existential reality characterized by strong unity in its various expressions of life, 
and foreign to any idea of dualistic understanding and division. 
The only distinction that the theological mind has introduced and on which it has 
insisted with reference to the ontological categories regarding the person, Yannaras explains, 
is that between the nature - in this case the human nature - and its energies. To describe the 
distinction I will simply use an example that Yannaras himself often quotes: that of a painter 
(Van Gogh is the name that Yannaras brings up most of the time) and his paintings. The 
6energy' in this case is the ability or the action of painting, which results in certain artistic 
results, the created pieces of art that we know as the works of Van Gogh. This energy belongs 
to or stems from human nature, which bears the ability to paint or draw, and the specific 
paintings of Van Gogh bear evidence of Van Gogh's special and unique way in which he 
realizes the one human nature in his person. In other words, Van Gogh's works bear evidence 
of the person of Van Gogh, so that the public which are already familiar with Van Gogh's 
individual style and technique, before a new painting of the same artist they would easily 
identify the painter behind it and say: 'this is Van Gogh'. 
Through such an example what Yarmaras, wishes to demonstrate is that although the 
nature and the energies are closely 
linked together and the latter cannot exist without the 
277 Person and Eros, pp. 75-8. 
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former, they still remain distinct: human works can give witness to human nature, which is 
able to create, and they can also 'speak' of the person whose particular manner of creating 
they bear. However, they are neither the nature nor the person itself; they remain only 
indications of both of them, since, even though they 'speak' of them (the nature of their 
creator and the particular person of some creator) they still do not say all there is to say about 
them, they do not expose them completely or make them known to us thoroughly. Therefore 
both the person and its energies are only the ways in which the nature exists, and only ways in 
which the nature gets disclosed, and despite their undivided unity with the nature they are not 
identified with the nature itself. 
From the above it follows that the distinction between the 'energies' and the 'person' - 
the former being the course through which the nature is revealed and the latter the unique way 
that this disclosure takes place in each individual - does not eventually initiate any division in 
the nature. The 'person' and the 'energies' are not parts, components of the nature; to 
distinguish between them does not mean that we break up, that we split the nature itself. The 
latter remains one and undivided and it is as such 'contained' in each different person. This 
fact constitutes the catholic character of the person to which we referred above, meaning that 
the person is the conveyor of the whole nature. Therefore the unlikeness with which the 
energies of the nature are realized in each individual existence - that is, for example, the 
variety of the forms of art produced by different people - is only indicative of the way in 
which the nature is, and this way is the personal singularity and uniqueness. 278 
The distinction between the nature and the energies that Yannaras brings out, and 
which has proved fundamental in the Eastern Christian theological tradition, also confirms the 
person as united. Because we get to know or approach the nature through its energies, and 
because the variety of the energies or of the ways in which they are expressed do not reflect a 
divided nature, but they rather sum up the whole nature, as we saw, it means that a person is 
united and inseparable as body and soul in all its expressions, in all those unique ways in 
which it embodies and realizes the energies of his twofold nature. Man remains one and 
278 Person and Eros, P. 94. As it has been indicated before, Yannaras' exposition on 'nature', 'person', and 
6energies' has 
i 
attained a synthesis of the 'nature-person' schema of Chalcedon and the Palamite distinction of 
tessence-energies'. Yannaras has shown successfully how all three, even though distinguished, interlock 
unbreakably with each other. 
See R. D. Williams, 'The Theology of Personhood: A Study of the Thought of 
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inseparable in all his actions and manners, and we would be misled into dualistic discords in 
our understanding of him if we were to separate human existence into purely bodily and 
psychological sides of it. 
Therefore, as it has been again pointed out earlier, the body, say, is not to be 
considered as a part of man's being, but as only the most immediate communication of the 
embodiment of the whole nature in the reality of a single person; and also as the most 
immediate communication of the unequalled way in which the same nature is realized in the 
case of each different person. Besides, due to the oneness of the person we get to know 
somebody as an entirety of body and soul together, as a wholeness which is expressed in the 
personal, ecstatic otherness of one's existence. 
Finally, to accept or not the differentiations discussed above, and especially the 
distinction between the nature and the energies, for Yannaras would not only stay a matter of 
theoretical disagreement, but it would rather constitute a difference in the whole attitude to 
life, and would consequently lead to different practices and even to diverse styles and cultures. 
In fact this has been the case in the course of Christian history for the Eastern and the Western 
Christian world, which, as Yannaras likes to remark, ended up developing diverse civilizations 
as a consequence of following distinct theological and philosophical ways. This being the 
case, the importance of theoretical differentiations like the ones expounded above and of 
possible disagreement in theological understandings would then go unquestioned. 
World, Space and Time 
The importance of being a person is for Yannaras brought out again in his discussion 
about the world (cosmos), space and time, where the personal way of being appears to 
determine all aspects of human experience and make a difference in all the ways that man 
relates with the surrounding world. Thus, because of the relational nature of the person, or 
within the relational way of being, space and time acquire a different dimension than the one 
we conventionally understand. All is experienced and understood and known and approached 
then differently. The personal aspect of the world, space and time as described by Yannaras 
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bring out the importance of the relational attribute of the person, and emphasise the fact that 
knowledge and experience of things is acquired within a relational frame; the personal way of 
being and the immediate relationship with things is what changes things to be experienced 
differently. We will look therefore below at what Yannaras says in particular about the 
personal aspect of the world, space and time. 
a. The personal character of the world 
The high importance that Yannaras places upon the event of a personal relationship 
and upon the knowledge attained within a personal encounter with what surrounds us, and 
which becomes apparent in Yannaras' discussion about the person in the first chapter of his 
book Person and Eros, keeps steadily coming out in the following chapter as well, as the 
discussion continues on the personal aspect or character of the world. 
The word 'Ycocrýtoc, ' itself, standing for world, Yannaras notes, is indicative of a 
relationship. This is because 'OcFpoý', deriving from the Greek verb 'xouýt(-J' and meaning 
originally ornament, is not just an accidental word that has been randomly chosen to describe 
the creation that surrounds us, but it is a term indicative of some evaluation that has taken 
place in the attempt to define the all-surrounding existence. And because the term 'YOcyo(; ' 
indicates an evaluation, it consequently bears evidence of a relationship, as any assessment 
presupposes a kind of encounter or personal engagement, within which we get to know 
something and determine its value. Thus, to acknowledge the surrounding world as an 
ornament, that is to acknowledge the beauty, harmony and order found in it, implies a personal 
relationship with this surrounding reality, an experiential meeting and familiarity with it and 
not just an abstract or rationalizing approach to the world. 
279 
The word 'xOuýtoý; ', as follows from the above and as Yannaras notes, does not 
simply designate the what of the world, does not simply, that is, give us a dry definition of 
what the world is, but it rather points to the way of physical reality, it refers to the way in 
which the surrounding reality, what we call 'cosmos', exists. It describes the fact that the 
world, as noted above, exists in beauty, order and harmony; it therefore exists, according to 
Yannaras, in a way of personal character, for the reasons that I will try to describe below. 
, 
279 Person and Eros, P. 107. 
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It is not only due to the fact that the world is the one part of a personal relationship, 
within which we get to know and describe it as -KocFýtoý -KbcyTjýta, that makes the world 
have a personal character. The world is of a personal character, following Yannaras' thought, 
also in the sense that it is revealing of Being, in other words of the way in which all that exist 
are, and this way is the way of personal uniqueness and singularity. Not least because all 
creation consists of a revelation or a materialization of the divine will and energy, which 
comes from a personal God, can this personal character be ascribed to the world. 
To take things in turn, Yannaras makes the point that even contemporary science 
comes to verify that the reality of the world and the knowledge we can have of it is not 
exhaustive and can never be limited within objectified definitions and certainties. Modem 
science itself, through theories such as the theory of relativity, for example, or Heisenberg's 
'Uncertainty Principle, 280 comes to reinforce a picture of the world other than that of a reality 
defined by cause-and-effect, bound together in an orderly way and mechanistically 
predictable; modem physics has come up with an image of the world which is a harmonious 
whole of infinite and indefinable differentiations, a harmonious plenitude of indefinite variety, 
and thus testifies to what one might well call the personal character of the world, depicted in 
the uniqueness and unparalleledness that the world represents. 
The way of Being, as discussed in the first part of Yannaras's book, is personal 
uniqueness and singularity; Being is revealed only in persons, in unique and unequalled 
individuals, which can be known and identified only within a relationship, within a direct 
personal encounter with them. Here Yannaras adds that this distinctiveness, which is the 
key 
feature of all beings, or rather the way in which all beings can be, consists also in the beauty of 
each creature and of the whole creation. The exceptionality of all that exist, the 
indefinable 
diversity of the world, still within a harmonious combination and coexistence, is what renders 
the physical reality to be 'YOcrýtoý; ', that is 'KO(TýITJýIOC, meaning 'beautiful' or 
'an ornament'. 
And as in the case of a piece of art, where the artistic creation gives witness to the singularity 
of an individual artist, similarly 
in the case of the world, the beauty of it testifies to a personal 
logos, in other words to a Person, to the logos of a Person, that is to the person of the 
Logos, 
yannaras says. 
280 Person and Eros, pp. 114-5. 
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Within his discussion of the personal character of the world, Yannaras makes some 
more points with reference to the beauty (KaAAoý) of the world and to what the stance of the 
Christian mind towards the cosmos is; he touches, that is, on Christian cosmology. 
The beauty of the world, Yannaras says, calls us to a fulfilling relationship and 
communion. This in simple words means that the beauty of the world, in all its possible forms, 
is attractive to man, who on impulse responds to the call of the things that attract him, as a 
result of his deeply existential need to form links of communion, basically in search of 
relationship with the things around him and of happiness. However, due to the fallen state of 
things and the self-centredness of the fallen nature of man, the relationship and communion 
with the world, to which man is called, fails. Man remains trapped in the urge of his fallen 
nature to use the world according to his own selfish desire and satisfaction, and fails to meet 
with the true logos of the things that surround him and to unite himself with them in a bond of 
true communion. Thus, the beauty of the world results in being a deadlocked tragedy for man, 
who always remains pulled towards it, but ultimately fails to realize a fulfilling connection 
with it, as he only relates with the world egocentrically. 
The Christian answer to this painful frustration, in which the experience of the world's 
attractiveness ends, Yannaras goes on, has been the practice of self-exertion and purification. 
Only when man resigns, within this Christian practice, from the urges of his fallen nature and 
individuality, is he able again to meet with the true logos of the things that surround him, to 
become conscious of their actual meaning and thus restore his failed relationship with the 
world. Our senses, although an important source of information and knowledge, because of 
sinfulness, show us things distorted, so that all we can see is only a shadow of the truth. To see 
things clearly, to approach the real meaning and nature of things, involves therefore a moral 
effort and achievement. It means that our senses need to be purified and restored to their 
initial, pre-fallen state and thus become ways of true knowledge and appreciation of the world. 
Only if man frees his senses from the compulsion to satisfy them can he cease from submitting 
the beauty of the physical reality to his selfish wishes and desires, and thus establish a 
relationship of genuine communion with the surrounding world, where the world will then 
be 
seen and respected as such, independently of man's needs and urges. 
This is, in other words, 
the meaning of the Christian cross, and this is how the spiritual exercise (ascesis) in the 
life of 
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the Church receives its meaning: through the sacrifice of our self-interested desires and 
through the self-denial attained through Christian practice and purification, the way opens 
again for man's potential towards a loving communion with the world and seeing the beauty 
of the world in itself. 281 
As it follows from the above, Christian cosmology then is not simply another theory or 
set of ideas about the world, but it represents a stance of life, a certain way of living and 
relating to the world. It involves the ability of man to respect, to look mito and to bring out the 
true logos of things. Man in this case is able to discern the truth of the world to the extent that 
he has cleared his own senses and faculties and freed them from the physical laws of 
necessity. In this way he may then recognize the presence of God as the personal will and 
energy depicted in all that has been created, and which forms a constant and active calling 
towards man for an immediate relationship with the personal God-Logos, through the logos of 
the visible, all living things. 
Yannaras' next point of discussion, then, is the fact that depending on what one's 
cosmology and relationship with the natural world is, the expression of this relationship, that is 
cultural development and civilization, will be formed accordingly. That is why in Yannaras' 
understanding and analysis, significant differences can be noted in the cultural expressions of 
the East and the West; this is not accidental, but is the result of the dissimilar outlooks on the 
natural world developed in each of these historical areas. For Yannaras, the deviation of 
Western Christianity from the authentic tradition of the one Church and the development of 
rationalism and scholastic thought has led to a different view and interpretation of the physical 
world, which then resulted in what we know today as the modem world and civilization. The 
unrestrained expansion of technology and its rough dominance over man and his life are the 
immediate result of an unorthodox cosmology, where the world has turned out to be seen only 
in a utilitarian way and become just a profitable object for man. For Yannaras even the variant 
artistic expressions of the two worlds, the East and the West, for example in architecture (the 
gothic architectural style on the one hand and the Byzantine on the other), depict a different 
frame of mind towards the material world and are expressions of the different frame of 
thought and attitude developed in each of these worlds. The contemporary environmental 
281 Person and Eros, pp. 119-2 1. 
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catastrophes and threats, Yannaras concludes, are evidence that something has gone wrong in 
man's view of the world and they mirror his disturbed relationship with it. 282 
b. The personal aspect of space 
Following the above, Yannaras discusses the idea of space: once he has pointed to the 
way in which we commonly experience and understand space, he goes further to demonstrate 
another, commonly ignored or hidden aspect of it, which is brought out in relation to 
somebody's absence, and that is the personal aspect of space for Yannaras, which in other 
words can be specified as the non-dimensional space realized within a personal relationship or 
experienced in the event of a person's proximity, even or mainly when this person is actually 
absent. 
Space or distance, Yannaras will note, is regularly understood in relation to the visible 
things that surround us, and is basically conceived as a totality of dimensions and 
measurements. We comprehend space in relation to the dimensional limits of the material 
objects, as one comes after the other, and even emptiness is understood as room lacking an 
item and movement as the succession of the room that an object occupies. This is a neutral and 
rational perception of space, which involves the idea of the physical-dimensional proximity of 
things, as we experience it in the physical reality around us. The main point Yannaras wants to 
make in this context though is that there is another reality where space is non-dimensional and 
where it cannot be defined objectively in such physical and uninvolved categories: that is the 
space of personal relationships, of that existential reality where one relates in a personal way 
with the world around him, that is in an ecstatic reference to the surrounding things, where he 
meets with and gets to know them and become involved with them in a unique, non-repeatable 
way which cannot be fully represented. 
In this line of argument, Yannaras uses the example given by Sartre, where somebody 
visits the caf6 where he normally meets with his friend Pierre. This time however, Pierre is not 
there, which makes the caf6 - for Pierre's friend, that is - to be full of Pierre's absence. The 
reality of Pierre's absence, however, which is easily recognized by looking around at all the 
tables and not seeing Pierre anywhere, works as a confirmation of Pierre's existence, Pierre's 
being. This is what Sartre wished to demonstrate using such an example, to specify existence, 
"' Person and Eros, pp. 142-6. 
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the experience or certainty that something is through reference to its absence or to 
nothingness. Yannaras, however, will take the example further, by stressing the fact that the 
absence of other people, who, say, Pierre's friend may have heard of but has not actually met, 
does not bear the same weight and does not have the same meaning for this person as Pierre's 
283 
absence does . 
For Yannaras, Pierre's absence from the caf6 where he commonly meets with his 
friend provides the opportunity - in this case for Pierre's friend, but in fact for any of us who 
would walk to the caf6 to find out that our friend that we regularly meet with at that place is 
not there - to realize the non-dimensional proximity of our personal reference to this person 
that happens to be absent. In other words this would mean that in the absence of our friend we 
are able to feel and confirm the reality and perhaps the familiarity that characterize our 
personal reference to him. This is independent of the fact of his physical absence or distance at 
the time, therefore Yarmaras calls it "non-dimensional nearness", meaning that it is free and 
out of the conventional notion in which we commonly understand or specify that somebody is 
present or not. We commonly do so through the categories of physical presence and physically 
measurable proximity within - what we objectively specify as - space. 
Nevertheless, what is it, Yannaras goes on to ask, that makes us realize the nearness of 
the person-other, recognized in his absence and within our personal reference to him? Why 
does the absence of people other than Pierre, whom we probably do not relate personally with, 
not generate the same consciousness of relational proximity? What is the condition necessary 
for such a consciousness? Why does the absence of others not provide us with the same sense 
of confidence about their existential imminence as the absence of our friend does? 
According to Yannaras' approach, the confident awareness of somebody's existence 
and nearness, realized mainly in the event of their physical absence, derives from the event of 
relating personally with them. The experience of the personal relationship that we have had 
with someone, up until their physical absence occurs, is the presupposition required, so as to 
sense in their bodily nonappearance the certainty of their existence and their nearness to us, 
experienced in our personal reference to them. It takes therefore a personal relationship, that 
unique and unrepeated event that is of ecstatic personal reference or connection with someone, 
Person and Eros, pp. 150-2. 
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within which we get to know the unequalled singularity of a person and connect and relate 
with it in a unique and impossible to be objectively represented way. 
Having expounded how our reference to and relationship with a person stands out of 
the physical dimensional space, or, in other words, having shown the non-dimensional or non- 
limited 'space' of a relationship, where someone as an unparalleled being meets ecstatically 
with the distinctiveness of the other, Yannaras then turns to point out how the energies of a 
person, or more accurately what results from them, are the non-measurable 'space' where the 
person is revealed and approached. 
Again he gives examples, such as listening to Mozart, say, or studying one of Van 
Gogh's paintings, where despite these peoples' actual absence we relate with them within a 
'space' that is beyond measurements and actual distance. This is the encounter with and the 
experience of their personal uniqueness and dissimilarity, depicted in their varying and 
matchless pieces of their work and talent. Their personal works, that is the visible outcomes of 
their personal energies, are the 'space' where the person - that is the unique, individual way in 
which they are - of these people is revealed and met and known. 
284 
Similarly, the 'space' of God, the 'place' where we can meet and relate with him, is his 
energies. This 'place' can be otherwise defined as God's love and grace, or even further as the 
created world itself, which is the visible revelation of God's personal energy. The cosmos, 
therefore, as the disclosure of God's creative and providential power, becomes the arena 
where we can meet and relate with God, the substantiation of God's personal will, and within 
it we then experience God's personal proximity and presence. It goes without saying that this 
proximity is not of God's nature, since, Yannaras notes in accord with the patristic mind, the 
reality of God is far beyond and other than the worldly one. Therefore their closeness is not 
natural, as creation stands far-off from God in terms of nature, of what it actually is, but only 
positional, as we might say, which means personal, that is exclusively a matter of a 
relationship. 
284 Person and Eros, pp. 15 8-60. 
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c. The personal aspect of time 
Moving on to the notion of time Yannaras discuses two different approaches to the 
issue of time and again brings out the importance of the person, of the personal way of being, 
with regard to the experience and evaluation of what we know as time and duration or even 
eternity, which in other words is a non-dimensional present or one beyond tIme, as he calls 't. 
The common experience and understanding of time is closely related to the idea of a 
succession of moments signified by events. Time is therefore appreciated as a succession of 
events, in other words it is realized as a change that takes place between what was before and 
what is now. This movement from 'before' to 'now' seems therefore capable of being 
objectively defined and constitutes the way in which time can be realized. In this way however 
time becomes a necessary condition for things to exist; anything that exists, exists in time and 
there is nothing that can exist regardless or outside of it. This is at least the ordinary way we 
understand beings and the existence of the whole world, and this has been, as Yannaras 
quotes, the main way of conceiving time since Plato and Aristotle, the latter defining time as 
the combination of the worldly movement and a subjective, psychological response. 
The above approach, where time is conceived as a sequence of objectively defined 
proceedings following one after the other, where everything that exists or happens takes place 
only within time and is 'counted' by it, involves also the consciousness of decay and death. 
Everything that exists is experienced as being-to-death, since everything that exists, exists in 
time, that is in a sequence of change, which is equivalent to decline and attrition and brings 
beings closer to an inevitable end. In other words the notion of time is closely bound to that of 
decay (00oQ00, and time is not only the existential condition for something to be, but also 
becomes the measure of reviewing beings and their life- span. 285 
To this objectified understanding of time, where time seems a principle or measure 
which is, as such, independent of beings, and where the latter undergo time and are determined 
by it, Yannaras suggests another approach, related to the reality of the person, where time is 
not the measure of determining beings, but rather proceeds from the existence of the latter, to 
the extent that beings are revealed within the 'horizon of the person', as Yannaras says, that is 
in relation to the person's ecstatic-relational meeting with them. 
285 Person and Eros, PP. 184-5. 
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To put it in different terms, and following from what Yannaras has expounded in 
earlier chapters about truth and the personal way of being, things are or are true 
(aAiIOEUouv) only as they come out of Aý", oblivion, only as they reveal themselves, that 
is, with reference to the person. Things get to be known, this means, not as distant and 
objectively, but within the ecstatic, relational connection of the person with the world around 
it. This represents the personal way of being, where things are known and experienced in their 
uniqueness within the frame of an again unique and unequalled personal relationship. This 
revelation of things with reference to the person., this movement from the oblivion of things to 
the consciousness of them, constitutes a change, a movement from an earlier to a later state, 
which is again experienced as time. 
However, time here only indicates this shift, it does not cause or determine it. The 
'measure' for the change, for the disclosure of things within the 'horizon' of the person, is the 
disclosure itself. Time is no longer the standard for beings to exist, it is not their existential 
condition as in the first approach to time, but stands only as a pointer, as it were, to their 
existence, which is realized only because of beings' exposure to the person and not because of 
time; this uncovering within the frame of a personal relationship, as Yannaras would note, is 
ultimately a choice and not an objective necessity. 
In this sequence of thought Yannaras brings forward the event of erotic love (EQ(oý) as 
an example or as a main case of personal ecstatic reference to the other, where the ecstatic 
relationship is experienced in its own sake and independent of time; the ecstatic self-denial 
and meeting with the personal other is a dynamic event not determined by time, but which 
instead determines time, and this is shown in the different impression that our consciousness 
may have of time when it comes to waiting a delayed train or completing a boring task '286 if 
we wish to stay with Yannaras' examples, and to realizing a meeting with the beloved one 
instead. The objective duration of all the above may be the same, however time does not feel 
the same in all cases. This is how time, for Yannaras, can be a sip that only signifies the 
personal way of being and is not then decisive for existence. 
Another example that Yannaras gives to show how personal existence and not time has 
the leading role with regard to the ontological issue, that he is basically concerned with, 
is that 
of personal energy. 
Personal energy, as we saw in earlier paragraphs, is the disclosure, the 
286 Person and Eros, p. 192. 
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chance we have to become aware of the fact that a nature exists and realizes itself in unique 
persons. This personal energy, Yannaras now notes, or rather the results of it, remain and last 
beyond time, and thus bring us before the reality of the personal presence that surpasses time 
rather than being determined by it. The example he brings forward here is, yet again, that of 
the works of an artist (Van Gogh), which for us represent the personal uniqueness of Van 
Gogh, and allow us to 'meet' with this person, more or even better than any description of him 
or objective information about his life would let us do. 
Finally, Yannaras takes the chance once again to explain how the practice of the 
Church, as delivered through the patristic mind and tradition, points to this personal way of 
existence; the fallen and fractured man, the individual, is called to overcome the existential 
split represented by his individuality, and achieve personal existence, become a person, which 
means free of the necessities that his fallen nature dictates, and in relation to what we expound 
here, free of the limits and bonds of time. That is what the liturgical time of the Church then 
denotes, the overcoming of worldly time: in the Eucharist for example not only we, the ones 
actually present at it, are there, but the living and the dead, all saints and sinners, those who 
are close and those who are far away, the first and the last ones, all are present there and then, 
before the person of Christ, in a direct personal relationship with Him. The Eucharist, that is, 
the coming together of the Church community and the partaking of the bread and the wine as 
the flesh of Logos, is not just a memorial, imitation or symbol of the Last Supper, but the 
always present possibility of partaking in the always present communion, in the always 
present event of the union, of man and God. In this way eternity does not refer us to an after- 
death reality, but to the immediate, personal presence, the reality of the everlasting and 
corporeal presence of Christ beyond time and the union with Him. 
Logos and Image 
a. Logos: the disclosure of the personal 
The central role and the priority of 'personal existence', that is the way of being where 
man has overcome 
his individualized, fractured nature in a self-denying encounter with his 
surrounding world, 
is brought out as Yannaras goes on to talk about the logos of things. The 
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latter is only the first in a series of ways that he analyses as signs or possibilities of denoting 
personal existence. And this is because the reality of a person, as Yannaras has already pointed 
out several times, can be experienced and known within a relationship and a direct encounter, 
but not fully depicted or exhausted in words or any other means of expression - only described 
and suggested. 
The Greek word 'A6-yo(; ', which could be variously translated as 'word', 'truth', 
6reality', or 'reason', is here used by Yannaras to refer to the very nature of things, to the 
essence of what something is. Yannaras starts off from the earliest uses of the word, where it 
9287 would be employed to indicate a 6collection9 or 'gathering together . Through such a use it 
ended up standing for the word or the language used to name something, because the names of 
things are ultimately collective of - they 'contain', as it were - all those elements that 
characterize and make up the identity of a being. 
As referring to the very nature of things, logos is indicative of the unity and the 
unequalled singularity of beings. Following on from Yannaras we can say that the logos of 
something is equal to the definition of that thing, in the sense that it delineates and refers to the 
attributes that distinguish one being from the other, excluding all the rest of qualities that do 
not belong to the nature of a being. As such, however, it presupposes that we have an 
experience of what we come to define; therefore once again logos reveals a personal 
relationship, reveals the personal encounter with whatever we get to know before we define or 
name it. 
In fact to arrive at the logos of something means to put together all the separate and 
particular experiences of that thing that each of us may have. That is how logos is in the end a 
signal or a 'symbol' of a being ((Tu'ýtpoAo in Greek deriving from the verb o-up-PaAA(j, 
which means bring or put together). 
But before logos ends up being identified with or reduced to a word or the language 
that we use to communicate and refer to the reality of our experience, it primarily reveals and 
denotes the unique and unequalled relationship and meeting of man with the surrounding 
beings that he encounters and which he later comes to name and define. For this reason, logos 
287 Person and Eros, p. 207, where he quotes uses of the word as early as in Homer and 
later in Philo of 
Alexandria. 
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is first of all and foremost a disclosure of the person himself and of his unparalleled encounter 
with the world around him, in other words of a personal relationship. As such, it means that it 
is not just the result of a reasoning and rational approach to things, but of a wholly experiential 
encounter or involvement with them. It follows then from the above, and Yannaras will here 
quote from Aristotle as well as from Maximus the Confessor to support this position, 288 that 
knowledge is not only the quality of what we restrictedly refer to as reason, but of the senses 
too, which are part of man as a whole and which contribute to the gathering of ifformation and 
the construction of our knowledge. 
Logos, then, referring to the nature of what something is, is indicative of an order, for 
logos does not only speak of the elements that make up the nature of something, but 
furthermore denotes the way those parts exist to compose the one essence. In this way logos 
conveys an order, an organized, ordered or 'logical' state of being ( 'logical' here, referring 
not to what we normally mean by 'ratio', 'logic' or 'reason', but to what is consistent with 
logos, with the structural principles of a being, Ka-cA A6yov). 
In previous chapters Yannaras discussed how the energies of nature are the 'channel', 
the way through which nature is revealed and known, always within the framework and reality 
of personal beings. Here he adds that the energies of nature reveal, in other words, the logos of 
nature, or more accurately, the logos of each person, that unique, distinct and unequalled 
realization of the one nature. Following from here he will then make the point how the cosmic 
logos, the logos of the cosmos, is basically the disclosure or the expose of a personal creative 
energy: that of the personal divine Logos. 
b. The image as Sig Rifying the non-conventional logos 
Having described how logos is not just an utterance of words, not just a conventional 
description of objectified realities but in fact a category bearing some ontological significance 
within the personalistic approach of ontology, Yannaras will go on to discuss of the role and 
the importance of the image, as a carrier of the same ontology, the ontology of the person. 
yannaras starts off by evaluating how the phenomenological approach to the 
ontological problem, that 
is the approach according to which one understands beings as 
288 Person and Eros, pp. 214-215. 
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phenomena, as what they appear to be mainly within the horizon of time, inevitably leads to 
conventional knowledge and to conventional language, which is employed to communicate the 
phenomenological knowledge. He sees this approach as one that rather restrains the human 
potential for knowledge. This is because, according to his analysis, if we start with 
phenomenology, knowledge and truth are ultimately identified with the objectified meanings 
of the words employed to communicate that knowledge. Given the restricted, stereotyped 
character of human language, alongside the fact of an awareness present from the onset of the 
phenomenological viewpoint that the oV'ata, the substance of things, remains hidden beyond 
what we can see, beyond the phenomena, it follows that one can realize, Yannaras maintains, 
how confined and relative phenomenological knowledge can be. Since we are limited to what 
we see, to what things appear to be, to the phenomena, our knowledge of things is only an 
allusion, an indication of what things are, let alone when this relative knowledge is identified 
with the very definitions of meaning that the use of a language imposes, with the very terms, 
which, constrictive in their meaning by nature, have been standardized in a conformist way to 
communicate knowledge, understandings, ideas, in short what we can make of the surrounding 
world and of our experiences. This is what in other words could be described as a linguistic 
positivism, where the possibility of knowing things is identified with - is one and the same as 
- the possibility of communicating this knowledge. This is how life, Yannaras will conclude, 
ends up not being served by language, but rather serving it, since it is acknowledged and 
realized only in what can be defined, linguistically spoken and expressed. 289 
For Yannaras, the answer to such a state of affairs lies again in the ontology of the 
person, in the personalistic approach to the ontological question, to the ontological issue. We 
could say that the whole philosophical and theological thought of Yannaras is personalistic, 
woven around a personalistic ontology; by this I mean an ontology, a discourse on the matter 
of beings and Being, centrally based upon the category of the person, the reality of personal 
existence. (Whether or not such ontology can be traced in and defended by the theological 
heritage of the Church Fathers is a separate and challenging question). For Yannaras the 
person is a fundamental category present in all strands of thought and theological or 
philosophical discussion. 
289 Person and Eros, pp. 223-6. 
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The person therefore is again the starting point for the issue of knowledge that 
Yannaras has been discussing here, in the second chapter of the third part of Person and Eros. 
The horizon within which we get to know things for Yannaras is not time, as in 
phenomenology, but the reality of personal existence. The event of personal relationship is for 
Yannaras a dynamic circumstance within which the process of knowledge unfolds as a moral 
achievement, as a potent undertaking towards a progressively more thorough realization of 
being as a person. Knowledge is not just a function of acquainting oneself with beings by 
becoming familiar with a stereotyped linguistic semiology employed to refer to and to 
describe all that exists; this would mean, as we saw above, a limitation of the true possibilities 
of knowledge and render Being, the substance of all that is, ov'aia, a complete mystery, a 
totally obscure and unexplored ground (what Yannaras calls mysticism of the substance, 
ýIVGTUKUTýtO; uq; oVcrLai; ). Knowledge, within the frame of personal ontology, where beings 
reveal themselves, ok-ATIO-F-vouv not within the horizon, for example, of time but of the 
person, depends on and is ultimately equal to the moral exercise of becoming more and more 
what it is to be a person, that is relational, self-denying, ecstatic, and in short all that is 
opposed to the fragmented state of individuality; in this way one gets more and more 
authentically involved with things and consequently achieves true knowledge. Thus 
knowledge is an ongoing becoming, is something dynamic and not limited, is an always open 
possibility for further progress in the view of things, in self-engaging with the reality, with the 
beings, in a loving self-offering and self-denial and overcoming of individualized existence. 
Now this knowledge which derives from the event of personal relationship or, to be 
more faithful to how Yannaras puts it, is rather identified with the personal relationship itself, 
can still be and is communicated through the human language of words. However in this case 
language serves life, is subject to the event of personal involvement with things and is taken 
closely in relation to whoever uses it. The terms employed to convey the meanings we wish to 
share are not rigidly objectified or just technically used. Therefore the language that is put to 
use, Yannaras will explain, is not to be understood as isolated from the person that applies it. 
The words one may use to express something are not everything, are not the fullness of the 
event, experience, thought, speculation, and so on, one intends to 
describe. Yannaras, drawing 
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, 290 here from the realm of literature and poetry, speaks of 'the word within a word , that is of 
what remains unspoken beyond what one speaks, of what lies beyond the terms used to refer 
to things. Language in this way preserves a dynamic and itself forms a calling to communion 
and personal involvement. Language communicates personal experience by alluding to it 
rather than in an exhaustive way; in this way it is rather an invitation to a personal engagement 
to approach and understand that experience. 
We are in part three of Person and Eros where Yannaras basically speaks of ways that 
signify personal existence, of channels, so to speak, which convey or denote the disclosure of 
the person. If logos -the nature of which was explored in the first chapter of the third part of 
Person and Eros - is one of these channels, the next one Yannaras will expound here is the 
image. Again he sets off by briefly exploring the etymology of the Greek wordEt, K6va as well 
as the way images have been used in the Greek world since classical times. Starting from the 
use of the image as analogy, humanity moved on to employ image in order to allude to things, 
rather than represent them in a realistic, natural way. Images, either in the form of paintings or 
sculptures, were initially used to represent reality as closely and faithfully as possible to their 
models. Their function was to depict their topic in an analogous way to reality, that is, as 
accurately as possible in relation to real life. Yannaras brings out the importance that vision, 
the ability to see and perceive things through the sense of sight, had possessed since ancient 
times and how OEwpia, the act of viewing, has been closely related to, if not identified with, 
the very act of knowing as early as Plato. To see things means to participate in them; the 
ability to have sight of things is the first step towards yEOEýq, which is a state of communion 
with things, participation in what we can see, and thus knowledge of it. MEOEýq equals a 
personal involvement, is the realization of a personal relationship with reality. Yannaras will 
analyse how this relationship is preserved and conveyed by the image, especially when the 
latter does not seek to represent strictly the objectified forms of reality, but when it invites the 
viewer to participate through the depiction of a theme in the inner logos of it. A painting or a 
piece of art does not illustrate everything, nor can it portray everything that 
it wishes to 
communicate, in an absolute, naturalistic way. It rather opens the way towards true 
290 Person and Eros, P- 230: 'The word within a word, unable to speak a word... T. S. Eliot, 
Gerontion'. 
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knowledge, towards the truth of things, which lies beyond what can be depicted and which can 
be endlessly explored within and through a personal relationship with the pictured subject. 
Thus the image preserves again the dynamics of personal existence, it is an invitation to a 
personal way of existing and it requires a personal involvement to understand what one can 
see in it. The image has a dual function of disclosing and at the same time concealing its 
objects, in a way that leaves open possibilities of a more genuine approach to true knowledge. 
This has been the function of Byzantine icons, as Yannaras explains, which have not sought to 
exhaust the event or the persons they represent in the illustration of the icon itself. The truth, 
Yannaras will point out, cannot be objectified, and icons as used in the Christian tradition have 
been an example of the consciousness of this fact. Another example of such awareness has 
been the theological language employed to speak about God and knowledge of him. Yannaras 
describes this language as -t'KOVOAOYtKý, illustrative, since through the use of opposite terms 
(UT(EQOU(YLOC, OU'Ma, VOUý aVOIJTOý, aV(Ovupov ovoýta, uTd-QOEoý; OF-6Tq;, etc. ) it seeks 
to preserve some meaning beyond the meaning of either of the terms used in each case. In 
other words it seeks to save the truth from becoming something objective and thus limited and 
not the truth. 
In the last part of Person and Eros headed as 'The Fall and Nothingness' Yannaras 
discusses aspects that have been essentially treated already in Heidegger and the Areopagite 
or themes that also occur in his discussion on the ethical dimensions of the personal way of 
being in Freedom and Morality, which we will be looking at in the following chapter. Here I 
will, therefore, turn to examine shortly the premises from the tradition that are appealed to 
in 
discussing theological personalism as well as the way in which Yannaras puts his patristic 
sources to use. 
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Part 11: Some issues further discussed 
If we turn to look at the tradition of the Fathers on the subject of the human person, as 
it has been pointed out, 291 some aspects of the human nature have been touched upon by the 
patristic tradition, particularly when the Fathers try to interpret and present the meaning of 
man's creation 'in the image and likeness of God'. However, the Church, through the voice of 
the great theologians and the Church Fathers, had rather., through the centuries, mainly to 
resolve other matters, such as the Trinitarian existence of God and the Incarnation of the 
second person of the Trinity, with all the relevant problems and controversies that would 
revolve around these themes at each time. Therefore, even though the Fathers invoked notions 
and terms related to the existence of the person when tackling the doctrines of the Trinity and 
Christology, they did not however expand separately on their anthropological presuppositions 
and they did not provide us with an elaborate, independent theology about the human being. 
This is a remark acknowledged quite widely by today's theologians, that the Fathers of the 
Church do not provide us with a distinct doctrine of the human person. It is not a recent 
observation. Over half a century ago Vladimir Lossky had made the same comment, and had 
been critical towards the attitude of attributing complex concepts of the human person from 
modem philosophical traditions to the Fathers. He did not, however, deny that at the same 
time we can, from the side, as it were, find some Christian anthropology in the Fathers, 292 
which in fact Lossky calls 'unquestionably personalist'. This means that the anthropological 
insights we find from the Fathers are in most cases raised in a not directly anthropological 
context. Even where we have treatises about man as such - as, say, in Gregory of Nyssa's 'On 
the Making of man' - the aspects that are analyzed in relation to man's being are approached 
in a different way and in a quite limited spectrum compared with the anthropological analysis 
and the ideas that we would come across in a modem setting. Thus the patristic texts talk, for 
example, of man's creation by God, of man's composite nature of body and soul, of man as a 
microcosm, of man's fall and of the human passions, but they do not go into these areas with 
the same kind of analysis with which contemporary theologians would approach the same 
matters. The patristic mind is set well apart from the problematic of contemporary thought and 
the ways in which the latter approaches and tries to interpret aspects of man's existence. 
We 
291 See Ware, 'Orthodox theology in the new millennium'. 
292 See his 'The theological notion of the human person', pp. 111-2. 
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need to keep in mind that the material presented by the Fathers often refers us to the biblical 
environment and the biblical language that it actually wants to interpret and that it does not 
address the issues or share the insights and the presuppositions that press on the modem mind 
in relation to the human being. 
In the modem times, on the other hand, theologians have turned to analysing the 
parameters of human existence with quite a different approach from that of the patristic 
material. Contemporary theologizing has gone down the path of looking into and discussing 
what man's existence involves primarily in terms of the relational and the communal character 
of being. So in addition to what the theological tradition would so far have to say about man, 
we have now some particular aspects of man's existence being stressed. The characteristic that 
is mainly stressed in relation to human personhood is the quality of relationality (the human 
person discussed in the light of the Trinity, the personhood of God, and therefore approached 
primarily as relational): man has been created to exist not in self-sufficiency but in relation 
with what is out there for him. Man is meant to experience Being by meeting and sharing in 
union with the Other, whether this other be God, other people or the natural creation. Man has 
been created, so the modem voice continues, to be a person, 7zQ6U-(07iov, to exist by facing 
or encountering and relating with what is before him. Only by doing so does man fulfill his 
true being. Or, to put it another way, it is by attaining to personal existence that man exists 
xa, ca Ao-yov, in accordance with his inherent logos. It is prominent in the mind of many 
modem theologians, that man fulfills the principle of his existence by opening himself up to 
the other and maintaining a relationship with it. It is seen as an integral aspect of what it is to 
be human that man overcomes the limits of his own existence and exists in communion with 
everything else beyond him. Now, we could say that for one to live in communion with every 
other living entity in the world feels at least technically unrealistic. We need to note therefore 
that the sort of the communion we refer to here and to which man is called is not quite the 
same thing as the communal co-existence of, say, living in the same city or 
belonging to the 
group of society. The communion theologians put 
forward as the very substance of the human 
existence is rather a deeper notion of an ontological nature. 
Thus people may live very close to 
each other - as in fact 
is the case in our modem world - but still fail to realize a genuine 
communal being. The communal character of man's nature 
that the theologians want to 
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emphasize is something well beyond a physical co-existence and signifies a spiritual quality 
that man has. It is the exercise of this spiritual quality to overcome the boundaries of his own 
limited existence, of his narrow individuality, that would allow man to relate to and even unite 
with the things that are not in physical proximity to him. Theologians see this aspect of 
relatedness of man's being as the very objective of man's existence. In this way to be a person 
is a mode of being juxtaposed to that of just being an individual. The contemporary 
theological personalism thus works with a contrast between 'person' and 'individual'. 'Person' 
is understood as the authentic way in which man was created to be, an existence opened up 
and sharing lovingly and in union with the fellow-people, with God and the world; while the 
'individual' is what the fall of man has left him with, basically man entangled in the 
limitedness of his human constraints and passions. 
1. The Trinity as the basis for discussing human personhood 
The understanding of persons as existing in, and constituted by, communion is not an 
idea peculiar to Yannaras in modem Orthodox theology, though he does not dwell at all on the 
implications of this way of thinking for the doctrine of the Trinity itself. It might, however, be 
useful to explore a little how the notion of the Trinity itself - understood as what has 
sometimes been called a 'social Trinity' - can be developed to provide a model for our 
understanding of human personhood. 
To discuss human existence in the light of the faith that the Church holds about the 
being of the revealed God has certainly been associated in the modem years and in the 
Orthodox world with the names of particular theologians. Furthermore, this attitude does not 
represent only the position of certain persons in the Orthodox theological world, but is rather a 
way of thinking, a general approach, infused in the thought and the work of the Orthodox 
theologians of our days more widely (I have in mind for example Vassilios Thermos, and 
others who are not primarily involved in discussing the Trinity and personhood, 
but who in 
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discussing personhood in a psycho-therapeutic context, take an existential approach to human 
person, sin, etc. ) 
Modem theological personalism appears to draw to a great extent on the established 
Tradition of the Church by making an appeal to Trinitarian theology and even to Ecclesiology 
when expounding its understanding of the human person. It would be helpful at this point to 
explain a bit further this association and see how contemporary Orthodox theological thought 
connects anthropology with the theology of the Trinity and also with its teaching about the 
Church. The doctrine of the Trinity is a pronouncement in the Christian faith which is by and 
large a mystery even to the believer. Why is God three persons or how he can be three and 
strictly one at the same time remains a wonder and even though it is not an arbitrary 
theological formulation but one that clearly reflects the experience of the Church, yet it cannot 
be logically explained and understood. Belief in a Trinitarian God is, therefore, something that 
often appears, to a non-Christian especially, as something bizarre, and for the faithful it can 
feel to some extent an awkward aspect of the faith to try to explain or justify. Even so, the 
dogma of the Trinity, as well as the rest of the doctrinal teaching of the Church, is not a 
random dictum that is there just to be blindly endorsed. Dogmatic theology reflects, and 
results from, the experience of the Church and it has significance for man's salvation, hence 
the great concern in the course of the Church history to safeguard and clarify the dogmas 
against heretical deviations. The beginning of Christian life, at least for an Orthodox Christian, 
is to believe rightly, to accede to the true faith (6Q0TI boýoc), since the authentic content of the 
faith serves as a signpost, as it were, for the way to a true life. Therefore the theological 
dogmas, instead of being seen totally as enigmas, need to be approached as articles of the faith 
that have relevance to our practice as Christians and to how we conduct our lives. On such 
grounds, some of the theologians who initiate the contemporary discussion about personhood 
start from or draw their insights from the established theology of the Trinity, which in the 
course of the Church history was formulated far more clearly and articulated in more definite 
terms than other theological subjects. They appeal, that is, to the patristic tradition and to the 
way the Fathers understood God as Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity 
is thus put forward as 
having great significance for and relevance to the actual life of the Christians. The fact that we 
believe in a God of three distinct persons perfectly united in one, it is suggested, has practical 
consequences for our understanding of 
human personhood and also for the sort of the society 
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to which we aspire. The way we organize our life and all the aspects of our social activity need 
to reflect our belief in God the Trinity. 293 
More specifically, the Fathers' doctrinal theology about the Trinity instructs us about a 
God seen as communion (YcoLwovLa) of distinct hypostaseis or persons. This means that rather 
than seeing the Triune God as a single whole owing to God's one common substance, the 
Triadic unity is understood mainly in terms of interpersonal relationships among the three 
divine hypostaseis. 294 Thus the unity of the Trinity is not an accord imposed, as it were, by 
God's nature or essence, but is seen rather as a union that results from the harmonious 
interaction between the three persons of God the Father, the Son and the Spirit. Besides, all the 
three distinct persons of the Trinity exist in an undivided correlation with one another and 
cannot be conceived as isolated hypostaseis; the Father cannot be thought of without the Son, 
nor the Son be seen as separate from the Spirit. God's being is thus understood and presented 
in terms of the relationships between the divine persons. It is relational being and it is not 
possible to speak about it while cutting it off from the concept of communion. 295 Thus the 
Christian God is also talked about in the contemporary context mainly as interpersonal 
community; the Trinity is a communion of persons in indivisible mutual dialogue, it is a 
'social' Trinity. The link from here with modem propositions about human personhood is 
quite evident, but I will return to this later on. 
The present-day theological appeal to the patristic tradition for the analysis of what it 
means to be human makes use also of the Fathers' presentation of God - not unrelated to the 
one of interpersonal community - as a Trinity of love. 
296 The connection among the divine 
hypostaseis is a bond of mutual and eternal love. God is not, as we saw, a single entity, but a 
union of persons that are related in between them not due to some necessity but in an 
exchange of reciprocal love. This leads to an understanding of God's hypostaseis as self- 
293 Kallistos Ware, 'The Holy Trinity: Paradigm of the Human Person', in Melville Stewart, ed., The Trinity: 
EastlWest Dialogue (Netherlands: Kluwer, 2003). In this article Bishop Kallistos draws basically on the theology 
of the Cappadocians, on Augustine and on Richard of St Victor. 
294 This is at least the way the Cappadocians talk of the Trinity, and yet not St Athanaslus, who emphasises rather 
the homoousios, the 'consubstantial', 'The Holy Trinity', pp. 229-30. 
29S This is for example a central position of the principal exponent of personalist theology in the recent decades, 
Metropolitan of Pergamon John Zizioulas. See Zizioulas, John, Being as Communion (Crestwood, New York: St 
Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1993). 
296 See Ware drawing on Augustine and Richard of St Victor, 'The Holy Trinity', pp. 230-3 1. 
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giving and responsive towards one another, since true love is not turned inwards. It means that 
God exists in complementary sharing, in an exchange that requires both a 'you' and an '1'. 
God is thus discussed as a fellowship, where completeness and perfectness rest in the love for 
another and where nothing is withheld from being shared among the loving partners. 
Moreover, the fullness of the Trinitarian love is realized and expressed in the fact that it is love 
not only between two partners but love shared among three. This is because the existence of a 
third party guarantees, as it were, the completeness of love, which is not confined in a closed 
track between just two persons but opens up to be jointly shared and also mutually received 
back by a third. In the words of Richard of St Victor whom Bishop Kallistos quotes in his 
discussion of how the holy Trinity can be an example for the human personhood: 'The sharing 
of love cannot exist among any less than three persons... Shared love is properly said to exist 
when a third person is loved by two persons harmoniously and in community, and when the 
affection of the two persons is in this way fused into one affection by the flame of love for a 
, 297 third . So the Holy Trinity is understood as a perfect unity of mutual love among God the 
Father, the Son and the Spirit, where all three persons are joined together in an internally 
structured oneness and where each of them remains fully distinct. Their complete unity, that 
is, does not invalidate or harm the absolute uniqueness of each Triadic person; each of them 
continues to exemplify the common essence of the divinity in their totally individual way and 
to have their own distinctive attributes (N(OýIaTa). 
Such views about the Holy Trinity are found in the theology of the Fathers. On the 
basis of this Trinitarian theology then and on the ground that man has been created in the 
image of God the contemporary theological approach moves on to discuss what it means to be 
human. The analysis and the understanding of the human personhood, that is, is presented as a 
consequence of the way we believe about God, of the view and the understanding we have of 
the Holy Trinity. Therefore, since the existence of the divinity is comprehended in the ways 
we described above, human personhood is interpreted similarly; attributes of the existence of 
the divinity are in such a context transferred to the being of man. Man, it is consequently 
proposed, cannot be a true person, 7TQ6cF(j7To, unless he faces the 
Other, unless he exists in 
fellowship with others. If God's being is a relational being then the same must apply to the 
297 'The Holy Trinity'. p. 23 1. 
170 
human existence. Just as it is impossible to separate the concept of communion from our 
understanding of the being of God, so we cannot achieve a true understanding of what it 
means to be human without involving the idea of communion, Kotvwvia. Man is truly a 
person, according to this contemporary presentation, when he relates with the Other. he is 
truly an image of the Trinitarian being only when he exists in communion with and in an 
outward movement of love towards the Other. This understanding of being authentically a 
person involves the concept of self-offering, of mutuality and of making the Other the centre 
of one's own existence. Personal being, similarly to God's being, is seen as constituted only in 
a relationship, in a loving exchange of an I and a You. The human person cannot be egocentric 
but only exocentric. It is also seen in terms of perichoresis, coinherence, and as constitutive of 
a perfect solidarity of love, where, however, the unbroken unity does not cancel the complete 
distinctiveness of each *personal existence. Human existence, this means, is discussed in terms 
of communion and unity with one another, in a similar way the divine persons remain one 
even though absolutely distinct from one another at the same time. The argument is that since 
human beings take after their Creator's image, they need to attain to a personal way of 
existence, in which they will preserve their complete uniqueness while at the same time 
sharing in each other and deferring to each other, as God the Father, the Son and the Spirit do: 
they stay united but not confused, distinct but not divided. Only when man's existence is 
relational, social, interpersonal, reciprocal, can it be a true image of the Trinitarian God. Thus 
the approach and the interpretation of the so-called Social Trinity is drawn in and projected, 
we could say, on to the being of humans. It is used as the starting point for the construction of 
a theological anthropology and for discussing how the faith in the Holy Trinity needs to be 
reflected in us humans and furthermore in our societies. 
Such positions about the significance of Trinitarian theology for the understanding of 
the human personhood can easily and legitimately enough raise some objections: in our 
attempt to inform our understanding of the human personhood drawing on what we know 
about the Trinity, do we run the risk of projecting on to the latter our modem perception of the 
6person' as basically an agent of subjectivity? Can we see the persons of the Trinity as distinct 
in the way we accordingly understand human persons, each as a different and separate centre 
of self-consciousness, willing and feeling? And can we, consequently, refer to the divine 
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Triune unity in similar ways to those in which we conceive the union of three human beings" 
Beyond the danger of misrepresenting the Patristic tradition, objections of this kind seem to 
forewarn us of the loss of the element of apophaticism, which is in general a fundamental 
constituent for the Orthodox theology. Therefore, as it has been noted by Bishop Kallistos - 
who is one of the exponents of the modem approach to the human personhood on the basis of 
our faith in the Holy Trinity - we need to remember that the depths of the divine darkness 
remain always beyond comprehension and that the analogies we use when we refer to the 
Godhead never cease to reflect our created reality and to employ, inevitably, our material 
language, charged as this must be by our human experience. Yet, the analogies we employ 
from our human experience are often the only way we have of making some sense of and of 
referring to God's reality. The term 'person', for example, is our only way of understanding 
relations; however, we need to make use of the concept while retaining at the same time an 
apophatic stance and keeping in mind that the divine reality always remains transcendent and 
beyond all our human notions of inter-personal relationships. Thus God is not personal in our 
created sense of being personal; the divine uncreated hypostaseis are not persons in the same 
way as we are. As Bishop Kallistos remarks, when the Church Fathers employed the term 
'person' they did not use it with the sense of what 'person' represents to us today in terms of 
subjectivity, self-consciousness etc., as this would mean that in the Trinity we would have 
three separate centres of consciousness. Instead, 'person' in the patristic tradition signifies the 
distinctive existence in terms of objectivity rather than subjectivity, how the person, that is, is 
manifest to an exterior witness. 298 Besides, the union of the three divine hypostasel .s cannot be 
equated to any kind of human bond, it is 'incomparably closer and stronger than any human 
association can ever be'. 299 It is important, therefore, to remember that when we discuss 
personalism employing the Trinitarian theology we actually take on two different levels of 
being and for this reason we need to set off with an apophatic mind. There is a fine balance to 
be observed: we would not, on the one hand, really mean to leave our faith in the Trinity aside 
as something absurd and irrelevant to our lives and, as Bishop Kallistos suggests, we need 
be 
confident that we do not fall short if we understand God in terms of sharing, solidarity and 
mutual love. On the other hand, we need bear in mind that the life of the Trinity exceeds all 
298 'The Holy Trinity'. p. 233. 
299 'The Holy TrInIty', p. 233. 
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our created sense of relatedness and 'we should not employ the analogy of mutual love to the 
exclusion of all other images and models [even though] ... this paradigm enables us to "make 
sense"' of the Trinity in a way that no other paradigm can do'. 300 
Such an exhortation on behalf of bishop Kallistos safeguards his propositions from 
being misunderstood, as at some point he takes the view that both our understanding of the 
Trinity can help us understand the human person and our understanding of the latter can also 
illumine us better about the Trinity, which can lead us to the kind of objections we pointed to 
above. He also makes the suggestion, taking the stimulus from Augustine's 'Trinities of the 
Mind', that insights from the theology of the Trinity could lead us to other interpretations of 
the person, for example on a unipersonal level, allowing thus the space for someone to realize 
the relative character of the interpersonal approach. 301 
2. 'Person' versus 'individual' 
Since the idea of the 'individual' is in this modem context juxtaposed to the notion of 
the 'person', which is, as we have said, particularly understood in terms of relatedness, the 
core of the content for the term 'individual' would seem to be the opposite of relationality: 
dissociation, disunion and estrangement. This means that being an individual is to be apart, to 
exist separately from one another, to be divided or detached. The existence of the human being 
then is not defined and understood in terms of relationality and communal life but is 
independent of those aspects that would be considered as constitutional for the making of the 
person. The community is not an integral part of the identity of the individual as it is in the 
case of the person. Thus an individual is seen as just a unit of a public alongside other units 
but not essentially in relation with them. This view of human beings as individuals has been 
reflected greatly on the social level in the modem times, and was widely inflicted by the social 
changes caused at the time of the industrialization. It still is very much a part of the picture of 
today's world as well. The citizens in our modem societies are generally seen as impersonal 
300 'The Holy Trinity', p. 235. 
301 'The Holy Trinity', p. 229. 
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members of the gigantic social whole, as just separate and neutral constituents of the big 
picture of the social order. They are individuals - holders of rights to be protected and served 
and bearers of needs to be provided for. In this way they are primarily seen as customers and 
potential buyers of services and goods. Partly as a result of this, individualized societies go 
hand in hand with consumerism while the latter incorporates as a fact man's destructive 
interference with the natural environment. All in all, in such modem expressions of 
individualized forms of life as these there is initiated a sense of division and fragmentation, 
whether the rupture refers to the relationship among men who are estranged from one another, 
or to the dissociation of individuals from the wider social group which basically represents to 
them an impersonal public, or to the hostile attitude that man develops towards his natural 
habitat or the natural world - not to mention the fact that there can even be a sense of split 
within man's own identity, too, arising from the experience of being uprooted, from the fact 
that modem humans less and less belong organically to a particular place or a specific 
community, as they can often move and adjust to different geographic locations and social 
settings. Furthermore, and as a consequence of this, people today often bear a sense of 
discontinuity and lack the consciousness of carrying a particular heritage, either in terms of the 
milieu of a certain locality or in terms of a long family background that would give them a 
sense of where they come from and who they are. 
All these are aspects of what contemporary theologians - at least those who invoke the 
distinction of 'person' versus 'individual' - would refer to as individualism; they are all 
examples of forms of life and behaviour that belong to what the modem theologizing would 
specify as individualized rather than as personal. However, when contemporary Orthodox 
theologians like Yannaras put forward the idea of the person and place it opposite that of the 
individual they do not allude just to the sociological, as it were, expressions or consequences 
of the loss of a personal way of being. The modem theological distinction 
between 'person' 
and the 'individual' is made, to my understanding, primarily on a more profound and rather 
ontological level. In Yannaras' language, more specifically, an 
individual is the human being 
that fails to realize life as a relationship. All the expressions of individualism that we pointed 
to above would then, in the thought of Yannaras and of some other contemporary 
Orthodox 
theologians, come about as the results of the tragedy where life is not realized as relationship. 
When man does not achieve personal being, when he fails to be a person, that 
is to relate 
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ecstatically with the Other and share life lovingly, then he ends up experiencing a disturbed 
relationship with the creation around him, whether the result is the formation of big and 
inhospitable, monster-like cities and the estrangement which they involve for people's lives or 
the devastating use of the natural environment. So what underlies such consequences is the 
ontological distinction between 'person' and 'individual'. The difference is thus in the mode 
of being: the person realizes its nature by leading it to its fulfillment, which is the sharing of 
life in a loving communion and unity with the Other, while the individual comprises a 
deformation of its nature, it is simply a misrepresentation of what would otherwise be true 
being. There is, therefore, a differentiation of a rather spiritual kind between 'person' and 
'individual'. These two vary, first and foremost, in their ontological quality: the person exists 
by making a loving turn out of itself and towards the Other while the individual is condemned 
to its very egocentricity; it is a self-absorbed existence that either isolates itself from the Other 
or turns towards it only to make use of it. Therefore, when contemporary theological thought 
seeks to defend personal being versus the individual, it does so not so much on a societal basis 
and spectrum, but mainly from a theological understanding. 
Present-day theologians, as mentioned already, like to present such contemporary 
insights as part of the patristic tradition of the Church. They appear to put forward their 
perceptions not as innovative ideas but as positions that one can well find and draw from the 
theology of the Fathers. Truly enough, the fact that man is created to exist as a being related to 
the Other is not anything alien to what the Fathers would have to say about man. The patristic 
mind would well be in accord with the idea that man was created by God to exist and rejoice 
in a loving relationship with Him as well as in sharing and relating with the other men and 
with all the creation. Hence man was not made as a solitary entity but as Adam and Eve. The 
biblical text is explicit about God's will in the creation of man: 'it is not good for man to be 
alone'. Man was created to be loved and to love, primarily to share in God's beatitude and 
maintain his being through a relationship of trust and love for God. Hence the Fall 
for the 
patristic mind is nothing other than the breaking of the bond with God, the ceasing of trust 
in 
God and of referring one's existence to Him. All these are positions that the Church Fathers 
and writers would very comfortably go along with and in fact it is a substantial part of their 
teaching. In the Fathers' teaching the revealed God of the Christians is a personal God who 
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out of the abundance of His love became man to meet again the fallen Adam and who 
continuously calls his creature back into a recovery of his broken bond with God. The God 
whom the Fathers proclaim is truly a God-lover calling man, and through man the whole of 
the creation, into a relationship with Him. 
Accordingly, the distinction between 'person' and 'individual' is not something 
unsuited to the mind of the patristic tradition. Certainly, this differentiation does not appear as 
such anywhere in the patristic texts and it is unquestionably a modem articulation. However, 
even though the terms and the distinction as such between 'person' and 'individual' are not 
explicitly there in the work of the Fathers in the way they are voiced today, the 
concepts/meanings and the qualities to which the terms allude are very much present in the 
Fathers' thought and theology. 
When the Fathers speak of fallen man, when they refer to the effects of the fall and the 
new state of the 'garments of skin', they refer to a state of being for the humans and for the 
world or creation in general where also fissure and dispersion prevail, where the harmonious 
unity and the loving communion of paradise have been lost and the authentic image of man 
has been damaged. They speak of a condition of being dominated by the passions, where the 
power of the soul, the voV-,;, has been darkened and consequently all the operations of the 
human nature assume a wicked and compelling disposition and cease to reflect the nature's 
true logos; they now lack their transparency and authenticity, they have become passionate 
functions. The fallen state of being is a condition where life does not derive from the 
relationship with God anymore; it is not realized in sharing and in the communion of a self- 
abandoning love as it was in the delight of paradise. Life now is found in self-reliance and in 
self-preservation. Adam's hiding from God's call and his self-defence in justifying himself for 
his drifting away from God is an image of the breach, the dispersal and the isolation into 
which man now enters and to which through him the whole of the creation is also dragged. 
After the fall, the centre of reference is not the Other, but one's own self; man's existing does 
not derive from the love for the Other but from securing the self s own gain, by turning the 
Other to one's use and advantage. In the Fathers' exposition man's being after the Fall equates 
to what the contemporary theological language would delineate as 'being an individual'. It is a 
state where man lacks his inner freedom, his freedom, that is, from the passions and the vanity 
of his fallen nature, and thus he does not connect lovingly with the things outside him. In this 
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sense then the patristic mind - discussing the restoration of the primordial order - connects the 
absence of passions (6't7zJc0F-La) with love (61-yaTiTI). All such ideas illustrating or interpreting 
man's fall are there in the Fathers, even though the latter's language does not involve the term 
'individual' to refer to the fallen man. Equally, they do not make use of the term 'person' with 
the content that the word holds in its contemporary usage, in the modem context of discussing 
personalism, - alluding to authenticity and to the fullness of being, or to what the religious 
language would refer to as holiness. 
On the grounds that I have tried to describe so far, I understand that when modem 
theologians discuss human nature in terms of communal being and relatedness they actually 
do so by drawing on a tradition that is already there. Also when they make the distinction 
between what they specify as the authentic mode of human being, namely the person, and 
what they see as the alienation of the former, that is the individual, it is primarily on a spiritual 
level that they identify or detect the difference. Thus by 'individual' they mean nothing less 
than what the patristic material would refer to as the damaged image of man or as the fallen 
nature. Subsequently to this the 'individual' today is then also identified with the modem 
expressions of man's failure to connect lovingly with God and with the world around him, 
examples of which we have given above: estrangement, the impersonalisation of human 
beings and man's becoming only a unit or a number, nature turning to selfishness, all in all 
man no longer being the minister and guardian of the creation, but a destructive consumer and 
an exploiter. Such contemporary theological insights are therefore not at variance with the 
patristic mind. What probably differentiates the contemporary theological presentations from 
the patristic tradition is the way in which certain aspects of man's being - such as relatedness 
or communal existence - are emphasized and put forward in such a way that they stand out as 
the characteristics of the human nature. Furthermore, theologians of today vary from the 
theological tradition established in the past in the way that they seem to associate their 
positions about the human nature and existence with the doctrine about the Trinity for 
example, a connection that cannot be found in the same explicit way in the Fathers. 
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3. Comment on Yarmaras' use of Patristic citations 
Having made a description of Yannaras' main positions as these are expounded in 
Person and Eros, it is interesting to turn to and look into the patristic sources that Yannaras 
quotes in defence of his expositions. For on the one hand Yannaras found himself led to this 
understanding of human relationships by his reading of the Fathers, and yet, as his critics have 
pointed out, what he finds in the Fathers seems to go beyond any ideas they might have had 
themselves. It is worth then looking in some detail at a selection of these citations to determine 
whether Yannaras can be regarded as faithful to his patristic sources, or perhaps better, what 
kind of faithfulness is implied in his creative use of these patristic sources. The thoughts 
Yannaras proposes in his book seem to rest on the patristic mind. Person and Eros abounds 
with references to patristic works. The use Yannaras makes of the patristic material is very 
extensive. In preparing what follows I looked closely at ten cases of patristic quotations used 
in Person and Eros, and I will give the description of four such references here. The examples 
I use come from St Gregory of Nyssa and from St Maximus the Confessor. Based on the 
limited sample of Yannaras' references to patristic sources at which I have looked, I will try to 
make a few points exploring how Yannaras founds his personalistic expositions on the Fathers 
and whether he draws them from the particular Church authors accurately and justly. I hope 
that the closer description of the specific references that will follow will justify and 
demonstrate the truth of the general evaluation of Yannaras' use of these references. 
A first general response on juxtaposing the two bodies of material looked at, that of 
Yannaras and of the Fathers, is the realization that certain patristic texts from which Yannaras 
draws are not on the same subject as the one Yannaras himself is involved in. As can be 
shown in the analysis of specific quotations further on, the theme that St Gregory of Nyssa and 
st Maximus deal with each time is not the same that Yannaras discusses and in defence of 
which he quotes from the patristic texts. Yannaras, as we have seen, is mainly involved in 
discussing the ontological issue, the question about beings and Being, and he proposes the 
notion of personal existence as a fundamental category within this discussion. Throughout 
yannaras' Person and Eros the idea of the person, with all the attributes and the existential 
consequences that the 
latter brings about, is a core idea, central to all the aspects of arguments 
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that Yannaras makes. Yannaras' topic basically is personalist existentialism. However, none of 
the patristic texts I am looking at below gets into such a conversation. It is pretty clear that the 
themes the Church Fathers were addressing had a noticeably different interest and a different 
objective. The latter are trying to clarify the content and consequently to secure the correct use 
of terms like 'substance' and 'hypostasis', or are discussing the function of vo&; in man and 
treating the views of their time with relation to the mind and its connections to the human 
body. They further talk about the event of the Church and describe its symbolism, as St 
Maximus does in the Mystagogia. But by no means do the Fathers seem to discuss existence 
the way Yannaras does; indeed, they appear quite unaware of the whole context of thought 
that Yannaras is concerned with. As can be shown in the examples below, Yannaras draws 
phrases from the Fathers used in a certain context of discussion and uses them as a foundation 
to his own thought, which is concerned with a different topic from that of the Fathers. In this 
way we would say that certain concepts are projected on to the Fathers since they are absent 
from the patristic text; an example of this based on the references I have examined is the 
priority of hypostasis or personal existence - Yannaras introduces and widely uses 'existence' 
as alternative or equivalent to 'hypostasis' - that Yannaras proposes versus nature, a notion 
absent from the particular texts of St Gregory of Nyssa to which Yannaras refers us. The 
variance of the theme between Yannaras' text and that of the Fathers, especially in certain 
cases, is striking. 
A second general comment on Yannaras' use of the patristic references, which follows 
from what was just stated above, is that Yannaras isolates patristic expressions which he most 
of the time successfully blends into his own writing, however these phrases appear to be 
suspended in terms of the context in which they are used. Yannaras does not truly refer his 
arguments to a patristic text that treats a similar topic of discussion as his; what he rather does 
is to pick up phrases or even single words from the Fathers and integrate them into his own 
discourse, in a way that rather creates the illusion that Yannaras' positions reflect the patristic 
mind. Such a realization is confirmed when we realize that the reference to the patristic 
sources made by Yannaras is often very fragmentary if not inaccurate. The patristic quotes 
used are often dislocated 
from their true context, and stretched by Yannaras to express 
something else than what the 
Fathers wished to say when they were using them. 
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Furthermore, it is useful to examine the quotations that are used really closely, no 
matter how scrutinizing such an attitude may seem to be; by doing so we come to discover that 
sometimes certain references are not accurately quoted. I have come across references where 
the patristic quotations have been altered, either by the addition of some words or by replacing 
a single word with another, close in meaning. Now, it may be argued that the alterations are 
insignificant. However, we could not leave unmentioned the fact that we even notice some 
misquotations. The analysis of certain quotations that follows can hopefully bring evidence for 
the above remarks. 
Speaking about the personal way of being in the first part of Person and Eros 
Yannaras quotes repeatedly from St Gregory of Nyssa's On the Creation of Man. In particular 
I shall look at a passage from chapter VI of St Gregory's work which Yannaras quotes twice: 
<<Mia yap TIr, Eav bv5vapiq, avTor, o EYK-ELF-EV04; VOVqf 0 
b1f ElCaUTOV T60V 
ata0ijvjptwv bL. E4tCV'V, Kal T(bV 0'VT60V E7TI6paaaoyEvo4;. OV?, TO4; 0-EWP6 bla T(, bV 
6(P0aAy(DvT6 (Patv6yEvovOVTOq avvtEi 
btii Til-,; aKoijqT6 A-EyoliEvov, aya7T(t TE TO 
II/ 
,I Xf-tpi xpýTat 7rp64; 
6 
'I 100, 
TL ICaTfV0V'jUOV,, Kat TO /ill KaO' ilbovqv a7waTpEoPETat, Kai' Tij 
floV'A. ETat>>. [For there is one faculty, the implanted nund itself, which passes through each of 
the organs of sense and grasps the things that exist. This it is that, by means of the eyes, 
beholds what is seen; this it is that, by means of hearing, understands what is said; that loves 
what we set our hearts on, and turns from what is unpleasant; that uses the hand for whatever 
it wills. ] 
The passage comes from the sixth chapter of On the Creation of Man, 
302 the content of which 
however - in order to discern what is the principle or the basis of the thought of Gregory of 
Nyssa in it - would need to be looked at not in isolation, disconnected that is from what 
immediately precedes it, but in continuity with what has been said earlier in the patristic work, 
that is in chapters four and five. There, St Gregory was speaking of the authority granted to 
man over the rest of the creation, showing how the character of man's creation 
demonstrates 
302 PG 44.140. 
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that man was made to have a ruling position in the world. This is so because man was made in 
the likeness of God, therefore taking after the divine kingship, and exactly in paragraph five St 
Gregory exposes a series of qualities granted to man, due to which the latter is found to 
resemble God. However, the variety of these qualities or energies should not cause us think 
that the simplicity or the oneness of God's nature is abandoned (or destroyed) because of 
them; therefore St Gregory goes on in paragraph six, which is headed 'Examination of the 
connection of the vou- ý to nature, in which also the doctrine of the Anomoeans is incidentally 
questioned', to speak about this oneness that is the feature of God's nature. In this line of 
thought he brings out the function of vou- ý, taken as an example from the human reality, 
where despite the range of our senses, with which we connect to all that is out there, the 
perceiving power behind all of them is one only, and that is man's intellect or power of 
knowledge, the voU- ý;, which is the one and same operating through all the human senses and 
the bodily expressions. 
The patristic lines in discussion are quoted by Yannaras twice, at two different points 
in Person and Eros, specifically in paragraphs 15 and 21 of the book, both within the first part 
of it, where the personal way of existence is discussed. More particularly, in the first case 303 
Gregory of Nyssa's text is employed alongside a couple of other quotations, from Gregory 
Palamas and Macarius of Egypt, as a supporting reference to the idea that the soul is not to be 
simply considered as one part of man's existence, identified with the spiritual element in man, 
say, and seen as contrasted to the material part of him, but that it rather represents the especial 
or the distinctive character of man's being, as this results from God's particular creative 
energy , when 
he breathed life into man. Right at the same point Yannaras in further words 
identifies the soul, iývXil, with the whole of man as a united personal existence, with what he 
has defined as a person, the unique and distinctive personal being in its unparalleled 
expression. (And the body consequently, he will go on to say, again is not just a part of man's 
being, but rather the material expression of the whole of the man again). Now, no matter how 
appealing this idea may be, trying to parallel it with what the patristic source says turns out to 
be rather a puzzling task, as the two texts (Yannaras' and Gregory of Nyssa's) do not appear to 
be talking about exactly the same thing. Yes, a notion of unity with respect to man's being is 
303 Person and Eros, p. 68. 
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present in both authors, however Gregory's reference quoted above does not talk about the 
single personal hypostasis in relation to the compound nature of man. In that particular 
quotation under discussion, St Gregory does not even touch, as far as I can understand it, on 
the issue of the composite human nature and does not give any definition of the component 
parts. He only talks about qualities of God that were passed on to man in the creation of the 
latter, and he also tries to secure the one nature of God and its simplicity, despite all the 
different energies through which God is revealed. If there is an idea of singleness that St 
Gregory is preoccupied with, that is the singleness of nature despite its expression through 
various energies, and not the singleness of existence despite the compound character of nature. 
The picture of this distinction between the two texts may seem to blur as one tries to look at it, 
but I think the two texts do not talk exactly about the same thing. 
The second time the same lines of St Gregory of Nyssa are quoted 304 is within the same 
part of Person and Eros describing the personal way of existence, where Yannaras talks about 
the unity of the person and in particular about the energies through which the nature or 
substance can be revealed or approached in each personal existence. He distinguishes the 
energies of the nature in "homogenous" and "heterogenous" energies, with respect to the 
nature that lies behind and generates them. To make this more explicit, if we are, quite 
arbitrarily Yannaras notes, to consider speech as a substance itself, then the voice is a 
"homogenous"' energy of it, while we could take written language or music or any art as 
"heterogenous") energies of this substance. In the case of God's substance, God's grace is 
energy akin to God's nature, whereas all created things are rather "heterogenous" energies, 
ways of expression, that is, of the divine nature. And in the case of man the energy 
"homogenous" to his nature is man's power of love and self-offering, while all creations, 
6, T-co Lyjýtaca% resulting from human action or effort are more subtle ways, so to speak, of 
revealing human nature. In this line of discussion Yannaras wants to stress the unique and 
unequal way in which the energies of the nature are realized in each person, the distinct way in 
which each personal existence embodies one and the same nature. This uniqueness of the 
realization of the nature in each person is represented also by the human body, which 
is a 
primary expression of the matchless way in which human nature is manifested. 
Yannaras 
wants to stress the exclusiveness of the person, the unparalleled character of the personal 
304 Person and Eros, P. 93. 
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existence, which is most immediately noticed over the individuality of the human body, and 
this is where he quotes St Gregory. However, from what has been expounded above in relation 
to the content of the patristic text quoted here, the inconsistency of the idea discussed by the 
two authors is again, one can say, striking. 
For Yannaras the idea of the person is a fundamental ontological category, personal 
existence is the way to be, and a central point he makes within this discussion is that the 
person is by definition something integral, united and unique in the way it represents or 
incarnates human nature. One way to put forward this unity of the person is by focusing on the 
union of the spiritual and bodily elements in man. Yannaras' main focus in the relevant 
discussion is to put emphasis on the idea that human existence is single and one despite its 
compound nature. The unity of the person is not damaged or diminished because of the 
twofold character of man's being, material, that is, and non-material. Personal existence 
remains a mystery of synthesis and unity and no antithesis should be envisaged between its 
305 composite parts . However, in the use of the above quotation that 
I have examined, there is a 
discrepancy of objectives between Yannaras' use of the patristic lines and the context in which 
these were initially uttered. 
The other three of Yannaras' references to the patristic mind that we will look at here 
come from Mystagogia by St Maximus the Confessor. In the first chapters of this work St 
Maximus discusses some symbolic references of the Church, as how the Church can be 
interpreted as a symbol or an image of God, of the cosmos, of man or even of the soul. Thus in 
chapter one he sets off describing how the Church can be understood as an image of God. He 
basically draws a parallel between the two, God and the Church, on the ground of the feature 
of unity that both of them bring about. God brings and holds everything together, all the parts 
of the creation, both visible and invisible reality, as being the cause, the beginning and the end 
of all. In a similar way the Church holds all its members together by granting the same 
spiritual renewal to all and by letting all people be called after the name of 
Christ, despite their 
miscellaneous origin, manner of life and circumstances, gender or age, customs and 
habits, 
knowledge or the offices they may hold. All those differences are overshadowed by the fact 
305 Person and Eros, p. 67. 
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that every single one participates equally in the body of the Church and shares likewise in the 
grace and faith and the relationship with the whole community. In exactly the same way the 
different nature of each of the parts of the creation is put in the shade before the fact that all 
refer to the same origin and cause which is the one Creator and God. All are viewed in a 
totality, where their individual differences are not terminated or invalidated, but rather 
outshone by the luminous fact that they all share in their one common cause; in St Maximus 
words, *aO'1jv n re oAoTip; avTil, Kai ra Týq 6AoTilroc, yipq q5atv-EaOat', r-E icat -Eivat 
-rr 306 7r-E(Pvic, Ev (0q JAj7v -EXovra T11v ahiav EavT(ov v7rEpAaY7Tov9av. [According to 
which the wholeness itself and the parts of the wholeness are accustomed both to appear and 
to be as having the whole of their cause radiating from beyond-] 
The above quotation is taken up by Yannaras early in the third part of Person and 
Eros. 307 There, Yannaras explores - further to the energies of the person that he discussed in 
earlier parts of his book - ways in which the reality of the person - as an ecstatic, relational 
existence - is revealed. Thus he looks at logos as one of these ways, taking logos to mean both 
the inner structural principle of the nature of things and, following from this, the conventional 
words or verbal expression, in which in fact the constituent attributes of things, as he explains, 
are actually depicted. Logos ultimately for Yannaras is the exposure of a personal relationship, 
of a direct encounter with whatever is, that lets us know things and get a grasp of or approach 
to their logos. In this line of argument he brings up the cosmic logos, as a revelation or 
evidence of the energies of God, and therefore as an indication or support of a personal 
creator. I think Yannaras smoothly integrates the patristic quotation into his own text, however 
it feels as if he stretches the patristic lines further than what St Maximus meant them to 
denote; that is further from the fact that all the created parts have or refer to a common cause, 
aQXTI, which was at least what Maximus' lines were talking about. Yannaras takes this further 
into another context, where he wishes to show that all having the same cause, are an evidence 
of the same personal logos of God, and this again is a part of his whole discussion of the 
personal existence as an ecstatic, relational one. 
306St Maximus, mystagogia PG 91.665. 
307 Person and Eros, p. 22 1. 
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In the fifth chapter of Mystagogia St Maximus gives an exposition of the human soul, 
so as to demonstrate how the latter can be viewed again as a representation of the Church. 
Inside the range of such a discussion St Maximus gives an account of the different elements of 
the human soul, starting basically with the distinction between the voEQov or contemplative 
part of it and the nQa-Kr LxOv, the active element, so to speak. He then exposes how these two 
respectively relate to the truth, aAýOELa, and to the good or the virtuous, ayao0v. The 
description of the soul goes in short like this: the theoretical (i. e. contemplative) part is what 
we can call mind, vo-O(;, which is successively connected to wisdom, to contemplation, 
Oaowc, to knowledge, and to knowledge enduring or immortal, the end and the fulfillment of 
which is the truth. The practical (i. e. the active) element of the soul, Aoyo(;, in a similar 
manner evolves through prudence, OQOVTjCFLý, to action, nQaýL(;, then to virtue or excellence, 
aQE, cTl, and to faith, 7-(LCFCU;, and the end of all of which is the good, ayaOOV. Further on St 
Maximus will go on to couple the above aspects of the human soul, that is, the mind with 
reason, A6yov, wisdom with prudence, seeing with works or action, knowledge with virtue 
and immortal knowledge with faith, all of the latter being caused or following on from the 
former respectively. 
From chapter V of Mystagogia Yannaras quotes twice, both quotations brought up in 
the third part of Person and Eros where the author discusses ways, as it were, that are 
evidence of, or which signify, the reality of the person, that is of personal existence. In 
particular, St Maximus' lines of which Yannaras makes use here are the following: '. EvEpyfta 
f--f, 308 yap EUTI Kat (PavipwUb; TOV VOVo Aoyo4; ' [The reason < logos> is the activity and 
manifestation of the intellect <nous>] and 'T4,; zPvXq-q, To piv 
OE(opilTmov... To U 
7TpaxTocOv icat ro Itiv 0-Ewpilrucov bcaAEt voVv rO 
6E 7TPaKTL'K0v, Aoyov. 309 [Of the 
soul there is the contemplative... and the practical <aspect>, the contemplative is called 
intellect <nous>, and the practical reason <logos>] 
308 PG 91.680B. 
309 PG 91.673C. 
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In the first instance 310 Yannaras discusses the function of the language, as basically a 
means through which a personal encounter with things is indicated. The words we use to speak 
about things and describe things are not random or just rambling sounds, the meaning of 
which we just conventionally agree upon to enable communication. Yannaras wants to defend 
the idea that human speech, the words we use to refer to things and communicate, is based on 
something more than a conventional agreement as to their meaning. They are rather vehicles 
of one's knowledge of things deriving from personal experience; a personal encounter with 
things, relational or personal experience of, or relationship with, all the different aspects of the 
world and of life is imprinted, as it were, in the various words we use to describe this 
experience of the reality that surrounds us. Thus, before language turns to conventional 
symbolism or names or meanings for the sake of interpersonal contact, it is initially a 
conveyor of the knowledge of the person about other beings or persons, as this knowledge is 
acquired through a direct engagement with things. In this way language, Yannaras will go on 
to assert, is the possibility the person has to denote and express his/her unique and unequalled, 
ecstatic, catholic, relational connexion with the other beings and the other persons. In support 
of this analysis Yannaras uses the first of the quotations we examine here coupled with 
another passage from Maximus, from the Chapters on Various Texts: 'I'] yA(OCT(TL'X TTI(; KC(TO( 
o, 311 /,, iývXq'v yv(ocrTLxT1(; EvEQ-y6m; F-cFTL (TuýtpoAov - F-VEQ-YF-La YaQ ECFTL XaL ý)LXVEQ(OffU; 
, roU vou 6 Aoyoý; '. At first glance, one might well easily admit that the patristic lines 
smoothly integrate into Yannaras' thought. However, the second passage, as our translation 
indicates, is not primarily about language; neither is the first passage, where -YACOCFCFa seems 
to mean tongue, rather than language. The variance of topic between the patristic work and 
Yannaras again cannot pass unnoticed. If Yannaras' reference to chapter V of Maximus' 
Mystagogia aspires to offer a patristic testimony to or justification for his own discussion, then 
the effort could be easily defeated, and the case is no better with the quotation from the 
Chapters on Various Texts. By no means is St Maximus involved in a discussion on the 
function of language, even less on ways of signifying personal existence. 
310 Person and Eros, p. 215. 
311 Kephalaia Theologika II (sic) (PG 90.1253C), the tongue <or language, as Yaanaras takes it> is a symbol of 
the knowing activity of the soul', quoted in Person and Eros, p. 215. 
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With relation to the second quotation from St Maximus' Mystagogia (chapter V) 
highlighted earlier and used by Yannaras, it is again taken up into a not very different 
discussion than the one of Yannaras described above. This time Yannaras discusses the 
function of the image and of visual forms as means initiating us to the view of the truth, 
Otaor-q Týý &AýOF-Laý, and to knowledge. 312 The forms the images take is another way that 
points to the event that we know things personally, through personal, relational involvement, 
in a way that is unique and unequalled for each of us and only depicted in images, that cannot 
be exhausted but only experienced, within the event of one's personal ecstatic being. The 
images, as Yannaras explains, disclose and at the same time conceal what they mean to 
illustrate, as what they reveal are the forms, the appearances, and not the substance of the 
things they depict. The truth of things is thus concealed, and it is the purpose of a personal 
struggle and ascesis to approach it and come to view and know it. The importance of personal 
involvement, ecstatic-relational engagement with things and personal experience and 
knowledge is once again here highlighted. Also underlined, I hope, is the fact that the three 
levels of knowledge that Yannaras discusses in this context, that is the possibility to know 
things on the basis of the senses (0('LO'OTjCFU; ), of the reason (Aoyoý) and of the mind (voDý), 
forms a different topic of discussion altogether from the one with which St Maximus in 
Mystagogia, which is being quoted here, is occupied. 
As the examples given above illustrate in some detail, Yannaras' use of the Fathers is a 
matter of some complexity. There is no question that Yannaras was in fact inspired by his 
reading of the Fathers and as far as the general thrust of his work is concerned he should be 
regarded faithful to the Fathers' general message. Furthermore, it is perhaps useful to draw a 
distinction between the general perspective on anthropology that Yannaras draws from his 
reading of the Fathers, especially Maximus and Gregory of Nyssa, and the use to which he 
puts particular citations from their works. In the case of these particular citations, it seems that 
Yannaras' enthusiasm often leads him to read into the Fathers ideas they did not have or to 
read their passages against a background that they would not have shared. 
312 Person and Eros, P. 254. 
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Chapter IV 
The Freedom of Morality 
Yannaras' philosophical discussion about personal existence is not just a theoretical 
engagement with an intellectual matter. His positions on the issue of being and on human 
existence are not generated and put forward by him as some merely conceptual advances that 
match the need to pursue speculative objectives or that meet with the requirements for 
conducting academic work. His insights do not assume their meaning and do not aspire to 
make a point on just an abstract, notional level. Before it takes the form of a theoretical 
pursuit, Yannaras' quest to explore and approach the constituents of personal existence and to 
set forth a perspective with respect to human personhood, is first and foremost a search of a 
practical character, an enquiry with a very pragmatic concern: What is the truth about human 
existence and how does that truth delineate the way man should live? Even more specifically, 
how does the truth about human existence relate to the existence and life of the Church? 
Basically, what does participation in the life of the Church involve, what are the parameters of 
an authentic Christian life? 
Yannaras' theoretical exploration of what it means to be a person connects, therefore, 
though not always very obviously in all of his works, with the theology of the Church and the 
tradition of Church life. This is explicitly the case in The Freedom of Morality with which I 
will engage in this chapter. Yannaras sees the existence of the person in absolute connection 
with the nature and the being of the Church, because what he delineates as 'personal 
existence' or 'hypostatic being' is to him attainable only within the life of the Church. 
This is 
so for, in Yannaras' perception, the Church represents not just a religious 
institution or a 
certain group of people sharing the same ideas, but a state of being, the mode of communal 
being, where an individual has the opportunity to turn into a person. An individual existence 
becomes a personal hypostasis, in Yannaras' wording, only to the extent that it is restored to 
the true Life that the Church represents and sets forth. The state of being that we ordinarily 
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know as humans is a fallen state, a condition of life incomplete and subject to pain, corruption 
and death. It is a condition from which human nature alone cannot rise above unless it 
partakes in the life of immortality which was brought about by the incarnation and the 
resurrection of Christ and which is transmitted through his body, the Church. The hypostatic 
union of the human and the divine natures in the single person of Christ represents the model 
and the possibility for man to be a hypostatic existence, a personal existence, unparalleled in 
the way he realizes being and free from the necessities of the nature. Man achieves his true 
being, which in Yannaras' formulation is existence as personal distinctiveness and freedom in 
a communion of love, only as he is grafted into the fullness of life and the immortality of 
human nature that Christ's incarnation and resurrection inaugurated. And this is realized 
through the life of the Church. 
Therefore, all Yannaras's account of human personhood and personal existence, as we 
went through it in the third chapter of this work, though very philosophical in appearance, 
links intrinsically with the true content of the nature of the Church and life within it. If the 
Church is the body of Christ, the re-establishment of life and being in their archetypal mode, 
then the human possibility of returning to the original mode of being, which is personal 
existence, is essentially bound up with man's participation and his engraftment into the true 
life realized in the person of the incarnated Logos, in the person of Christ, and prolonged in 
history through His body which is the Church. Partaking in the life of the Church provides the 
opportunity man has to transcend the present state of his nature, that is the corruption and the 
mortality of nature, and the present condition of his existence, which is his fragmentary 
biological individuality, self-centred and limited in space and time. Only through the life of 
the Church, the life that flows from the empty tomb of the resurrected Christ, can fallen 
humanity emerge reborn in the true, original way of being, into life immortal and life realized 
as personal distinctiveness and loving communion. Yannaras' thought is mostly expressed 
through philosophical language, but despite the philosophical clothing his reflections actually 
313 
convey theological convictions. Therefore, in Yannaras' thought, man's present state of 
being suffers entrapment in the aftermath of the Fall, it reflects the consequences of the 
abolition of authentic life which was life as loving communion and union with God. By 
313 For a theological exposition on the topic of the nature and truth of the Church by Yannaras see Christos 
Yannaras, AAýOEja Kai Ei, 6, rqTa 'rq,; EKKAýaiac [Truth and Unity of the Church] (Athens: Gngoris 
Publications, 1997). 
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Adam's free rejection of communion of love and trust in God, by his drifting away from God 
and his ceasing to realize being as a relationship with reference to the Other, God's image in 
him was damaged and the possibilities of his nature suffered distortion. This means that the 
way man was created to be, that is as personal distinctiveness and communion of love, was 
abandoned, and instead of realizing the possibilities of his nature for personal existence, he 
rendered human nature fragmented into individual entities; the possibility of nature being 
realized as a life of love and communion is now turned into the absolute need for individual 
survival and into the individual's illusion of self-existence in its egocentric self-sufficiency. 
Man himself, as created nature, cannot overturn the state of being implemented by the Fall, he 
cannot conquer corruption and death. He can do so only by uniting himself again with the 
source of everlasting life that is God, only by engrafting himself into the body of the 
incarnated Logos of God who in the experience of the Church is Jesus Christ and who took up 
in his person fallen human nature and renewed it by restoring it in its original splendour. 
In this way Yannaras' philosophical positions about the personal existence have from 
this perspective a highly practical significance. There is a direct link between the existential 
truth about man and man's practical life; the viewpoint we take in relation to man's being has 
immediate consequences for the understanding we will subsequently form with regard to what 
human life involves, how should man's existence be organised and expressed in every level, 
social, political, economical or other. That is how Yannaras evaluates the diverse historical 
interpretations of and stances towards the ontological question - namely, in the scope of the 
author's discussion, the Western Christian tradition and the tradition of the Christian East - 
that have resulted in different historical formulations and cultural expressions. And since 
Yannaras' philosophical speculation reflects his theological framework, the practical 
significance of his views relates to the content of the Christian life, to what membership of and 
life in the Church involves. Yannaras' existential approach to man's being - the idea, for 
instance, that man's true existence is personal, which is existence as complete distinctiveness 
which cannot be delimited or predetermined by nature, that man, in other words, transcends 
nature - is all reflected 
in his understanding of the nature of the Church and the kind of life 
into which the Church invites us and which she sets forth for her members. 
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We would certainly not err if we said that Yannaras' work and the interests he took on 
followed naturally from the experiences in his youth in the religious environment of Zo, ý, as 
we have shown in the first chapter, and also from the incentives that the young man's life and 
study abroad later gave him. In this way his pursuits reflect, or are an expression of, those 
early experiences and years of his life. Yannaras, as we have seen him confessing through 
some parts of his autobiographical material, was left, after his experiences in the strictly 
moralistic environment of Zo6, with the strong need and an eagerness to know and to clarify 
what the true content of Christian life was. This meant that he would have to identify authentic 
understanding about the being of the Church and what life in the Church was about. In other 
words, as we have mentioned before, he was left with a 'Hunger and Thirst' 314 to find out and 
to throw light on the orthodox criteria for the Christian life, for Christian spirituality, for the 
life and nature of the Church. His academic work then, we could say, has been a sequence of 
advances where gradually and bit by bit Yannaras achieved some theoretical answers in 
matters that certainly reflected his own personal existential quest. This means that to resolve 
the troubling or even painful questions that he was left with after he abandoned Zo, ý was not a 
matter of theoretical importance only; to come up with answers was rather a pressing 
requirement for him personally, it was a hugely significant task that he owed first and 
foremost to himself. 
In the pages that follow I will try to describe how Yannaras' philosophical stance in 
relation to the question of ontology and existence has consequences for the way he views and 
puts forward the content of the Christian life for man as a member of the Church. The 
existential repercussions of his positions on personal being are more apparent when he 
discusses Christian ethos and morality, an area of his presentation that has attracted the most 
criticism and that created an upheaval in Greek theological circles in the past. Yannaras 
engaged with these topics in The Freedom of Morality, a work that the western audience 
received rather genially, 
315 but which brought down on the author severe criticisms and attacks 
314 As we saw in the first chapter, this was the title of one of Yannaras' juven'lla, a compilation of short literary 
essays that he composed while still a probationer in Zo6; the ti 
witness to the state of 
his intellect at the time. 
itle he gave to the collection without doubt a 
315 iew of The Freedom of Morality Norman Russell greeted the book as 'a stimulating meditation on In his rev, 
the nature of man, ... 
full of valuable insights', seeing in it a 'guide to the thinking of the Greek Fathers on the 
nature of man': Norman 
Russell, review of I Eleftheria tou Ithous (Athens: Ekdoseis Grigori, 1979) by Christos 
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on the Greek side when it was published in 1970. We are so informed in Td KaO' EaV[61% 
where through Yannaras' own exposition we are also acquainted with the feelings of sorrow 
and bitterness that he experienced in those days at the way in which his work and himself were 
treated. The positions expressed in his book, in Yannaras' view, were not criticised in a 
constructive way; the faultfinders did not engage productively with the content of the book, 
they did not disprove his ideas by building constructive arguments against them. They did not 
appear interested in listening to him, in indicating errors or winning him over. Instead, rather 
shocked by the positions and the language of his book - which for that time must have been 
novel and therefore provocative - they sought just to condemn and blame him. The assaults 
came from all sides, even from people considered to be close friends, while many of the 
attackers, Yannaras points out, were just alarmed and driven by the general censure; they had 
not even read the book themselves. Even those who agreed with the positions in The Freedom 
of Morality still accused him of 'exaggerations' and 'scathing language' that they felt to be 
unacceptable. There was also, although as an exception, an enthusiastic response to the book 
by some Greek poets: Nikos Karouzos, Nikos Triandafylopoulos, and Panos Laliatsis. The 
majority, however, hurled charges at the author, that he was a heretic, a betrayer of the faith, a 
blasphemer and an agent of the imperialist powers. 316 
Yannaras comments that today the positions of the book would seem commonplace: 
morality is derived either from a social consensus or from the unquestionable submission to 
supreme authorities or it results from ontology. In this last case, when regulative principles 
result from the answer we give to the ontological question, then morality amounts to man's 
struggle for existential authenticity, it is his very adventure of exercising freedom, poised on 
the borders between authentic life, Ka-C aAýOEtav (a)q, and the alienation or falsification of 
life. In this way morality is freed from the legalistic formalism, even though this autonomy is a 
painful one for the human consciousness, since formalism offers protection, a sense. of 
psychological security and egocentric armour, wholly required by the human psyche. 
317 
Yannaras in Sobomost 5: 2 (1983), pp. 96-8. In all fairness, the work met with some sharp criticisms too, however 
reviewers agreed on 
its creative and perceptive element. 
316 KaO'kavT6v, pp. 95-6. 
317 KaO'Eavr6v, p. 97. 
192 
1. The basis for discussing morality 
The starting point for a Christian to talk about truth and existence and consequently 
niý. aDOUt the meaning and the content of the true life, is the content of the Christian Revelation, in 
other words the experience of the Church, extending from as early as the time when the 
Israelites were designated the people of God, an event that is seen to have prefigured the 
establishment of the Church as the body of Christ in the times of the New Testament. And the 
Christian Revelation for the Church is none other than God's presence made known in a very 
personal way. He is God the Father, who commits Himself and bestows upon His people a 
covenant, God the Son who entered history by taking up human flesh, the Logos of God 
incarnate in the historical person of Jesus Christ, and God the Spirit bequeated to the Church 
as her Paraclete by whom the Church is built up and nourished. God is revealed as a Trinity, a 
communion of inseparably distinct and non-confusedly united persons. We made a more 
extensive reference to this association between the truth about God and the truth about the 
human being in the part of the previous chapter, where we saw how such an approach is 
exemplified in the recent years in the discourse developed on human personhood as an 
extension of the Trinitarian theology into anthropology. 
Yannaras' material does not present us with any very thorough review of this kind. We 
do not find in his work an examination of the Trinitarian interpersonal relations and of the 
ramifications these have for human personhood in exactly the same way as we find it in other 
authors. Still, Yannaras' exposition and his perspective are by no means devoid of the same 
attitude of discussing man's being in the light of God's being. 
318 Yannaras sets off from the 
fact that the truth that the Church holds about God is not related to an abstract God. God in the 
faith of the Christians is not known or understood as an objective ultimate power, neither is he 
identified with a vague energy that stands at the beginning of the world, the neutral primal 
cause or 6prime mover. 
3 19 Nor does the Christian faith see God merely as a guarantor of 
value, an authority required for validating ethics. Yannaras is keen on emphasising that 
God in 
the Christian tradition is known as a particular hypostasis, as He who is (Ex 3: 14), as a 
personal God. He is revealed to mankind on specific occasions and is 
known to people by his 
318 See 'The ethos of Trinitarian communion' in The Freedom of Morality, pp. 16-8. 
319 Freedom of MffaliO', P- 16. 
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relating to them in a personal way, being thus the God of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob. He 
assumes human flesh and becomes a theme of specific reference (o-qý160 (TU-YKEKQLý1EV1jZ 
ocva(ýoQO(ý): 'we speak that which we have known and testify that which we have seen' (John 
3: 11); and he also stays with the people and edifies them in the truth (John 14: 16,14: 26). All 
of God's personal manifestations are one and the same God, an undivided communion of 
hypostaseis, being inseparably together in a loving coinherence. This delineates for Yannaras 
the way we are to understand and speak about Being and existence. We cannot talk, this 
means, about Being as such in an abstract way, we cannot approach Being save in particular 
existences. In the case of God we can talk of His being only as this is known to us in God's 
personal revelation, and God reveals Himself, Yannaras emphasizes, as personal 
distinctiveness and as love. In the faith of the Christian tradition God's being instantiates in 
every instance a quite unique expression of being and of relating; God is made known as a 
completely distinct presence and He also amounts to a presence of utter and unfailing love. 
God is love, as the biblical tradition affirms; He is the true Eros, as the patristic mind has also 
set down. This leads Yannaras to the understanding, as we have seen in the previous chapter, 
that the only possibility for God's Being - and subsequently for the human being - to be is the 
personal: personal existence is the comprehensive and exhaustive expression of God's 
being. 320 God's personal existence reveals to us the truth about Being, and this truth is that true 
Being is realized as distinctiveness and love in freedom, as a life of loving communion of 
distinct persons. God the Father 'constitutes His essence or being, making it into "hypostases": 
freely and from love He begets the Son and causes the Holy Spirit to proceed. Consequently, 
being stems not from the essence, which would make it an ontological necessity, but 
from the 
person and the freedom of its love which "hypostasizes" being into a personal and 
Trinitarian 
communion. God the Father's mode of being constitutes existence and 
life as a fact of love and 
personal communion'. 
321 
if our knowledge of the true God, the truth of the Trinitarian God, reveals to us the 
truth about Being, then, Yannaras' argument goes on, we can draw from our experience of 
God as Trinity to understand and speak of the existence of man. This 
is not an arbitrary 
320 Freedom, P. 17 
321 Freedom, PP- 17-8. 
194 
connection Yannaras makes, but as with others, it follows naturally since, according to the 
biblical instruction, man was made in the 'image of God'. The truth about God's being has 
great significance for understanding the truth about man's being. For Yannaras this means that 
since God is as personal distinctiveness and love man was made to exist also as personal 
distinctiveness and loving co-existence. Man made in 'the image of God' for Yannaras means 
that man was made with the potentiality to realize his own nature in the same mode of 
existence as God. The 'image of God' in man, God's imprint in man, has, in the course of the 
Church history, under the influence of Western rationalism, been erroneously associated, 
Yannaras notes, with the nature of man as such, and even further with only just one put of 
man's nature, the 'spiritual' part, and with certain properties of man's 'spiritual' nature. 322 
However, this is something that contradicts patristic references of which Yannaras makes 
use 323 and which see man's soul and body as united in an existential totality, and understand 
the 'image of God' in reference to both, to the whole of man's nature. Yannaras, therefore, 
strongly proclaims that the image of God in man relates to the possibility that man has to use 
the potentialities of his nature - such as rationality, free will, and dominion - in order to 
realize existence in the same way as God is, as personal distinctiveness from the nature and as 
communion of love, embracing in his being the totality of nature. Man is not created by God 
to exist in isolation; he is made to realise life as communion and to delight in the sharing of it, 
and when he resists this opportunity he loses something of what it means to be human. This is 
what Yannaras refers to as the fragmentation of nature inflicted after man's repudiation of the 
possibility of realizing his being in unity with God and life as love. The Fall occurs when man 
defies the 'image of God' in himself, rendering himself an individual, that is, not an existence 
in communion, not an existence that draws being from the Other and realizes life as love and 
therefore distinctiveness from nature, but as individuality, as an entity closed in on itself and 
succumbing to the laws of nature, and thus fragmented. The recovery from the loss of the true 
mode of being can then take place, as we shall explore in later paragraphs, only in the Church, 
which is the depository, as it were, of Life, since it is the body of Christ, who, in his 
theanthropic hypostasis, restores humanity to the Trinitarian mode of existence, that is to true 
life. Hence the description of the Church as 'KIP(orog', 'ark', which - like the ark that in the 
322 Freedom, p. 24. 
323 Freedom, p. 25. 
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days of Noah saved all the living forms of the Creation from the flood - becomes the 
repository of true being, of Life. The Church therefore is clearly not an ideological 
association, nor a society devoted to conceptual ideas or some particular philosophy; it is 
primarily the restoration of the damaged human nature back to its true mode of being, which is 
personal being, distinctive from nature, participation in the life of the Father and the Son and 
the Spirit. In this sense the Church inaugurates spiritual life, which applies to man's whole 
mode of being, and not just to some 'spiritual' part of his nature. 
2. The being of the Church and the liturgical ethos 
It follows, therefore, that the restoration of the human nature to the true way of being is 
offered as a possibility for man within the Church. Thus Yannaras is particularly keen on 
bringing out the true character of the being of the Church, marking it off from all alienations 
that it has from time to time suffered in the course of time and human history. This means that 
the Church to him is not at all a conventional kind of institution that exists in order to 
safeguard morality for society and the common good. Neither is it some sort of an ideology 
that exists alongside other ideological systems, to provide humans with ethical or social ideals 
to pursue, and thus give meaning to an otherwise insignificant or futile course of human life. 
Yannaras wants to emphasise that the Church does not represent a system of morality - of 
usually a rather conservative trend - nor does it stand for a religious structure, which provides 
a code of beliefs to fulfil or satisfy man's religious needs, as it were. Yannaras is clearly keen 
on putting forward quite a different understanding of the Church and talks about the Church in 
far more dynamic and existential terms. Tbus the Church in Yannaras' mind is the restoration 
of existence to authentic life, to the true mode of being. The being of the Church involves first 
and foremost a presence, a very specific and tangible one, that of Christ who is in the midst 'of 
two or three gathered together in [His] name' 324 and offered to all each time they gather to 
celebrate 'in remembrance of [Him],. 325 The Church is Christ, reaching through time and 
space to invite humanity anew to share in Him, to share in the true life, in the authentic mode 
of being. rrhis means the Church is the possibility of recovery for fallen man, and the 
324 Mat. 18: 20. 
325 Luke 22: 19. 
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restoration of man's nature and through him of the whole of the creation to its original 
splendour - the re-establishment of the world to the archetypal order of existence created by 
God, and which was damaged by man's free act of apostasy. 
Quite commonly the term 'Church' refers our mind to a certain assembly of people, 
say the clergy and those who practise the Christian faith; thus in our thought the word 
'Church' is ordinarily associated with some sort of group or establishment, with certain 
customs perhaps of some particular character, such as other associations would also have. But 
when dealing with Yannaras' thought and vision, it becomes clear that we need to abandon 
completely such an understanding of the Church. For Yannaras the Church is clearly not an 
institution. It is the 'ecclesial event', as he often refers to it and by which description he 
alludes to the experience of gathering together and of being and remaining united with one 
another. This experience is what actually makes the Church and what at the same time 
manifests the reality of the Church. Yannaras employs the phrase 'ecclesial event' conscious 
326 of the meaning the term 'ecclesia' - EYxAYjcFLa - had originally in its Hellenic use. There, it 
denoted the assembly of the people of the city, the'ExxAilcia co-O ATIýtou. It referred, that is, 
to the function of the community that demonstrated and confirmed the very existence of the 
city and also made this existence possible, by being the medium through which the city 
operated and governed its affairs. In its Christian usage then the 'ecclesial event', the event of 
the Church, refers to the gathering of the people in the name of Christ to celebrate and partake 
in the Supper, an act that expressed and verified their common faith and at the same time 
realized their new faith and way of being, which was about being together 'with one accord in 
one place'. 327 Therefore the Church - Ex-KArjcia - represents for Yarmaras the state of 
existence where life is realized as a communion of persons, as the reality of being together, of 
sharing being and of staying united. It signifies a way of being, a way of relating, which - as 
in the classical 7T6ALC, - aimed at bringing out and realizing true being, the -Kocc' 6cATI 0 F-Lav 
PLO; - 
The ecclesial event is thus the invalidation of life realized as self-sufficiency and 
separation; it is the annulment of life as the survival of individual entities, which basically 
326 ChrjStOS Yannaras, Evtivva cTq Opqo-Kcia [Against religion] (Athens: Ikaros, 2007), pp. 43-44. 
327 Acts 2: 2. 
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equates to existence suffering fragmentation and faced with death. This reversal in the mode 
of being, which means the defeat of corruption and death and the possession of the advantage 
of eternal life, cannot be accomplished by created nature on its own. The truly existent is 
identified with God alone and therefore only in communion with Him can created being - and 
therefore human nature - rejoice in true and eternal being. Even more after the Fall it is not 
within the reach of the capacities of damaged human nature to overturn the consequences of 
sin save through Him who defeated death, the incarnate and risen Christ. Accordingly, 
Yannaras sees the possibility of true being only in connection with the life of the Church. And 
it is in this way in Yannaras' thought that the being of the Church is associated with morality. 
The question about ethics, about how man ought to live, links directly in Yannaras' outlook 
with the life of the Church, as it is only in the reality of the 'ecclesial event' that true being can 
be realized. Morality, as it will become apparent also in the following paragraphs of this 
chapter, is not identified for Yannaras with the conventionality of adhering to some ethical 
code - most likely a system of a human origin and nature. Morality relates to the striving to 
achieve existential authenticity of nature, of realizing the possibilities of nature for true life, 
that is life as distinct from nature and thus as everlasting life. In other words, then, morality is 
about complying with God's will, which intended that man be in God's 'image and likeness', 
that is, sharing in God's way of being, in God's life, which is life eternal. Since this is not 
attainable, as we have said, for man alone but only when man is united with God, it means that 
in our worldly condition after the Fall it is attainable only in view of Christ's resurrection; it 
becomes possible through the life of the Church, which is the restoration to the authentic mode 
of being, the defeat of corruption and death in the person of the incarnate and risen Christ. It 
therefore becomes apparent how for Yannaras morality relates to the existence of the Church. 
In fact Yannaras' attitude to the matter of the Church as the 'ecclesial event' simply 
brings out the Eucharistic character of the Church as the fundamental aspect that actually 
makes the Church. This is not an innovation on Yannaras' part, as others well before him have 
drawn out and have highlighted the Eucharistic origin of the Church. However, it is clearly an 
appeal that Yannaras makes to what he also sees as constituent of the true being of the 
Church 
in order to draw from this and specify what the ethos of the Church then is and what is the 
kind of morality, if at all, that the Church presents. In Yannaras' thought, as we have already 
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noted, the Church is clearly a reality of co-existence, the gathering together of the scattered 
328 people of God to carry out the 'work of the people', the liturgy, AELCOUQ-YLO(. Yannaras 
aptly comments that all the descriptions used in the biblical and the liturgical texts with 
reference to the Church, such as 'the people of God', 'the heavenly city', 'the body of Christ', 
'the new creation', 'the new Israel', 'the Kingdom of God' and so forth, all of them allude to 
the reality of the Church not as an ideology nor as a religious system of belief, but as an event 
of shared being, as a reality of unification and joint existence. The Church in Yannaras' mind 
represents the reality of renewed being, of new life as this is offered through the resurrection 
of Christ, the only one who 'trampled on death', as this is presented every time we celebrate 
the Eucharist: being as distinctiveness and freedom and as loving communion. In Yannaras' 
actual words '[the Church] is the historical manifestation of God's new relationship with 
mankind as a whole "in flesh and blood". She is the fact of God's incarnation and the 
deification of man, the Eucharistic supper of the Kingdom'. 329 
For Yannaras, to identify the true being of the Church opens the way to a valid 
discussion about the ethos of the Church and the character of Christian morality. We can talk 
of the ethos of the Church only in relation to the true nature of the Church, to what makes the 
Church, and since the liturgy is 'the core and the sum of [the Church's] life and truth 330 then 
the ethos of the Church is nothing else but a liturgical ethos. This means that the heart of the 
Christian life is the liturgy and our participation in it, and therefore the whole content of a 
Christian's life is directed only and simply by it, that is by the readiness to remain organically 
part of the body of Christ, to exist as a member in a unity and communion, to realize life as a 
relationship rather than as individual sufficiency and self-centredness. Beyond the liturgical 
ethos, that is the Eucharistic reference of the world's being and life and the transformation of 
it as a gift of God's grace, the Church knows no other directive. 
Consequently, following Yannaras' thought, to be a Christian does not mean 
adjustment to a certain protocol or the adaptation of a set of ideas and beliefs or of tenets for a 
certain moral conduct, but a personal, existential involvement to meet and unite with the 
personal God residing and presiding in His Church. To be a member of the Church is an 
328 Freedom, PP. 82-3. 
329 Freedom, P. 84. 
330 Freedom, P. 85. 
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invitation to the Eucharistic Supper, which substantiates the new life inaugurated by the 
incarnate and resurrected Christ. It is, in other words, an invitation to Life, to life restored to 
its fullness and to its authenticity; it is restoration to the original mode of existence, to life 
realised as communion of distinct and free persons united freely in love. The Church is not a 
human organisation nor is it a merely pious or spiritual type of establishment. It is a unity of 
God's presence and man's free collaboration and participation; it is a workshop, as it were, for 
man's return to God, for man's free choice and movement to siding with (uuwa(To-opEvo) 
the true mode of being realized in the person of Christ, and for renouncing death, as is 
mentioned in the initiatory rite of baptism, as this is celebrated at least in the Orthodox 
Church. 
For the Church, therefore, morality, Yannaras' emphasis goes on, is first and foremost 
the adventure of man's freedom, about how man deals with his freedom, the venture of using 
one's free will granted by God either to consent to the true life of loving freely and being in 
unity with God, thus fulfilling the true mode of existence, or to reject life and its Creator. The 
greatness of God's conferring of freedom to man, Yannaras points out, lies in the fact that God 
grants man the possibility of using his human will to give up even on God. Morality thus is not 
seen as adjustment to some external moral law but is understood primarily as the disposition 
and the activity of the human heart. Moral integrity is not simply substantiated in ethical 
deeds; virtue is not the demonstration of a certain conduct, but it is primarily the condition of 
the heart. Not to say that what Christian morality is concerned with in the first place is not 
virtue but truth, something that will become clearer by what is explained further on. According 
to Yannaras - who in fact draws at this point on the ascetic material of the Church tradition 
such as the Macarian homilies and homilies of St Isaac the Syrian in order to bring out and 
describe the ethos of the Church - morality takes place mainly 'within'. It is identified with an 
internal change of man to reflect the image of God and thus to promulgate the Kingdom of 
God, a change that can still be expressed through good works and translated into good acts of 
a social nature, the latter in this way being only the outcome and not the precondition of moral 
change and man9s moral condition. In Yannaras' words the Church does not deny social 
ethics, the ethos of the Church does not disregard social participation of Christians living the 
world in duties and moral obligations of a social nature, however 'in no way does [the Church] 
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confine her own truth and morality within the limits of social behaviour and the conventional 
obligations which govern it'. 331 What is found in the centre of Christian life is not the 
adherence to some objectively ordered ethical norms, but the internal contrition of the heart, 
man9s interior movement of repentance and re-turn towards God with the realization of human 
inadequacy. The state of the heart thus is, as it were, the criterion for morality and all the 
external attitudes are valued and measured against one's inner inclination and condition, not 
against some objective code of ethics. For example charity, to follow an example of Christian 
merit that Yannaras himself picks up, 332 is not, as the world would generally see it, an act of 
altruism that sets the individual conscience at rest with a sense of self-praise. By the Church's 
criteria such individual virtue could be 'equivalent to injustice and theft and the other sins', 333 
to the extent that it distinguishes the individual as separate from the others and it favours the 
self-regarding conscience through conferring private justification and self-appraisal, and in 
this way actually only perpetuates the original sin of self-deification and of deviation from 
God. For the Church's true ethos, instead, charity takes place primarily 'inside'; it is an inner 
act of fellowship, identified with the 'burning' of the human heart for all the creation. It is the 
state of the merciful, remorseful and prayerful heart that contemplates every entity of God's 
creation with compassion and sums up thus in its 'microcosm' the whole world. Charity thus 
seen, therefore, is a sign of the 'good alteration' that takes place in man and encompasses the 
realization in man of his Trinitarian prototype. 
334 Such is the approach to righteousness that 
the Church has, which leads to an understanding of morality as something very profound and 
deeply existential, not conventional or subject to the relativity of a human-centred ethical 
evaluation. This means that 'moral', Yannaras highlights, by the Church criteria is that which 
reveals the truth, that which brings out the true identity of man and not something that just 
ameliorates his external behaviour or improves the human character. For that reason, in 
Yannaras' outlook morality has to do with man's search for his true self and is thus rather an 
existential category which relates to the personal identity of man beyond all 'masks imposed 
upon him by the egocentric need for external and formal compliance with the 
demands of 
331 Freedom, pp. 78-9. 
332 Freedom, P. 80. 
333 Freedom, p. 78. 
334 Freedom, P. 80. 
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social recognition and respectability'. 335 It is in this sense that the Church does not look for 
virtue, as we mentioned earlier, but for the truth, where 'virtue' stands for a private ethical 
attainment or an agreement with standards of goodness conventionally understood, whilst 
'truth' signifies the innermost purpose and function of beings, what theological language 
would refer to as the 'logos' of beings. So if logos, as in Maximos, relates to the will of God, 
the intention pre-existing in God's will for the role or purpose of beings, then morality looks 
to connect man to his logos, to his true reason for being, that is to God's will, indeed to God, 
since complying to God's will indicates union with God. 
3. Ethics in the Scriptures and the phenomenon of Pietism 
Virtue seen on an individual basis, that is, as a private attainment of righteous 
behaviour generating individual valuation, can be said, as we have already mentioned, actually 
to be a sin. This is because sin is what cuts us off from God, and virtue understood as an 
individual accomplishment is none other than what drove the first man, Adam, away from 
God. Self-deification, the attitude where man sets off from himself and his own resources and 
not from God even when having the best of intentions, even to resemble God, constitutes the 
original and the fundamental content of sin and apostasy. Righteousness then, when serving 
man's self-justification, is nothing but a repetition of the original deception, which ultimately 
not only fails to save man from his fallen state, from entrapment in his individuality and 
fragmented being, but in fact reinforces this condition. Man's ethical conformity does not 
fundamentally restore him to a new mode of being, which is life realized as communion and 
loving co-existence, rather than life as individual survival. Man's own efforts at moral 
obedience may at most result in an improvement in human conduct and the amelioration of 
one's character, but cannot inaugurate for man a new life, they cannot initiate the 'new 
creation' of God which is the life of unity brought in by the Church. Thus the morality of the 
Church is not the improvement of morals but regeneration to the true life, to the Trinitarian 
mode of being, of which the Church is the realization and manifestation. The Church's 
morality is summarized, as we saw, in the liturgical ethos of the Church, the ethos that looks 
335 Freedom, p. 77. 
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to engraft all in the unity of the life-giving body of Christ. This is a practice that involves the 
abandonment of one's own way, departure from the way of individuality, which is self- 
reliance, even when this self-reliance is camouflaged behind the ultimate acts of altruism, in 
an effort to reach out to moral ideals. Quitting one's own interests thus marks the beginning of 
turning to the Church's ethos - participation in her body, coming together and being together, 
as this is realized and manifested in the Eucharist, the definition and the essence of the 
Church. And this is consequently how, as Yannaras insists, 'the Church's ethic is diametrically 
opposite to any philosophical, social or religious ethic... '. 336 It is not individual belief or virtue 
that makes the Christian, but participation in the body of the Church, in other words 
restoration to the fullness of his existential possibilities as a person. 
In fact individual virtue and the sense of merit that spring from compliance with 
objective law, Yannaras maintains, oppose the true ethos of the Church. He firmly holds that 
the ethics of the Gospels does not signify at all some morality of individual justification or 
merit on the basis of religious principles and objectified regulation. Even the observance of the 
Law in the Old Testament, Yannaras explains, was not a means for personal justification, but 
the way for the people of God to manifest their Truth, which was their participation in God's 
covenant with His people. 337 The observance of the law was not an act of a juridical nature, an 
act for securing individual merit, but an expression of faithfulness to God's call and a 
demonstration of belonging to His chosen people to whom God had given the promise of 
salvation. It is not without significance, Yannaras points out, that God's deliverance of the law 
in the book of Exodus coincides with the disclosure to Moses of God's name. The reception of 
the given law, this means, was not just the acceptance of some juridical constitution, but 
amounted to participation in a relationship with God and the possibility of knowing Him. The 
law therefore represented God's call, a gift of grace, and did not aim at just providing the 
Israelites with legal commandments useful for social administration and order and for 
religious correctness. 
336 Freedom, P. 82. 
337 Freedom, pp. 53-6. 
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Similarly, the ethics of the New Testament relate to an existential regeneration of man 
and not to the formation of a religious type of person whose righteousness could be measured 
against objective norms of conduct. Rather the latter is fiercely criticized and rejected by 
Christ himself on many occasions. The Gospel, Yatmaras emphasizes, rejects individual 
ethics, in the sense that individual justification of man by reference to the objectively 
formulated religious law and its moral norms merely reinforces man's sense of self-adequacy 
and self-validation, and basically shuts the way to repentance and encounter with God. The 
starting point for repentance is instead man's realization of his human insufficiency and 
failure; this, for Yannaras, needs to be sharply distinguished from feelings of guilt, which are 
just another expression of human egotism. Guilt, as a consequence of ethical transgression, is 
associated with the understanding of morality in terms of individual achievement. Morality 
however for the Church ethos, as this is put forward in the earliest expression of the 
consciousness of the Church found in the Gospel, is not man's achievement, but the result of 
man 9s rebirth, 338 which is initiated by the abandonment of human individuality 339 and man's 
incorporation into the new way of life, life as communion and relationship, participation in the 
Trinitarian mode of existence., which Christ's hypostatic being reveals and to which it 
pointS. 340 
The conventionality of secularizing the message of the Gospel by identifying the 
radical character of repentance with adjustment to a formalized code of values and thus 
seeking religious reassurance found expression, according to Yannaras, in the phenomenon of 
pietism. The term refers to the religious trend in the history of the Church where practical- 
active piety has been over-emphasised, at the expense of dogmatic theology. Pietism thus 
developed as a zeal for Christian activity, featuring a strong emphasis on the significance of 
good works and an intense individual focus on the practice of the virtues and morality. 
341 In 
such a context man's salvation is approached as an individual event; 
it is understood as the 
result of individual moral endeavour, an individual attainment. 
Salvation is therefore a moral 
achievement, whereas the body of the Church signifies, as we 
have seen, a mode of existence, 
338 John 3: 7. 
339 Mat. 16: 25. 
340 See Freedom, pp. 49-64. 
34 1 For Yannaras' presentation on pietism see Freedom, pp. 119-36. 
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the Trinitarian mode of being, and participation in which restores man in his existential 
authenticity despite his individual unworthiness and human sin. 342 For pietism the Christian 
life is understood as a series of duties, leading to an individual imitation of Christ, something 
that, as Yannaras notes, may allow for the improvement of morals or one's character but 
'which cannot possibly transfigure our mode of existence and change corruption to 
incorruption, and death into life and resurrection'. 343 It follows therefore that pietism amounts 
to the abandonment of the liturgical and the Eucharistic character of the Church, since it acts 
as alienation of the Church's criteria and a trend of moralistic considerations. It brings about a 
shift from an ecclesial to an individual ethos, since man's justification does not result from 
participation in the life of the Church which effects for man the transformation of his mortal 
individuality into the hypostasis of eternal life ; 344 the Church is instead treated as the 
gathering of the morally 'reborn' and the pure, with reference to objective moral criteria. On 
such grounds Yannaras does not therefore hesitate to characterise the pietistic movement as 
heretical, since in its expressions the Church becomes a religious form of Man's fall, 345 a kind 
of religious institution through which man certifies his moral self-reliance, his individual self- 
sufficiency based on moral achievement. 
4. Liturgical realism 
The unorthodoxy of pietism finds its opposite in the strong liturgical realism that 
distinguishes the ethos of the Church and on which Yannaras ardently insists. Christian ethics 
is specified by a pragmatic and forthright acknowledgement of human sinfulness, spoken out 
without fear or reticence and at the same time without any pessimistic attitude. This is because 
the Church's pragmatism about human failure finds its counterbalance and answer in the 
reality of the Incarnation and in the Eucharistic event. The Church's message of salvation is 
not a theoretical exhortation and does not impel man to some abstract or absurd set of tenets 
and duties. The Church's life is signified by the realism of initiating a change in man's mode 
of existence, a realism which derives from the fact that the Logos appeared in the flesh and 
342 Freedom, P. 121. 
343 Freedom, P. 122. 
344 Freedom, P. 127. 
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consequently proceeds from the substantiality of the Eucharist. With the incarnation of Christ 
the renovation of the world becomes a tangible possibility and is effected in the liturgical 
assembly, which is the actual realization and manifestation of the Church and in which man's 
participation changes his mode of existence from individuality to community and communion. 
In the act of Eucharistic celebration man's fallen state of being is transformed. As Yannaras 
346 puts it, 'the Eucharist is man's assent to the assumption of his nature by Christ' , in other 
words it is man's assent to his existential change and to the salvation of life from corruption 
and death. This transformation of being becomes an experienced reality in the ecclesial event 
of Eucharistic unity and communion. Yannaras firmly insists on this Eucharistic realism by 
emphasizing the fact of physical participation in the body of Christ through the act of eating 
and drinking the Eucharistic offering. 347 Moreover he points to the reality of the union and 
communion of 'all in all' within the liturgical context, where both the militant and the 
triumphant Church are present and take part, as 'the saints are indivisibly joined in heavenly 
and holy union with [Christ],, 348 and also where the life and the inner principle of the whole 
world is summed up in man's assent and thanksgiving to God. 
Yannaras' repeated emphasis on Eucharistic realism, in other words on the fact that the 
Eucharist is an existential fact of unity and communion, a tangible reality of life being 
transformed and not just some theoretical view or interpretation of the biblical Last Supper, 
nor an intellectual acceptance of moral principles and axioms, fundamentally seeks to 
underwrite the realism of man's salvation. The life of the Church which emanates from the 
resurrection of Christ and which is realized in the liturgical event is the existent possibility for 
man to experience a reversal of the consequences of the Fall, it is the opportunity for the world 
to overcome death and corruption, something that man alone, despite all human endeavours 
after moral improvement, cannot bring about. Humans' own moral efforts may effect some 
improvement in their life, but cannot defeat death. Human morality cannot make the flesh 
immortal . 
349 it cannot overcome the existential self-sufficiency of nature bound up with 
individuality. This, however, is for the Church a tangible reality, set forth in the Eucharistic 
346 Freedom, P. 86. 
347 Freedom, P. 81. 
348 Freedom, P. 82. 
349 Freedom, P. 81. 
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gathering. Besides, Yannaras' emphasis on the true character of the Eucharistic event 
maintains the make-up of the ethos of the Church which is, as we have said, a liturgical ethos, 
in other words an ethos of participation; it means that life in the Church is about a personal 
involvement in the experience handed down by the Fathers; it is about faith and trust, 
experiential knowledge and personal engagement with and verification of the truth. It is the 
ethos of dealing with life and death. Christian ethics look for an existential change in man, 
350 ultimately for the salvation of life from corruption and death . 
5. The cosmological dimension of the Church ethos 
The fact that in the Eucharistic celebration the whole of the creation is taken up and 
referred to God points to the cosmological dimension of the Eucharist and therefore to the 
cosmological dimension of the liturgical ethos of the Church. Speaking of the cosmological 
dimension of the Eucharist and of the Church ethos as articulated in Yannaras' work, the first 
thing that we need to note is that Yannaras completely rejects any kind of dualistic view of the 
world and thus discountenances divisions such as those between spiritual and corporeal, 
sacred and secular, material or worldly and holy. If we detect such differentiations in his 
material, they are not made with reference to the corporeality of the world as such in 
opposition to ecclesiastical faith and the mind of the Church, but they are made in regard to 
how created reality as a whole stands in relation to God. This simply means that the material 
world is not seen as bad or as opposed to the spirit; sin is not identified with the body alone 
and the latter is not viewed as the enemy of the soul. The world as a whole, as both matter and 
spirit, was created by God and was made icaA6; ALav. To the extent that the world turns 
towards God, and stays in relationship and union with God, it fulfils its inner principle, it 
brings out the logos assigned to it through God's creative action. In this sense it remains holy, 
a spiritual world, a world that bears and conveys the hallmark of God's Spirit. On the other 
hand, the world's breaking away from God is what introduces sin and initiates evil, and thus 
brings the world to a darkened state, where created reality instead of substantiating the glory 
of God now embodies damage and vice. In the celebration of the Eucharistic event we 
have 
31' Freedom, p. 87. 
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the overturning of this failing condition since in the elements of the Eucharist the world is 
taken up and referred back to God in an offering of thanksgiving, and thus is brought back to 
its natural end, which is the manifestation and glorification of God. The Eucharist thus is the 
ultimate evidence on the part of the Church that she accedes to the material world and it is also 
a demonstration of her belief in the godliness of the materiality of the world. The Church does 
not repudiate matter, but, as verified in the celebration of the liturgy, she takes matter on board 
and it is essentially through and with it that she works, AELTOUQ'YF-L, God's presence and that 
she communicates Life to the participants. Christ is fundamentally present by assuming 
matter. The very elements needed to sustain physical life are changed in the Eucharistic 
offering into the means of immortality and eternal life without ceasing to be material. 
In the event of the Eucharist then we have the supreme manifestation of the unity 
which the Church sees between uncreated and created reality, but also of the integral unity 
between man and the world. For this reason, the cosmological dimension of the ecclesial ethos 
is simply a natural and inseparable aspect of the morality of the Church. This means, in line 
with Yannaras' exposition, that someone cannot be a member of the Church and partake in 
Life and yet despise the material world, or remain indifferent to it and consider the use of it as 
irrelevant to human salvation. 351 As has by now been established, life in the Church for 
Yannaras involves an existential change for man. For the Church, repentance, as Yannaras 
himself notes, is not to be identified with an intellectual or emotional change, but is deep down 
an existential event. This means that what changes in man is eventually his way of existence, 
including thus a change in the way man connects with the world and in the way he uses the 
world, since human existence is organically connected with the life of the world and our use of 
it. in the new way of being, which in Yannaras' language is the personal way of being, man's 
rectified vo&;, his mind or power of the soul, comes to see the world not possessively, that is 
as an object for use merely to sustain his individual sufficiency, but man comes to see the 
world and recognize in it the loving act of God. He comes to discern the true principle of 
things, the logos of the things of the world and relate with them in ways that substantiate the 
personal way of being, that see them as realities of relationship and communion. 
352 If this way 
of relating to the world is supremely represented, as we described above, in the 
Eucharist, then 
31 'Freedom, p. 86. 
352 Freedom, P. 87. 
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man9s moral efforts involve a personal extension of the Eucharistic ethos into all aspects of 
human life. To quote Yannaras' actual words: 'Work, economic life, the family, art, 
technology, politics and cultural life all become part of man's eucharistic relationship with 
God". 353 This means that the liturgical ethos of the Church, which comprises Christian 
morality, is to be lived out in the relationship of Christians not only one with another, but also 
with the material world and it is to be reflected in all the aspects of human life, whether it be 
the economic, social, or political side of human activity or any other. 354 
Nevertheless, although the Church ethos is to reflect in all the aspects of human 
activity, there is another equally significant point Yannaras makes. He takes the position that 
the ethos developed in the Church with regard to the relationship of Christians with the world 
cannot be codified and organised into an economic system or into a political ideology. 355 The 
change in man's relationship with the world comes out in the extent to which change takes 
place first within man, in his very way of being. Man's relationship with the things that 
surround him is a reflection of his inner disposition, and therefore the way he relates to the 
world can be modified to the extent that his inner inclination changes. As the way of being 
shifts from individualism and self-centredness and reaches closer to what Yannaras refers to as 
the personal mode of existence, where being is realised as personal distinctiveness and 
communion, so man comes to see clearly and recognise the truth of things, thus being able to 
see the other beings in the world as they truly are in themselves. This cleansing of man's 
darkened voDq is something that can be worked on and take place on a personal basis only. 
Therefore the Christian ethos cannot be externally imposed on people, for if it were, it would 
not be a truly Christian ethos. That is simply because the core of Christian morality, as we 
have seen, is how man deals with his own freedom, how he chooses to use it in relation to the 
possibility he has for attaining to the truth, to the authenticity of his being, into the personal 
way of being and thus in relation to God. Christian ethos, consequently, is not like a juridical 
law that could be outwardly applied, but is the way man chooses to be, it is the stance he opts 
to take towards himself, the world and God, and it is something that occurs in one's heart, and 
can thus only spring from the inside out. The particular ethos that the Church holds on 
how to 
153 Freedom, P. 94. 
354 Freedom, pp. 86-8,94 and also 'The Historical and Social Dimensions of the Church's Ethos' in Freedom, pp. 
195-229. 
355 Freedom, P. 87. 
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relate with the world can be realized only on a personal level and is revealed in as much as 
man's being evolves from individual sufficiency to relational and communal existence. For 
this reason, Yannaras adds, the way Christians live out their relationship with the world and 
the way they use the world cannot be separated from the life of the Church to be put forward 
autonomously in any social or political or economic programme. At the same time he observes 
that naturally the ethos of the Church creates a culture, and can thus bring about a general 
attitude as to how Christians should live in the world and in relation to certain aspects of 
human life, such as the economic or the political aspect. Still, despite the general tone that the 
faithful mind may bear, this is to find expression, Yannaras insists, only on a personal level, it 
is to be embodied in persons and not schematised in objectively imposed solutions. 356 
6. Does the absence of predetermined ethics amount to immorality? 
We have seen so far how Yannaras' approach to the matter of morality does not 
accommodate concepts of a juridical kind. His thoughts on the Christian life and ethos do not 
involve a legalistic understanding. Yannaras does not identify morality with a personal 
achievement of adherence to some law, and consequently the failure to be moral, or - in 
theological language - the condition of sinfulness is not thought of as the transgression of 
ethical norms, thus engendering feelings of guilt. In Yannaras' outlook morality is the 
achievement of attaining to the true way of being, which is realized in and through the practice 
of the Church. Truly, the authentic way of being, which Yannaras specifies as personal 
existence, should then find expression in all aspects of human activity and would need to 
be 
interpreted in all the very particular circumstances and demands of our life. This brings us to 
acknowledge that there cannot be preset answers to determine what in specific circumstances 
would be good or bad, what would be the right or the wrong thing to 
do in individual 
situations. In other words, Yannaras leaves us with the understanding that 
for the ethos of the 
Church there are no predetermined directives to be followed in some rigid and absolute way, 
as if they were disconnected 
from the truth of life and the reality of man's existence. If the life 
and the existence of each person 
is something that develops organically in ways that cannot be 
356 Freedom, P. 88. 
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predicted or predefined, then the truth about the life of each one of us is to be experientially 
discerned and discovered. Consequently what someone ought to do at a particular moment 
determined by one's own very personal and specific circumstances cannot be pre-decided and 
thoroughly circumscribed. If this were the case, it would mean that the moral law would 
function as an absolute principle above and beyond the truth of life and also that personal 
freedom would have to be strangled to fit into the expectations of moral rules and regulations. 
But this might well amount to lack of respect for the person, failure to appreciate his personal 
circumstances, in other words failure to honour the uniqueness of each personal existence. It is 
then pretty obvious how this would in fact contradict the very ethos of the Church, which as 
we have seen is concerned with discovering and following logos in the world, with bringing 
out the distinctiveness of the world and the uniqueness of each human person and thus with 
acknowledging and glorifying God's creation. 
In this way, to take Yannaras' thought a little further, but in accord with the spirit that 
his own ideas convey, we could say that in the Church we are not presented with some rigidly 
predetermined ethical rules to follow, thus fulfilling the role of being good Christians. The 
only aspiration the faithful have as members of the Church is to meet with the revealed God, 
to be able to see God, to discern God's love and presence and let this love operate in their 
lives. We could also say that if there is a tenet for the Christian life this is to resemble God, to 
realize the 'image and likeness' assigned to humans, to be the embodiment of God's grace and 
love. This would involve in practice the development of qualities such as the ones we would 
recognize in God, for example humility, forbearance and forgiveness. However, these for the 
Church ethos are XaQWFýIaTa, gifts of grace that man can be endowed with through the life 
and practice of the Church, rather than something that human ability and skill can achieve by 
simply abiding by some code of moral conduct. Besides, the way such qualities will be 
translated and realized in practice, in the reality of life, is for the mind of the Church bound up 
with the uniqueness of the person. Love, humility and all other virtues, can only find 
expression on a personal level and therefore in a quite distinctive way. Therefore, the Church 
does not really provide her members with prescriptions about how to act morally in the 
manner of instructions to be followed step by step. This would simply create moral robots; it 
would prompt people to adjust and fit into identical patterns of action and thus would annul 
personal distinctiveness and 
freedom. The Church in that way would be turned into a system, 
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she would be similar to any ideological structure, where followers need to demonstrate 
discipline and strictly adhere to and follow the principles and norms of it. And an ideology is 
exactly what Yannaras passionately wants to exclude from the reality of the Church. He holds 
very firn-fly to the conviction that the Church is not an ideology, is not a system of beliefs, 
rather it is the 'ecclesial event' as he often refers to it, which represents a totally different 
reality; it is the ceaseless quest of engaging with the enigma of life and death. The line 
Yannaras draws at this point is steadfast. In this sense he speaks about the 'freedom of 
morality', referring to the fact that for the ecclesial ethos - unlike the case of ideological 
systems - freedom is intrinsically connected with morality, the former is rather the 
precondition of the latter and at the same time evidence of the presence of the latter. One 
cannot take steps towards a moral life save by a free and voluntary choice. If morality is 
identified with true being and authenticity of existence, as we have seen in earlier paragraphs 
of this chapter, this means that it is the fruit only of a genuine quest; it cannot result from 
imposition, it cannot be the product of a mandatory regime. In an analogous way if we are to 
attain authentic being, which in Yannaras' language is specified as personal being, then it 
means we have achieved freedom, in the ways in which personal being substantiates the 
latter. 357 Therefore, morality cannot exist without freedom and the latter would not be true 
freedom save as freedom in morality. 
This brings us to the point where we need to make an important distinction and also an 
equally significant clarification. The distinction relates to the forms of freedom and 
subsequently the clarification is about what the freedom of the Church experience, in other 
words the freedom of personal being, does not involve. We are bound to ask, if the freedom 
fostered in the context of personal existence is true freedom, then what is not true freedom? 
Also, if Church life does not involve, as we said, a predetermined law for action does that 
mean that we open the way to a wild type of freedom, a lack of restraints, a state where 
everyone just does as they feel or fancy to the loss and damage of any order or cohesion? 
357 The association of freedom with the existential category of the person (as opposed to individual) is not 
found 
exclusively in Yannaras; the same occurs 
for example in Zizioulas. See Metropolitan of Pergamon loarinis. 
'N6cFo,; KOLý ()Wc'7-cEý0' c,, ý, IOQ066oýTj &EoAoyýa' ['Disease and Treatment in Orthodox Theology'] In 
lopi9o6o4ia Kai ZfqXpovoý K6apo(; [Orthodoxy and Contemporary World] (Leukosia, Cyprus: KývrQo 
MEAE, r(-0V, jE06t,; MoV11,; 
KOKicov [Kentro Melet6n Hleras Moms Kukou], 2006); also: Being as Communion, 
pp. 39-49. 
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Furthermore one could not help but wonder about the existence of elements of the Church 
tradition and life such as the canons and asceticism, which are in common thought identified 
with the understanding of a very restrictive and strict way of life. 
We ordinarily understand freedom, evenmore so in our modem times, generally as the 
autonomy for people to act as they will. Thus our mind commonly identifies freedom as a 
concept more or less with the absence of control or restraints, with the possibility that one 
does what one likes to do. However, we would all without disagreement consent to the fact 
that in human societies the freedom of the individuals needs to be regulated, in order for the 
public body to hold together, in order for the social group to exist as such, to remain united 
and to retain its coherence. In this way we come to accept that there are boundaries to our 
freedom, that we are free within the limits of the civic law, which regulates human 
relationships and confines human activity by certain restrictions. We are accordingly used to 
thinking and saying that 'the freedom of the one ends where the freedom of the other begins' 
suggesting in this way the operation of some conventional agreement that legalizes our human 
activity and safeguards the order of our social co-existence. We understand then that the 
freedom we experience in our everyday human reality is conventional and in that way not a 
form of complete freedom. 
So what would be a form of perfect freedom? Would simply the absence of rules and 
regulations allow us to experience a more genuine freedom? Does it perhaps mean that the 
legal code alienates us from our true humanity, from our natural liberty and what it means to 
be human and that if we were allowed to express our wants and longings totally freely, we 
would then attain to true freedom? As we have mentioned just a little way above, for the mind 
of the Church, which Yannaras wants to bring out, true freedom is only the freedom achieved 
in morality. From what we have described already in this chapter we should be able by now to 
think of morality in connection with the authenticity of being, with the realization of the 
potentialities of existence to be xciToc Ao-yov, with the personal hypostatization of the nature, 
in other words with personal existence. Therefore true freedom, Yannaras would insist, is the 
freedom of the Trinity, the freedom manifest in the Trinitarian relationships, the freedom of 
being realized as distinctiveness and love. There freedom does not annul unity and does not 
threaten cohesion, while at the same time it allows for personal difference and uniqueness 
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without destroying the balance of the relationships, without allowing any overpowering of one 
person by another. It is the freedom realized in a communion of persons, where no imposition 
of uniformity is necessary to hold the persons together as they are organically united in love. 
None of the Trinitarian persons exists on its own or for its own sake, but they hypostasize 
being only in relation to the others, and this signifies, as Yannaras at every opportunity 
highlights, the way of the truly existent, the way of true being. The unity we find in this type 
of the Trinitarian communion is not a unity imposed by some charter; it is unity fostered in 
freedom and therefore freedom - characterised by love - is integral to personal existence, it is 
essential to what it means to hypostasize being as a person. Besides, despite the absolute 
freedom that characterises the Trinitarian relationships, in the Trinity we do not have anarchy. 
There is structure and order, induced by the very distinctiveness of each person, by the unique 
place that each Triune person occupies always in relation to the others. In other words we 
could say that because the Trinitarian persons substantiate absolute freedom it does not mean 
that they exist and act arbitrarily, as they individually please, as it were, neither does their love 
for each other operates restrictively on their freedom. Love in the Trinity is not a principle that 
is introduced in order to counterbalance freedom. It is simply integral to the divine hypostasis, 
it is simply the other fundamental constituent, alongside freedom, of what it means to 
hypostasize being personally. Therefore, the Trinitarian persons substantiate absolute, that is 
true, freedom and love as they are and act rcaca Ao-yov, in accord to the logos of personal 
existence, in line with the way of personal being, which means hypostasizing nature in a 
matchless way going beyond nature and overcoming any necessities or predeterminations 
nature would entail. 
Having described the model of true freedom as it is put forward in the faith of the 
Church and turning back to our opening question about whether the absence of external law 
would mean the presence of a more complete freedom, we should now be able to envisage that 
the abolition, as it were, of our human constitutions would not necessarily result in genuine 
freedom. To be perfectly free is not just a state of being loose, of having no law and of acting 
exclusively on the drive of the self's own wants and likings. Perfect freedom, the freedom 
revealed in the case of the Trinity, is for our human state of being something to be achieved, 
not something we already possess. And what stands in the way of our attaining it is our 
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rebellious human nature, not the existence of external legal restrictions. True freedom is the 
achievement of existing YcaTa Ao-yov, that is according to the logos, the principle or the truth 
that permeates our nature; in other words the achievement of realizing the fullness of the 
potentialities of our created human nature, which, in the language of the theological teaching 
of the Church, was made in God's 'image and likeness': to exist in relationship and union with 
God. However, human nature sought to achieve on its own what it could fulfil only in unity 
and communion with God. 'In the day you eat of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, 
you shall be as gods'. 358 That first revolt of humanity is repeated every time man seeks to 
attain to true life by himself, to realize existence as self-sufficiency, ignoring the fact that he 
was created 'in the image and likeness' of God, meaning he was created and called to exist in 
the way of the truly existent, that is, not as a monad but as a communion of persons, a 
communion of personal distinctiveness and love. Thus we understand that the liberty to act as 
we subjectively choose as individuals - in the ordinary concept of freedom that we have in our 
present state of being - not only does not suggest true freedom but it can well be a state of 
captivity for man in his existentially autonomous and alienated nature. In other words, the 
freedom of nature when the latter turns to an existential absolute is not true freedom, as it is 
bound up with the necessities and the urges of a rebellious and thus fallen nature. Yannaras - 
by referring to the work and the language of Maximus the Confessor - specifies the 
existentially autonomous human nature as 'beast-like' and relates it 'not to the body alone, nor 
to the spirit alone, but to the common reality of the nature manifested and expressed by 
359 and it reflects the immensely both' . 
For Yannaras this clarification is of huge significance, 
important distinction of nature and energies. This means that both the body and the soul 
represent the energies of nature, they are both expressions and manifestations of the one united 
human nature . 
360 Therefore the Fall and the present sinful condition of the human nature is not 
to be identified with just the body. The Fall affected the human nature as a whole, not just the 
material part of it. If we fail to adhere to this elucidation, Yannaras insists, we end up with 
dualism, with an a priori scorn for matter and the body, and consequently with an 'external, 
schematic understanding of ethical life - ultimately, the juridical moralism of the Roman 
358 Gen. 3: 5. 
359 Freedom, P. 112 
360 The matter of integral unity between the body and the soul is central in Yannaras' interests from the very start 
of his scholarly career, a theme 
first explored by him inH METaOVULKý TOf)a(ýyaToý. 
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Catholic Church, and the pietism and Puritanism of the Protestants'. 361 It means then that 
when Yannaras speaks of existence as subjugated to the necessities of the nature, he does not 
associate the existential failure of a being with its materiality, he does not link the 6 necessities' 
or the passions or compulsions of nature with the body alone. The existential failure of man 
refers to the way he realizes his nature, that is, to the way of self-sufficiency and self- 
centredness, to the fact that nature becomes an end in itself, a condition that then finds 
expression in soul and body together. Therefore it is not our corporeality that is regarded as 
sinful and governed by the passions, but fallen human nature in its totality. The physical 
manifestation of the passions may be more apparent and easy to identify, but in no case does 
the body represent human wickedness as such. Subsequently, freedom is not a requisite with 
reference to the body and the functions of the latter. The morality of the Church, as we have 
already highlighted, does not seek to fight the body, or free the spirit, as it were, from the 
body, it does not turn against the body, neither does it treat matter with contempt. We shall 
consider this further shortly, when we look at the nature of asceticism. 
By what we have said so far we should find ourselves in a position also to deal with the 
question of whether the fact that - as Yannaras suggests and as we have earlier explained - the 
Church does not receive its members by handing out to them a predetermined prescription for 
ethical action, does not mean that this allows for loose and unchaste conduct. The answer 
should now be obvious, because if true freedom is freedom realized rcara A6yov, the 
freedom of personal existence as we identify it in the model of the Trinity, then living in 
accordance with the urges and needs of our rebellious nature is not at all what Church life 
involves and what she invites people to. The freedom of the Church ethos that we referred to 
in earlier paragraphs does not mean a total liberalism where man is dragged along by the 
passions of his nature. It is exactly the overcoming of the necessities of nature, as we have 
said, that Church life looks to. And when Yannaras suggests that for the Church ethos there is 
no predetermined ethics and also when he speaks about the freedom of morality, he alludes to 
the kind of true freedom that we have earlier tried to describe, the freedom of true being, of 
361 Freedom, P. 112. 
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personal existence, which does not need the law, since according to the Scripture: 'you shall 
know the truth and the truth shall make you free'. 362 
7. The nature of asceticism and the Canons 
As much as Yannaras highlights the idea of freedom in the sense that we have 
explained, and as much as he passes judgment on legalistic interpretations and practices of 
morality and ethical life, he at the same time holds in high regard the practice of asceticism in 
the life of the Church. It therefore seems necessary to throw some light on what may appear as 
a variance of approach. This may easily feel so as we commonly tend to associate asceticism, 
and similarly the canon law, with strict discipline and conventionality, with obedience and 
restriction and with the sense of a rigid and miserable attitude to life, all very different from 
the impression and the tone that Yannaras' style and manner in discussing the theme of 
morality convey. The unravelling of this ostensible inconsistency lies in Yannaras' actual 
exposition; the answer can be found in the illumination that he himself offers with regard to 
asceticism and also to the Church canons. Thus from the very outset of his account of 
asceticism Yannaras clarifies the fact that for the mind of the Church ascesis is not an 
individual but an ecclesial matter. 363 This means that the Church does not put forward the 
ascetic life as a means of achieving individual virtue. Asceticism is not seen as a way for man 
to exercise individual merit and to become, as it were, a better person. It does not seek to 
improve people's behaviour, to get them to achieve steadiness of character and compliance 
with some objectified code of righteousness. All these in Yannaras' thought are rather 
objectives that an external and legalistic interpretation of ethics would offer. The ascetic 
practice of the Church, therefore, is intended not just to improve human character, 
but to 
regenerate human existence, to transfigure our mode of being, to change 
'our nature's 
individual mode of existence into a personal communion and relationship, [to offer man] a 
dynamic entry into the community of the life and body of the Church'. 
364 We have referred in 
earlier paragraphs to what Yannaras describes as the engraftment of man 
in the body of Christ, 
362 john 8: 32. 
363 Freedom, p. 109 
364 Freedom, p. 109. 
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and how this is closely linked to the nature and life of the Church. It is in accordance with this 
same outlook that Yannaras sees the practice of ascesis. Asceticism is the practice of turning 
the mode of self-sufficiency and self-centredness of our fallen nature into relationship and 
communion; it is the way to overcome our fragmented individuality by submitting it to the 
common practice and life of the Church. Take fasting for example: it is a practice that signifies 
the submission of the individual's need for food to the common practice of the Church. 365 
Eating, instead of serving an autonomous need, turns into an act of participation in the life of 
the Church, thus preventing nature from becoming an end in itself and preserving a focus on 
the sole end in creation, which is the participation in the life of God, the Trinitarian 
communion. This means that ascesis is not in conflict with the body, but with the alienated 
way of our nature's being, and it aims not at fighting our materiality but the rebellious human 
nature, which by dissociating itself from God became existentially absolute and an end in 
itself. The mind of the Church, as we have noted before and as Yannaras constantly 
emphasizes, is against the dualism of seeing the body as unclean and the soul as pure. Both 
matter and spirit are products of God's creative action and love, and therefore highly regarded 
in the faith of the Church. Consequently, the ascetic practice of the Church, Yannaras notes, 
seeks to reverse the movement of self-deification, not to tame the body as such under the 
superior soul, as it were. Ascesis in all its forms - fasting, sexual abstinence, prayer, acts of 
charity - seeks to reverse the motion of nature that exists independently and as an end it itself, 
and to get nature to realize existence as personal hypostasis, as freedom from any necessities, 
as distinctiveness and love, in other words as participation in the life of the Trinitarian 
communion. Asceticism is thus a form of resistance to the egocentric individuality, which is 
expressed equally in the totality of the human nature, both bodily and spiritual reality. 
Yannaras also brings out the fact that in the tradition of the Church the life of asceticism is 
identified as philokalia, that is as the love for beauty, 'love for the beauty of that 
"uncompleted perfection" which is personal fulfilment, the restoration of God's darkened 
image in man to its original beauty' . 
366 , his is how - only to shed further light to what we 
mentioned in an earlier paragraph - Christian ethics and accordingly here asceticism 
have an 
365 Freedom, p. I 10. 
366 Freedom, P. III- 
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interest in truth and not in virtue; they intend to bring out and to restore the lost archetype of 
human nature and not just to adorn, as it were, nature with moral attributes. 
Christian ethics is about drawing out and restoring the parameters of the true life and 
therefore is characterised by a strong realism of acknowledging and of sympathizing with 
human failing and with the condition where human life falls short of these standards. This 
involves honesty and courage in the way in which the human weakness is addressed and it 
means that Church ethics does not foster pretences and does not seek just to conceal the 
human sinfulness, by suppressing it and dressing it up in 'virtuous' ways. The only way for the 
Church mentality to eliminate sin is to transform it through repentance into genuine love for 
God and thus into conscious inclination towards the One who is the only Good and the truly 
existent. It means, that is, that the emphasis for Christian ethics is not on appearances but 
primarily on what truly lies beneath in the human heart. Christian ethics and asceticism is the 
recovery of the genuineness and the integrity of being. 
It is the exploration of this kind of human genuineness and integrity that prevails for 
example in the work of people such as Dostoyevsky and the Greek short story writer 
Alexandros Papadiamandis, both of whom Yannaras holds in high regard. 367 In the narratives 
of these writers one can identify a representation of the ecclesial ethos expressed in the 
existential adventure of their characters, who often disclose bravely their human failure and 
fight their way through their lapses with sincerity, towards an existential conversion of their 
defeats (for example Alyosha in Brothers Karamazov and Barba Giannos in Papadiamandis' 
short story Love in the Snow). Dostoyevsky and Papadiamandis, that is, portray the human 
search for God beyond pretences of moral propriety and without masking human inadequacy. 
They illustrate man's existential struggle to establish a relationship with God, and by 
displaying the risk that the search for God involves - as the realism of every living 
relationship does - they preserve the true ecclesial ethos and criteria, according to which 
man9s communion with God is truly a relationship, an exercise of freedom, a venture devoid 
of the self-assuring objectification of a moralistic scheme based on the logic of effort and 
result. 
367 See Orthodoxy and the West, pp. 408-14. 
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In line with the love of original beauty, then, the ascetic texts talk of the Eros of God. 
One need not be surprised that the ascetic material often employees a very erotic language to 
talk about the experience of the spiritual life and the knowledge of God. The ultimate 
objective for the heart of the ascetics is to find and unite with God and this is how asceticism 
becomes philokalia, the quest for and the attraction to the source and the cause of beauty, 
which is God. In searching God the ascetics seek for the perfection and the beauty of the 
original order. Therefore, what may feel as a kind of incongruity, namely how asceticism can 
fit with notions and expressions of fervent love, is only a genuine expression of the very spirit 
and ethos of the Church tradition and practice. 
Yannaras takes the elucidation of the nature of ascesis even further: given that the 
salvation of man, the victory over the death that has befallen nature, is not accomplished by 
human efforts but is a gift of God's grace, in Christian asceticism man hopes for nothing from 
his human powers, '[the] human ascetic endeavour does not even aspire to crushing the 
rebellion of man's nature. It simply seeks to affirm the personal response of man's love to the 
work of his salvation by Christ... ' 368 This is a remark in harmony with the distinction that 
Yannaras is keen on making between Christian asceticism and individual virtue, and it refers 
to the bankruptcy, as Yannaras also likes to specify it, of all anthropocentric morality. It means 
that all human efforts to overcome the fallen state of the nature are condemned to failure as 
they only enforce the same movement of autonomy and self-sufficiency, which was 
responsible in the first place for the distortion of the way in which nature realizes its being. So 
what we have been used to seeing broadly as the nucleus of morality and to evaluating as the 
definitive expression of power of the human will within the practice of a Christian life, namely 
asceticism, Yannaras goes as far as to call just a 'response' on man's side. Such an 
interpretation and understanding of asceticism wipes out any sense of it as a stem and 
conventional aspect of Christian practice. 
Similar is Yannaras' approach to the Canon law of the Church. The canons, Yannaras 
maintains, are there to serve the true ethos and character of the Church, which is of an 
ontological nature since it seeks to restore existence to its authentic mode of being, that is, to 
the transcendence of individuality and participation in the life of God, in life as communion. 
368 Freedom, p- 114. 
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Consequently, it is a mistake to understand the canons in juridical and moralistic terms: their 
character is 'healing and therapeutic 9369 since their function is not to pass judgement but to 
indicate ways that do not constitute an expression of true life according to the Church ethos, to 
signify what is falsification or alienation of the authentic mode of being, in other words to 
point out what forms failure or sin. Thus they operate only as a precondition and possibility 
for existential and not for moralistic justification, for realizing life as freedom and personal 
distinctiveness. It means then that the canons are of an ascetic nature; they seek to enable the 
subjection of individuality - understood as the falsification of true life which is communion - 
to participation in the common life of the Church. The canons thus 'guide man to the 
fulfilment of his possibilities for life' . 
370 To understand the canons as a corpus of moral 
legislation, Yannaras highlights, does not do justice to their soteriological character and 
ultimately contradicts and alienates the truth of the Church, its being and ethos. That is why 
from the very beginning the Church did not give precedence to law over her life; she resisted 
replacing salvation by submission to ethics and thus changing her ontological nature into a 
religious one. 371 Furthermore, the right interpretation of the nature of the canons allows us 
understand the frequently applied principle of economy in the implementation of the canon 
law, as well as the absence of a codified corpus of the canons in the Orthodox Church. 372 
Yannaras describes the 'miracle of [the canons'] antinomy', 373 exemplified in the fact 
that although they are regulations that point out sin, initiate order in the Church life and 
prescribe penances, still they do not turn into legislation, they do not substitute the eucharistic 
nature of the Church for an institutional one, nor do they strain personal particularity and 
freedom. Yannaras' approach to the matter of the cannons is not eccentric or aberrant. 
Especially this concept of the 'miracle of antinomy' found in the canons calls to mind the 
ascription of a mystical quality to the nature of the canon law, expressed well before 
Yannaras' Freedom of Morality. The canonical decrees - Orthodox theology has told us 
before - participate in a dual nature, temporal and spiritual, corresponding 
to the dual divine- 
human nature of the Church, as this derives in its turn from the dual nature of her head, the 
169 Freedom, P. 180. 
370 Freedom, P. 181. 
31 1 Freedom, P. 177. Yannaras appeals to St Paul's stance towards the Judalzers' 
insistence on the Law, and the 
osition of the apostolic council on 
the same matter: Freedom, pp. 174-7. 
1 ý712 
Freedom, pp. 181-2 and 189-92. 
373 Freedom, pp. 191-2. 
221 
nature of Christ. 374 This annuls any understanding of the canons as absolute, objectified 
formulations or legal norms, and allows us see the law of the Church as a living 'apparatus' 
that serves her very nature and her spiritual life. It therefore serves and provides for the 
personal distinctiveness that life involves; it does not precede it nor does it predetermine it. It 
allows, on the contrary, to the Church adaptation and creativity - indeed, it calls for it -, for if 
the Church does not show 'a creative attitude toward [modem life] ... a passive acceptance of 
it is inevitable 9.375 
The Freedom of Morality is an essay of a crosswise pattern: it talks about the Freedom 
signified in the condition of the truly existent, the freedom of Life shared indivisibly in the 
mutual perichoresis of persons, yet totally distinct in their way of hypostasizing their shared 
nature: the freedom of the Trinitarian God, the only model of morality. And also about the 
Morality achieved only through and in the presence of true Freedom as archetypally found in 
the life of the Trinitarian being; morality realized in the distinctiveness of personal existence, 
devoid of any necessity and predetermination yet submissive to the love of/for the Other. 
Moral law marks the distance that separates the world from God. Freedom from the law means 
that the interval is crossed over, that we have reached the end of the law, Christ alone. 376 The 
Freedom of Morality closes on a poetic note, drawing all its points together through a selection 
from St Isaac the Syrian. It feels almost like a prelude to Yannaras' Comment on the Song of 
Songs, which, more than any other of the author's early works, epitomizes by its very structure 
the Christian way to God, with its allusion to music and musical terms. We start by studying 
and playing given patterns; we simply repeat what is given to us. In this way, however, we 
take steps towards making perhaps one day our own music, towards discovering our own 
personal gift. The more we advance on the templates, the closer we may get to our personal 
distinctiveness. We head for finding and bringing out our unique and unrepeatable personal 
expression, the matchless, unequalled and yet inexhaustible personal existence 
disclosed in the 
musical notes; free as it may be, non predetermined, over and above patterns and 
instructions 
and only resembling its archetype in being itself a creator. 
374 See Nicholas N. Afanasiev, 'The Canons of the Church: Changeable or UnchangeableT, 
St. Vladimir's 
Theological Quarterly 11: 2 (1967), pp. 54-68. 
375 Afanasiev, p. 65. 
376 Rom. 10: 4. 
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Epilogue 
377 For the great mystics of the Church, to know God is to 'suffer' God . The knowledge 
of God is not the knowledge of the sciences; it is knowledge that asks for much more than our 
reason. It takes an engagement; it calls for participation in a relationship. It justifies, like every 
relationship, a thorough involvement: man as a whole, mind, soul and body equally, receiving 
the Bridegroom who is encountered in the flesh. 
What could be a better representation of this involvement than the bond of husband 
and wife, 378 in which the Church from its earliest stages has seen an image of the love of God 
for Israel, of Christ for the Church: a genuine relationship, deep intimacy and all-embracing 
participation - all essential qualities of the bond of love and knowledge between man and 
God. The life of the Church does not address the human spirit alone, as if this existed 
disembodied. The spirituality of the Church does not renounce matter; it rather embraces the 
material. Tberefore, it does not hesitate to use the images of physical love. What the Church is 
wary of is not nature but the way of nature, when this becomes selfish appropriation of life, 
cleaving to the self, leading, therefore, to fragmentation, death. 
The context of the erotic affair presents the most pertinent setting to exemplify both 
ways of the nature: life as self-dispossession, which signifies the joyful experience of love, 
where we meet the unique other, utterly and yet inexhaustibly disclosed to us. If not the affair 
sooner or later becomes imposition, self-defence, unbearable strain, isolation; the pain intense 
as none other; the injection of mortal poison between man and man, as self-absorption gains 
its way; being conquered by death. 
To know God is to 'suffer' God. We know God through the loneliness of his absence. 
His arrival is prepared for in the wilderness. And even when he appears, it takes 'our eyes to 
377 This is the language used for example by Denys the Areopagite, who, speaking of his spiritual father, presents 
him as someone who did not so much 
learn about the divine things as suffered them. In the mystical tradition 
suffering is seen as inscribing 
knowledge, as deepening the soul and making what the latter learns part of its 
being: Louth, 'The influence of Denys the Areopagite', pp. 198-9. 
378 Hosea 1-3, Jeremiah 2: 2, Ezekiel 16, Ephesians 5: 25,31-32. 
, 22 3 
open' to recognize him; as soon as we do, he vanishes again . 
379He remains for us the eternal 
object of our quest - unless, that is, we turn him into an objectification-, a distant certainty, a 
conviction - unless we replace God by religion or ideology. 
But God is no-thing. He is not a being; he is rather a presence. Like our loved one, the 
desired partner, he may give himself to us, but he is not our possession. He is self-determining 
and free - and even more longed-for when he is 'out of [our] sight'. In the 'suffering' of his 
absence we verify his existence. Helpless, we look out for him with trust in his mercy; we hold 
on in uncertainty with the groundless hope that only the lover who is driven out of his senses 
may bear. 
The fulfillment of the expectation signifies the extra-ordinary. The 'nonsensical' 
longing lets the way open for the unique Incomer, the one beyond compare. It is a meaningful 
disclosure, an arrival that gives rise to a purpose, a revelation that takes far more than pure 
reason to make sense of. It presents us with a taste of the 'not yet', the transcendental, as this 
is explored and reached from the inside: '... the kingdom of God is within you'. 380 The 
presence of the Other casts plenty of light: up to our in-most imprint, the 'image' of an injured 
and helpless lover, who astounded at the revelation of Personal distinctiveness cries out the 
song of love: 'Your kingdom come ... Amen, Come Lord! 
', '... cause me to hear [your 
voice] ... make 
haste, my beloved... '. 
The Comment on the Song of Songs (. EX6Ato or-c6 Aorya Acyaram), 381 is a book that 
came out of 'the experience of colours', as the author himself puts it; the experience of human 
love, which naturally brightens up the otherwise pale or achromatic everyday reality. 
382 An 
experience of 'colours' caused by a short-lived occasion, such as falling in love with another 
person, which, however, opens up the way to the possibility or the prospect of fulfilled life, of 
True Life, TT-1c, &T(oý; In the powerful sense of fulfilment and perfected life that 
derives from the happiness of man's relational being and exchange - possibly the most 
379 Luke 24: 3 1. 
380 Luke 17: 21. 
381christos Yannaras,, EX6)io oT6 Acya Aaydr(vv [Comment on the Song of Songs] (Athens: Dornos, 2003). 
382T, i -KaO, javT6v, pp. 77-80. 
2`2 4 
intimate of which is that which takes place within an erotic encounter - Yannaras sees not just 
a symbol, but rather a revelation of the creating and loving-erotic call of God to mankind. 
However, owing to the worldly and imperfect state of our nature, the human experience of 
happiness is the experience of the ephemeral: short and passing. The reasons that cause our 
happiness and brighten up our reality turn soon, very often, to sources of pain, as they reveal 
their finite character subject to limitations. It is almost intrinsic to human experience of 
fascination for it to turn, sooner or later, to disappointment and unfulfilment. Therefore 
ZxOllto orr6 Aorya Aorya-rwv, Yannaras clarifies, is a book of ascetics, which has dared, 
however, to present the occurrence and the knowledge of 'colours' in the language of non- 
celibates. Despite the difference in the expression, the ascesis for monks and non-monks 
remains the same: to master the pain caused by the realization of the ephemeral character of 
the reasons that open our eyes to the True Life; to discern between the real and the imaginary, 
to distinguish life from the illusions of life, to tell the difference between the grey and the 
colourful . 
383 It is only the short means of fulfilling happiness that we are offered. However, 
6 owing to these means we are born to the aspiration for true life, [owing to them] we realize 
our metaphysical being'. 
384 
The Comment on the Song of Songs is a lyrical review of the theme of love and 
existence by way of a commentary on the 'Song of Solomon'. It is a work that Yannaras has 
composed rather than written; it consists of nineteen melodious parts that guide us through the 
variations of the existential tune 'played' through the course of human experience, along the 
way of being. This runs from the acknowledgement that the fulfilment of the fathomless thirst 
for life lies in love (Ouverture), through the life-giving call of a Presence to the dynamic 
achievement of a relationship (Intervallum), to the realization that 'death' is all we have and 
all we can possibly contribute (Imitation), and leading up to glorification (Te Deum). It is a 
chant of humility before the 'non-existing' God that we are unable to recognize; a tune of 
apologetics that eliminates the 'terrible' God through the recognition that the armaments of 
our reason and religion, of law and merit are not repellent of punishment, 
but only of mercy. 
But let us just attend. 
383TLi 
Kal9' EavT61', P. 80. 
384 Týr KaO'EavT6v, P- 103. 
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Ouverture Our nature knows that love holds the fulfilment of life. You get recruited in the 
navy of death, though, in order to sail along the coasts of life; then you realize that life is not 
to exist and love, but you exist only because you love and to the extent that you love. 
Modulatio Mutual love is the sense of Adam and Eve on the first day of the creation. Ready 
for everything, even for death, for the lover's sake. 
Appoggiatura The 'damage' interrupts the miracle; it creeps unnoticed into life, like the snake 
in thefoliage ofparadise. The Other now con rms my loneliness. fi 
Notes de Passage To compromise is only lack of hope. The next Other will accept me without 
calculation, will love me without limits. We cease from life in illusion; we persistently shut our 
eyes before reality. 
Intervallum The lover's beauty: invitation to life, the ultimate stimulation. And behind the 
attraction: nature -a mocking grimace of death. Necessity of nature: to subdue life to the 
objective of her own survival and perpetuation. Death entraps life. 
Divertimento If love is the way of life, marriage is the way of nature. The distinction is laid 
bare in the model of the way of life, Christ, the kenotic self-offering: If any man come to me, 
and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, and his 
own life also, he cannot be my disciple (Luke 14: 26). 
Promenade de parmi les tons voisins Our innermost self or our 'soul', our true person, rises 
free from death, when in the Other we recognize the personaI call that makes us what we 
are: The Person of the Lover, the Father. 
Scherzo Earth of the people: the multifonnIPolymorphic drama. The only crevice in the 
fteezing wall offacts is loving confidence in the Father. 
Stretto Where the law does not spread out his deadly tentacles, chastity is an erotic 
expression. Final end: the source andfulness of eros, the Person of God. 
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Exposition au relatif There, in the relationship, rises ... the distinctiveness of the innermost 
nucleus of our existence, our persona1 hypostasis; freedom from the natural, from the 
commonly given. For nature to become relationship, there is needed the intervention of Grace, 
of love naturally free from mortality. Only the 'always alive' Lover can utter, 'Lazarus, come 
forth'. 
Comma The harlot does not offer repentance to receive justification; she does not aim at a 
deal. She only offers what she has and what she is. 'OE'aXEv av"Tq E7101'qorE (Mark 14: 8); for 
she loved much. Love is born when 'suddenly' there becomes apparent the vanity of the 
unchaste deal, ... of our virtue, or good name: treasures unable to overturn 
death. Love is born 
when 'suddenly', as the only hope of life, there shines the one 'who raises the dead'. 
Cantus Firmus Erotic nudity is ... the 
language of 'kenosis'. 'Kenosis'means that theformless 
takes on form, the ineffable becomes language. Form and language is the flesh of the finite, 
the ephemeral; the flesh of the mortal. The Other is always beyond the 'sign' of my desire, 
undefined by language, accessible only in the intimacy of the erotic relationship. 
Ricercare The Enlightenment made war with the weapons of the opponent. Where illumination 
rises, knowledge is not exhausted in the meaning of the definitions; it is the experience of a 
relationship. Relationship: participation in the 'energies' of nature. Energies: accessible in 
the imminence of the experience. 
Reptise Every 'dogma' and 'confession' create their own type of man, 'devoted' to God ... He 
is in love with his 'devotion', his idolized egotistic chastity, not with God. You undress 
yourself of the annour of concepts and dive annihilated into the void, into the nil. 
We call 
4 ascesis'... the everyday pace in self-denial and self-submission. 
Imitation Exhilaration of the spring that drives creatures crazy at the calyxes offlowers. How 
can nature be 'very good' when it contains the possibility of 
death? 'I have said, you are gods; 
and all of you are children of the most High. But you shall 
die like men'. Yes, we ignore what 
we are; we only know the making of our natural decay and 
death. I only have death... and that 
I offer in than ksg iv in g. 
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Interlude 'EýtAOa-c, - Kai ý&, r, - (Solomon's Song, 3: 11): the departurelexodus, first 
condition for the viewing. The kingship and the crown, the mother, the day of gladness and the 
nuptial chamber, 385 remain imaginary sketches of the feeling, if the nerve for the exodus1flight 
to the relationship with the real runs short. In the culture of timidity there abides insurance: 
the voracity of self-sufficiency. The exodus to the view of the real: the Church calls it mvste 
r y. We speak of the mystery by excess, walking on tiptoe on the edge of nature and 
relationship, of mortal and grace. 
Dissonantia Clever nature ... plays the game of selfishness even through the way of virtue. The 
opposite of desire: self-adequacy. The opposite of love: self-adoration. The torture of hell will 
be the failure to recognize Christ in the Person of the Bridegroom and Lover of our souls. He 
cannot be the one who embraces the unchaste - the publican, the harlot, the prodigal, the 
thief. We wait for him who will not come ... unable to recognize the Bridegroom, present and 
most close, in his erotic self-submission. 
Conclusion sur pidale de donzinante The true life (ov-cw(; (Wqj) consists in the way of 
existence, not in 'nature'. Each Person hypostasizes the whole 'nature' in the way of kenosis 
from every 'natural' autonomy and self-existence: the way of love. The immortality of the 
[Trinitarian] Persons is not given by 'nature' and it is not compulsory; true life is not an 
oppressive natural predetermination. Personal freedom hypostasizes nature as erotic self- 
transcendence. Christ Jesus ... the person of the 
Virgin hypostasizes life not in the way of 
nature, but in the way of love. In the fireedom of submission to the manic love of God for 
humanity. 
Te Deum Crowds swarming always across London Bridge, in the dens of the underground in 
Paris, along the avenues of Tokyo, in the sportsfields of Los Angeles, the factories of Osaka, 
Cologne, Toronto. Each person: a matchless look, a unique smile. They drink in the present 
with the carefreeness of the eternal. Unrelated to the death that will mow them down, 
unrelated to the treachery of the flesh that withers every day and some day will rot in the 
ground. We have known the composition of the nucleus of the atoms, the structure of 
DNA, the 
nature of light, the constituent elements of the farthest galaxies. And we 
do not know how to 
"' Yannaras draws on the Song of Solomon, 3: 11. 
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define the beginning and the end of the human subject, of our very seýf We dig into the 
mystery of our existence, the mystery of life and death, like earthwonns in the mud after the 
rain. 
There may be 'another' knowledge where the positive knowledge ends. There may arise more 
confident knowledge when all becomes dust, ashes and shadow. 
'I said to my soul, be still, and let the dark come upon you, 
Which shall be the darkness of God'. 
The darkness of the questions is the natura1 distance that separates man from God To 
alter the natura1 distance into persona1 relationship is an exercise of self- resignation 
from nature, it is love. The gift of thanksgiving takes the place of the unanswered questions. 
Ir V1 Ir 3 )/ T7TEP 7TaV'F6dV, COV torpEv Kat (ov ovK tatiEv. 
'So the darkness shall be light, and the stillness the dancing'. 386 
386 The section in italics is a collection of verses, chapter by chapter, 
from the Commentary on the Song of Songs 
by Christos Yannaras, a celebratory presentation-surnmary by the author of the themes that 
he generally explores 
in his works. The excerpts have 
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